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Abstract.
Between 1972 and 1979, the politicians and officials of South Africa's Department of Information 
attempted to manipulate and neutralise the international media's treatment of South Africa. This programme 
of activity was exposed at the end of the decade in what became known as the Information scandal. 
Meanwhile, in Europe and North America, South African exiles and British and American citizens opposed 
to apartheid, campaigned under the banner of 'anti-apartheid'.
Foreign correspondents in South Africa numbered little more than a dozen in 1972. By the end of the 
1970s, they had become a formidable force. This expansion was directly related to events on the ground, 
most notably the South African invasion of Angola (1975) and the Soweto uprising (1976). The 
introduction of the Cold War to the southern African sub-continent transformed the nature of the 
international media's coverage, leading, eventually, to a greater American media presence in South Africa. 
The increased number of American journalists, resident in the Republic, served to expand the scope of the 
debate regarding the intertwining of colonialism and racism in apartheid. In general, Americans tended to 
represent South Africa as a metaphor for the racial problems of the United States, whereas British 
commentators discussed the country in the context of a decolonisation story that had somehow gone wrong.
One of the most significant developments in the coverage of South Africa, during the 1970s, was the re- 
emergence of colonial representations of both Africans and Afrikaners. This followed the temporary 
suspension of such representations in the 1960s. Despite the extensive efforts of the anti-apartheid 
movements and the Department of Information to influence the South African 'story', these shifts in 
representation appear to have originated with the international media. It should, however, be acknowledged 
that the British and American media's dependence on the South African English-language press remained 
profound throughout the decade.
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CHAPTER ONE
REPRESENTATION & REFRACTION.
... because of the pressures of space, of the constant need to compress 
and synthesize, what really happened is not always what we wrote 
about, even if our facts were indisputable, not because of an intent to 
deceive, but because we are compelled to deal in essentials ... I have 
always been struck by the fact that reporters, relaxing and drinking 
together, are always swapping stories about what happened and that 
these stories are funnier, truer and more revealing than anything they 
write for their media.1
The fault, I know, lies with my own feebleness of wit, yet sometimes I 
suspect that social scientists live in a world beyond the reach of 
ordinary mortals, a world organised in perfect patterns of behavior, 
peopled by ideal types, and governed by correlation coefficients that 
exclude everything but the most standard of deviations. Such a world 
can never be joined with the messiness of history.2
1. Edward Behr, 'Anyone here been raped and speaks English?1: A Foreign Correspondent's Life Behind the 
Lines (Sevenoaks, 1982), pp. x-xi.
2. Robert Damton. The Kiss of Lamourette; Reflections in Cultural History (London. 1990), p. 60, 
originally published as 'Writing News and Telling Stories'. Daedalus. Vol. 104, No. 2, Spring 1975, pp. 
175-194.
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Contextualisation.
At the beginning of the 1970s, 'the only apparent blips on white South Africa’s rosy horizon ... were 
nagging inflation and the growing irritant of an international sports boycott.13 By the end of the decade, 
South Africa had experienced a resurgence of industrial unrest, the fall of the Portuguese empire, the 
collapse of the policy of detente with sub-Saharan Africa, the Soweto uprising, the Information scandal and 
the imposition of a mandatory amis embargo by the United Nations. The 'blips’ which had irritated the 
country in 1970 had grown into a full-blown economic crisis and a global anti-apartheid campaign for 
disinvestment.4 Great Britain and the United States of America had also experienced a dramatic decade: 
Great Britain's post-war political consensus collapsed during the mid-1970s in political acrimony, and in 
the United States, President Nixon resigned in 1974 following the Watergate scandal; meanwhile the 
United States experienced the global repercussions of their military defeat in Vietnam. Although British 
and U.S. relations with South Africa had been consciously low-key in the period between the early 1960s 
and 1974, the fall of the Portuguese empire exposed the significance of the region to Western policy­
makers. In response, Britain and the United States developed a form of 'domino theory' for southern Africa 
which suggested, that following the independence of Angola and Mozambique, the crisis in 
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe would need to be resolved before the future of South-West Africa-Namibia could be 
negotiated. Finally, the problem of apartheid in South Africa could be addressed.5
The role of the South African government was considered to be a crucial component in the Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe crisis by British and American politicians. South African-U.S. relations became more complex 
following the debacle in Angola (1975-1976). For a short period, U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger 
developed a version of his famous 'shuttle diplomacy' in order to address the problems of southern Africa, 
but the election of Democrat President Jimmy Carter in November 1976 ushered in a new period of tension
3. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party. 1948-1994 
(Randburg, 1996), p. 170.
4. The best recent history of South African politics during the 1970s is O'Meara, Forty Lost Years. See also 
Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 (London, 1983); Shaun Johnson (ed.), South 
Africa: No Turning Back (Basingstoke, 1988).
5. In some respects, following the events of 1974, the global anti-apartheid movements also adopted a 
domino theory for southern Africa. This was in recognition of the fact that the global institutions, South 
Africa and the Western governments were more open to influence on the lesser (and, some would have 
said, more urgent) subjects of Rhodesia and Namibia than on South Africa.
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between the two countries.6The American focus on South African human rights was reduced following the 
United Nations vote in favour of a mandatory arms embargo (October 1977). During 1978 and 1979, 
relations between the two countries were uncomfortable but not critical.7 The minority Labour government 
elected in Britain in 1974 called a second general election in the same year but only managed to win a tiny 
parliamentary majority. By 1977, the Labour administration was dependent upon support from the Liberal 
Party in order to remain in office and, although a large number of Labour politicians expressed support for 
the anti-apartheid cause, the Labour government continued to perceive Rhodesia as the central problem for 
Britain. In addition, many members of the British 'establishment' remained sympathetic to the South 
African cause.8 Significantly, the Labour government were not prepared to introduce any new diplomatic
6. See for instance the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young's off-hand remark that 
South Africa was an illegitimate regime (Graham Hovey, 'Young sets off furor by agreeing South Africa 
rule is "illegitimate'", New York Times. 16 April 1977); and Vice-President Walter Mondale's 
ambiguous statement in favour of Tull political participation' within South Africa (Roy Lewis, 'Vorster 
Mondale talks end on a note of disagreement and mutual incomprehension', The Times. 21 May 1977). 
See also Charles Mohr, 'U.S. policy in Africa is broadly advanced1, New York Times. 29 May 1977.
7. On U.S.-South African relations see Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy In Southern Africa: The 
Stakes and the Stance (Washington D.C., 1978); William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited: 
Western Interests and the Burdened History of Southern Africa (New York, 1986); Christopher Coker, 
The United States and South Africa. 1968-1985: Constructive Engagement and Its Critics (Durham, 
North Carolina, 1986); James Barber & John Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for 
status and security 1945-1988 (Cambridge, 1990); Zaki Laidi, The Super-Powers and Africa: The 
Constraints of a Rivalry. 1960-1990 (Chicago, 1990); Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: 
South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg. 1984); Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices: Critical Years 
in America's Foreign Policy (New York, 1983); Donald B. Easum, 'United States policy toward South 
Africa', Issue. Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 66-72. For an insight into the South African Department of 
Information's perception of the relations, see Daan Prinsloo, United States Foreign Policy and the 
Republic of South Africa (Pretoria. 1978); Jack Robinson, 'Pretoria's Texas oil baron', To The Point 21 
June 1974, p. 44, was a profile of John G. Hurd, the U.S. Ambassador to South Africa, 1970-1975.
8. Beyond the general academic texts discussing South Africa's foreign relations (see footnote 7), there are 
few studies of Britain's relations with South Africa during the 1970s. An exception is: Geoff Berridge,
Economic Power in Anglo-South African Diplomacy: Simonstown. Sharpeville and After (London, 
1981); The memoirs of senior British politicians of the period skirt over the subject. A lone exception is
David Owen, Time To Declare (London, 1991). See also Sir David Scott, Ambassador in Black and 
White: Thirty Years of Changing Africa ('London. 1981). During 1977, Scott stated in a speech to the 
Cape Town Press Club: 'We [Britain] now find ourselves with very little ammunition left to defend 
ourselves against intense international criticism that we are leaning over backwards to defend South 
African internal policies ... I have spoken frankly, but 1 hope you will accept that I have spoken as a 
friend.' (p. 195). Following his term as Ambassador to South Africa, 1976-1979, Scott was appointed 
Vice-President of the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association [UKSATA], 1980-1985. In this 
appointment, he was following Sir Arthur Snelling, who had served as Ambassador to South Africa from 
1970-1972 and was Vice-Resident of UKSATA from 1974 to 1980. Snelling regularly contributed pro- 
South African articles to the newspapers during the 1970s, see, for example, Sir Arthur Snelling, 'The 
wages of Africans', Financial Times. 30 March 1973; 'Viewpoint: Labour and Apartheid', Financial 
Times. 19 April 1974; 'Developing the Bantustans', Financial Times. 15 Jan. 1975. See also Patrick Wall, 
Prelude to Detente: An In-depth Report on South Africa (London, 1975). Wall was a Conservative M.P..
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initiatives for the southern African region without full U.S. support and leadership.9 In both Great Britain 
and the United Slates, Conservative and Republican politicians, who were far less critical of South Africa, 
were waiting in the wings. The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and President Ronald Reagan in 1980 
closed the window of opportunity which had existed during the previous half-decade for international 
action against the Republic.
Throughout the 1970s, the South African government engaged in an extensive campaign of propaganda 
and disinformation in order to counter the work of the global anti-apartheid movements. The central aspect 
of its campaign was a determined attempt to reinforce links between South Africa and the West. On one 
level, this led the South African state to demonstrate its willingness to assist the United States and Britain 
in finding a resolution to the problem of Rhodesia.10 On another level, the campaign concentrated upon 
establishing connections between South Africa and the emerging 'New Right’ in Britain and the U.S. At its 
most dramatic, it also involved covert attempts to buy influence in both Washington D.C. and the global 
media. This defensive propaganda campaign was later exposed by the South African domestic English- 
language press, in what became known as 'Muldergate1 or the 'Information scandal1. It eventually led to the 
downfall of South Africa's Stale President and ex-Prime Minister, John Vorster, the Minister of Plural 
Relations and Development and Information, Cornelius Mulder, the head of the Bureau of State Security 
(BOSS), Hendrik van den Bergh, and the Secretary for Information, Eschel Rhoodie.
Although the British and American governments may not have viewed it as such, the South African state 
was engaged in a 'war of representation' during the 1970s.11 This 'war' was in essence a struggle for 
influence between South Africa and the global anti-apartheid movement. The U.S. and British 
governments adopted a pose of 'neutrality' in this conflict. This was considered justified by a conjunction of 
different factors: the all-encompassing Cold War; the scale of investments held by British and American
9. Vance, Hard Choices, pp. 261-262; Owen, Time To Declare, p. 284.
10. The compliant stage of this process reached its climax during the Angolan War at the end of 1975. The 
South Africans, who claimed that they had been encouraged by the United States to invade Angola, felt 
that they were abandoned by the Western powers. (See chapter six).
11. Military metaphors recur with regularity within statements originating from the Department of 
Information. See, for example, Keith Abendroth, 'Rhoodie ready to bruise a few toes for South Africa1, 
Rand Daily Mail. 24 Oct. 1972: 'The fight would continue for more money to improve the sendee. 
"After all we cannot expect to use an air rifle against tanks," [Rhoodie] said.'
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companies in the Republic; the unwillingness of Britain and America to intervene in the domestic politics 
of an independent state; and the unstated but significant racially-based antipathy towards both the exiled 
liberation movements and the African, 'Coloured' and Asian populations of the Republic. The central battle­
ground in the struggle for representation was the Western media, which was regularly condemned by South 
Africa for supposedly focusing on negative news, and criticised by some members of the anti-apartheid 
movement for being 'soft on apartheid'.12 This thesis attempts to assess this dual critique and in the process 
provide a guide to the contradictions, fractures and nuances inherent in the international media's treatment 
of South Africa.
The state of race relations within Great Britain and the United States of America undoubtedly influenced 
the coverage of South Africa. The United States of America, while remaining the scene of continuing racial 
tension, had just emerged from the civil rights struggle of the 1960s. The surface presentation of anti- 
racism, as exemplified by the 'melting pot' trope, was the accepted political consensus of the 1970s. 
American reporters who covered South Africa during this period had often cut their journalistic teeth 
reporting the civil rights movement. It is not surprising, therefore, that many American journalists and 
politicians viewed South Africa through the lens of their own country's unique racial experience.13 Although 
British politicians and journalists normally treated South Africa in a colonial or African context, the 
undercurrents of British racial tension during the 1960s and 1970s also influenced the development of the 
media treatment in the U.K.. In their study of race issues in four British newspapers between 1963 and
12. In the context of this thesis, I am using the term 'Western media’ as being interchangeable with 
'international media'. The importance of the term, 'international', is that many of the news agencies, 
newspapers, news-magazines and broadcast media studied in this thesis were genuinely international, 
in that they were republished or available in many countries, not the least South Africa. My central 
sources have been the British and American media. Of course, a study which also included an analysis 
of other country's media would be more accurate. It would also have been impossible in the time 
available. The reasons for focusing on the British and American media were two-fold, firstly, most 
foreign correspondents in South Africa from 1972 to 1979 were British or American; secondly, the 
South African government and media were most intensely concerned about the representation of their 
country in the British and U.S. media.
13, The U.S. media had experienced a representational shift on the subject of racism during the 1950s and 
1960s. By the 1970s, the consensual media position was one of anti-racism. However, this had not as 
yet led to a situation where the number of African-American journalists working for the elite media 
reflected their percentage of the population. See for example Richard A. Pride & Daniel H. Clarke, 
'Race Relations in Television news: a Content Analysis of the Networks', Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 50, 
Summer 1973, pp. 319-328; Churchill Roberts, 'The Presentation of Blacks in Television Network 
Newscasts', Journalism Quarterly. Vol. 52, Spring 1975, pp. 50-55.
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1970, Paul Hartman and Charles Husband observed t h a t t h e  press has reflected pressures that on the one 
hand have sought to exclude coloureds from British society and on the other have aimed to reduce 
discrimination against them.114 Ambiguities of this sort dominated the British media during this period and 
recurred with unerring regularity in the coverage of South Africa.15
Television broadcast news, which had achieved its ascendancy in the United States during the 1960s, 
began to dominate the dissemination of news in Britain during the 1970s. In part as a response to this shift 
in media power, newspapers underwent a period of flux, during which they attempted to develop a 
distinctive new role as providers of complementary news. While broadcasters established a relatively 
new form of foreign news gathering (the use of 'firemen' or 'parachutists'), the newspapers began to cut 
back on their foreign staff.16 South Africa was an exceptional case during this period as the number of 
correspondents and 'stringers' increased rapidly following the Angolan war, in contrast to many other areas 
of the world.17 In the years following the Tet Offensive (1968) in Vietnam, the American media were 
popularly perceived as being capable of exercising extraordinary power. This power was tested in the
14. Paul Hartman & Charles Husband, Racism and the Mass Media (London, 1974), p. 144. See also 
Andrew Stephen, 'Uganda Asians and the Press', New Statesman. 8 Sept. 1972, p. 310, which 
concludes: 'All of which illustrates the mixed-up, schizophrenic attitude of the British media on race 
issues.' During the 1970s, the number of Afro-Caribbean journalists working for the national British 
newspapers was, as now, pitifully small.
15. See Stuart Hall, The Whites of their Eyes: Racist Ideologies and the Media', in Manuel Alvarado & 
John O. Thompson, The Media Reader (London, 1990); Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies,
The Empire Strikes Back: Race and racism in 70s Britain (London, 1982).
16. 'Firemen' or 'parachutists' are journalists who arrive to report an event and then leave. The use of this 
type of reporter is normal practice for broadcasting companies because the cost of keeping television 
bureaus in a large number of countries is prohibitive. Newspaper 'firemen' can be divided into two 
categories: staff and editorial writers, who are normally little more than visitors; and the reporter, 
covering countries which practice strict policies of censorship or limit the issue of visas, who knows 
that he/she will be unlikely to be allowed to return to the country again, and is therefore more critical 
than might have been the case if access to the story had been willingly provided. See Mort Rosenblum, 
Coups and Earthquakes: Reporting the World for America (New York, 1981), pp. 10-11.
17. 'Stringers' are non-staff correspondents working for news publications. Sometimes they receive a 
financial retainer, sometimes they work on a freelance basis. For details on the increasing number of 
reporters in South Africa following the Angolan War, see chapter two.
18. For the story behind the publication of the Pentagon Papers, see Sanford J. Ungar, The Papers and the 
Papers: An Account of the Legal and Political Battle over the Pentagon Papers (New York, 1989). On 
the coverage of Watergate, see Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, All The President's Men (London,
1974); James McCartney, The Washington "Post" and Watergate: How two Davids slew Goliath', 
Columbia Journalism Review. July/Aug. 1973, pp. 8-22; Nat Hentoff, 'Lingering questions' & Laurence 
I. Barrett, 'The dark side of competition', in 'Woodward, Bernstein and "All the President's Men"', 
Columbia Journalism Review. July/Aug. 1974, pp. 10-15; Philip Nobile, 'How The New York Times 
became second banana', Esquire. May 1975, pp. 85-99.
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conflict between the Nixon administration and the New York Times over the publication of the Pentagon 
Papers and reached its apotheosis during the Washington Post's expose of the Watergate scandal.18 By 
1977, Tom Bethell could comment without irony: we clearly do now have something very close to a new
system of government, in which editors holding the equivalent of oversight Cabinet meetings have left the 
pamphleteers with portable presses ... very far behind.'19 The British media of this period demonstrated less 
overt power due to the continuing exercise of restrictive libel laws, the Official Secrets Act and the 
government's application of D-Notices. However, the print and broadcast media were also subject to the 
exhortations of the growing networks of right- and left-wing political agencies during the 1970s. From the 
right, these voices emerged in the form of interventionist lobby groups, public relations companies and 
publishing outlets. From the left, a number of pressure groups and sociologists accused the media of 
being incapable of representing the news either fairly or accurately.20 It was into this controversial field 
that the South African Department of Information launched its programme of manipulating the media. It 
utilised the left-wing refrain of unfair treatment by the media, while simultaneously employing elements of 
the pragmatic interventionism of the burgeoning New Right lobbyists.
During this period, the foreign news coverage of the print and broadcast media was generally subservient 
to the perceived national interest of its country of origin and the Cold War and its ramifications were 
treated as a genuine war. Newspapers and television programmes were able to suggest that British or 
American foreign policy was misguided, foolish or doomed, but they did not express support for the 
'enemy', which in the main was Communism. This made the coverage of South Africa particularly 
problematic. The British and U.S. governments consistently condemned apartheid but they rarely backed
19. Tom Bethell, 'The Myth of an Adversary Press', Harper's, Jan. 1977, p. 39. See also Kevin Phillips, 
'Busting the Media Trusts'. Harper's. July 1977, p. 23, in which Phillips discusses '... "the media" as the 
decade's most notable economic, cultural, and political phenomenon.'
20. An example of right-wing pressure on the media was the organisation Accuracy In Media [AIM] which 
was launched in the mid-1970s, based in Washington D.C., and published regular Accuracy In Media 
Reports. An example of left-wing pressure was the criticism of the media that came through 'media 
studies'. See, for example, Glasgow University Media Group, Bad News (London, 1976); More Bad 
News (London, 1980L Really Bad News (London, 1982). On the international stage, UNESCO 
conferences often provided regular criticism of the international media's coverage of developing 
countries. This was accompanied by the instigation of censorship in many of these countries, for 
example, India during the Emergency of 1975. See also Martin Woollacott, 'Where no news is bad 
news', The Guardian, 27 Aug. 1975; Mort Rosenblum, 'Reporting from the Third World', Foreign 
Affairs. Vol. 55, No. 4, July 1977, pp. 815-835.
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their statements with actions. In effect, they practised a system of 'structural hypocrisy'.31 The African 
National Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP) were perceived as being allied 
to the Soviet Union and were thus associated with the 'enemy'. This confusion created a large area of
representational opportunity for correspondents or columnists writing about South Africa but it also,
paradoxically, increased the need for official guidance. Barbara Rogers explains how the guidance system 
operated in Britain:
... diplomatic and foreign correspondents of all the major news media 
attend daily press conferences on foreign affairs at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO); the same applies to most London-based 
correspondents of news agencies and major foreign media. Although 
access to these press conferences is fairly easy, it is a privilege which 
could be withdrawn if the correspondent published something which 
seriously embarrassed the government. The press conferences 
themselves help to shape news reporting on international affairs, 
providing background information on current news topics which 
correspondents can use for instant analysis ... There is, in addition, a 
system of regular briefings for correspondents from the major British 
media, which are a much more powerful instrument for influencing the 
news. Access to these briefings is seen quite explicitly as conditional on 
good behaviour, and there have been cases of major newspapers being 
excluded from them for a while, as retribution for undesirable news 
coverage or comment. The briefings are perhaps the major source of 
news and background information on foreign affairs for the British 
media, and therefore help to shape the coverage by the newspapers, 
radio, television, overseas broadcasting and the news agencies. The 
process is, if anything, becoming even more influential as the number 
of foreign correspondents each organisation can afford dwindles. A 
cosy relationship of mutual convenience has been built up behind the 
scenes in Whitehall, in which direct orders about how to present the 
news are often unnecessary; a liint may be all that is required.32
James Thomson recalls that the relationship between the press and the U.S. government overseas was both 
mutually supportive and mutually productive: '... in foreign postings for both officials and journalists, 
mutual learning is the name of the game. The best of the Foreign Service officers and the best of the 
overseas press corps are fundamentally in the same business. Everyone from ambassador and bureau chief
21. For an explanation of the causes of the American version of this structural hypocrisy, see Donald B. 
Easum, 'United States Policy Toward South Africa', Issue. Vol. 5, No. 3, Fall 1975, pp. 66: 'Interests 
determine policies. Policies appear confused or ambiguous, or evoke controversy, when the interests 
they are designed to serve are themselves in conflict. A policy that promotes one particular interest may 
threaten the condition of some other interest. This interrelationship of interests and policies is of 
unusual significance in the case of U.S. policies toward South Africa.1; Easum had served as Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs between 1974-1975. Easum's explanation could apply equally 
effectively to British policy toward the Republic.
22. Barbara Rogers, The Image reflected by Mass Media: Manipulations. The Nuclear Axis: a Case Study 
in the Field of Investigative Reporting (New York, 1980), p. 9. Rogers had worked for the British 
Foreign Office for sixteen months, following university. (Interview with Barbara Rogers, 5 Dec. 1995).
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on down is in the business of information gathering, analysis and transmission ... Inevitably, they seek out 
and use each other.'23 Governmental influence appears to have permeated the production of news by the 
media on a number of different levels. However, it should also be recognised that debates within the news 
media and the fractures and nuances within the coverage, while reflecting tensions and discrepancies in 
government policies, could, on occasion, lead to shifts within these policies. This degree of influence was 
directly related to the press's perceived ability to represent and reflect public opinion. As Leon Sigal has 
observed, 'Especially important among the imponderables in the official's calculus is the state of public 
opinion ... because of the difficulty of ascertaining public opinion on any given issue, officials rely on the 
opinions of commentators and editorial writers for a "quick reading of the public mind." As a 
consequence, the press ... is public opinion in the eyes of officials.' [original emphasis]24
The final influence which demands mention is South Africa's domestic English-language press. During the 
1970s, newspapers such as the Rand Daily Mail were perceived by the South African government as being 
little short of an unelected opposition. However, South African government propaganda also relied upon 
the existence of a 'free' press and judiciary as evidence that the country was 'democratic'.25 The South 
African English-language media performed a critical function during the apartheid years but it was under 
almost constant threat from a government which was intent on using the existence of the South African 
press for propaganda purposes while attempting to control it.26 The manifold influence of the domestic 
English-language media was crucial to the construction of the international media's treatment of the 
Republic. The struggle for the representation of South Africa can therefore be seen as a multi-faceted 
process in which many voices contributed to, and contested, the final text.
23. James C. Thomson Jr., 'Government and Press: Good news about a bad marriage', New York Times 
magazine, 25 Nov. 1973, p. 53. Thomson worked for the State Department and the White House for 
seven years during the 1960s. He later became the administrator of the Nieman Fellowship at Harvard 
University.
24. Leon V. Sigal, Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking (Massachusetts, 
1973), p. 135.
25. Elaine Potter, The Press as Opposition: The Political Role of South African Newspapers (London,
1975), pp. 208-209.
26. For details of the restrictions imposed by the South African state on its domestic media, see Frene 
Ginwala, The Press in South Africa. United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 
24/72, Nov. 1972; Alex Hepple, Press Under Apartheid (London, 1974); For further information on the 
compromised nature of the South African press, see chapter eight.
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Interpreting the media.
The claim that newspapers compose the 'first draft of history' is an obvious exaggeration. It is, perhaps, 
more accurate to say that the media contribute a complex web of clues towards an early interpretation of 
events. These clues reflect the structure and condition of their cultural production. The images and texts 
produced by the news organisations are thus best described as refracted representations of reality.27 While 
all texts are, to a certain extent, refracted representations, the significance of media texts is that readers and 
viewers assume that they are attempts at representing reality. As Maria explained in Mark Pedelty's War 
Stories, 'Many [journalists] speak of finding the truth, or presenting the reality ... but there are many 
realities and there are many truths.'[original emphasis]25 The issue of ideology has dominated academic 
studies of the media during the last twenty-five years.29 For the purposes of this thesis, Herbert Gans's 
assessment of the form of ideology functioning in the media is particularly useful because it recognises the 
existence of fluid or shifting representations:
If the news includes values, it also contains ideology. That ideology, 
however, is an aggregate of only partially thought-out values which is 
neither entirely consistent nor well integrated; and since it changes 
somewhat over time, it is also flexible on some issues. I shall call this 
aggregate of values and the reality judgements associated with it 
paraideology, partly to distinguish it from the deliberate, integrated, and 
more doctrinaire set of values usually defined as ideology, but it is 
ideology nevertheless.30
27. Martin Walker, The Powers of the Press: The World's Great Newspapers (London, 1983), p. 390, sums 
up the international print media's coverage of Iran in the 1970s as functioning like a 'distorting mirror'. 
Todd Gitlin, The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New 
Left (Berkeley, 1980), p. 77, describes the shifts in the New York Times's representation of the New 
Left as '... corresponding] to something real in society: not accurately, as a mirror image corresponds to 
a reflected object, but as a distortion of something actual'.
28. Mark Pedelty, War Stories: The Culture of Foreign Correspondents (New York, 1995), p. 227.
29. See Stuart Hall, 'Culture, the Media and the "Ideological Effect'", in James Curran, Michael Gurevitch 
& Janet Woollacott (eds.), Mass Communication and Society (London, 1977), pp. 315-348; Stuart Hall, 
'The rediscovery of "ideology"; return of the repressed in media studies', in Michael Gurevitch, Tony 
Bennett, James Curran & Janet Woollacott feds.L Culture, society and the media (London. 1982), pp. 
56-90; Ruth Tomaselli, Keyan Tomaselli & Johan Muller, 'A Conceptual Framework for Media 
Analysis', in Tomaselli, Tomaselli & Muller (eds.), Studies on the South African Media: The Press in 
South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 5-21; Gitlin. The Whole World, pp. 249-282; See also Louis 
Althusser, 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in Essavs on Ideology (London. 1984), 
originally published in French, 1970.
30. Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News. NBC Nightly News. 
Newsweek, and Time (New York. 1979), p. 68.
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It is possible to detect Gans's paraideology in the consensus system which dominates the work of the 
international media. Observers as varied as Walter Lippmann and Noam Chomsky have discussed the 
media's tendency towards 'manufacturing consent' and this is clearly one of the unstated central tasks of 
journalism.31 Herman and Chomsky are correct to assert that the media is subject to a series of filters which 
'... fix the premises of discourse and interpretation and [define] what is newsworthy in the first place.’32 
However, the suggestion that these filters amount to a 'propaganda system' implies a determinism which 
bears similarity to Althusser's theory of Ideological State Apparatuses.33 A less rigid analysis might explain 
the media's manufacture of consent as an example rather of the Gramscian concept of hegemony.34 Todd 
Gitlin's observation th a t '... journalists' values are anchored in routines that are at once steady enough to 
sustain hegemonic principles and flexible enough to absorb many new facts; and [that] these routines are 
bounded by perceptions of the audience's common sense and are finally accountable to the world views of 
top managers and owners', reflects very neatly the fusion of contradiction and coalescence which appears to 
be such a central part of the construction of news.33 Mark Pedelty, in his anthropological study of 
correspondents in El Salvador, emphasises the importance of the reporters' working practices (or routines) 
in anchoring and controlling 'complex issues':
Reporters are usually in a tertiary relationship to the news events they 
cover. Since they are rarely at the scene of breaking events ... they must 
collect and evaluate interpretations thereof. Given their emphasis upon 
elite sources, who themselves are usually hearing about events second- 
and third-hand, reporters are often evaluating others' interpretations of 
others' interpretations, and so on. The journalist must comb through 
complex layers of interpretation and representation, hoping to derive a 
more concretized sense of the original event. Pseudo-events are a great 
aid in this interpretive process ... Like legal trials, pseudo-events reduce 
complex realities into two-dimensional form, producing manageable 
outlines of complex issues. Journalists complete the process among
31. Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1947), p. 248, originally published in 1922; Edward S. Herman 
& Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, 
1988); See also Henry Grunwald, 'Don't love the press, but understand it', Time. 8 July 1974, pp. 74-75. 
Grunwald commented following the Watergate scandal,'... the press will have to help rebuild an 
American consensus.'
32. Herman & Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, p. 2.
33. Althusser, Essays on Ideology, suggested that the media were one of the ideological systems utilised by 
the state, in the 'private domain', to control, sustain and police capitalist society.
34. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith, 
(London, 1971). See also Dagmar Engels & Shula Marks (eds.), Contesting Colonial Hegemony: State 
and Society in Africa and India (London, 1994).
35. Gitlin, The Whole World, pp. 272-273.
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themselves in intra-press negotiations, reducing 'the story1 to its most 
significant, or at least its most marketable, elements.3*5
The process of news-gathering as practised by individual journalists was, as Pedelty discovered, both 
complicated and chaotic. It appears to be subject on multiple levels to both manipulation and the random 
factor. Daniel Hallin noted in his book on the coverage of the Vietnam War, that 'The ideology of the Cold 
War was ideally suited to the reduction of this complexity: it related every crisis to a single, familiar axis 
of conflict.'37 However, in the case of South Africa, Cold War ideology was only really significant from 
1974. and was partly negated by the fact that race relations in the Republic conflicted with the consensual 
representation of race relations in Britain and the United States. This tension (or partial negation) 
established a small degree of flexibility within the media's consensus. Recognising this flexibility, or 
potential for shift, is central to any understanding of how the media, and the forces which attempted to 
influence the media, operated. International news is, in effect, the site of an ideological struggle for (and of) 
representation. In this struggle, the power of capital possesses a distinct advantage. However, as Hallin has 
suggested, there is the consistent potential for conflict and chaos at the heart of the system:
Corporate control of the mass media does not guarantee that the media's 
cultural products will consistently serve the interests of the capitalist 
system as a whole, any more than corporate control of energy 
guarantees against an energy crisis ... If the anarchy of production 
leaves the capitalist system vulnerable to economic crisis, why should 
the anarchy of ideological 'production' not leave it similarly vulnerable 
to cultural crisis?38
The coverage of foreign news, especially the foreign news of a country whose political system is regularly 
criticised by the national governments of the international media, exaggeiates the potential for what Edward 
Said has called '... eccentric, unexpectedly original, even aberrant' moments39 In order to examine both the 
original and the orthodox in the construction of foreign news, it is essential to determine who comprises the
36. Pedelty, War Stories, p. 125.
37. Daniel C. Hallin, The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam (New York, 1986), p. 50.
38. Daniel C. Hallin, 'The American News Media: A Critical Theory Perspective', in John Forester (ed.), 
Critical Theory and Public Life (Massachusetts, 1985), p. 137.
39. Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the
World (New York, 1981), p. 48,
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international media. Unfortunately, the sociological and anthropological traditions of media analysis have
consistently underplayed the role of the individual journalist. As David Morrison and Howard Turnber have 
commented:
... insufficient attention has been paid to how the journalist as an 
individual exercises his own judgement in negotiating his role, and 
more than that, the critical politicizing of research in the area of mass 
communications has meant that the journalist as news gatherer has been 
pushed out of sight. He no longer fits, or rather researchers cannot find 
a place for him, in the grand indictment of the news as the reproduction 
of the dominant ideology.4®
This depersonalising of the media has led to a profound dichotomy between the bulk of mass 
communications research and the institutional histories of newspapers or memoirs of editors and 
journalists. It is almost always a case of 'never the twain shall meet'. Travelling between the two, one is 
struck by the extraordinary degree of tension that has built up between the two approaches during the last 
twenty years.41 This tension is particularly disappointing because, as Morrison and Tumber discovered in 
their research for Journalists at War, many reporters are willing to discuss the issues arising from the 
problems of news-gathering. Research of this sort reveals a fascinating oral tradition of myth, anecdote and 
observation. Even more critically, the failure to examine the role of individuals within news organisations 
has permitted a shroud of invisibility to surround the work of vast numbers of journalists, a shroud which 
has allowed individuals to progress in their careers without justified examination or criticism.42 Research 
into the backgrounds and identities of journalists often reveals useful insights into why the coverage
40. David E. Morrison & Howard Tumber, Journalists at War: The Dynamics of News Reporting during the 
Falklands Conflict (London, 1988), p. x.
41. See, for instance, David Remnick, 'Dept, of Disputation: Scoop', New Yorker. 29 Jan. 1996: 'What most 
press critics ignore is that much of the reason for what actually appears in newspapers and on television 
screens has to do with the people who produce the words and images - with the wild range of talent 
among reporters and editors, with their folkways and habits ...'; See also Howard H. Davis, 'Media 
research: whose agenda?', in John Eldridge (ed.), Glasgow University Media Group, Getting the 
Message: News, truth and power (London, 1993), p. 46: 'It is well known that media studies have had a 
poor reputation in the practitioners' world, and that serious attempts to put research on a better footing 
in relation to broadcasters, for instance... have met with little success'. While arranging and conducting 
interviews with journalists for this thesis, I found that in some cases all I needed to say was that I was 
an historian not a media student, for them to agree to talk with me.
42. There is no index or guide to journalists working in the international media in either Britain or the 
United States. In order to research the backgrounds of the correspondents who had covered South 
Africa, I had to interview them. In order to find out more about their reputations, I had to ask their 
contemporaries.
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emerges in the form that it does. Thus, in an article for the New Statesman, Chris Mullin reported that: 
'Few readers of the Daily Telegraph will, for example, have realised that the paper's Salisbury stringer - 
Brian Henry - is the same as the Daily Mail's Peter Norman who is the same person as the Guardian's 
Henry Miller. And that all these people are in real life a Rhodesian journalist called Ian Mills who, as it 
happens, is also the BBC correspondent.’43 There is a growing academic literature on war correspondents 
that does address the issues of journalistic identity.44 Unfortunately, studies of foreign correspondents in 
regions that are not technically at war are still rare.45
The lack of study of the journalist as an individual contributor to the news-gathering process leads on to a 
lack of analysis of the significant role of the internal media discourse. On one level, this internal discourse 
relates to the question of who the journalist believes that he is wilting for. Robert Damton remembers of his 
days working for the New York Times, that ’We never wrote for the "image persons" conjured up by social 
science. We wrote for one another.’46 If the primary ’public’ for a journalist's work is his/her contemporaries, 
the secondary public are often the (official) sources themselves. Darnton asserts that 'The reporting of news 
runs in closed circuits: it is written for and about the same people, and it sometimes is written in a private 
code.147 Penetrating such codes should be one of the central tasks of media analysis.
In 1972, Timothy Crouse recorded the conservatism which dominated the media: 'Journalism is probably 
the slowest-moving, most tradition-bound profession in America. It refuses to budge until it is shoved into 
the future by some irresistible external force.148 This is partly due to the symbiosis which often develops 
between reporters and their sources.4’ However, while symbiotic relationships do emerge, so do severe
43. Chris Mullin, 'Rhodesia and the British Press', New Statesman, 25 Feb. 1977, p. 247.
44. For example, Morrison & Tumber, Journalists at War: Pedelty, War Stories.
45. One recent exception is Stephen Hess, International News & Foreign Correspondents (Washington
D.C., 1996).
46. Damton, Kiss of Lamourette. p. 62.
47. Ibid, p. 76.
48. Timothy Crouse, The Bovs on the Bus (New York. 1973), p. 321.
49. For a detailed examination of journalists and their sources, see Gans, Deciding What's News, pp. 116- 
145; Sigal, Reporters and Officials, p. 54; and Tom Wicker, The greening of the press', Columbia
Journalism Review. May/June 1971, p. 7: '{The] biggest weakness [of the American press] is its
reliance on and its acceptance of official sources'.
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antagonisms. Evidence of these antagonisms rarely appears in a blatant form in the media, but the clues are 
there. The only effective method for unearthing long-standing tensions in the media is to tap into the oral 
history of the journalists in question.
Another facet of the internal media discourse which is particularly significant to historians is the system of 
precedents which appears to presage shifts in representation. It is a matter of record that exposes are rarely 
anything of the sort. They are often prefigured by a long history of references, clues and pointers. For the 
journalist, these precedents provide a useful support in the 'selling of the story'. While the precedents for a 
shift in representation can be overwhelming, on other occasions they can be virtually non-existent and this 
in itself can be instructive. During 1978, Trevor Brown investigated the coverage given to Steve Biko 
before his death in September 1977. He found that the 'internationally known' South African leader had 
barely received any press coverage during the preceding years. Brown engaged in telephone interviews 
and correspondence with journalists on various newspapers and was informed by Jim Hoagland 
(Washington Post) that 'A reader of the [New York] Times and the Post over the years ... would have known 
of Biko.'50 The only evidence to support Hoagland's assertion was three articles in the American media.51 
Brown did not examine the similar sparsity of reference to Biko in anti-apartheid publications.
To understand the media's employment of standardised and stereotyped representations, the reader needs to 
engage in active interpretation. The media is, in effect, a store of historically-loaded representations. Shifts 
and tensions within these widely accepted representational assumptions are crucial clues to the condition of 
the hegemonic culture. In one form or another, they are always present.51 Walter Lippmann described the 
system of stereotypes as constituting
50. Cited by Trevor Brown, 'Did Anybody Know His Name? U.S. Press Coverage of Biko', Journalism 
Quarterly. Vol. 57, Spring 1980, p. 37.
51. Donald Woods, 'South Africa will regret banning its black leaders', Christian Science Monitor. 14 Sept. 
1976, originally published as 'Remember the name well', Rand Daily Mail. 27 Aug. 1976; later 
republished as 'Make a note of Steve Biko', Washington Post. 27 Sept. 1976; See also John F. Bums, 'A 
jailed black relays warning to Kissinger', New York Times. 19 Sept. 1976.
52. See Frank Johnson, 'What the devil shall we say about Blair?1, Daily Telegraph. 8 March 1997: 'Sooner 
or later - usually sooner - an idea takes hold about a Prime Minister, Nearly everyone suddenly agrees 
with it, and it becomes almost impossible for the politician to rid himself or herself of it.' The 'idea' that 
Johnson considers is the representational stereotype.
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... an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the world, to which our 
habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes have 
adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete picture of the world, 
but they are a picture of a possible world to which we are adapted. In 
that world people and things have their well-known places, and do 
certain expected things. We feel at home there. We fit in ... There we 
find the charm of the familiar, the normal, the dependable; its grooves 
and shapes are where we are accustomed to find them. And though we 
have abandoned much that might have tempted us before we creased 
ourselves into that mould, once we are firmly in, it fits as snugly as an 
old shoe.“
Robert Damton recalled that journalists ’... simply drew on the traditional repertory of genres. It was like 
making cookies from an antique cookie cutter. Big stories develop in special patterns and have an archaic 
flavor, as if they were a metamorphoses of C/r-stories that have been lost in the depths of time.'54 In effect, 
the ’news' is subject to the influence of long-standing cultural determinants. These determinants define what 
is 'news', what the 'story' should be and how it should be told. The inheritance of these story-telling 
tropes, determinants or techniques, and their employment in conjunction with the composition of news 
creates the neat match or 'fit' described by Lippmann. Interestingly, Damton employed a similar metaphor 
to describe the same process: 'It is the neatness of the fit that produces the sense of satisfaction, like the 
comfort that follows the struggle to force one's foot into a tight boot. The trick will not work if the writer 
deviates too far from the conceptual repertory that he shares with his public and from the techniques of 
tapping it that he has learned from his predecessors.'ss Lippmann suggested that, without reform (or in 
periods of great social tension), the system of stereotypes could culminate in the creation of absolute 
representations: '... a system of all evil, and of another which is the system of all good ... Real space, real 
time, real numbers, real connections, real weights are lost. The perspective and the background and the 
dimensions of action are clipped and frozen in the stereotype.156 Fifty-two years after the publication of 
Lippmann's Public Opinion, Alexander Cockburn addressed the issues of foreign correspondence in an 
ostensibly humorous article for the journalism review, More. Discussing the work of the veteran roving 
New York Times correspondent, C.L. Sulzberger, Cockburn observed:
53. Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 95.
54. Damton, Kiss of Lamourette. p. 86.
55. Ibid. pp. 87-88. See also Gitlin, The Whole World, p. 267: '... stereotyping solves an enormous number 
of practical problems for journalism.'
56. Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 156.
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What has C.L. Sulzberger got to do with the practice of foreign 
reporting, people ask. 'Why, lie's an embarrassment at the [/Vew York] 
Times,' a N YT  staffer told me. Far from it. It seems to me that C.L. is 
the summation, the platonic ideal of what foreign reporting is all about. 
It's true that we do not find him courageously observing Cambodian 
soldiers on the outskirts of Pnom-Penh, but this is incidental. C.L. has 
divined the central mystery of his craft, which is to fire volley after 
volley of clichd into the densely packed prejudices of his readers. There 
are no surprises in his work ... He never deviates into paradox, His 
work is a constant affirmation of received beliefs, [original emphasis]57
Bearing in mind Damton's assessment that 'foreign correspondents ... bring more to events they cover than 
they take away', media analysis should be particularly concerned with the cultural context and history of 
news production.58 In addition, it is essential to recognise that the stereotypes and standardised 
representations described by Lippmann, Darnton and Cockburn are subject to rare but significant 
adjustments. These reformations can, perhaps, be described as 'representational paradigm shifts' because 
their evolution bears some resemblance to a  softer version of Thomas Kuhn’s revolutionary scientific 
paradigms:
... novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested by resistance, 
against a background provided by expectation. Initially, only the 
anticipated and usual are experienced even under circumstances where 
anomaly is later to be observed. Further acquaintance, however, does 
result in awareness of something wrong or does relate the effect to 
something that has gone wrong before. That awareness of anomaly 
opens a period in which conceptual categories are adjusted until the 
initially anomalous has become the anticipated.57
Lippmann suggested th a t '... any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an attack upon the foundations 
of the universe.'60 Indeed, the innate conservatism of the media does resist change, especially change which 
threatens or contradicts the traditional image repertoire. The reasons behind a shift in representation are
57. Alexander Cockburn, 'How to earn your trench coat', More. May 1974, p. 24. For details on C.L. 
Sulzberger's connections with the CIA, see Carl Bernstein, 'The CIA and the media', Rolling Stone. No. 
250,20 Oct. 1977, pp. 59-61. See also Robert D. McFadden, 'Obituary: C.L. Sulzberger, Columnist, 
Dies at 80', New York Times, 21 Sept. 1993.
58. Darnton, Kiss of Lamourette. p. 92.
59. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1970), p. 64. Although genuine 
revolutions in representation are rare ,'... when paradigms change, the world itself changes with them. 
Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and look in new places. Even more important, 
during revolutions scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in 
places they have looked before.1 (p. 111).
60. Lippmann, Public Opinion, p. 95.
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varied and can be related directly to the power of the original source. In the case of foreign news, shifts are 
usually due to the intensity and drama of the events being reported. On extremely rare occasions, however, 
they can be influenced by the work of individual journalists. In summary, the media does not reflect reality. 
It provides refracted representations which are a product of cultural consensus, paraideology and a degree 
of chaos. The chaos in the system can either be the result of the individuality of the journalists themselves, 
who are not automatons, or the potential randomness of the news, which is only partly predictable. The 
refracted representations produced by the media serve on one level as an internal media discourse and 
on another level, as a system of stereotyped and standardised paradigms. These representational paradigms 
are subject to occasional adjustment or shift. Above all, the media is rarely neutral or objective.
Methodology.
This is not a study of what the international media should have been, but what it was. As an historian I do 
not feel that it is my task to inform my historical subject how s/he should have acted.*11 am concerned to 
examine how and why the media representations of South Africa during the 1970s emerged in the forms 
that they did. Among the issues which this thesis attempts to address are: the sources of influence and 
manipulation in the media; the media's construction of news stories; the role, significance and occasional 
adjustments in the media's traditional image repertoire; and the fractures, nuances and 'blips' (the chaotic 
element) which randomly affected its system of representation. I have done this by studying the textual 
coverage of South Africa during the 1970s in both the British and American print and broadcast media and 
interviewing as many of the people responsible for reporting the news from South Africa as was possible.62 
The central purpose of these oral interviews was an attempt to get 'behind the news' in order to understand, 
in the language of journalism 'the who, what, when, where and why1, of foreign conespondence in South 
Africa. Examining the news-gathering structures of the various media organisations was an essential 
consideration before any analysis of foreign correspondence in South Africa could be attempted. Finally,
61. Pedelty, War Stories, pp. 219-230, concludes with suggestions for methods to improve the media.
62, For an index of the print and broadcast media sources examined within this thesis, see the bibliography. 
The vast majority of journalists agreed to speak to me. However, it should be acknowledged that the 
interviews were often only made possible by a barrage of telephone calls, faxes and letters. A small 
number of journalists were untraceable or refused to speak with me - See appendix A. v. for details.
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the results of the fusion of the textual analysis and supporting interviews were tested against the existing 
history and political science texts on the events of the period in three case-studies.
There are few models for a thesis of this type. The majority of academic studies of the international
media's coverage of foreign affairs concentrate on periods of time that are loo short for constructive 
historical analysis, and focus on too small a selection of media to be representative of the whole. 
Comparative examinations of the coverage of British and American news-gathering of any one country' are 
virtually non-existent. The most useful models were Daniel Hallin and Todd Gitlin's work on the U.S. 
media's coverage of the Vietnam War and the Peace Movement, respectively. These two studies offer many 
useful clues towards a workable methodology, most notably in their fusion of textual analysis and 
supporting interviews with journalists.63 Although there is a growing literature on the domestic South 
African media, no single study has, as yet, focused upon the international media's representation of South 
Africa.64 Trevor Brown's essay on the U.S. press coverage of Biko remains the only academic example, 
discussing the 1970s, of textual research followed up by investigative interviews.65
Although failing to provide a model analysis, a useful source on the media, was the media itself.
Journalistic critiques of the media were relatively rare in the British press of the 1970s.66 In the United 
States, however, the growth of schools of journalism and the increasingly high profile of investigative 
reporting contributed to a significant body of pragmatic and penetrative media criticism. Magazines as 
varied as Harper's, The Nation and Esquire carried regular examinations of the media. These were 
complemented by the observations of Columbia Journalism Review, More and Nieman Reports. Even Time
63. Hallin, The 'Uncensored War'; Gitlin, The Whole World. See also Elaine Windrich, The Cold War 
Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi. the U.S. Media, and the Angolan War (New York, 1992), which is an 
exceptional example of a study which recognises the significance of propaganda in the construction of 
news. Windrich, however, does not follow up her analysis with interviews with the journalists.
64. Richard Poliak. Up Against Apartheid: The Role and the Plight of the Press in South Africa (Illinois. 
1981), contains one chapter (pp. 78-90) which discusses the international media; William A. Hachten &
C. Anthony Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: The Role and Plight of the Press in South Africa 
(London, 1984), contains a brief section (pp. 275-281) on foreign journalists; See also Sanford J. Ungar, 
'South Africa in the American Media', in Alfred O. Hero Jr. & John Barratt (eds.), The American People 
and South Africa: Publics. Elites, and Policymaking Processes (Massachusetts. 1981), pp. 25-46.
65. Trevor Brown, 'Did Anybody Know His Name? U.S. Press Coverage of Biko’, Journalism Quarterly. 
Vol. 57, Spring 1980, pp. 31-44.
66. Exceptions included the New Statesman. Time Out and Private Eve.
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and Newsweek carried regular columns on the press. While there has been an abundance of books by 
journalists on the media during the 1970s, very few commentators have attempted to offer a viable method 
of media analysis.67 The final chapter of Martin Walker's Powers o f the Press stands as a rare exception.68 
In this, Walker discussed the histories of twelve of the world's most famous newspapers. He then proceeded 
to test their reputations by considering their respective reporting of Iran during the 1970s. The system that 
he used merged a simple form of content analysis (collating the number of articles on Iran per year, and 
their subject) with a recognition of the relative importance of differing writers and reports. Walker's 
conclusions manage to be critical, realistic and convincing, a  conjunction rarely achieved in academic 
media analysis.
This thesis does not employ statistical content analysis for the simple reason that I am not convinced that it 
is particularly useful. The fundamental problem with content analysis is that it normally treats its limited 
sample in isolation. The wider context in which the news is constructed, the Cold War for instance, is 
normally forgotten. Perhaps, most significantly, content analysis fails to provide any system forjudging the 
relative impact of separate reports or articles. Yet, on admittedly rare occasions, an individual article can 
launch or accelerate a 'moral panic' and thereby influence a flood of coverage by other news media. Articles 
of this sort are obviously worth more than countless mundane news agency reports. As Morrison and 
Tumber have suggested, content analysis '... cannot go beyond its own methodology to explain how the 
picture was arrived at .... To understand the creation of news as distinct from social relationships as 
demonstrated by the news, it is essential to get to grips with people as operatives within a system rather 
than operators of a system.'69
In order to address the question, how are media representations constructed and, in part, as compensation 
for the lack of an analytical system, I have allowed the case-studies in this thesis to expand beyond the
67. For some of the most successful examples, see A.J. Liebling, The Press (New York, 1961); Crouse, The 
Bovs on the Bus; Rosenblum, Coups and Earthquakes; David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New 
York, 19791: GavTalese. The Kingdom and the Power (London. 1981); Behr, Anyone here been 
raped?; Philip Knightley, The First Casualty. From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War 
Correspondent as Hero. Propagandist and Myth Maker (London, 1989).
68. Walker, Powers of the Press, pp. 342-393.
69. Morrison & Tumber, Journalists at War, p. x.
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usual minimal sample in orthodox media analysis. The range of the media examined in this thesis was also, 
in part, an acknowledgement of Carol Weiss's research into the diverse media readership habits of 
American ’leaders' and Henry Grunwald's assertion t h a t " t h e  media" are a great many large and small, 
often contradictory if not warring, newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, columnists, editorial writers, 
reporters, publishers - together providing a mass of reportage and opinion that defies any single bias.170 
Although small circulation publications and stringer journalists are featured throughout this thesis, the core 
sources, predictably, proved to be the elite media of Britain and the United States. This was because the 
elite press during the 1970s still tended to designate more space for foreign news and comment than either 
the television or the tabloid press.
The reasoning behind this thesis’s extensive trawl of media sources was also an attempt to address 
Morrison andTumber's observation th a t’There is no absence of material on foreign correspondents, but 
studies are rare ... the veiy few academic studies which do exist fail in the clarification of basic questions 
because it is unclear who is being referred to by the title "foreign correspondent".171 During the process of 
interviewing, I discovered that many of the most informed and informative journalists had worked on the 
periphery of the media. A study which had limited the size of the media under analysis would have missed 
the true scale of the internal media discourse, a discourse that at times serves as a running commentary on 
itself. The research for this thesis suggests that the 'foreign correspondent’ was only the most visible player 
in the construction of foreign correspondence. In the case of the newspapers for example, news about South 
Africa was also constructed by the editorial writers, columnists, cartoonists, photographers, sub-editors, 
foreign editors, stringers, visiting correspondents and, most significantly, South African (black and white) 
reporters. Examining the diversity of the media also reveals a number of profound differences as well as 
similarities in the representation of news. As Daniel Hallin explains of the American media:
Because of their different audiences ... and because of television's 
special need for drama, TV and the prestige press perform very 
different political functions. The prestige press provides information to 
a politically interested audience; it therefore deals with issues.
Television provides not just ’headlines,’as television people often say,
70. Carol H. Weiss, ’What America's Leaders Read', The Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, 
Spring 1974, pp. 1-22; Grunwald, 'Don’t Love The Press ...', Time. 8 July 1974, p. 75.
71. David E. Morrison & Howard Tumber, 'The Foreign correspondent: date-line London', Media. Culture
and Society, Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct. 1985, pp. 445-446.
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nor just entertainment, but ideological guidance and reassurance for the 
mass public. It therefore deals not so much with issues as symbols that 
represent the basic values of the established political culture. This 
difference is certainly not absolute. Newspapers too can play the role of 
moralist ... And television has always been torn between a desire to 
belong to the inner circle of serious journalism and its other identity as 
storyteller-moralist. [original emphasis]72
A recognition of the different traditions and differing working methods of the newspapers, news­
magazines, news agencies and broadcast media is an important addition to knowledge of the identities of 
the journalists. These structural differences are multiplied in an examination of the British and American 
media. Chapter two provides a relatively prosaic guide to the structures of the international media which 
takes into account such factors as: the density of South African coverage in the respective newspapers; the 
opening of bureaus in the Republic; visits by columnists and members of the editorial staff; and the 
publication of surveys and special reports on South Africa. It is complemented by appendix A., which 
provides brief biographies of the main correspondents and stringers, amongst other additional information. 
Detail of this sort establishes a bed-rock on which the later analysis of the three case-studies can take place.
Since studies of the media have established conclusively that journalists are dependent upon, and often 
manipulated by their sources, it is particularly surprising that little academic attention has been given to the 
pressure groups whose primary purpose is to influence media representations. Robert Darnton recalled that 
'Press spokesmen and public relations men are often former reporters, who adopt a tone of "we are all in 
this together" and try to seem frank or even irreverent in their off-the-record comments. In this way they 
can influence the "angle" or the "slant" of a story - the way it is handled and the general impression it 
creates.*73 Karen Rothmyer's report on the role of public relations companies in the United States during the 
Biafran War concluded by warning that '... the Government or the news media rely too heavily on such 
firms rather than their own investigation ... The farther away geographically the story occurs, the more
72. Hallin, The 'Uncensored War', p. 125-126. Although the situation is Britain was very different because 
of the public-service ethos of the BBC, Hallin's basic distinction stands. The conservatism of television 
media is magnified in motion pictures. For examples regarding South Africa, see Kenneth M. Cameron, 
Africa On Film: Bevond Black and White (New York, 1994).
73. Darnton, The Kiss of Lamourette. p. 75.
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likely it is that special-interest groups will be successful in influencing its telling.'74 The case of South 
Africa during the 1970s demonstrates many of the elements Rothmyer reported in the coverage of the 
Biafran War. In New York, Washington D.C., and to a certain extent, London, a maze of public relations 
companies, lobbyists and secret organisations campaigned and manipulated on South Africa's behalf. These 
were opposed by the global network of anti-apartheid groups. Chapter three examines the propaganda 
programme put into action from 1972 by South Africa's Department of Information. Chapter four discusses 
the attempts by the British and American anti-apartheid movements to influence the international media's 
representation of the Republic.
The three case-studies in chapters five to seven are based upon a fusion of oral interviews and textual 
analysis. The interviews, in particular, proved to be a very rich source. I did not offer interviewees the 
option to remain anonymous, although I did accept a small amount of material given 'off the record'.75 The 
interviews (which lasted, on average, one hour) were concerned with questions arising from my textual 
analysis, the structures of news gathering, the relationship between the correspondent/stringer in South 
Africa and the editorial staff of the publication, and the journalistic internal discourse. On many occasions, 
responses to questions unearthed observations or details that would have been impossible to recognise if I 
had relied solely on a reading of the newspapers. A significant amount of information gathered during the 
oral research for this thesis proved unsuitable for use. Most of this information consisted of amusing 
anecdotes, unsubstantiated stories and allegations about other journalists. However, determining the 
veracity of stories, 'chasing leads' and negotiating the traditional representations that often dominate the 
reporter's anecdote, provided me with both an education in investigative journalism, and a number of
74. Karen Rothmyer, 'What really happened in Biafra?', Columbia Journalism Review. Fall 1970, p. 47. See 
also Windrich, The Cold War Guerrilla. In the U.K., there were less public relations companies than in 
the United States.
75. Gans, Deciding What's News, p. xiii: 'I told the people I studied I would not use nam es;... anonymity is
an old fieldwork tradition. Sociologists are more concerned with the roles people perform ... than with
individual personalities.'; Pedelty, War Stories, listed his interviewees by first name only; Hallin, The
'Uncensored War', and Gitiin, The Whole World, permitted some of their interviewees to remain
anonymous. 'Off the record' means not for attribution.
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useful insights into the journalists' impressions of the 'reality' of news production.76
There were also problems relating to the textual analysis. The primary stage of the textual research was a 
matter of studying the cuttings files on South Africa at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA).77 
The RIIA collection was then compared with the existing indexes of the newspapers.78 Finally, with certain 
unindexed newspapers and magazines that were not available at the RIIA, I was forced literally to comb 
through each edition of the publication. This research was then complemented by a similar system in South 
Africa and the United States of America. Gaining access to broadcast media proved more difficult. My 
extensive survey of the print media provided a list of all the television programmes on South Africa that 
had attracted the attention of the press. Actually viewing these programmes and news reports was nearly 
impossible.79 From the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Independent Television News (ITN) it 
is possible to gain access to the 'day lists' for news programmes from the 1970s,8° The BBC written archive 
in Caversham possesses transcripts for most BBC documentaries screened on the subject of South Africa in 
the 1970s. Other transcripts were obtained from the regional broadcasters.81 The only other method for 
getting access to broadcast material was by appealing to the producers or directors of the television 
programmes. This proved successful in some instances. Once again, similar methods were employed 
in the U.S. and South Africa.83 Without actually viewing or listening to the majority of the broadcast media 
coverage of South Africa, I might have underplayed the significance of the medium in this thesis. I have
76. During the 1994 elections in South Africa, for example, The Independent's correspondent, John Carlin, 
permitted me to travel with him while he observed the voting. We also discussed the work of foreign 
correspondents in South Africa. Carlin provided me with a crucial entree to the world of news 
gathering, as it is practised now.
77. During the 1970s, the RIIA still subscribed to an extensive selection of British and U.S. newspapers.
78. Indexes exist for New York Times. Washington Post, Los Angeles Times. Wall Street Journal.
Christian Science Monitor. Chicago Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle. The Times. Sunday Times. The 
Guardian. Daily & Sunday Telegraph (1979 only), The Economist. The Spectator. New Statesman.
US News & World Report. The Nation. New Republic. National Review and The Financial Mail.
79. The vast majority of television broadcasts before 1980 were shot on film and have not been transferred 
to video-tape.
80. 'Day lists' provide information on the running orders of news programmes. In the case of ITN's archive, 
they also include the lengths of the news clips and the names of the reporters.
81. One exception was Thames Television which lost its franchise some years ago and now runs its library 
on a massively reduced budget. Films were only available on commercial terms.
82. The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)'s archive of 1970s broadcast material is in an
appalling state. Only a tiny sample of material remains viewable.
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consistently tried to be aware of this danger.
The three case-studies in this thesis examine exceptional moments in the international media's coverage of 
South Africa during the 1970s. They should be read in the context of the struggle for representation 
between South Africa's Department of Information and the global anti-apartheid movement, described in 
chapters three and four. Chapter five considers the Guardian's wage starvation exposd (March 1973) and 
the resulting debate in the British media. Chapter six examines the international media's coverage of the 
South African invasion of Angola (1975-1976) and chapter seven analyses the shifts in representation 
which followed the Soweto uprising (1976). I chose the three case-studies because each one established 
precedents for the coverage of the 1980s: the economic sanctions issue; South African military 
intervention; and violent unrest in South Africa. In addition, each chapter demonstrated a different facet of 
the international media: the investigative expose backed by a newspaper campaign (chapter five); war 
correspondence (chapter six); and dependence upon South African journalism (chapter seven).83 The final 
chapter attempts to draw together the various strands of the thesis by considering: the influence which 
South African journalism exerted over the coverage of the country; the transformations in the society of the 
foreign correspondents and stringers during the decade; the results and implications of the South African 
government's attempts to manipulate the media; and the similarities and differences in the British and 
American interpretation of apartheid. Ultimately, the chapter (and, indeed the thesis) pose the question: in 
view of the differences in the British and American traditions of journalism and their interpretations of the 
significance of the South African 'story', why, over the long-term, were their representations so similar?
Academic analysis of media coverage often neglects the historical context of news production. 
Contemporary historical studies often utilise media sources with little examination or criticism. This thesis 
is an attempt to combine a critical analysis of the international media's coverage of South Africa with a 
history of the 1970s. The case-studies, which are by nature experimental, offer guides to the histories of a 
number of notable South African stories, while tracking a series of shifting representations and noting the
83. Other case-studies could, perhaps, have included the treatment of: South Africa's attempts to circumvent 
the sports boycott (1972-74); the ‘Independent homeland1 policy and the 'independence1 of the Transkei 
and Bophuthatswana (1976-77); the nuclear programme (1977-1979); and the representation of Gatsha 
Buthelezi, throughout the 1970s.
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competing voices of South Africa's Department of Information and the anti-apartheid movements. Greg 
Dening has suggested that: ’History is all the ways we encode the past in symbol form to make a present. It 
is in this sense very vernacular. It is an everyday, every moment act. Making History is our constant 
cultural exercise. We express the past and by that make our social relations and our social structures ... We 
create change, we establish the status quo in our History making.'84 The international media's news 
production might not be a valid 'first draft of history' but it is an example of 'history making'. The print and 
broadcast media are not scientific, they do not produce news to any single pattern. Edward Said has 
observed that 'We do n o t ... live at the mercy of a centralised propaganda apparatus, even though a great 
deal of what is actually propaganda is churned out by the media,'88 Through a study of the media, the 
organisations whose central function was to influence the media, and the news which the media created, 
this thesis attempts to analyse and explain the contradictions which dominated the representations of South 
Africa during the 1970s.
84. Greg Dening, History's Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch f Lanham. 1988), p. 2.
85. Said, Covering Islam, p. 44.
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CHAPTER TWO
STRUCTURES OF INTERNATIONAL
NEWS.
Mention South Africa, and most people immediately think of apartheid. 
But there's more to this country than its politics, as many businessmen 
are discovering. The rising price of gold has sent the economy soaring - 
with a 6% real growth rate projected for this year. And it has sent 
businessmen rushing to Johannesburg. American Express estimates that 
the influx of Americans has increased about 20% during the past four 
months. South Africa isn't the vacation capital of the world by a long 
shot. Shops close at 1 p.m. on Saturdays, and movies never open on 
Sundays. And don't expect the likes of Last Tango in Paris. You won't 
find Penthouse or Playboy on newsstands, either. In fact, don't bring in 
any reading material that's even slightly blue. Customs officials have an 
astonishing lack of humour and will probably confiscate your material 
and fine you as well. There are after-hour annoyances, too. You can 
buy drinks in your hotel, but you will have to bring your own liquor to 
some unlicensed nightclubs and restaurants outside hotels. And women 
are typically banned from drinking spots, except for hotel 'Ladies' Bars.1 
You'll also have to tolerate the 'white only' signs in restaurants, 
cinemas, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, you can have a pleasant stay.1
When somebody asked the other day what change I had seen in South 
Africa, I found myself giving the very subjective answer that life was 
much pleasanter now for the visiting British journalist. The former 
enmity had been replaced by at worst indifference, at best friendly 
interest. In the early sixties, in the aftermath of Macmillan's 'wind of 
change' speech, the resentment shown to reporters was sharp. ... a great 
many white South Africans now suspect that the journalists may have 
been right all along and that separate development is not only unjust but 
unworkable. Hostility to the English journalist has also declined for a 
less welcome reason - the South Africans no longer give a damn what 
we think of them. ... The collapse of England's power has meant, 
among other things, that the English journalist here has been replaced 
as a bogey figure by the American journalist.2
In chapter one, this thesis suggested that foreign news is barely ever solely the product of the foreign 
correspondent. The construction of foreign news can best be understood by an examination of the news- 
gathering structures which contributed to and coalesced into the news material which then appeared in the 
newspapers and on the television.3 This chapter considers the external contribution of the British and 
American news organisations to the coverage of South Africa in the 1970s by examining the newspapers, 
the news-magazines; the news-agencies; and the broadcasting companies. The exploration of the news-
1. 'Personal business: Booming South Africa lures businessmen', Business Week. 11 May 1974, p. 131.
2. Richard West, 'Toothless bulldogs', The Spectator. 5 March 1977, p. 7-8.
3. For two studies of the U.S. media's coverage of South Africa during the periods at either end of this 
thesis, see John Seiler, 'The Formulation of U.S. Policy toward Southern Africa, 1957-1976: The Failure 
of Good Intentions', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1976, pp. 5-42 (on the 
period 1957-1971); and Sanford J. Ungar, 'South Africa in the American Media', in Alfred O. Hero Jr. & 
John Barratt (eds.), The American People and South Africa: Publics. Elites, and Policymaking Processes 
(Massachusetts, 1981), pp. 25-46 (on the period 1979-1980). There are no studies of the British media's 
coverage of South Africa during the 1970s.
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gathering structures of the international media should he read together with the mass of biographical and 
other detail provided in appendix A.4
The British newspapers.
A simple guide to the British elite newspapers of the 1970s would probably place the Daily and Sunday 
Telegraph on the right, the Tunes, Sunday Times and the Financial Times in the centre, and the Guardian 
and the Observer on the liberal-left. These political descriptions fail to take into account, however, the fact 
that newspapers tend to function as 'broad churches'. On occasions, the ostensibly liberal Guardian adopted 
a right-wing stance and, similarly, the supposedly conservative Daily Telegraph sometimes carried liberal 
comment.
During the 1970s, the Times was still an 'establishment1 newspaper. It offered Britain's only example of a
4. See appendix A for i) brief biographies of the correspondents and stringers in South Africa; ii) the 
structure of the syndication systems which interlink the news organisations; iii) the circulation figures of 
the newspapers during the 1970; iv) the ownership structures of the news organisations. For further 
information on the newspapers analysed in this study see Oliver Boyd-Barrett, The collection of foreign 
news in the national press: organisation and resources', in Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Colin Seymour-Ure & 
Professor Jeremy Tunstall, Studies on the Press: Royal Commission on the Press Working Paper 
Number 3 (London, 1977); Michael & Edwin Emeiy, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of 
the Mass Media (New Jersey, 1988); John C. Merrill & Harold A. Fisher, The World's Great Dailies: 
Profiles of Fifty Newspapers (New York, 1980); Dennis Griffiths (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the British 
Press, 1422-1992 (London, 1992). See also the many histories of the newspapers and news organisations: 
Gay Talese, The Kingdom and the Power (London, 1971); Harrison E. Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor: 
The New York Times and its Times (New York. 1980); Ben Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and 
Other Adventures (New York, 1995); David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York, 1979); Lloyd 
Wendt, The Wall Street Journal: The Story of Dow Jones and the nation’s business newspaper (Chicago, 
1982); Edward E. Scharff, Worldly Power: The Making of the Wall Street Journal (New York, 1986); 
Lloyd Wendt, Chicago Tribune: The Rise of a Great American Newspaper (Chicago. 1979); Charles L. 
Robertson, The International Herald Tribune: The First Hundred Years (New York, 1987); Merle Miller, 
'Why the editor of Newsweek is not the editor of Time, and vice versa, Esquire. June 1973, pp. 169-231; 
Howard Zinn, 'Rosebuds: Always several political steps ahead', More, Dec. 1975, p. 3; Robert Sherrill, 
'The new regime at The New Republic', Columbia Journalism Review. March/April 1976, pp. 23-29; 'All 
the President's Magazines', Time. 15 Dec. 1980, pp. 50-51; Andrew Kopkind, 'MacNeil/Lehrer's class 
act', Columbia Journalism Review. Sept./Oct. 1979, pp. 31-38; John Grigg, The History of The Times, 
Volume VI: The Thomson Years. 1966-1981 (London, 1983); Alastair Hetherington, Guardian Years 
(London, 1981): Geoffrey Taylor. Changing Faces: A History of The Guardian, 1956-88 (London, 1993); 
Duff Hart-Davis. The House that the Berrys Built: Inside The Telegraph, 1928-1986 (London. 1990); 
David Kynaston, The Financial Times: A Centenary History (London, 1988); Harold Evans, Good 
Times, Bad Times (London, 1983); Frank Giles, Sundry Times (London, 1986); Richard Cockett, David 
Astor and The Observer (London, 1991); Ruth Dudley Edwards, The Pursuit of Reason: The Economist. 
1843-1993 (London. 1993); Donald Read, The Power of News: The History of Reuters. 1849-1989 
(Oxford, 1994); Hugo Young, 'Rupert Murdoch and The Sunday Times: A lamp goes out', The Political 
Quarterly. Vol. 55, No. 4, 1984, pp. 382-390.
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'newspaper of record1. With eighteen foreign correspondents distributed throughout the world, The Times's 
global representation was greater than any other British newspaper. The paper's Cape Town bureau had 
been re-opened in 1969. The Times's position on South Africa reflected the divisions within the British 
establishment. These tensions were replicated within the editorial structure of the newspaper. The foreign 
news editor, Jerome Caminada, had been bom in South Africa and was sympathetic to white South Africa's 
problems. Kenneth Mackenzie, the chief foreign sub-editor was also South African born, but was a critic of 
the apartheid regime. Michael Knipe (correspondent, 1971-1975) recalls: 'I took the view that I had two 
South Africans in London and therefore it was a damn sight easier getting my stuff in the paper than it was 
for anybody else.15 The Times's correspondents in South Africa were supported by two stringers and the 
editorials were written by Roy Lewis. South African-born Marcel Berlins, the newspaper's legal 
correspondent, commented upon the Republic following his regular visits.6 Louis Heren, the deputy and 
foreign editor of the Times visited South Africa during the spring of 1978 and interviewed John Vorster. In 
the opinion pages of the newspaper, Bernard Levin devoted regular space to condemnations of the 
apartheid system and Lord Chalfont contributed a number of articles which were gently sympathetic to the 
South African government.7 Between 1973 and 1975, the Times earned three suiveys of the Republic and in 
1978, a special report on the Transkei.8
The Daily and Sunday Telegraph divided their news pages (under the control of managing editor, Peter 
Eastwood) from the opinion and editorial pages (controlled by the editor).9 The Telegraph kept a staff of 
thirteen correspondents world-wide supported by ninety stringers. The coverage of South Africa, as was the
5. Interview with Michael Knipe, 12 April 1995.
6. As legal correspondent, Berlins reported the Biko inquest during Nov. 1977 for The Times.
7. Levin was the most vociferous of the British columnists. He wrote twenty-four columns between 1972 
and 1979 on the subject of apartheid. 'South Africa was very important to me in the same way as the 
Soviet Union ... was important, because I care about basic human rights and freedoms.' (Letter from 
Bernard Levin, 10 July 1996) Levin was banned from visiting South Africa. Lord Chalfont, an ex-Labour 
politician, began writing regular columns on South Africa, following the Angolan War. He recalls that he 
saw himself as a 'centrist' on South African issues, during the 1970s. (Interview with Lord Chalfont, 12 
March 1996). Chalfont visited the Republic in 1977 in order to interview John Vorster for the BBC.
8. 'Business and trade centres of the World - 8: Johannesburg', The Times. 12 June 1973; 'Export corridors 
of the world: South Africa', The Times. 16 May 1974; 'Investment centres of the world: Johannesburg', 
The Times, 26 Aug. 1975; 'A special report: Transkei', The Times. 16 Oct. 1978.
9. For a discussion of the divisions within the Daily Telegraph, see Hart-Davis, The House the Berry's 
Built, pp. 236-239.
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case with most newspapers, was twinned with that of Rhodesia. Bill Deedes (ex-Conservative M.P. and 
editor of the Daily Telegraph from 1974) was one of the few editors in Fleet Street to comment openly on 
the subject of South Africa.10 The Telegraph also carried regular background articles by ex-correspondents 
such as Douglas Brown.11 Journalists on the Telegraph were more prepared to visit the Republic than was 
the case with reporters with other British newspapers.12 Although the newspaper employed few South 
Africans, Peregrine Worsthome, the Sunday Telegraph's columnist, had visited South Africa on a regular 
basis during the 1950s and 1960s and retained a deep affection for the country.13 'Peter Simple', the Daily 
Telegraph's columnist was also a South African sympathiser. Columns by guest writers in support of South 
Africa were normally sub-titled 'personal view'.14 Unlike in the Times, articles opposing these views were 
rare. During the autumn of 1977, the Daily Telegraph carried a five-part series entitled 'What is South 
Africa's Future?', wherein South Africans were invited to debate the country’s prospects. Of the five 
contributors, only one was African: the Chief Minister of the 'homeland' of Lebowa.15
The Guardian possessed the smallest overseas representation of the elite British daily newspapers: eight 
correspondents and thirty-two stringers. Throughout the 1970s, the newspaper was consistently refused its 
request to situate a correspondent in the Republic and it was therefore forced to depend upon South African 
stringers.16 James MacManus was appointed Africa correspondent in 1974 but was not allowed to enter 
South Africa until March 1977; thereafter he returned with regularity. Because of its financial and logistical
10. See, for example, William Deedes, 'Why Vorster has written us off, Daily Telegraph. 8 Dec. 1976.
11. Douglas Brown was the Daily Telegraph's correspondent in South Africa during the 1950s. He later 
wrote a book about the country: Douglas Brown, Against The World: A Study of White South African 
Attitudes (London. 1966).
12. Ian Waller, political correspondent of the Sunday Telegraph, visited South Africa in 1973 and 1976; 
Graham Turner (Sunday Telegraph) visited in 1976; David Adamson, diplomatic editor of the Daily 
Telegraph, visited in 1976 and 1977; George Evans (Sunday Telegraph) interviewed Prime Minister 
P.W. Botha during March 1979; and Peter Taylor (Sunday Telegraph) visited in 1979.
13. Interview' with Sir Peregrine Worsthome, 15 Jan. 1996. Worsthome visited South Africa in 1977.
14. See, for example, Robin Page, 'Why South Africa needs us', Daily Telegraph, 29 May 1979.
15. Basil Hersov, Nic Rhoodie, Derrick de Villiers, Dr F. van Zyl Slabbert & Dr Cedric Phatudi, 'What is 
South Africa's future? I-V', Daily Telegraph, 31 Aug.-6 Sept. 1977. Hersov was the President of the 
South Africa Foundation. Nic Rhoodie was the brother of the South African Secretaiy for Information.
16. The Guardian's stringers in South Africa were Stanley Uys (until 1976) and Patrick Laurence 
(thereafter). The newspaper attempted to position Jonathan Steele as the correspondent in South Africa
in 1974 but Steele was rejected by the Department of Information. (Interview' with Ian Wright, 26 Oct. 
1994).
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limitations, the Guardian was the most accessible of the British newspapers to freelance and visiting 
journalists.17 The paper also employed a group of young staff writers: Martin Walker, Richard Gott, 
Jonathan Steele and Adam Raphael, who were all keen South Africa-watchers. Walker had worked for the 
South African magazine News/check during the 1960s. Steele and Gott had visited the country in 1970 and 
1971, respectively. Raphael and Steele were both married to South Africans.18 However, as Richard Gott 
recalls, The Guardian was a very pluralist ship'.19 Examples of the newspaper's 'pluralism' could be seen in 
the editorials and articles written by Geoffrey Taylor, which recommended recognition of the Transkei, and 
the fact that the Guardian was the first of the British newspapers to carry articles by writers associated with 
the African National Congress (ANC) and South African Communist Party (SACP) in 1975.20The Anti- 
Apartheid Movement (A-AM) considered the Guardian to be one of the more sympathetic of the elite 
British newspapers.21
The international coverage of the Financial Times under the foreign editorship of J.D.F. Jones underwent a 
period of dramatic expansion following his appointment in 1967 at the age of twenty-seven. David 
Kynaston in his history of the Financial Times comments: 'At a time when most papers were cutting down 
on their foreign staff, the FT  was doing quite the reverse and getting the people in place to provide full 
coverage and analysis.'22 In 1976, following Jones's departure from the foreign editor's post, the Financial 
Times possessed sixteen correspondents and eighty-three stringers. Jones, whose first job after university 
had been on the Pretoria News, retained an interest in South Africa and, following a term as managing 
editor, returned to South Africa as the newspaper's correspondent in 1981. One of his innovations as foreign
17. Freelancers and stringers utilised by The Guardian included Roman Eisenstein, Richard Wagner, 
William Raynor (1972-1973), Denis Herbstein (1976), John Kane-Berman and Steve Friedman (1979).
18. Interviews with Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994; Jonathan Steele, 15 Nov. 1994; Martin Walker, 9 April 
1996; and Richard Gott, 14 May 1996. See Jonathan Steele, 'The other South Africa'. The Guardian 2-5 
March 1970 and Richard Gott, 'Farther to the Right in South Africa', The Guardian. 23 Dec. 1971.
19. Interview with Richard Gott, 14 May 1996.
20. Geoffrey Taylor had been The Guardian's foreign editor from 1960-1969, Northern editor from 1969- 
1972 and assistant editor from 1973. See 'Independence for the Transkei1 & The Transkei state of 
mind', The Guardian. 20 April & 28 May 1976; and his final statement on South Africa, a four-part 
series: ’Afrikanerdom adrift in a sea of change', The Guardian. 15-18 Nov. 1976. For information on 
The Guardian's publication of articles by ANC-SACP associated journalists, see chapter four.
21. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Annual report on activities and developments (London, 1977), p. 22.
22. Kynaston, The Financial Times, p. 376.
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editor had been the establishment of a structure of regional specialists, based in London, who periodically 
travelled and reported from their region. The regional specialist for Africa throughout the 1970s was 
Bridget Bloom.23 Jones and Bloom visited South Africa regularly before the Financial Times's appointment 
of a staff correspondent to the region in 1976.24 Within South Africa, the Financial Times utilised the 
opportunities made possible by the newspaper's 50 per cent holding in the (Johannesburg) Financial Mail 
to employ a number of the latter's reporters as specialist stringers.25 The South African-born columnist, Joe 
Rogaly, only rarely devoted his 'Society Today' column to questions relating to South Africa; when he did, 
however, the resulting articles normally attracted attention.24 Between 1972 and 1975, the Financial Times 
published three surveys on South Africa.27 J.D.F. Jones recalls that 'There was great pressure on us both 
from the [South African] Embassy and from the advertisers in South Africa to steer clear of politics [in the 
surveys].'28 Jones and the Financial Times were not prepared to accept any editorial interference and, as a 
result, during the second half of the 1970s, the newspaper did not publish any surveys on the Republic.29
The Sunday Times employed only five correspondents and no more than a dozen stringers. In addition to 
Benjamin Pogrund's reports, coverage of South Africa during the early 1970s usually consisted of feature 
articles by Sunday Times visiting journalists. After some difficulty in obtaining a work permit from the 
Department of Information, Eric Marsden was appointed correspondent in 1977. On the staff of the 
newspaper in London was South African-born Denis Herbstein, who worked as a stringer in the Republic 
during 1976, until his application for an extension to his work permit was refused. Herbstein was also a 
regular contributor of sympathetic material on the A-AM in Britain. Hugo Young, the editorial writer of
23. On Bridget Bloom, see appendix A. i.
24. Following the appointment of Quentin Peel as the Financial Times correspondent in 1977, visits by 
Bloom decreased. Ian Davidson, foreign editor, visited South Africa in 1978.
25. At one point during the mid-1970s, Financial Mail journalists: John Stewart (Cape Town), Stewart 
Carlyle (Durban), Richard Rolfe (mining) and John Kane-Berman (labour) were all stringing for the 
Financial Times. Although the Financial Times sold their holding in the Financial Mail in the mid- 
1970s, the connection persisted. Bernard Simon (Financial Mail) became the Financial Times's chief 
stringer during the late 1970s.
26. See, for example, Joe Rogaly, 'Lombard: Mr Vorster is a poor risk', Financial Times. 17 Sept. 1976;
’The West cannot win in southern Africa’, Financial Times. 2 Nov. 1977.
27. Financial Times. 17 July 1972; 22 Jan. 1974; 25 Feb. 1975.
28. Interview with J.D.F. Jones, 3 Nov. 1995.
29. Ibid. The Financial Times did not cany Club of Ten advertisements. See chapter three.
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the Sunday Times, also visited South Africa in 1972. The Observer was not permitted by the South African 
government to place a correspondent in the country and therefore like the Guardian depended upon South 
African stringers.30 The newspaper commented in an editorial during 1976: 'If the South Africans are so 
keen to let the world know they have nothing to hide in their country, why do they persistently refuse entry 
visas to our reporters.131 David Martin, the newspaper's Africa correspondent (from 1974) was also not 
allowed to enter the Republic. Peter Deeley was eventually granted a work permit in 1979. The Observers 
global representation was similar to that of the Sunday Times. Of all the British Sunday newspapers, the 
Observer earned the largest number of feature articles on South Africa.32 In Colin Legum, the Observer 
possessed one of Fleet Street's longest-standing and most dominant Africa experts.33
The American newspapers.
The fundamental difference between the British and the American newspapers chosen for analysis in this 
thesis results from the absence of South African journalists in the United States. Additionally, while most 
British newspapers were reducing their foreign coverage during the 1970s, their American equivalents were 
beginning to expand their networks of foreign correspondents. There is a grain of truth in W.A.J. Payne's 
assertion that 'In contrast to Britain and France, where journalists have made a prestigious lifetime career of 
becoming authorities on Africa, an American journalist is expected to approach Africa as a short-term 
assignment in the safari tradition.134 By the 1970s, however, the era of the British 'old Africa hand' had
30. The Observer's stringer in South Africa was Stanley Uys. Uys was succeeded by Hennie Serfontein. 
The Observer also published the Observer Foreign News Service (OFNS) which was syndicated 
world-wide. OFNS carried articles by a wide range of stringers and free-lancers: Colin Smith, Richard 
Wagner (1972-1973), John Borrell (1975-1976), Donald Woods and Roger Omond (1976-77).
31. Editorial, 'Pretoria propaganda'. The Observer. 19 Dec. 1976.
32. Neal Ascherson, The life-blood of apartheid'. The Observer. 20 April 1975, republished in the 
American 'radical' publication, Ramparts. July 1975, pp. 11-13; Lord Goodman, 'A world of tragic 
disillusion' & 'Can the world save South Africa?', The Observer. 18 & 25 Sept. 1977. Lord Goodman's 
parents had been bom in South Africa; Anthony Sampson, 'The General's white lies', 'The spymaster 
and the playboy' & 'The long reach of the arms men', The Observer, 22 Jan.-4 Feb. 1979; Conor Cruise 
O'Brien, 'Metamorphoses of apartheid' & The guilt of Afrikanerdom1, The Observer. 22 & 29 July 
1979. Cruise O'Brien was editor-in-chief of The Observer.
33. On Colin Legum, see appendix A. i.
34. W.A.J. Payne, 'Through a Glass Darkly: The Media and Africa', in Helen Kitchen (ed.), Africa: From
Mystery to Maze (Massachusetts. 1976), p. 219.
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almost passed.3* British journalists arriving in South Africa from the mid-1970s were often on a similar 
career assignment to their American counterparts. At the same time, American journalists were becoming 
increasingly knowledgeable about the countries that they were covering. The American newspapers 
discussed here can be tentatively divided politically as follows: the Wall Street Journal and the Chicago 
Tribune on the right; the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and the Christian 
Science Monitor in the centre; there were no major U.S. newspapers on the liberal-left.36
The New York Times is often described as the United States of America's only 'newspaper of record'. The 
paper's foreign staff was the largest in the world: thirty-two correspondents, reporting from twenty-three 
bureaus, with the support of twenty-five stringers. Excluded from South Africa since the expulsion of Joe 
Lelyveld in 1966, the New York Times maintained correspondents in both Nairobi and Lagos. Before the 
newspaper was permitted to re-open its Johannesburg bureau, the Republic was covered annually by 
Charles Mohr (Nairobi correspondent, 1970-1975). Editorials and background articles were written in New 
York by Graham Hovey.37 C.L. Sulzberger, the newspaper's senior foreign correspondent visited South 
Africa during December 1975. Amongst the other New York Times columnists, the most regular 
commentator was Anthony Lewis. In addition to his two visits to the Republic in 1975 and 1979, Lewis 
turned his twice-weekly 'Abroad At Home - At Home Abroad' column to the subject of South Africa on 
more than twenty occasions.38 Tom Wicker began to address the subject of South Africa during the Angolan 
war. It was at this time that issues relating to southern Africa entered the American political mainstream.
35. For an amusing, if romanticised, account of the 'old Africa hand', see Chris Munnion, Banana Sunday: 
Datelines From Africa (Rivonia. 1993).
36. The six major American newspapers analysed in this study were voted the best six U.S. newspapers in 
an American survey in 1983. Among the 610 people surveyed were newspaper publishers, editors and 
journalism professors. ('Best in the USA', Editor and Publisher, 11 June 1983). On the basis that the 
elite U.S. newspapers tended to exert a significant influence over the other areas of the American 
media, I decided that those newspapers which were judged 'best' in the above poll probably represented 
a good place to start my analysis.
37. Graham Hovey visited South Africa in 1975. See also Leonard Silk, 'Interest and ideology', New York 
Times, 9 Oct. 1973. Leonard Silk was a member of the New York Times editorial board during the 
early 1970s. He visited South Africa in 1973.
38. Exceptional articles by Anthony Lewis included: 'South Africa: The end is inevitable but not 
predictable'. New York Times magazine. 21 Sept. 1975, pp. 13-91; 'State of violence'. New York
Times. 5 Dec. 1977: 'We learned the cost of national racism once before, and said: Never again.' 'State 
of violence: II', New York Times. 8 Dec. 1977: 'The logic of events is moving, and should move, 
toward American economic withdrawal.'
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Three years later, Wicker visited South Africa for a few weeks and filed his thrice-weekly 'In The Nation' 
column from the country.39 During 1976, the New York Times was finally permitted to reopen their 
Johannesburg bureau. Intensive coverage of South Africa followed. One year later, Seymour Topping 
(managing editor) visited southern Africa and interviewed John Vorster.1,0 In November 1977, the New York 
Times carried a powerful editorial which challenged South Africa's long-standing accusation that the 
world's media practised 'double standards' in its coverage:
In our letters columns today, Johan Adler, the Deputy Consul General 
of South Africa asserts that his troubled country is 'a microcosm of the 
world1... In fact, South Africa is not a microcosm of the world. Indeed, 
it is unique: the only state where an entire segment of the population - 
in this case, the nonwhite majority - is altogether denied participation in 
national politics solely because of race ... Ever since the horrors of 
Hitler's Germany became known during World War II, there has been 
almost universal agreement that deprivation and suppression based 
upon ascribed membership in a racial, religious, or ethnic group are 
morally unacceptable. South Africa is unique in its explicit attempt to 
build an entire society upon such racial suppression. It is therefore 
clearly deserving of censure.41
The Washington Post did not employ any foreign correspondents until the 1950s. Yet by the 1970s, the 
newspaper had eleven correspondents, supported by twenty-three stringers. South African coverage 
throughout the 1970s was handled by stringers with regular support from David Ottaway, the 
Washington Post's Africa correspondent.42 The newspaper's previous Africa correspondent, Jim Hoagland 
(1969-1971) had won a Pulitzer Prize in 1971 for his coverage of South Africa. Hoagland returned to the 
Republic for another visit in 1976.43 Peter Osnos, the foreign editor visited South Africa in 1978, in order to 
interview John Vorster. The Washington Post's editor, Benjamin Bradlee visited the country in 1979 with
39. Exceptional articles by Tom Wicker included: 'Investing in apartheid', New York Times. 6 Dec. 1977; 
'Should American business pull out of South Africa?', New York Times magazine, 5 June 1979, pp. 31 
-75.
40. See Seymour Topping, Excerpts from Interview with Prime Minister Vorster on South African policy', 
New York Times, 17 Sept. 1977; Seymour Topping, ’How long can Africa's whites hold out?', New 
York Times magazine, 13 Nov. 1977, pp. 37-114.
41. Editorial, 'South Africa and the double standard', New York Times. 14 Nov. 1977.
42. The Washington Post's stringers in South Africa were Peter Younghusband (1972-1974), Robin Wright 
(1974-1977) and Caryle Muiphy (1977-1981). Muiphy was eventually upgraded to the status of 
correspondent.
43. Jim Hoagland, 'Black power vs. White power: South Africa', Washington Post. 9-16 Jan. 1977.
Hoagland was permitted to enter South Africa for a six-week period on condition that he covered the
'independence' of the Transkei, (Interview with Jim Hoagland, 10 April 1996).
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his wife, the paper's style editor, Sally Quinn.44 With the notable exception of Jack Anderson, the 
Washington Post's columnists did not assign much space to the subject of South Africa in the early 1970s. 
However, during the first eighteen months of the Carter administration, Stephen Rosenfeld, Rowland 
Evans, Robert Novak and William Raspberry visited the Republic.45 South Africa had clearly become a 
major policy story in Washington D.C.. The Washington Post's editorials on South Africa were written by 
Stephen Rosenfeld and Karl Meyer.44
The I d s  Angeles Times was also involved in a programme of foreign expansion. In 1962, the paper had 
possessed only one overseas bureau, but by 1978 it had eighteen. In 1974, Tom Lambert had opened the 
Los Angeles Times bureau in South Africa, but he retired just before the Soweto uprising. Georgie Anne 
Geyer of the newspaper's foreign staff visited for a few days towards the end of June 1976. Veteran 
correspondent Jack Foisie arrived two months later and remained in the country until his retirement in 
1984. In Los Angeles, editorials on South Africa were written by Louis Fleming, who had paid a visit to the 
country in 1974. However, Los Angeles Times correspondents received little assistance from either 
stringers or visiting staff-writers.47 Unlike other American newspapers which favoured a limited term for 
correspondents, the Los Angeles Times operated a system which encouraged both continuity and (a degree 
of) freedom. Jack Foisie later commented that 'Bob Gibson [the foreign editor] was not a great 
communicator with his staffers. I once chided him in a telephone conversation across ten thousand miles for 
not providing me with more "guidance." He replied somberly, "You're getting paid to make judgements. 
When we think you're off base, we'll let you know".'48 Although the Los Angeles Times did not possess any 
regular columnists of the calibre of those who wrote for the New York Times or the Washington Post,
44. Benjamin C. Bradlee, 'Images of Africa', Washington Post. 4 March 1979; Sally Quinn, 'The Afrikaner's 
burden', 'Tea and fury in Soweto', 'Questions of color, burdens of proof' & 'An alliance going sour’ 
Washington Post, 4-7 March 1979.
45. Evans and Novak - June 1977; Stephen Rosenfeld - Oct. 1977; the African-American columnist, 
William Raspberry visited South Africa in April 1978.
46. Meyer also wrote editorials for the New York Times, from 1976.
47. During 1978 and 1979, David Lamb (Nairobi correspondent) and Alvin Shuster (managing editor) 
made short visits to South Africa.
48. Jack Foisie, 'A New Broom or an Old Hand?', Nieman Reports. Winter 1985, p. 16.
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conservative opinion was expressed in William F. Buckley Jr.'s (the editor of the National Review) 
syndicated column and the paper also carried two articles by Barbara Hutmacher.49
The Wall Street Journal operated a system of foreign news-gathering which was described by Time 
magazine in 1980 as lumbering after news instead of sprinting.' However, Time also acknowledged that 
'The Journal's editorial page is possibly the most influential conservative voice in the U.S.'.50 With only 
five overseas bureaus, coverage of Africa was organised from London before the appointment of an Africa 
correspondent, Richard Leger, in 1977. There was often no more than one visit a year to the Republic by 
members of the Wall Street Journal staff. News from South Africa (which was rare) was normally left in 
the hands of South African stringers.51 George Melloan, deputy editor of the paper's editorial page was the 
only senior member of the Journal's staff to visit the Republic during the 1970s. The Wall Street Journal 
carried one 'survey' on South Africa which appears to have been designed solely to offset the threat of 
sanctions.52 The Chicago Tribune did not possess a resident correspondent in South Africa during the 
1970s. Beyond the rare visits of Tribune staff reporters, coverage depended primarily upon the news 
agencies.55 The African-American columnist, Vemon Jarrett, only addressed the question of South Africa 
following the visits of South Africans to Chicago.54 However, Patrick Buchanan's syndicated column 
offered a consistently conservative tone on the subject. Indeed, on a number of occasions, Buchanan served
49. Barbara Hutmacher, 'A South African editor stands his ground', Los Angeles Times. 10 Feb. 1976; 
'South Africa’s bottled-up freedom', Los Aneeles Times, 29 Nov. 1977. Hutmacher was an American 
citizen, who had worked on the (East London) Daily Dispatch in the mid-1970s. See also Barbara 
Hutmacher, In Black and White: Voices of Apartheid (London, 1980).
50. 'A leading economic indicator', Time, 7 July 1980, pp. 44-45.
51. The Wall Street Journal's stringers were Neil Behrinan (1972-1976) and Stephen Mulholland (1977 
1984).
52. Wall Street Journal. 10 Nov. 1978.
53. Visitors included James Yuenger & Clarence Page, 'Wheel of hatred turns, S. African town explodes'
& 'Crisis in black and white', Chicago Tribune. 20 & 27-30 June 1976. Clarence Page was an African- 
American, Yuenger and Page were accompanied by African-American photographer, Ernie Cox Jr. 
Clayton Kirkpatrick, 'Economic pressure for change builds in South Africa1; 'More S. Africa whites 
muster opposition to apartheid'; 'South African moderate blacks' goal: a free and fair life'; 'The world 
has a big stake in a peaceful South Africa', Chicago Tribune, 5 ,7 , 9 & 12 Dec. 1976. Kirkpatrick was 
the editor of the Chicago Tribune. Ray Moseley, 'South Africa: At the crossroads' & 'Industry wants halt 
to S. African bias' & 'U.S. companies erasing apartheid in S. African plants', Chicago Tribune, 4-6 & 
25-26 Nov. 1979. Moseley was a renowned foreign correspondent.
54. See, for example, the following articles written by Jarrett after meeting Donald Woods: Vernon Jarrett,
'Racial war closer in South Africa' & 'Some good advice from South Africa', Chicago Tribune, 21 May 
& 4 June 1978.
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as the most sympathetic columnist the Republic had in the major U.S. newspapers. His belief that 'The most 
virulent strain of racism in the world today is not anti-black, anti-yellow, or anti-red; it is anti-white,' would 
have been shared by Eschel Rhoodie.55 The Chicago Tribune did not devote a large number of reports and 
columns to the subject of South Africa but editorials on the subject appeared as often as those of the other 
elite American newspapers.
The Christian Science Monitor had the smallest circulation of the elite American newspapers discussed 
here but the newspaper was read by Christian Scientists within South Africa who regularly corresponded 
with the editorial staff in Boston.56 The Monitor possessed eight foreign correspondents and forty stringers 
world-wide. Throughout the 1970s, the Africa correspondent was responsible for the coverage of the entire 
region south of the Sahara.57 John Hughes, the newspaper's editor had reported from Africa between 1955 
and 1961. Hughes and the Christian Science Monitor's foreign editor, Geoffrey Godsell, were not born in 
the United States, being Welsh and English, respectively. Godsell visited South Africa in the summer of 
1977 during which period June Goodwin introduced him to Steve Biko.58 Godsell later contributed a six- 
part analysis of the Republic to the paper.59 In keeping with many of the columnists on other newspapers, 
Joseph C. Harsch, the Monitor's veteran columnist did not address the subject of South Africa before 
Western involvement became a significant factor in the Angolan War.
55. Patrick J. Buchanan, 'Young slanders black patriots', Chicago Tribune. 27 March 1977. See also 
Patrick J. Buchanan, 'Who is Carter to cast first stone?1, Chicago Tribune. 27 Oct. 1977: 'And where 
does Carter come off lecturing South Africa on race relations? If memory serves, up until several 
months ago, Carter worshipped at a segregated Southern Baptist Church. Indeed, when an itinerant 
black preacher showed up to pray with Jimmy and the white folks, half the congregation wanted to 
inteiTupt "Nearer My God To Thee1' to go up side his head.'
56. June Goodwin recalls that the Monitor received correspondence from South African Christian Scientists 
regarding her coverage. (Interview with June Goodwin, 5 April 1996).
57. The Christian Science Monitor operated a strict limit on the length of terms for correspondents: Frederic 
Hunter (1969-1973); Henry S. Hayward (1973-1976); June Goodwin (1976-1978); Gary Thatcher 
(1978-). The newspaper preferred its correspondents to be practising Christian Scientists although this 
was not obligatory. Unlike the Los Angeles Times, the Monitor also employed stringers within South 
Africa, see appendix A. ii.
58. Interview with June Goodwin, 5 April 1996.
59. Geoffrey Godsell, 'Crisis in South Africa', Christian Science Monitor, 8-16 Sept. 1977.
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The Bi'itish and American news-inagazines and news agencies.
A simple guide to the British news-magazines would tentatively place the Economist and the Spectator on 
the right and the New Statesman on the liberal-left. Of these magazines, only the Economist offered a 
comprehensive coverage of South Africa during the 1970s. The unsigned reports were normally written by 
the South African journalist, Allister Sparks. Articles in other sections of the magazine were composed by 
Graham Hatton (business) and Benjamin Pogrund, amongst others. Reports in the Economist were heavily 
edited but not re-written.60 The coverage was controlled by an Africa editor in London, operating to a 
similar news system as the Financial Times. John Grimond served in this post during the first half of the 
1970s, during which time he visited the Republic on a regular basis.61 The Economist carried one survey of 
South Africa between 1972 and 1979: a study of gold and its influence on the country.61 Only the final 
pages of the survey addressed the internal politics of the Republic. The magazine also published a 
confidential Foreign Report, which for a period during the 1970s was edited by Robert Moss.63
The New Statesman's opposition to the apartheid regime was normally pronounced. Stanley Uys provided 
regular background articles from South Africa (between 1972 and 1976) and was succeeded by Donald 
Woods (1976) and Roger Omond (1977), A large number of other writers commented on the Republic from 
London.64 Christopher Hitchens exerted a continuous anti-apartheid influence through firstly, the editorials 
and the Crucifer diary, and following his appointment as foreign editor, through articles written as a visitor 
to the country/.65 The Spectator carried fewer reports from South Africa than the New Statesman. During the
60. Interview with John Grimond, 29 Jan. 1996.
61. Between 1974 and 1976, articles by John Grimond on southern Africa were syndicated to the New York 
Times.
62. M.S. Mendelsohn, ’Kruger's golden rand: A survey of gold and South Africa', The Economist. 22 
March 1975.
63. See Edwards, The Pursuit of Reason, pp. 900-901. On Moss, see chapter six.
64. Most notably, Suzanne Cronje (1972-1974).
65. See Christopher Hitchens, 'Aspects of Southern Africa1, New Statesman. 27 Oct. 1978, pp. 534-535; 
'Namibia: The Birth of A Nation', New Statesman. 3 Nov. 1978, pp. 572-576. Another visitor to South 
Africa who filed a series of reports was Steven Lukes, 'Apartheid: visible and invisible', 'White politics: 
the limits of change' & 'Black politics: the dangers of disunity', New Statesman. 19 Oct.-2 Nov. 1979, 
pp. 586-587, 628-629, 676-677.
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first half of the 1970s, the Spectator's regular commentator was Roy Macnab, who was also the London 
director of the South Africa Foundation/6 During the second half of the decade, reports from South Africa 
were often supplied by Richard West.67 The Times's correspondent in the Republic, Nicholas Ashford, filed 
for the Spectator during 1979 while the Times was on strike. Other British publications which carried 
occasional commentaries on South Africa included the satirical magazine, Private Eye, the London listings 
magazine, Time Out, and New Society.
The seven American news-magazines discussed in the next few pages can be differentiated politically as 
follows: U.S. News and World Report, Business Week and National Review on the right; Time, Newsweek 
and the New Republic in the centre; and the Nation on the liberal-left. The only American magazines to 
retain stringers in South Africa throughout the 1970s were Time and Newsweek.™ Time had been excluded 
from the country since the expulsion of Lee Griggs in 1961 and depended during the early 1970s on the 
reports of Peter Hawthorne. Following the Soweto uprising, Lee Griggs was allowed to return for a brief 
visit.69 In 1977, Time were permitted to re-open their Johannesburg bureau under the stewardship of 
William McWhirter. Peter Hawthorne was retained as a stringer. In the build-up to re-opening the bureau, 
John Elson (a Time senior editor) had visited the Republic to interview John Vorster, and Henry Grunwald, 
editor of the magazine, had completed a two-week tour of the country. Grunwald's ensuing analysis rejected 
a ’one man-one vote1 solution but did acknowledge that 'Comparisons should be made not with the rest of 
Africa, but with what the blacks' lot could be in South Africa ... As for the double standard, South Africa 
almost demands to be judged according to higher criteria by the very assets it proclaims.' [original 
emphasis]70
66. For information on the South Africa Foundation, see chapter three.
67. Richard West, who had previously written for the New Statesman and continued to write for Private 
Eve, financed his visits to South Africa by writing travel articles for holiday companies. (Interview with 
Richard West, 28 Nov. 1995).
68. As a rule the vast majority of articles on South Africa in Time were only carried in the international 
edition. The domestic edition of the magazine only carried articles on foreign affairs when the subject 
matter directly related to the United States, All references to Time and Newsweek in this thesis refer to 
the international editions.
69. Lee Griggs was allowed to return to South Africa in order to cover the independence of the Transkei.
70. Henry Grunwald, 'Arguing with South Africa1, Time. 27 June 1977, p. 19.
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Newsweek did not open a South Africa bureau during the 1970s, retaining its Nairobi base as the centre for 
the magazine's coverage of sub-Saharan Africa. Andrew .Taffe (Africa correspondent) was consistently 
refused a visa to enter South Africa. Peter Younghusband operated as Newsweek's stringer in the Republic, 
receiving support from senior editors, Arnaud de Borchgrave and Andrew Nagorski (general editor of 
Newsweek International), during 1976.71 Discussing Time and Newsweek, Mort Rosenblum has observed 
t h a t t h e  role of the desk [in New York or Washington D.C.] is so important that when Newsweek began 
giving by-lines it listed the writers in New York first and then followed with the correspondents who 
actually wrote the story ... the finished product often bears no resemblance in wording or style to what the 
correspondents originally wrote, although ideally the facts stay the same.'72
U.S. News and World. Report's coverage of South Africa was minimal in comparison to that offered by 
Time and Newsweek, The normal method of operation was an annual visit to the Republic by a staff reporter 
from the London bureau. An Africa correspondent was appointed in 1978. Business Week barely mentioned 
South Africa during 1972 and 1973, although coverage increased following the collapse of the Portuguese 
empire.73 During April 1977, George Palmer, the editor of the (Johannesburg) Financial Mail joined 
Business Week as the senior editor in charge of international business coverage. A correspondent, Jonathan 
Kapstein, was situated in South Africa during 1978. Business Week carried one 'special report' on the 
Republic during the decade.74 The N ation  was the first of the news-magazines to carry regular 
commentaries from an American stringer living in South Africa. Andrew Silk's reports for the magazine 
from 1976-1977 demonstrated a degree of understanding, sensitivity and innovation that had not been 
present in previous reporters’ articles on South Africa. The Nation, like its British equivalent, the New 
Statesman, provided regular space to those commentators who were opposed to apartheid.
Although the New Republic was less concerned with South African issues than the Nation, the magazine
71. See Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'We Can Trump Russia', Newsweek. 17 May 1976, pp. 22-23; 'The way the 
BOSS sees it', Newsweek, 25 Oct. 1976, pp. 19-20; Andrew Nagorski, 'A matter of color', Newsweek. 3 
Jan. 1977, pp. 18-20.
72. Mort Rosenblum, Coups and Earthquakes: Reporting the World for America (New York, 1981), p.
131.
73. See opening quotation, footnote 1.
74. 'Special report: Doing business with a blacker Africa', Business Week, 14 Feb. 1977, pp. 64-70.
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spoke for (and to) the American east-coast establishment. This was demonstrated on one level by the 
occasional commentaries on South Africa provided by James Thomson, curator of the Nieman Foundation 
for Journalism at Harvard University.75 Following the Soweto uprising, the New Republic began to publish 
regular articles by Benjamin Pogrund. From 1979, the magazine carried articles by James North (a.k.a. Dan 
Swanson), an American stringer of the calibre of Andrew Silk.76 The National Review adopted an extremely 
conservative position on South Africa in line with its role as the voice of the New Right. Publisher, William 
A. Rusher was a loyal supporter of the Republic and the editor, William F. Buckley Jr., visited South Africa 
in 1974.77 South Africa was only rarely the subject of feature articles in the National Review, as the 
magazine did not employ a stringer or correspondent in the country. Coverage was normally limited to 
editorials, William Buckley's 'On the Right' columns and the occasional report of a visitor to South Africa. 
In 1979, for instance, F.R. Buckley visited Soweto:
Soweto is a settlement where blacks are segregated: a 'slum' it is not, 
failing the definition by as wide a margin as Watts. I've seen worse 
living conditions in St, Louis. In material circumstances it cannot be 
compared with the wretchedness of the shantytowns that ring Caracas,
Bogota, Rio de Janeiro, or Santiago. On the basis of three hours of 
rubber-necking, plus the statistics - and with reasoned regard for the 
political, economic, and historical contexts - Soweto cannot be held up 
as representing any policy of material, mistreatment of blacks, nor any 
racially motivated indifference to their well-being. To the contrary, and 
despite staggering obstacles, Soweto represents a continuing (since 
1948) if sporadic effort by the white government to provide, within the 
constraints o f  apartheid, decent habitation for black miners and 
quarriers, with an inadequate, at times perplexed and ideologically 
loggerheaded - yet persistent - policy of improvements, [original
75. Thomson visited South Africa during 1975 and proceeded to devote half of the Nieman Reports. 
Autumn/Winter 1975 edition to a close examination of South Africa, which included contributions from 
Benjamin Pogrund, John Con' (Philadelphia Enquirer), Gatsha Buthelezi and Percy Qoboza. In the 
editorial for the magazine ('Why South Africa?'), Thomson observed: 'This year's South African 
Nieman - Percy Qoboza ... is again a black, for the first time in a decade.' (p. 61). During 1977 and 
1978, and in conjunction with the persecution of African journalists and black consciousness groups in 
South Africa, Nieman Reports became one of the most vocal forces for liberal 'anti-apartheid' in the 
U.S. establishment. For the campaign regarding Qoboza, see James C. Thomson Jr., 'African Nemesis?', 
Nieman Reports. Summer/Autumn 1977, pp. 2 & 31; 'The Percy Qoboza Case’, Nieman Reports. 
Winter/Spring 1978, pp. 34-37; 'The Percy Qoboza Case: Continued', Nieman Reports. Summer 1978, 
pp. 46-49.
76. See James North, Freedom Rising (New York, 1985).
77. See William A. Rusher, Letter to the editor. New York Times magazine. 16 Nov. 1975, p. 105. During
his visit in 1974, Buckley interviewed John Vorster for his network television show, Firing Line.
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In 1980, Sanford Ungar noted in his analysis of the American media's coverage of South Africa that 
[the] magazines that tend to serve the American intelligentsia and the influential minority interested in 
foreign affairs - The Atlantic Monthly, Harpers, the New Yorker, Commentary, and the like - often feature 
articles about South Africa, both reportorial and philosophical.'79 However, this is only an accurate 
assessment if one ignores the period between 1972 and 1976, when there had been no articles of any 
description on the apartheid regime in the four magazines. The New Yorker earned two major articles on 
South Africa during 1979, both of which were written by the veteran writer, E.J. Kahn Jr.. The two essays 
discussed American investment in South Africa and life in South-West Africa-Namibia.80 Only Esquire, the 
radical monthly, Ramparts, the Progressive and the African-American publication, Encore American and 
Worldwide News, carried major articles on South Africa before the Soweto uprising.81 In the period 
following the Soweto uprising, publications as varied as the New York Review o f Books, Commonweal, 
Fortune, Forbes, Rolling Stone and the journalism review, More devoted space to studies of South Africa.®
The three major international news agencies, R euters, Associated Press (AP) and United Press 
International (UPI) differed significantly in their respective operations in South Africa. Reuters had a long-
78. F.R. Buckley, 'Soweto visited: another country'', National Review, 13 April 1979, p. 482. Compare 
Buckley's impressions of Soweto with Christopher Hitchens, 'Aspects of Southern Africa', New 
Statesman. 27 Oct. 1978, p. 534: 'I expected to find that Soweto was pretty aw fu l... Wrong, of course.
It is far worse than one has heard it is.'
79. Ungar in Hero & Barratt (eds.), The American People, pp. 28-29.
80. E.J. Kahn Jr., 'Annals of international trade: a very emotive subject', New Yorker. 14 May 1979, pp.
117-153; 'A reporter at large: who cares? ... we do!', New Yorker. 25 June 1979, pp. 60-88.
81. Ian Robertson & Phillip Whitten, 'Sexual politics in South Africa', The Progressive. Sept. 1972, pp. 42- 
45; Tad Szulc, 'Why are we in Johannesburg?', Esquire. Oct. 1974, pp. 48-91; Robert A. Manning, Tony 
Hodges & Paula Giddings, 'The South African connection, parts 1 & 2', Encore American &
Worldwide News. 22 March & 5 April 1976, pp. 18-23 & 22-31.
82. Conor Cruise O'Brien, 'South Africa: an ominous lull', New York Review of Books. 27 Sept. 1978; pp. 
28-30; Peter Walshe, Alan Paton, William B. Gould & Thomas J. Downey, ’On the brink in South 
Africa', Commonweal, 10 Nov. 1978, pp. 713-722; Herman Nickel, 'The case for doing business in 
South Africa', Fortune, 19 June 1978, pp. 60-74; John Train, 'South Africa: U.S., don't go home',
Forbes. 27 Nov. 1978; Jan Morris, 'States in siege, part 1: South Africa1, Rolling Stone, 2 June 1977, pp. 
47-53; Patrick Laurence, Martin Schneider, ObedKunene & Daniel Schechter, 'Banned in South 
Africa', More, Dec. 1977, pp. 12-33. See also George W. Ball, 'Asking for trouble in South Africa' & 
Benjamin Pogrund, 'The anatomy of white power', The Atlantic Monthly. Oct. 1977, pp. 43-60; Dan 
Jacobson, 'Among the South Africans', Commentary. March 1978, pp. 32-48.
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standing relationship with the South African Press Association (SAPA) with whom they exchanged foreign 
news for domestic South African reports. AP  exchanged material with South African Associated 
Newspapers (SAAN) and UPI exchanged reports with the Argus Group. AP  and UPI also carried 
photographs, Reuters did not. AP  did not have a broadcast media wing but UPI (United Press International 
Television News - UPITN) and Reuters (Visnews) did. All three agencies retained bureaus in South Africa 
throughout the 1970s, although it should be acknowledged that Reuters possessed a distinct advantage in 
the region. This advantage was a legacy of South Africa's colonial past. The same was true throughout 
Africa, 'By the early 1970s, Reuters had approximately 22 staff correspondents in Africa against Anglo - 
France Presse's (AFP)  24. The American agencies each had approximately half a dozen staff 
correspondents.'®
During the early 1970s, South Africa was a relative backwater for the news agencies, as indeed it was for 
the newspapers. Reuters concentrated on reporting the remunerative Johannesburg stock exchange for 
which it maintained the largest bureau of the agencies. Larry Heinzerling (AP bureau chief, 1974-1978), 
oversaw a major expansion of the AP  staff during his period in the Republic. By the end of the decade, AP 
had six correspondents and stringers in South Africa. UPI were forced by circumstances to work on a much 
smaller budget than Reuters or AP, and only employed one correspondent in the Republic until 1976. 
Recognising the historical advantage which Reuters possessed in the region, AP and UPI concentrated on 
feature articles and analysis. Surprisingly, none of the news agencies employed any African journalists 
during the 1970s, which perhaps explains why news agency 'scoops' were rare. One of the most dramatic 
reports filed by the news agencies: the visit by journalists to Robben Island in April 1977, was only an 
exceptional story because the international newspapers were excluded from the trip.84
Oliver Boyd-Barrett has noted that 'One of the most important features of the ... leading world agencies in 
their role as international news wholesalers is their fundamentally national character.185 Both AP and UPI 
remained dominant throughout the 1970s in the U.S. market, whereas Reuters continued to possess a
83. Oliver Bovd-Barrett. The international news agencies (London. 1980), p. 178.
84. Reuters. 'An outsider's look at a special South African jail', New York Times. 27 April 1977.
85. Boyd-Barrett, in Boyd-Barrett, Seymour-Ure & Tuns tall, Royal Commission on the Press, p. 35.
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distinct advantage in the British market. Within South Africa, all three agencies hired at least half of their 
reporters locally. Reuters had a very large number of South African employees, while AP  retained key posts 
for American journalists. UPI employed a significant number of British or South African staff-writers. 
During the 1970s, in keeping with a number of the newspapers, there was a general trend amongst the news 
agencies to establish head-quarters for continental coverage in Johannesburg. According to the AP foreign 
editor, Nate Polowetzky, the journalists''... access and capacity to function is greater in South Africa than in 
any other country on the continent.85 Two 'radical' news 'feature' agencies were established in 1967 and 
1973, respectively: Gemini (in London) and Africa News (in Durham, North Carolina).87 Although few of 
the major newspapers credited articles to Gemini or Africa News, their influence grew over the decade.
The British and American broadcaster's.
In 1976, Aaron Segal noted that 'If U.S. magazines and newspapers do not have enough reporters on the 
ground to begin to cover Africa, then radio and TV have yet to land. Neither has ever had a single full-time 
correspondent in Africa since World War II.188 This situation was transformed by the Angolan war, the 
Soweto uprising and the intensifying liberation struggle in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. By 1978, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Independent Television News (ITN), Columbia Broadcasting System 
(CBS), National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and American Broadcasting Company (ABC) had all 
established television bureaus in South Africa. Before 1977, it had been normal practice for British 
and American broadcasters either to buy footage from UPITN, Visnews, or freelance reporters, or to send a 
'fireman' into the Republic.87 Television images and reports, therefore, lacked the continuity and fluency 
that might have been expected if resident correspondents had been situated in the country. One of the key
86. Cited by Ungar in Hero & Barratt (eds.), The American People, p. 37.
87. See Richard Bourne, News on a knife-edge: Gemini journalism and a global agenda (London, 1995) & 
'Our turn: a seventh year for Africa News', Africa News, 20 July 1979, pp. 5-7.
88. Aaron Segal, 'Africa and the United States Media', Issue. Vol. VI, No. 2/3, Summer/Fall 1976, p. 49.
89. UPITN was owned by UPI and ITN (25 per cent each) and Paramount Pictures (50 per cent, 1971- 
1974); John McGoff (50 per cent, 1974-1979), see chapter three. Visnews was controlled by Reuters
and the BBC. Within the American market, ABC, NBC and CBS held shares in Visnews. For an
introduction to the complexity of this system of image-production, see W. Stephen Gilbert & Patricia
Williams, 'The news bazaar1, Time Out No. 304, 9 Jan. 1976.
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factors in the establishment of international television bureaus was the launch of the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)'s television service in 1976 which both provided footage to the 
international broadcasters and increased the number of South Africans who were trained to work in 
television production.
The rush to open bureaus in South Africa was, however, a shock to many of the journalists concerned. 
John Simpson later recalled: 'I'd taken the job of BBC radio correspondent in South Africa, having been 
told that there was no question of a television bureau being set up there. Then, a few months later, out came 
John Humphrys - as television correspondent.'90 Michael Nicholson (ITN), who had covered the country for 
many years as a fireman, was the first correspondent to establish a bureau. Humphrys followed soon 
afterwards. For the British broadcasters, South and southern Africa proved to be a lucrative asset, which 
would pay back, in part, British dependence upon the American broadcasters in other areas of the globe. 
Although NBC and ABC opened their own bureaus in the Republic during 1977, they continued to 
exchange material with the BBC and ITN, respectively. CBS had no such relationship with the British 
broadcasters and, indeed, was the last to establish a base in South Africa.91 While Nicholson and Humphrys 
remained in Africa throughout the rest of the 1970s, the turnover of U.S. bureau chiefs was rapid. The first 
ABC correspondent, Rex Ellis, was dismissed within a few months of arriving in South A frica'... when it 
was felt he failed to aggressively pursue the story of Stephen Biko.'92 Other American correspondents relied 
heavily on locally recruited South African or Rhodesian cameramen, technicians and producers.93 During
90. John Humphrys & John Simpson, 'How we met', Independent on Sunday magazine, 10 Dec. 1995, p. 
91.
91. 'Televising Africa for America'. Africa. No. 87, Nov. 1978, pp. 96-97, reported that CBS opened their 
first African bureau in Nairobi during Jan. 1977, under the stewardship of an African-American 
correspondent, Randy Daniels. Although Daniels did report from South Africa, visas to enter the 
Republic continued to prove difficult to obtain. During Feb. 1977, Walter Cronkite, the CBS 
'anchorman1, visited South Africa and complained about the fact that 'We are not permitted to have a 
resident correspondent here - our requests for visas are largely denied. But we have a correspondent in 
the Soviet Union.' ('No ban on visas for CBS', SA Digest, 25 Feb. 1977, p. 25. SA Digest was a 
Department of Information publication.) CBS opened a bureau in South Africa during 1978 with a 
white American correspondent.
92. Ellen Graham, 'Serious competitor: ABC News improves but ratings still lag, under Arledge regime', 
Wall Street Journal. 26 April 1978.
93. Interviews with Heather Allen, 16 April 1996; Keith Shaw, 26 May 1995; Tony Wasserman, 4 Oct.
1996.
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the two years following the establishment of SABC television, a significant number of the newly-trained 
SABC staff departed for jobs with the international broadcasters.
Although regular news reports from television correspondents based in South Africa were a new 
development during the late 1970s, British and American broadcasters had always possessed other means 
of covering the country. Perhaps, the most important of these was the utilisation of documentary films, 
'specials' or television series on the subject. British television consistently discussed political developments 
in South Africa more regularly and at greater depth than the Americans. The weekly BBC programme, 
Panoram a , for instance, carried reports or interviews from South Africa on more than half-a-dozen 
occasions between 1973 and 1978.94 On Independent Television in Britain, Thames Television's This Week, 
Granada Television's World In Action and London Weekend Television (LWT)'s Weekend World became 
increasingly concerned with issues relating to South Africa in the period between 1976 and 1978. This 
Week, under the influence of David Elstein and Jonathan Dimbleby, adopted a notably anti-apartheid 
stance.93 During the same period, South African politicians and the apartheid issue became a regular source 
of debate on CBS's Face the Nation, ABC's Issues and Answers and NBC's Meet the Press.96
Four programmes or series broadcast on British television during the 1970s require additional comment. 
On 12 December 1974, the BBC's Man Alive screened an edited version of the independently-made film, 
Last Grave at Dimbaza, which provided a harrowing portrait of poverty and infant mortality in a South 
African 'bantustan'. However, the BBC appeared to have succumbed to the entreaties of the South African 
Department of Information, in that it also screened a propaganda film contributed by Vlok Delport, Director
94. Subjects covered by Panorama included the police shooting of miners in the Transvaal (Sept. 1973);
The Angolan war (Jan. 1976); the Soweto uprising (June 1976); Kissinger's diplomacy (Sept. 1976); an 
interview with John Vorster (Feb. 1977); an interview with Roelof Botha (Nov. 1977); and the breaking 
of the arms embargo against South Africa (Nov. 1978). In 1974, Panorama broadcast an interview with 
John Vorster which had originally appeared on William Buckley's Firing Line in the U. S..
95. Clancy Sigal, 'Balance', The Spectator. 26 Nov. 1977, p. 32: 'Comparing current television coverage of 
news with the older newsreels, Dimbleby demolishes the concept of the objective reporter. "The 
obsession with balance" he insists, "distorts truth ... My fear is that when our successors look back on 
the coverage of events in South Africa ... by the British media today they will look back with the same 
kind of dismay that now we look back on the way the cinema covered the events in the 'thirties in 
Germany".'
96. John Vorster appeared on both Face the Nation and Issues and Answers in 1976 and 1977. Vorster was
also interviewed on public television's The MacNeil-Lehrer Report, which regularly covered the South
African story. (Ungar in Hero & Barratt (eds.), The American People, p. 38.)
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of Information at the South African Embassy in London. The pair of films were broadcast, in conjunction 
with a studio debate which pitted Albert Dhlomo (an ex-Robben Island prisoner), the film's director and a 
missionary who had recently visited South Africa, against Delport, L.E.S. de Villiers (the Deputy-Secretary 
for Information) and an African supporter of the South African government's policy of grand apartheid. 
Charles Curran, the Director-General of the BBC later defended the programme by asserting th a t '... we 
shall go on ... with these unique balancing acts. And we shall do so, as we did on this occasion, without any 
pressure compelling us other than our own wish to be as fair as we can, even in the most emotive 
controversies.'57 When Last Grave at Dimbaza was screened on American public television ten months 
later, there was no accompanying South African propaganda film.98
Eighteen months later, the BBC screened a series of four programmes on The Philpott File which 
addressed the issue of the introduction of television in South Africa. Unfortunately, these fundamentally 
light-weight programmes were broadcast during the Soweto uprising, in the context of which Philpott's 
faith in the liberalising effect of television must have appeared quite strange.99 In complete contrast to the 
work of Trevor Philpott, the series of films, The South African Experience, made by Antony Thomas for 
Anglia Television (ATV) and screened during November and December 1977, was, in the words of Sadie 
Forman (Anti-Apartheid News), '... an historic document. Those watching were able to know, sometimes 
loud, sometimes muted but always clear, what is happening in South Africa right now and the definitive 
part played by Britain in shoring up apartheid."00 The three films, functioning as a triptych, examined: the
97. Charles Curran, Letter to the editor, Sunday Times, 22 Dec. 1974.
98. C. Gerald Fraser, '"Dimbaza," film smuggled out of South Africa, won aid of church and labor' & John 
J. O'Connor, TV: On oppression in South Africa', New York Times, 27 Oct. 1975. The WNET TV 
screening was followed by a debate between Anthony Lewis (New York Times) and the South African 
Ambassador to the U.S. and U.N., Roelof Botha.
99. The Philpott File: SA faces television. BBC 2, 8-29 July 1976. For an example of the tone of the 
programmes, see Trevor Philpott, 'The end of an innocent age?', The Listener. 8 July 1976, pp. 2-4. See 
also Department of Information, Report for the Period 1 January 1976 to 31 December 1976 (Pretoria, 
1977), p. 6, which published a letter from Trevor Philpott to Eschel Rhoodie: 'We hope that we'll show 
that there is a good deal of entertainment and laughter in South Africa instead of the usual solemn and 
ominous view of the country which is so often the only one that is presented by the foreign media.'
100. Sadie Fonnan, 'Working for Britain - apartheid-style’, Anti-Apartheid News. Jan./Feb. 1978, p. 11.
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story of Sandra Laing, an Afrikaner child who was reclassified as 'coloured'; the events of the Soweto 
uprising; and the international beneficiaries of the apartheid system, through an examination of the wages 
and conditions at Tale and Lyle, British Leyland and the General Electric Company.
Thomas, who had worked for the South African government as a young film-maker during the early 1960s, 
recalls that although the Department had provided him with a 'minder' during the research stage of the 
documentary film, he was not harassed during the actual making of the programmes.101 The South African 
Experience had a profound impact on British viewers and Thomas was awarded the British Academy of 
Film and Television Arts Award for the best factual television series of 1977. Stanley Uys commented in 
the Rand Daily Mail: 'After this film [The Search for Sandra. Laing], the South African Department of 
Information and all its associated publicists and propagandists, might as well fold their tents and steal 
away.'102 However, it was the third film in the series, Working for Britain, which attracted the most political 
attention within Britain. Tate and Lyle claimed that the film '... contain[ed] grossly distorted statements 
which combine to give a totally unrepresentative picture'.103 While Tate and Lyle managed to delay the 
showing of the film by one week, they failed to silence Thomas and ATV. The one-hour television debate 
after the showing of the film provided a platform for a genuine anti-apartheid voice, in the person of Abdul 
Minty. The failure of Chris van der Walt (the Director of Information at the South African Embassy) and 
Louis Luyt to provide an effective defence for South Africa had significant repercussions within the 
Department of Information.104
The films made by Antony Thomas were eventually screened in 30 countries, including the United States. 
SA Digest reported Eschel Rhoodie as commenting that 'Through [Thomas's] actions he ha[s] slammed the
101. Interview with Antony Thomas, 26 July 1996.
102. Stanley Uys, 'S.A.'s image badly slurred', Rand Daily Mail, 3 Dec. 1977.
103. 'An Announcement by Tate & Lyle Limited', advertisement, Daily Express. 14 Dec. 1977.
104. Luyt's television performance and the fact th a t'... Dr Rhoodie did not have much good to say about 
it,' led, eventually, to Luyt and the Department of Information parting company. Within a few weeks, 
the first exposes of the Information scandal emerged in the South African press. (Mervyn Rees &
Chris Day, Muldergate; The Story of the Info Scandal IJohannesburg. 1980], p. 118, citing Louis 
Luyt's evidence to the Mostert Commission). See also Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 
1979, transcript, p. 382.
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door tight in the face of other foreign TV film producers.'105 Thomas recalls that ATV were very 
frightened by the experience.'106 The South African Experience represented the end of a period in which 
relatively radical documentaries on South Africa appeared on British commercial television. Within a few 
months, David Harrison arrived in the Republic to make a four part series on the history of the Afrikaners 
for the BBC. He later explained that although we got a  lot of stick over Antony Thomas', it was possible 
to make a series in South Africa because the Department of Information wanted the Afrikaners' story to be 
told: '... the argument that we had been getting ... was "You guys - all you talk about is the irritations of 
petty apartheid. You don't know anything about the history - you don't understand what we're trying to do - 
you never tell people about the grand design" ... so I said "okay, lets do it".'107
The White Tribe o f Africa proved to be both retrogressive and confusing. Screened during January 1979, at 
the height of the Information scandal, the series might have revealed to the viewer Afrikaner culture in 
crisis, Instead, it offered a representation of the Afrikaner which had barely changed over the previous 
twenty years. In this respect, Harrison and the BBC were not alone. American documentaries also 
concentrated on the mysterious power of the mythologised 'white tribe'. The radical American film-maker, 
Peter Davis's work, The White Laager, while attempting to emphasise the anti-apartheid position also '... 
documents the white power version of South Africa. No Black person speaks in the film, and scenes of 
Blacks are seem as if from white eyes.'108 Among the most dramatic documentaries made by the network 
American broadcasters on the subject of South Africa during the 1970s was NBC Reports: Africa's 
Defiant White Tribe. However, even this ostensibly intelligent treatment, which referred directly to the
105. 'Door closed', SA Digest. 9 Dec. 1977, p. 9.
106. Interview with Antony Thomas, 26 July 1996.
107. Interview with David Harrison, 8 Dec. 1995. See also David Harrison, 'In search of the White Tribe', 
The Listener. 1 Feb. 1979, pp. 181-182, which recounts the problems faced during the filming of the 
series. These problems included Eschel Rhoodie's demands for a right of response. The second part of 
The White Tribe of Africa, which examined the Broederbond, was awarded the Royal Television 
Society Supreme Award for Best Documentary of the Year, 1979.
108. Kimberley Safford, 'Peter Davis' Film View of South Africa: An American review', Critical Arts, Vol. 
1, No. 2, June 1980, p. 96. Davis's second film study of South Africa, Generations of Resistance
(1980), viewed the society from the African perspective. The White Laager (1977) was made in 
conjunction with the United Nations and screened on public television in the U.S..
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economic base of apartheid and discussed South Africa's nuclear programme, concentrated its focus on the 
Afrikaner. As the Washington Post television reviewer observed: 'Most of the interviews are with whites, 
who control the country. It's a fundamental way to look at an explosive situation.'109
While the failings of the American television broadcasters might be explained by the relative lack of 
knowledge in the U.S. media about South Africa, no such excuse was available for the BBC. In his 
comprehensive study on the reporting of South Africa by the BBC between 1948 and 1961, Howard Smith 
has suggested th a t '... the frame of reference had been set immutably after Sharpeville' and that since that 
time, the BBC '... could not be "neutral, unbiased or impartial'" on the subject of apartheid.110 While this 
may be true at a formal level, in practice, the BBC's television coverage of South Africa during the 1970s 
demonstrated a significant degree of tolerance for the apartheid state. Radio coverage of the Republic was 
particularly dominated by the BBC during the 1970s. In 1972, the BBC was the only radio broadcaster to 
have a resident correspondent in the country.111 The BBC continued to differentiate between television 
reporters and radio staff, although on occasions journalists would be expected to utilise either medium. 
Turnover of correspondents was relatively rapid during the 1970s, with the average term of residency being 
eighteen months. Within South Africa, BBC radio employed Peter Hawthorne as a stringer; in London, the 
most regularly called upon commentators were Bridget Bloom and Stanley Uys.112 BBC Radio 4 covered 
events in South Africa in greater detail than the television broadcasters with major news stories being 
reported on the Today programme, the World at One, the P.M. show and The World Tonight. From Our 
Own Correspondent, the weekly foreign news programme, also featured many South African reports 
during the late 1970s. BBC domestic radio was, however, on occasions open to pro-South African opinion,
109. Hollie I. West, 'Africa's Defiant White Tribe', Washington Post, 27 July 1977. For information on the 
making of the film, see Richard Poliak, Up Against Apartheid: The Role and Plight of the Press in 
South Africa (Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1981), pp. 88-89.
110. Howard Smith, 'Apartheid, Sharpeville and "Impartiality": the reporting of South Africa on BBC 
television 1948-1961'. Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, Vol. 13, No. 3,1993, p. 291, 
citing Sir Hugh Greene, The Conscience of the Programme Director (London, 1965),
111. Voice of America covered events in South Africa from a neighbouring country.
112. For Hawthorne's list of strings, see appendix A i. Uys and Bloom also regularly appeared on BBC
television and ITN.
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and demonstrated much the same acquiescence and concern for 'balance' as BBC television.113
BBC World Service Radio provided the most comprehensive coverage of South African news on an}' 
British or American radio station. World Service Radio, in addition to breaking a number of significant 
stories, was the first and only section of the international media to employ an African stringer in the 
R epublic .114 Focus on Africa , under the editorship of Israel Wamala, featured reports by BBC 
correspondents and background material by freelance reporters, stringers and print journalists such as 
David Martin. Following the Soweto uprising and the establishment of American television bureaus in the 
Republic, CBS Radio and ABC Radio began to broadcast reports to the United States.115 By the end of 
the 1970s, National Public Radio, which was, in effect, an U.S. version of the BBC, possessed a stringer 
in South Africa and programmes such as Morning Edition and All Things Considered regularly debated 
the apartheid issue.116 With Africa News and the Christian Science Monitor's extensions into the production 
of radio news, the subject of South Africa became available to an increasingly large radio audience in the 
United States.
Information of the sort contained in this chapter, while prosaic on one level, is also central to any study of 
the media which wishes to address the issues raised in chapter one. The, often very brief, visits to South 
Africa by the senior members of the editorial staff of the news organisations were important because they 
demonstrated the perceived significance of the South African 'story1. At its core, this chapter has been an 
attempt to describe the complicated, and at times inchoate, discourse between the correspondents in South 
Africa and the editorial staff (and commentators) in Britain and North America. This discourse is examined
113. For rumours regarding the attitude of senior editors at the BBC towards South Africa and the South 
African government, see 'Media news', Private Eve, No. 390,26 Nov. 1976, p. 3 & 'Street of Shame', 
Private Eve, No. 401, 29 April 1977, pp. 4-5. See also Editorial, 'No news', Daily Telegraph. 16 Sept. 
1976: ’Mr Desmond Taylor, the head of BBC news and current affairs, lamented on Tuesday that 
South Africa was the freest country in Africa from which to report news.' This was at a time when the 
South African police were arresting African journalists and detaining them without trial.
114. Nat Serache, an African reporter on the Rand Daily Mail was recruited as a stringer by the BBC World 
Sendee in 1973. See chapter eight.
115. ABC possessed four separate radio networks, supplying 1400 radio stations in the United States. CBS 
and NBC each owned one radio network. (Rosenblum, Coups and Earthquakes, p. 146).
116. Ungar in Hero & Barratt (eds.), The American People, p. 38.
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further in the case-studies (chapters five-to-seven). Penetrating the media discourse and thereby influencing 
the development of the media’s representations, was the central task of South Africa's Department of 
Information and the anti-apartheid movements. Their attempts to achieve this aim are examined in the next 
two chapters. The successes and failures of the news organisations in their coverage of South Africa and, 
perhaps most critically, the social and political forces which impinged upon the work of the correspondents 
and stringers will be examined in the conclusion to this thesis (chapter eight).
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CHAPTER THREE
INFORMATION &/OR PROPAGANDA.
[Eschel Rhoodie] was probably the most brilliant propagandist of the 
century - 1 think he was better than Goebbels,1
I specifically said to [John Vorster]: rI want you to approve, not an 
information asset, but a propaganda war in which no rules or 
regulations count. If it is necessary for me to bribe someone, then I 
would bribe him or her. If it is necessary for me to purchase, for 
example, a sable mink coat for an editor's wife then I should be in a 
position to do so. If it is necessary for me to send somebody on a 
holiday to the Hawaiian Islands with his mistress for a month, then I 
should be able to do so.12
The South African government's relationship with the international media had been riven with difficulty 
since 1948. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre (1960), the relationship was 
tortuous. National Party (NP) politicians were well aware of the power of the press, having been subject to 
anti-Afrikaner coverage in the British media since the nineteenth century, and having utilised the 
Afrikaans-language media throughout the long journey from nascent nationalism to the election victory of 
1948.3 It would therefore be completely inaccurate to suggest that the NP were 'anti-press'.4 They were, in 
fact, ardent supporters of the press, so long as it was under their control and served their requirements. In 
1950, the South African government established a Press Commission of Inquiry with a brief to investigate 
the domestic and the international press in South Africa. The full findings of the Commission were finally 
published in 1964 and stretched to nearly eight-thousand-pages. The Commission employed a system for 
judging the 'quality' of the coverage in the foreign media which divided the reports into four categories: 
'good1, 'faulty', 'bad' and Very bad'. 'Very bad reporting' was described as '... either blindly partisan or
1. Interview with Carl Noffke, 12 May 1995. Noffke was the Director of Information at the South African 
Embassy in Washington D.C., from 1975.
2. Mervyn Rees & Chris Day, Muldergate: The Storv of the Info Scandal (Johannesburg, 1980), p. 172, 
citing interview with Eschel Rhoodie.
3. On the role played by Afrikaans-language newspapers in the construction of Afrikaner nationalism, see 
Isabel Hofmeyr, 'Building a nation from words: Afrikaans language, literature and ethnic identity, 1902 
-1924', in Shula Marks & Stanley Trapido (eds.), The Politics of race, class & nationalism in twentieth 
century South Africa (London, 1987), pp. 95-123. Richard Poliak, Up Against Apartheid: The Role and 
the Plight of the Press in South Africa (Carbondale & Edwardsville, 1981), pp. 12, observed that 'A 
strong cross-pollination characterizes Afrikaner journalism and politics.1 D.F. Malan was the editor of 
Die Burger before becoming prime minister; H.F. Verwoerd (prime minister, 1958-1966) was the first 
editor o fDieTransvaler. During the 1970s, many leading NP politicians served on the boards of the 
respective Afrikaner publishing companies, Perskor and Nasionale Pers.
4. Poliak, Up Against Apartheid, p. 38.
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unscrupulously tendentious, the selection is so tendentious, prejudiced and/or unscrupulous as to distort 
the South African political and racial scene and the comment is so blindly partisan and/or 
unscrupulous as to be generally unjustifiable.'* The reports of the full-time correspondents in South Africa, 
between 1950 and 1955, were evaluated as being '... good, 3.62; faulty, 1.02; bad, 14.70; and very bad, 
80.66 per cent.’6
Between 1948 and 1972, the Information service of South Africa was reorganised on a regular basis, most 
significantly in 1961 when the Department of Information was founded.7 However, it had long been felt by 
a number of the Department's civil servants that it had consistently failed to defend the country from 
international criticism.® In 1968, for example, John Howland Beaumont, the editor of South African 
Panorama (a Department of Information publication) resigned and informed the press that 'Much of what 
was published by the department to promote the official South African viewpoint abroad ... was misdirected 
and used the wrong tone, so that it often did South Africa's image overseas more harm than good.'9 This 
chapter examines the activities of the Department of Information and South Africa's other propaganda 
agencies during the 1970s by considering the following: the Department of Information, during 1972-1976, 
when there was a concerted attempt to put a programme of media manipulation into action; it also covers 
the Information scandal (also known as 'Muldergate') which led to the resignation of both the Minister and 
the Secretary for Information; the secret projects engineered by the Department in connection with the 
international media; and the complementary roles played by the South Africa Foundation, the private-sector 
propaganda agency, and BOSS, South Africa's intelligence agency.
5. Second Portion of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Press (Pretoria, 1964), Appendix to 
Annexure XX, p. v.
6. Ibid, p. 1617.
7. See Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making 
(Johannesburg, 1984), pp. 16-17.
8. Eschel Rhoodie. The Real Information Scandal /Pretoria, 1983), p. 82, described the Department of 
Information, before 1972, as being like a 'glorified post office.'
9. A.J. Wannenburgh, 'Ex-Information editor slates S.A. publicity’, (Johannesburg) Sunday Times. 15 Sept.
1968.
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The Department of Information, 1972-1976.
In 1968, Dr. Connie Mulder was appointed Minister of Information. Three years later, he undertook an 
extensive overseas tour with the Secretary for Information, Gerald Barrie, in order to examine the 
'propaganda offensive' facing South Africa. Mulder later informed Deon Geldenhuys that 'The essence of 
their findings was that the international propaganda offensive against South Africa was well organised, 
highly sophisticated and generously funded ... In a report submitted to the prime minister it was 
recommended that South Africa ... should immediately and actively get involved in the propaganda war and 
employ the same methods as its opponents.' Mulder instigated the first secret projects upon his return from 
the tour. Heinz Behrens, a German public relations specialist, was hired to feed articles into the European 
media, and To The Point magazine was launched with the support of government funds through extensive 
subscriptions.10 Meanwhile, Mulder encouraged the elevation of Gerald Barrie to the post of Auditor- 
General and began the search for a Secretary and Deputy-Secretary for Information capable of putting the 
new propaganda programme into action.11 The civil servants who were chosen were Eschel Rhoodie and 
L.E.S. de Villiers.12 Both Rhoodie and de Villiers had been affected by their experience of overseas anti- 
South African vitriol: 'As a press and information officer in the United States just after the Sharpeville 
shootings in 1960,1 was spat upon by American students ... I therefore knew what it was to be humiliated 
for being a South African.113 Rhoodie's appointment was ratified in August 1972 against the wishes of
10. Geldenhuys. Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 84-85.
11. Mulder believed Barrie to lack '... both the experience and the innovativeness [which he] sought in the 
Department's top official.' (Ibid. p. 85, citing interview with Connie Mulder).
12. Eschel Rhoodie was born in 1932. He worked as a journalist during the mid-1950s for a South African 
Defence Force publication and Die Vaderland. In 1958 he joined the Information Service and between 
1958 and 1972 served three terms in the United States of America, Australia/New Zealand and Holland. 
Rhoodie's doctoral dissertation compared the penal systems of the Commonwealth. This was rapidly 
followed by a trilogy of books: South-West: The Last Frontier in Africa (Johannesburg, 1967); The 
Third Africa (Cape Town, 1968): The Paper Curtain (Johannesburg. 1969). During 1971, he was 
employed as Special Advisor to Connie Mulder. At the beginning of 1972, Rhoodie resigned from the 
Information Service in order to work as the assistant editor of To The Point.
L.E.S. de Villiers was born in 1935. His full name was Lourens Erasmus Smit de Villiers and thus he 
was nicknamed 'Les'. De Villiers worked as a journalist with the SABC and Nasionale Koerante 
(National Newspapers), and in public relations with an oil company during the 1950s. In 1960 he joined 
the Information Service and served two terms abroad in Canada and the United States of America, 
where he befriended an American publisher, John McGoff. An article by de Villiers on the 
representation of South Africa was published as ’A Scarecrow Image', New York Times. 3 Aug. 1971. 
Neither Rhoodie nor de Villiers were members of the National Parly or the Broederbond.
13. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 79. See also Les de Villiers, Secret Information (Cape Town, 1980), p.
26.
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the Public Service Commission.14
Rhoodie suggests in his memoir that his book, The Paper Curtain, had been central to Mulder's decision.15 
According to Rhoodie, the 'Paper Curtain' which afflicted South Africa differed '... from the Russian 'Iron 
Curtain', East Germany's infamous 'Wall' and Red China's 'Bamboo Curtain' in that it is being drawn not by 
the people held responsible for all the 'evil deeds' of apartheid but by the very people who claim that they 
wish to introduce reason into South Africa.' [original emphasis]16 Rhoodie's book also launched a number of 
criticisms of the international media which the Department of Information promoted throughout the 1970s. 
The most common of these were the concepts of 'double-standards' and 'journalistic racism'. By double- 
standards, Rhoodie meant that South Africa was being judged in isolation and not by the standards of other 
countries, while by journalistic racism he meant that ’... the very same people who advocate this philosophy 
[the establishment of a non-racist South Africa] set an example of racialism (anti-White racialism) by 
ignoring crimes of Black against White and Black against Black.’17
A number of years later, Rhoodie recalled that his inspiration for The Paper Curtain had been an ex-CIA 
employee, whom he had met in the United States in the early 1960s. 'Mr Brown', or 'Brownie' as Rhoodie 
titled this mysterious figure, believed that 'The only way to influence the media was to own it, or to own 
some of the senior people in it.'18 This analysis inspired Rhoodie's preoccupation with 'elite' politicians and 
newspaper executives. The suggestion that in order to influence the media one needed to own all or part of 
it later contributed to his downfall; ownership did not and could not mean absolute control. The Paper 
Curtain was an orthodox work of propaganda in that it lacked the degree of objectivity which would have 
made balanced analytical judgement possible. However, for all its contradictions, Rhoodie's book was a 
cunning polemic which managed to utilise the Afrikaner distrust of an uncontrolled media, while
14. J.H.P. Serfontein, 'Verkramptes upset over Rhoodie', (Johannesburg) Sunday Times. 3 Sept. 1972,
15. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 69.
16. Rhoodie. Paper Curtain, p. 81.
17. Ibid, p. 97. The Department also invoked a global metaphor in defence of the Republic: 'If we wanted to 
say something about the racial situation in South Africa, we should emphasise ... that this was a 
microcosmic of the world and just as there were no easy solutions to the problems of the world, there 
were no easy solutions to South Africa. (Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, transcript, 
p. 402).
18. Rees & Day, Muldergate. p. 164.
- 67-
suggesting that resistance to the imagined misrepresentations was possible if the will, the funding and the 
ideas could be found. Rhoodie had, in effect, promoted himself as the only South African media analyst 
capable of taking on the task. Years later, he admitted to Mervyn Rees that the real reason for the 
Department of Information's involvement in covert propaganda activity was the unwillingness of private 
sector groups to do the job for South Africa: 'I heard so many times Afrikaans business leaders ... 
expressing their feelings of patriotism, but they never put their money where their mouths were.'19
During his first year as Secretary of Information, Rhoodie attempted to mobilise support in the South 
African government for the necessary funding required to transform the function of the Department of 
Information from what was in his opinion '... the official policy during the period 1955 to 1970 ... [which] 
was not to do anything,1 to something more substantial and proactive.20 At the Perskor annual dinner in 
September 1972, Rhoodie attempted to convince leading Afrikaner politicians of the importance of 
launching a propaganda offensive which was prepared to employ 'whatever means necessary':
There are certain factors, certain political realities, certain thrusts in 
foreign criticism of South Africa that we must take note of, side-step, 
blunt, meet head-on, try to avoid or to neutralise in order to promote a 
better image of South Africa ... It is difficult for us ... to counter [these 
factors, currents, and events] because our efforts will always be 
criticised as that of paid apologists for the government. But they are 
factors that can be countered by organising and making extensive use of 
existing goodwill among individuals, companies and organisations and, 
where they are non-existent, we should look to creating our own. Such 
non-governmental voices, independent, or ostensibly independent, 
whether South African or foreign, are very often more effective, are 
listened to and are considered more seriously than our own.21
One month later, Rhoodie discussed his plans for the Department with the Rand Daily Mail. In a peculiar 
interview littered with military metaphors ('... in the front line trenches in the international battle for 
recognition and understanding') Rhoodie revealed th a t'... there would also be a change in the emphasis of 
publicity methods and he foresaw a lime when 50 to 60 per cent of the department's methods would be 
"hidden", not in the sense of secrecy or subversion, but on an indirect basis. Events would be exploited to
19. Rees & Day, Muldergate. p. 204.
20. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 42.
21. Ibid p. 56.
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South Africa's advantage, even if they did not directly affect the country.'22 An immediate innovation within 
the Department of Information was the promotion of Les de Villiers and Deneys Rhoodie to the position of 
joint-Deputy-Secretary. In addition, the Department's institutional structure was expanded from four 
divisions to eight. The Division for Planning and Special Projects which was, in effect, responsible for 
secret projects was headed by Les de Villiers.
New secret projects included two advertising front-organisations, the Committee for Fairness in Sport and 
the Club of Ten; a massive increase (30,000) in overseas subscriptions for To The Point; and the 
employment of two journalists, Bernard Lejeune and Karl Breyer.23 Lejeune, a Frenchman, would later 
facilitate links between South Africa and Francophone African states. Breyer, a German photographer, used 
Department of Information funds (R26,000 per annum) to establish a photo-news agency which supplied 
material to a large number of European publications. Both Lejeune and Breyer had previously had their 
work published by To The Point and according to Rhoodie and de Villiers, both journalists offered their 
services to the Department without being approached.24 In addition, Rhoodie commissioned Richard 
Manville Inc., a New York public-relations firm, to engage in a market analysis at a cost of R280,000. The 
report which eventually covered 14 countries and stretched to 17 volumes proved very disconcerting for the 
Department of Information, 'Apartheid, it was confinned, was the one word that popped into people's minds 
most frequently when questioned about South Africa. In most countries, the word and the general concept 
of what it signified made South Africa the most unpopular nation barring one - Idi Amin's Uganda. We 
rated well below Red China ... and Russia.05 The survey had an immediate impact upon members of the 
South African government who were privy to the data. Rhoodie later acknowledged that i t '... contributed
22. Keith Abendroth, 'Rhoodie ready to bruise a few toes for South Africa', Rand Daily Mail. 24 Oct. 1972.
23. On Breyer, see Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 61; On Lejeune, see de Villiers, Secret Information, p. 50.
24. A third journalist who appears to have been financed by the Department of Information was Guy 
Lorraine. Lorraine's name appears on the Department's secret projects list - see appendix B. i., project 
G. 16 O, although there is no mention of him in the various memoirs relating to the subject. Lorraine 
barely wrote any reports for the international media, except Guy Lorraine, 'Strike trembles South 
Africa', Christian Science Monitor. 7 Feb. 1973. None of the journalists who worked for the Christian 
Science Monitor during the 1970s have any memory of him.
25. de Villiers, Secret Information, p. 108. See also Jack Anderson, 'The "worst leader" list', Washington 
Post. 16 March 1975, in which Vorster was placed eighth (after Idi Amin, Nguyen Van Thieu, Augusto 
Pinochet, Muammar Qaddafi, Lon Nol, Ferdinand Marcos and Kim II Sung) by a poll of thirty foreign 
affairs experts.
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enormously to Vorsler's eventual decision to launch the first in a series of two five-year propaganda 
campaigns. If South Africa's image was not much better than Uganda's, then previous methods, diplomatic 
and otherwise, had obviously failed.'26
On 3 December 1973, the Department of Information finally received the blessing of the Prime Minister. 
In a circular letter, which had actually been written by the Rhoodie brothers and de Villiers, Vorster 
informed Cabinet Ministers that 'In the light of increasing political and propaganda attacks against the 
Republic ... it has become necessary ... to adapt the functions of the Department of Information accordingly 
... In the execution of his objectives it is left to the Minister of Information to decide what methods, 
medium and actions, whether public or secret, will be the most effective or necessary.127 Rhoodie’s sense of 
power can be detected in the Department of Information's Annual Report for 1973: '[The Department's] 
instruction is to reach, convince and influence opinion-formers and decision-takers across the whole 
spectrum of public life in all countries that are of importance to us ... In order to give effect to this, no 
medium, channel or tactics will be overlooked.128
During January 1974, Mulder and de Villiers visited the United States of America. During this tour, 
Mulder had a secret forty-minute meeting with Vice-President Gerald Ford. This meeting was arranged by 
the American publisher, John McGoff. Other meetings were held with Ronald Reagan, then Governor of 
California, and a number of Congressmen and Senators. In addition, Mulder and de Villiers visited the 
editorial board of the New York Titnes, where it was later claimed an agreement had been reached regarding 
the re-opening of the newspaper's bureau in Johannesburg.29 Soon after their return to South Africa, Mulder
26. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 60-61.
27. Ibid, p. 63.
28. Department of Information, Report for the Period 1 January 1973 to 31 December 1973 (Pretoria,
1974), p. 6.
29. de Villiers, Secret Information, pp. 65-66. Details regarding this meeting are problematic. A rumour
emerged that the New York Times had agreed for their correspondent, Charles Mohr's, coverage to be
evaluated over a specified period by the Department of Information. A number of New York Times
journalists who were present at this meeting remember nothing of the sort being agreed. (Interviews 
with Jimmy Greenfield, 29 March 1996 & Graham Hovey, 17 April 1996). Les de Villiers suggests that
the key to the meeting was winning Connie Mulder's support for the New York Times bureau to be 
reopened. (Interview with Les de Villiers, 18 April 1996). See also 'Emissary extraordinary', Financial 
Mail. 29 Nov. 1974, p. 859; Peter Younghusband, 'How Eschel Rhoodie fought the "paper curtain"',
The Capetonian, Feb. 1979, p. 9.
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and de Villiers assembled in Cape Town with Eschel Rhoodie, Deneys Rhoodie, Nico Diederichs (the 
Minister of Finance), and John Vorster to discuss Rhoodie's proposal of a 'five-year-plan' for 1974-79.30 
Previous projects had cost R800,000 during 1973 and had been funded through BOSS. Rhoodie now 
estimated that his Department would need R15-25 million per annum in order to finance the expanded 
propaganda war. The 'five-year-plan' was approved and it was decided that funding would be supplied 
through P.W. Botha's secret Defence Special Account, which did not have to be declared to Parliament.31 
As Les de Villiers later explained: 'South Africa, like the United States, Russia and Germany before them ... 
had to buy, bribe or bluff its way into the hearts and minds of the world. We needed newspapers of world 
renown to speak up for us and if we could not get any to do so independently we should secretly buy our 
own.'32
The years 1974 and 1975 were relatively successful for the Department of Information. John Seiler 
acknowledged for example the '... immediate challenge to Swedish television reporters to prove their story' 
of a "massacre" in the Caprivi strip. The resultant press investigation left both foreign and South African 
journalists satisfied that no massacre had taken place.'33 In the field of secret or unorthodox diplomacy, on 
which Mulder, Rhoodie and van den Bergh (the head of BOSS) worked in unison, the detente with Black 
Africa attracted favourable international press coverage.34 The visitor's programme which was developed in 
opposition to the existing 'liberal tour' was judged by Rhoodie '... to be the most important element of 
almost everything we did'.35 The Department's Annual Report (1974) noted that events at the United 
Nations had also turned to South Africa's favour:
Ironically the exclusion of our delegation from the deliberations of the
30. Rhoodie. Real Information, pp. 82-84. See also de Villiers, Secret Information, pp. 73-74.
31. Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 85-87.
32. de Villiers. Secret Information, p. 110.
33. John Seiler, 'South African Perspectives and Responses to External Pressures', The Journal of Modem 
African Studies. Vol. 13, No. 4, 1975, p. 460.
34. In Sept. 1974, Vorster visited the Ivory Coast. This was followed by a visit to Liberia (Feb. 1975) and 
the Victoria Falls Conference on Rhodesia (Aug. 1975).
35. Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, transcript, p. 221. In 1973 for example, eighty two
foreign guests visited South Africa. Two of the four guests from Britain were journalists: Ian Waller,
the political correspondent of the Sunday Telegraph and Jerome Caminada, the foreign news editor of
the Times. (Southern African Information Sendee, July-Dee. 1973, p. 320 & Jan.-June 1974, pp. 629 
-630). On the 'liberal tour', see chapter eight.
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General Assembly, seen by South Africa's enemies and hostile critics as 
a severe blow to our international prestige, in fact had the opposite 
effect among most news media, opinion-formers and decision-takers in 
those countries whose opinions we value. The fact that the attack on 
South Africa was immediately followed up by an attack on Israel 
reverberated to the advantage of South Africa.36
With the new funds available from the Defence Special Account, Rhoodie and Mulder also began to 
involve themselves in grander schemes. The most dramatic of these was the attempt in 1974 to purchase the 
Washington Star. This project was conceived by Les de Villiers and the American publisher John McGoff. 
Rhoodie was particularly supportive because the concept managed to merge both the 'Brownie dictum' of 
controlling the press through ownership and the importance of establishing a discourse with the opinion- 
formers in the United States.37 In September 1974, R8 million was placed in a Swiss bank account in order 
to finance McGoff's bid for the newspaper. This first major attempt by the Department to become secret 
international newspaper proprietors resulted in disaster.38 An opposing bid for the Washington Star was 
accepted and McGoff purchased the Sacramento Union instead. Rhoodie claimed that McGoff informed the 
Department of Information that he had bought the Sacramento Union with the interest on the original R8 
million. During 1976 it became clear that McGoff had actually used the original capital sum. The 
Department of Information had, in effect, been swindled and had little effective recourse.39
Failure to learn from their mistakes was Rhoodie and Mulder's most glaring error. In 1975, they attempted 
to neutralise a section of the South African domestic press by buying the SAAN publishing group. When 
this bid failed, the Department of Information decided that they would secretly launch their own English- 
language newspaper, The Citizen. This project would also be fronted by the Afrikaner businessman,
36. Department of Information Report for the Period 1 January 1974 to 31 December 1974 (Pretoria, 1975), 
p. 3. See Editorial, 'Pretoria, the PLO and the U.N.', Washington Post. 14 Nov. 1974; Editorial, 'Self- 
destruct at the U.N.', New York Times. 15 Nov. 1974.
37. See Carol H. Weiss, 'What America's Leaders Read1, The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 
1, Spring 1974, p. 5, which revealed that 'After the three leading newspapers [the Washington Post, the 
New York Times & the Wall Street Journal!, next in popularity is the Washington Star. Its readers are 
limited primarily to Washington-area residents for whom it functions apparently as a hometown 
newspaper.'
38. In 1973, the Department had attempted to purchase the independent Natal Mercury. See Interim Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of Information 
(Pretoria, 1979), section f. 26-27, pp. 8-9; Rhoodie, Real Information, pp. 772-774.
39. Rhoodie, Real Information, pp. 382-391. See also Karen Rothmyer, 'The McGoff Grab', Columbia 
Journalism Review. Nov./Dec. 1979, pp. 33-39.
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Louis Luyt, who had led the bid for SAAN. During the twenty months which had followed the meeting 
in Vorster's office on 6 February 1974, the Department of Information had expanded their operations to 
include a bewildering array of different areas of influence. Les de Villiers recalled that by 1975 the 
Department was beginning to lose control of its 'investments'.
By then we had tens of spooks and more than a hundred secret projects 
under the direction of three of us - Deneys Rhoodie at his own 
insistence was also allowed by his brother Eschel to dabble in the dirty 
tricks division. I frequently found that payments had been made and 
orders given to spooks and front organisation without my knowledge; 
and I would register my disapproval. But time and again I would be 
reminded that only the three of us had to run the whole department - 
both open and secret - and that day-to-day consultation was impossible.
So the secrets slipped and the spooks ventured far from their cupboards 
and front organisations turned transparent.40
Eschel Rhoodie later admitted, in a rather quaint phrase, that ’I took too much on my fork.41 However, at 
this stage the chaos was containable, if expensive. As 1976 progressed a series of representational crises (in 
particular, South Africa's military withdrawal from Angola and the Soweto uprising) afflicted South Africa; 
in the wake of these crises, the Department of Information discovered that it was impossible to control their 
extraordinary level of operations and  provide an effective voice for the beleaguered South African 
government. For Rhoodie, however, the failure of foreign governments and the international media to 
recognise the independence of the Transkei, and more particularly the duplicity of the South African state 
in its dealings with the 'independent' state, represented a crushing humiliation. In his memoir, he discussed 
the hypocrisy of separate development: 'Separate [development] has no hope of success ... if, after 
independence, as happened with the Transkei, the inhabitants of that Slate are still treated like any other 
black person when they entered white South Africa. This is the Achilles Heel o f National Party policy. It is 
the point where my belief in the honest objectives of separate development foundered on the rocks of 
reality.' [original emphasis]42
During July 1976, Rhoodie, Mulder and van den Bergh assembled at the Montreal Olympics and 
developed a 'blueprint for change' which would be employed following the expected retirement or death of
40. de Villiers, Secret Information, p. 50.
41. Rees & Day, Muldergate. p. 186.
42. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 881.
- 73-
John Vorster. The core of this blueprint involved:
... the establishment of a thinktank comprising key civil servants, 
leaders of commerce and industry, scientists, technologists, political 
scientists, m ilitary strategists, representatives of the country's 
intelligence and law enforcement services. The thinktank would be 
responsible for all the country's forward planning on major political, 
socio-economic and capital works programmes. This thinktank, or 
supreme council, would make recommendations to the Cabinet - but the 
Cabinet would not be allowed to make decisions on its own, without 
the supreme council first discussing the issues.43
The plan involved Mulder's election as Prime Minister; van den Bergh's appointment as chairman of the 
supreme council; and Rhoodie's appointment as '... the co-ordinating director of the thinktank.144 Twelve 
years later, Rhoodie described the plan as having symbolised '... the wish that there could be a dictatorship, 
which we qualified as "benevolent” or "verlig", to enforce separate development on an imaginative scale.'45 
However, the idea of benevolent dictatorship did not appeal to everybody within the Department and this 
eventually led to the leaks which assisted the investigations by the domestic South African press which 
began in earnest in 1977.46
'Muldergate', the Information scandal.
Les de Villiers recalls in his memoir that 'The speculation started almost from the day Mulder first served 
notice in Parliament in 1973 that he and his revamped and rejuvenated Department of Information had 
embarked on an unorthodox psychological war against its enemies abroad ... one question kept cropping up:
43. Rees & Day, Muldergate. pp. 183-184.
44. Ibid, p. 184.
45. Eschel Rhoodie, 'P.W.: a hero of his own crises', The Star (Johannesburg), 25 Sept. 1988.
46. During the leadership election in 1978, following the resignation of Vorster, Retief van Rooyen told 
Mervyn Rees, 'I knew I had to do something to stop [Mulder]. I had put my head through the door of 
potential dictatorship and what I saw' there horrified the hell out of me.' (Rees & Day, Muldergate, p. 
72).
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Where do they get the massive amounts of money to feed this hidden war?147 During 1976, Gerald Barrie 
launched an investigation into irregularities in the Department of Information.48 On 25 November 1976, 
Rhoodie '... issued instructions "on the advice of both Prime Minister Vorster and General van den Bergh" 
that we destroy all "unnecessary documentation",!49 Whether it was the threat posed by Barrie's 
investigation or a development related to the Montreal blueprint, the Department's Annual Report for 1976, 
submitted in May 1977, proved to be an extraordinary document. In the Report, Rhoodie listed the 
problems that had faced South Africa during the 3'ear but in contrast to previous reports, he cited a number 
of the media representations with veiy little criticism. For example, 'The Prime Minister was described ... as 
a man unable to control the direction of events and unable or unwilling to effect those changes in South 
Africa, which it was claimed, were necessary to prevent a race war.'50 Rhoodie's prognosis for the year 
ahead was astonishing. In effect, he suggested that apartheid, in its current form, was unsellable and 
required reform:
All in all it will be a difficult year for the Department of Information 
and for its officials in South Africa and abroad. The Department has 
taken all precautions and has considered all possible strategies and
47. de Villiers, Secret Information, p. 151. Before 1977, investigations into South Africa's Department of 
Information by the international media were rare and normally associated with incidents or 
organisations in Britain. See Adam Raphael, 'How Vorster uses the Club of Ten', The Guardian. 17 June 
1974 & David Martin, 'Mystery men behind the Club of Ten1, The Observer, 23 June 1974, of which de 
Villiers later commented: '... in 1974, the Guardian and its friends had tried to shake a Sparrow out of 
the Club of Ten tree-top. We had narrowly averted disaster.' (de Villiers, Secret Information, p. 82). For 
other exceptional commentaries or exposes, see Adam Raphael, 'The good news machine', The 
Guardian. 12 Dec. 1974; Benjamin Pogrund, 'Battle for the freedom of the press', Sunday Times. 9 
Nov. 1975; Barbara Rogers, 'South Africa's propaganda machine', Southern Africa. Vol. IX, No. 7,
Aug. 1976, pp. 5-9; David Martin & Rosanne Harvey, 'Apartheid's millionaire backers', The Observer. 
19 Dec. 1976; Julian Burgess, Esau du Plessis, Roger Murray, Peter Fraenkel, Rosanne Harvey, John 
Laurence, Peter Ripken & Barbara Rogers, The Great White Hoax: South Africa's International 
Propaganda Machine (London, 1977). Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 232, records that Esau du Plessis,
a Coloured exile from South Africa and a member of the executive of the Dutch anti-apartheid 
movement'... succumbed to a tempting cash offer' and provided mailing lists and information regarding 
the Dutch and British Anti-Apartheid Movements to the Department.
48. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of 
Infonnation (Pretoria, 1978), chapter 5.104, p. 27. Barrie later recalled th a t'... a chance conversation 
with Dr. Deneys Rhoodie at Lisbon Airport in June 1974 gave rise to misgivings as to whether money 
was being spent by Infonnation efficiently.' (Gerald Barrie, 'Rhoodie is wrong', The Star 
[Johannesburg], 9 Jan. 1984).
49. de Villiers, Secret Infonnation, p. 152. See also Report of the Commission of Inquiry, chapter 5.117, p.
30.
50. Department of Infonnation, Report for the Period 1 January 1976 to 31 December 1976 (Pretoria,
1977), p. 3. See also Arnaud de Borchgrave, The way the BOSS sees it', Newsweek, 25 Oct. 1976, p.
19-20.
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actions. However, with the non-acceptance of the Transkei and in the 
wake of Angola, Rhodesia and the urban Black riots, foreign opinion at 
least will not easily be moved except by imaginative large scale moves 
in South Africa in the implementation of government policy to move 
away from racial discrimination and to structure a plurality of 
democracies for the country.51
Rhoodie later recalled that 'Vorster was furious at the repo rt... Any criticism of the Prime Minister by an 
official, even obliquely, was not only unheard of but also was considered bad form, disloyal, and, naturally, 
fatal to [the writer's] career.'51 The events of 1977 only magnified Rhoodie and Mulder's problems. While 
Barrie's investigation began to unearth evidence of corruption within the Department, intermittent unrest 
continued to be a feature of life in South Africa's townships. During July 1977, Les de Villiers informed 
Rhoodie that he had decided to leave the civil service in order to accept a position as Vice-Chairman with 
the Department of Information's public relations firm, Sydney S. Baron and Company, in New York. Few 
knowledgeable observers were in any doubt that de Villiers was 'leaving a sinking ship'. De Villiers records 
in his memoir that 'It was clear early in 1978 that the whole edifice of lies on which we had tried to launch 
South Africa back into the world was in imminent danger of being demolished by the Press.'53
By the autumn of 1977, the difficulties faced by the Department of Information were becoming 
insurmountable. Rhoodie recalled that they '... had a very strong suspicion that there was a mole right in our 
midst. We did not know who it was and we did not know how much was being leaked, or why it was being 
leaked to journalists from the SAAN group.151 In addition, Vorster constantly failed to arrange a requested 
meeting between Gerald Barrie and the Department of Information. Rhoodie began to believe that he was 
being abandoned.55 His only remaining hope was that Vorster might resign and Mulder be elected to the
51. D of I, Report 1976. p. 10.
52. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 80.
53. De Villiers, Secret Infonnation, p. 159. Les de Villiers left the Department of Information on 1 Nov. 
1977. See also Editorial, The South Africa Foundation News. Jan. 1978, p. 2: The recently retired 
No 2 of the Department of Infonnation says that the Government's separate development policies are 
not saleable overseas.'
54. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 420. See also Rees & Day, Muldergate. p. 2; Hennie Serfontein, The 
three men destroyed by Muldergate', The Observer, 10 Dec. 1978, in which he noted that in Nov. 1977, 
'One of the Nasionale Pers newspapers ... confronted Mr Vorster with the results of their investigation 
[into the Department of Information]... Mr Vorster persuaded the [Afrikaans-language] newspapers not 
to publish saying that a large sum of money was at stake.'
55. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 424.
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Premiership. During the same period, the Department of Information, which was now almost totally 
preoccupied with attempting to stop secret operations spiralling out of control, was called upon to explain 
the death of Steve Biko in police custody (September 1977), the banning of black consciousness groups and 
the closure of the World (October 1977). In this task, Rhoodie and others were found wanting. As the 
Secretary for Information commented in the Department's Annual Report for 1977,
When the General Assembly of the United Nations proclaimed on 
December 14 last that 1978 was going to be the International Anti- 
Apartheid Year, it brought to a climax the worst period of anti-South 
African publicity and hostility in the country's history ... Reporting on 
the Biko case was extremely negative and widespread. It received the 
most in-depth coverage of any South African news story since the first 
heart transplant and was extremely damaging.56
In February 1978, the Auditor-General delivered his report to the Parliamentary Select Committee on 
Public Accounts, in which he criticised two unnamed officials of the Department of Infonnation for misuse 
of public funds.57 On 2 April, the (Johannesburg) Sunday Express published a story which detailed a state- 
financed vacation in the Seychelles which Rhoodie and others had taken in January 1977.58 In a desperate 
response to the pressure of the domestic newspapers, Rhoodie issued a statement on 5 May: '... I wish to 
state that the Department of Information has, for years, been asked by the government to undertake 
sensitive and even highly secret operations as counter-action to the propaganda war being waged against 
South Africa.159 Five days later, Mulder denied in the South African parliament that the government were 
secretly financing The Citizen.60 This lie would later lead to his resignation from the government and 
eventually, the National Party. At this stage, however, the victims of the press expose were the Rhoodie 
brothers who were forced into early retirement at the end of June 1978. The Department of Information was 
immediately subsumed within the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Three months later, the scandal re-emerged following the resignation of John Vorster and the election of
56. Department of Infonnation, Report for the Period 1 January 1977 to 31 December 1977 (Pretoria,
1978), p. 3.
57. Rees & Day, Muldergate, p. 18.
58. Kill Katzin, 'Dr Rhoodie's remarkable jaunt', (Johannesburg) Sunday Express. 2 April 1978.
59. Eschel Rhoodie, Press statement, 5 May 1978.
60. 'Mulder denial of subsidy to newspaper', The Times. 11 May 1978.
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P.W. Botha to the post of prime minister.61 The revelation that the Department of Information had funded 
the publication of The Citizen was rapidly followed by Judge Anton Mostert's contribution to P.W. Botha’s 
'clean administration'; he released a four-hundred page report on exchange control contraventions which 
directly implicated leading South African politicians.62 General van den Bergh accepted retirement, Eschel 
Rhoodie fled the country and the Botha administration established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
the 'alleged irregularities'.63 The first Report of the Commission was published in December 1978, by which 
point it was clear that the South African English-language press had uncovered an extraordinary tale of 
manipulation and corruption. Elements of the story continued to trickle out for the next three months and 
were complemented by two extensions to the Commission of Inquiry.64 Anthony Lewis described the sense 
of expectation at the beginning of March 1979: 'Imagine Watergate at a point just before the cover-up of the 
cover-up began to come ap art... Three men involved in the affair have been fired or forced to resign. For 
the moment, the lid is on the stoiy. But the three men are beginning to sound angry and if they talk ...'“
Mulder and van den Bergh remained silent, but Eschel Rhoodie, having been discovered in Latin America 
by Mervyn Rees, agreed to be interviewed.66 Although Rhoodie provided a vast amount of evidence related 
to Infonnation activity, many observers felt that the full story had not been fully exposed.67 The Information
61. Botha won the leadership election against Mulder by 24 votes (out of 172). Vorster was elevated to the 
then ceremonial position of President.
62. Kitt Katzin, 'The Citizen: secret revealed', (Johannesburg) Sunday Express. 29 Oct. 1978; The Botha 
government had attempted to stop Mostert from releasing his report. See also Mervyn Rees, 'It's all 
true!', Rand Daily Mail. 3 Nov. 1978.
63. Following van den Bergh's retirement, BOSS was re-named the Department of National Security.
64. Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the Former Department of 
Information (Pretoria, March 1979); Supplementary Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Irregularities in the Former Department of Infonnation (Pretoria, June 1979),
65. Anthony Lewis (in Johannesburg), Three loaded guns', New York Times. 1 March 1979.
66. Extracts from Mervyn Rees's interviews with Eschel Rhoodie were published in the Rand Daily Mail, 
from 9 May 1979. See also David Dimbleby, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, Tonight Special, BBC 1, 
21 March 1979. For a precis of Rhoodie's revelations, see appendix B. ii..
67. Rex Gibson, The information scandal in retrospect1, in South African Conference on the Survival of the 
Press and Education for Journalism. 4-6 October 1979 fGrahamstown. 1979), p. 1, described the 
scandal as 'A conspiracy whose true extent has yet to be established.'
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scandal finally ground to a halt in June 1979, following the resignation of John Vorster. The major effect in 
the international media of Rhoodie and Mulder's programme of media manipulation was a transformation in 
the representation of South Africa's Afrikaner leaders. As Stanley Uys (writing from London) explained:
I have often come across uncompromising critics of apartheid who have 
nonetheless remarked: 'But at least your country's leaders have clean 
hands.' This is the familiar view: that the men who were applying South 
Africa's reprehensible policies were not reprehensible themselves, 
except in a strictly political sense. Somehow, they had acquired an 
image of incorruptibility and austerity. They were mistaken and 
misguided, but they were not corrupt and venal. That was the image, 
and it was bolstered by the strongly religious flavour of National Party 
politics ... The Department of Information has ended all this.68
The Secret Projects: Interventions iii the media.
Amongst the earliest propaganda devices utilised by the Department of Information were the advertising 
front-organisations, the Club of Ten and the Committee for Fairness in Sport (CFS). Between April 1973 
and June 1978, the South African state financed 32 advertisements by these organisations in the major 
newspapers of Europe and North America.69 The CFS was headed by Gert Wolmarans, a former South 
African sports-writer, and Louis Luyt.70 The CFS was primarily concerned with protesting against the 
sporting isolation of South Africa. The Club of Ten's original administrator was Gerald Sparrow, author and 
one-time Judge in the International Court in Bangkok. Sparrow had met Rhoodie during 1972 while visiting 
the Republic as a tourist. The targets of the Club of Ten advertisements, during Sparrow's stewardship, 
included The Guardian's wage starvation campaign, the World Council of Churches and the United 
Nations. Sparrow later recalled that '... all the newspapers (with one exception, the London published 
Church Times) accepted the advertisements with alacrity and competed with one another to offer the best
68. Stanley Uys, 'The denting of a Nat myth', Rand Daily Mail, 10 Nov. 1978. See also 'Muldergate',
Today. BBC Radio 4, 6 Dec. 1978: '... the days of the politicians in South Africa running their country 
like a merchant bank are well and truly over.'
69. For a full list, see appendix B. iii.
70. In 1978, Rhoodie parted company with Luyt, and Gary Player was appointed as chairman of the CFS.
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space, coverage and terms for these profitable displays.171
During 1974, the Department of Information agreed to sponsor a privately circulated quarterly entitled 
Phoenix, which was to be edited by Sparrow. The quarterly was intended to be devoted to the exposure 
of the politically motivated double standards ploy.1 However, according to Sparrow, The first three issues 
... met with the qualified approval of Dr Rhoodie but the last issue was not acceptable to the department... I 
replied that in England it was not possible to have the policy of a paper dictated from outside.’72 Following 
this contretemps, the Department of Information terminated its relationship with the Judge. The Club of 
Ten re-emerged in February 1976 with a new administrator, Donald Boddie.73 Rhoodie claimed that Boddie 
was not informed about the origins of the Club's finances.74 The advertisements continued to criticise the 
usual bugbears, while adding new subjects for condemnation, such as the communist threat to southern 
Africa and the western world's 'double-standard' in not recognising the Transkei.75 Following the resignation 
of Les de Villiers (who had originally been responsible for the writing of the advertisements) the concept of 
the Club of Ten became confused. The remaining ten advertisements continued to reiterate the theme of 
double-standards but seemed to lose the ability to focus on a media error or a genuinely contradictory point. 
This, after all, had been the achievement of the original advertisements. The Club of Ten disappeared 
following the resignation of Eschel Rhoodie. Elseviers magazine later reported that the entire campaign had 
cost in excess of $1,000,000.76
71. Gerald Sparrow, 'The Infonnation file. Sparrow's story part II: How the Club of Ten began', Rand Daily 
Mail, 27 June 1978. Club of Ten advertisements did not appear in the Financial Times, Los Angeles 
Times, Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune and Christian Science Monitor. Rhoodie later recalled that 
the advertisements had an immediate effect: 'There were letters coming in from all over the world, not 
by the tens or hundreds but literally by the thousands and there were cheques, small amounts [and] large 
amounts being sent in.' (Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, Roll 18, p. 264).
72. Gerald Sparrow, The Information file. Sparrow's story part III: The Club & I part company', Rand 
Daily Mail, 28 June 1978.
73. Boddie had worked for the Natal Mercury in his youth, and had been the editor of the (London)
Evening News from 1972 to 1974.
74. Dr. Ferry A. Hoogendijk, 'Muldergate: The Eschel Rhoodie story1, Elseviers, 28 July-18 Aug. 1979, 
news agency translation.
75. A notable advertisement during this period was 'Moscow's next target in Africa' (March 1977), 
reproduced apparently without permission from Robert Moss's series in the Sunday Telegraph (see 
chapter six). For this and other examples of Club of Ten and CFS advertising, see appendix B. iv.
76. Hoogendijk, 'Muldergate1, Elseviers.
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To The Point was founded in January 1972 by a Dutch publisher, Hubert Jussen. The Department of 
Infonnation did not technically own the magazine but it did make publication possible through extensive 
subscription. During the first two years of its existence, To The Point was published as a bi-weekly, 
thereafter appearing on a weekly basis. Before his appointment to the position of Secretary for Information, 
Eschel Rhoodie had been employed by the magazine as an assistant editor. Although conservative, To The 
Point did not serve solely as a propaganda tool for the Department of Information. The vast majority of its 
news columns and articles were relatively orthodox. The editorials, however, read as if they came straight 
from Rhoodie's pen.77 Following the appointment of Dr. John Poorter (ex-Department of Information 
Director in London) as editor in 1973, the magazine began to carry an 'editor's memo' in addition to the 
editorials. This structural device suggests that Poorter needed to have his own editorial space; the editor's 
memo rarely echoed the same ideological message as the editorials. To a certain extent therefore, the 
editorials serve as a useful guide to the internal debates of the Department of Information.78 Between April 
1974 and October 1977, an international edition of To The Point was published from Antwerp.77 Before 
1976, the magazine played a complementary role to the South African government's detente with Africa. 
Following the Angolan war, coverage shifted towards the new concerns arising from the penetration of the 
Cold War into Africa. The Transkei's nominal independence was celebrated by a sixteen-page 
supplementary survey of the region.80
77. This can be detected both in the writing style and the subject matter of many of the editorials. Poorter 
claims that Rhoodie did not exercise any influence over the magazine. (Interview with Dr. John Poorter, 
26 May 1995). Les de Villiers suggests that Rhoodie was involved in the editorial writing. (Interview 
with Les de Villiers, 18 April 1996). See also de Villiers, Secret Information, p 133, which recalls that 
Louis Luyt felt that his problems with the Department of Information ’... started with Rhoodie's 
persistent calls to the Citizen staff, feeding them government scoops directly and coaching them on 
editorials.'
78. See, for example, Editorial, 'No time for discord', To The Point, 11 July 1975, p. 17 & Editorial, 'Not 
our controversy’, To The Point 25 July 1975, p. 21, which addressed the conflict between the 
Departments of Foreign Affairs and Information. Rapport (an Afrikaans newspaper) suggested that 
Rhoodie was responsible for the first editorial. The newspaper was fined at the Press Council for 
making this suggestion. (Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, pp. 111-112).
79. To The Point International was only available on subscription unlike the domestic edition. In 1975, 
Gordon van der Merwe (ex-SAPA correspondent in London and managing editor of To The Point), was 
appointed editor of the international edition. From this point. To The Point International carried 
different editorials to those in the domestic edition. These did not appear to have been written by 
Rhoodie.
80. 'Independence: A special survey of the Transkei', To The Point. 8 Oct. 1976.
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To The Point and To The Point International (TTPI) epitomised many of the paradoxes which dominated 
the Department of Information's secret projects. On one level, the magazines were no more than a feeble 
imitation of Time or Newsweek. However, they were able to publicise Rhoodie's ideas relating to double 
standards and journalistic racism, and did have a marginal impact.81 In addition, the staff of To The Point 
wrote and designed the four financial and economic advertising supplements which appeared in Business 
Week between 1974 and 1977. These annual supplements, which in total amounted to more than 100 pages, 
were financed by the Department of Information's (secret) purchasing of advertising space.82 Ultimately 
however, To The Point replicated the problems of control that the Department of Infonnation had 
experienced in other spheres of its activities. This was most clearly demonstrated by the collapse of the 
magazine's international edition in the autumn of 1977. Following a protest by the European staff regarding 
the publication of material filed in Johannesburg, Hubert Jussen ordered a mass dismissal.83 A press release 
by the staff of TTPI declared: 'All but one of the journalists ... have chosen to leave after being ordered to 
accept South African propaganda.'84 The international edition was duly transformed into a precis of the 
domestic publication. Following the Information scandal, To The Point staggered on with the open 
sponsorship of the South African government until December 1980,
In 1975, John McGoff purchased a controlling 50 per cent share of United Press International Television 
News (UPITN) from Paramount Films. The money was provided by the Department of Information, As 
Karen Rothrayer has noted, 'With more than 100 clients in eighty countries, UPITN is, after Visnews, the 
second largest newsfilm producer and distributor in the world, and in many third world countries it may be
81. The only print inteiviews with John Vorster during the Soweto uprising were published by To The 
Point. See Gordon van der Merwe, 'Vorster: "long-term interests of S.A. are at stake'", To The Point, 2 
July 1976, pp. 7-8; Dr. John Poorter, 'Situation is "serious, but not critical,"' Prime Minister Vorster tells 
TTP', To The Point. 13 Aug. 1976, p. 8. The magazine's commentaries also gained occasional reference 
in the international media, see 'Mirror of opinion: South Africa's "bad press'", Christian Science 
Monitor, 13 June 1977.
82. Hoogendijk, 'Muldergate', Elseviers. See 'Grow with South Africa', Business Week, 2 Nov. 1974, pp. 41 
-72; 'Dynamic South Africa', Business Week, 10 Nov. 1975, pp. 11-44; 'Doing business with South 
Africa', Business Week, 22 Nov. 1976, pp. 15-48; 'Invest in South Africa', Business Week. 21 Nov.
1977, pp. 23-42.
83. Hubert G. Jussen, 'Publisher's memo: A matter of principle', To The Point International. 12 Sept. 1977, 
p. 5.
84. Press statement by former TTPI staff. (The Rand Daily Mail archive, University of the Witwatersrand). 
See also David Dale, 'Up to a Point...', New Statesman, 23 Sept. 1977, p. 390.
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the only source of foreign news. In the U.S. it is relied on for foreign spot coverage in remote areas; its 
major American client is ABC, which sold its foreign news customer list to UPITN in 1976.185 With 
McGofPs associate, Clarence ’Dusty1 Rhodes, appointed to the position of President and Chief Executive of 
UPITN in London, Rhoodie felt that the Department could now exploit the '... virtually unlimited access to 
all of the international outlets [available to] this television news distributing agency.'86 Rhoodie later 
claimed that UPITN distributed programmes covering the independence of both the Transkei and 
Bophuthatswana, although the Department's greatest coup was staging an interview with John Vorster, for 
which Rhoodie had written both the questions and the answers.87
Although some of the material distributed by UPITN probably served the propaganda needs of the 
Department Rhoodie recognised that the programmes could not be totally one-sided: 'Now and then David 
Oosthuizen was asked to produce a critical short for UPI[TN], critical of the South African Government, to 
protect Rhodes and the project.'88 In effect, manipulating UPITN had proved as problematic as the other 
media interventions. After the Erasmus Commission revealed the financial basis of McGoff's slake in 
UPITN, Hugh Whitcomb, the editorial manager of ITN stated that McGoff '... was never in a position to 
dictate editorial policy nor, as far as I know, did he ever try to do so.189 Karen Rothmyer investigated his 
other holdings and discovered that 'Former executives of various McGoff newspapers say that while they 
were occasionally ordered to run pro-South African articles and were supplied with magazines and other 
material extolling South Africa, they felt no concerted effort on McGoff's part to shape their editorial 
decisions.'90
In Great Britain, the Department of Infonnation collaborated with two South African businessmen, David 
Abramson and Stuart Pegg, in its media-buying operation. During 1976, an attempt was made to raise the
85. Karen Rothmyer, 'The McGoff grab', Columbia Journalism Review, Nov./Dec. 1979, p. 37.
86. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 391.
87. Ibid, p. 392-394.
88. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 395.
89. 'Publisher cited in South African Inquiry is bought out by partner in film agency', Wall Street Journal,
15 June 1979.
90. Karen Rothmyer, 'The South African lobby', The Nation, 19 April 1980, p. 456.
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revenue needed to purchase the publishing group Morgan-Grampian. Rhoodie felt that 'Morgan-Grampian 
could be the very basis on which to build the second five yea?- program?ne, due to go into operation in 
1980.' [original emphasis] He also felt t h a t c o n t r o l  of a major British publishing house, with contacts and 
outlets all over the world [would provide] a possible cover for the agents of General van den Bergh in 
countries where it would normally be difficult for Bureau agents to operate.'91 29 per cent of the shares in 
Morgan-Grampian were purchased but it proved impossible to raise the funds for a full take-over.92 In 1977, 
Abramson and Pegg attempted to purchase the Investors' Chronicle with Department of Information funds. 
Stephen Mulholland, the Wall St?‘eet Journal's stringer, in Johannesburg, was pencilled in as the new 
editor.93 IPC and the Financial Times decided not to sell the magazine after receiving warnings from the 
publishing group, Morgan-Grampian, regarding 'South African "funny money".'94 The Department of 
Infonnation then proceeded to buy a 50 per cent share in the Investors' Review instead, but never managed 
to gain editorial control.
In addition to the surreptitious attempts to buy representation in the international media, the Department of 
Information possessed many other outlets for its opinions, these included: the various book publishing 
outlets either owned or sponsored by the Department; famous South African citizens, such as Gary Player 
and Christiaan Barnard; the visitors' tours; friendly (or pliable) American publishers; and the letters'
91. Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 217-218. It is possible that some of the journalists covering Africa for To 
The Point served a similar function.
92. This was probably an early sign of Rhoodie's star beginning to wane in Pretoria. For Rhoodie's analysis 
see Rhoodie, Real Information' pp. 220-221. Ironically, the South African government made a profit of 
£1.2 million on the sale of the Morgan Grampian shares.
93. Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, transcript, p. 209 & 415. Mulholland claims that 
he has never heard of this plan. (Interview with Stephen Mulholland, 30 Sept. 1996). However, it is also 
claimed that Mulholland was a close friend of Abramson and Pegg. (Interview with Martin Welz, 4 Oct. 
1996). In addition to his Wall Street Journal string, Mulholland also worked for the (Johannesburg) 
Sunday Times.
94. Rees & Day, Muldergate, p. 127.
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columns and opinion pages of the newspapers.95 In his evidence to the Erasmus Commission, Mulder 
observed that 'In Britain, you have to make an "understatement" while in America you have to storm a man 
head on.196 During his years as Secretary for Information, Eschel Rhoodie attempted to put Mulder's thesis 
into action. During April 1974, Newsweek carried an article by Peter Younghusband entitled The Afrikaner 
spirit.' Unfortunately, the article was brutally transformed by a sub-editor in the United States.97 Rhoodie 
proceeded to engage in an extended correspondence with the editor of Newsweek which culminated in a 
ten-page letter detailing the errors in the original article and demanding Younghusband's dismissal. This 
was not forthcoming. As the financial Mail later commented: '... surely the Secretary for Infonnation has 
more urgent claims on his lime than writing controversial letters like this?'98
Three years later, while Rhoodie was being investigated in South Africa, he became increasingly 
vociferous in his reaction to what he considered to be inaccurate reporting. In January 1977, for example, 
he objected to a series of articles by Jim Hoagland in the Washington Post." When the Washington Post 
refused to publish Rhoodie's full response, the Department of Information bought advertising space in the 
newspaper to air its critique. Following the usual reiteration of the theory of journalistic racism, Rhoodie
95. Pro-South African books were published through Valiant Publications or the South African Freedom 
Foundation. (Rhoodie, Real Information, p. 264); On Player and Barnard, see Rhoodie, Real 
Information, p. 181-190. See also Christiaan Barnard,'... And "a good deal that is positive'", New York 
Times. 21 Oct. 1977; Two exceptional friends of the Department were Beurt SerVaas and C.W. 
Borkland. During the decade, SerVaas published a large number of articles which argued in favour of 
South Africa in his monthly publication, the Saturday Evening Post. With his wife, Cory (the editor of 
the magazine), he visited the Republic regularly during the mid-1970s and was a member of the Jussen 
syndicate which 'purchased' The Citizen from Louis Luyt in 1978. Borkland's publication, Government 
Executive earned a massive (thirty-page) six-part series of articles in 1978 on South Africa, based 
primarily upon Department of Information propaganda.
96. The Erasmus evidence: A hard-sell strategy born on foreign soil', Rand Daily Mail. 15 May 1980. 
James Srodes recalls that there was an 'invasion' of South Africans into Washington D.C. in the mid- 
1970s. He described the general tone at Embassy parties in the following terms: 'Hey look, we're nice 
people - Have some more champagne.' (Interview with James Srodes, 11 April 1996). Articles by 
Mulder in the U.S. press included 'South Africa's objectives,1 New York Times. 14 May 1974; 'An 
overture from a Pretoria official', Los Angeles Times. 12 June 1975; 'U.S. policy on South Africa: 
"Anti-white racism"', New York Times. 23 May 1978.
97. Peter Younghusband, 'The Afrikaner spirit', Newsweek, 29 April 1974; Younghusband recalls that 
Rhoodie suspected that the sub-editor was an African-American. (Interview with Peter Younghusband, 
15 May 1995).
98. 'Emissary extraordinary', Financial Mail. 29 Nov. 1974. The full Rhoodie correspondence was not 
published by Newsweek.
99. Jim Hoagland, 'Black power vs. White power: South Africa', Washington Post. 9-16 Jan. 1977.
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launched into an extended point-by-point refutation of the 'errors' in Hoagland's coverage. By the end of the 
advertisement, he was virtually hysterical: 'In conclusion. If Jim Hoagland wins a Pulitzer Prize for the 
misconceptions and ascertainable inaccuracies dished up as reliable in-depth report on South Africa, then 
Pravda also deserves one for its "accurate objective and dispassionate reporting on human rights and race 
relations in the U.S.A." After all, neither Mr. Hoagland nor the Washington Post holds a world copyright on 
intellectual dishonesty.'100 An article which appeared in National Geographic in June 1977 received a 
similar response.101
During the Infonnation scandal, Peter Younghusband wrote a summary of the career of the fallen Secretary 
in the Capetonian (a small-circulation magazine which Younghusband published). On the subject of 
Rhoodie's correspondences with the international media, he commented:
... as a psychological exercise they were a disaster, and reflected only 
that the Department of Information moved crudely and awkwardly in 
the sophisticated and cynical realms of the international press. It is 
possible that over the entire period of Dr Rhoodie's tenure of office, his 
aggressive and undiplomatic brow-beating of foreign editors, together 
with a heavy-handed policy of trying to 'manage' and pressure overseas 
newspapers and their correspondents by various means, caused more 
harm to South Africa abroad than the revelations confirmed in the 
Erasmus rep o rt... The generally held view of the international press 
fraternity - from editorial executives to correspondents - was that 
Eschel Rhoodie was a man of considerable energy and ability, but was 
temperamentally unsuited to the job he held. He also lacked a grasp of 
the true principles of journalism and the functions of newspapers in 
democratic societies.101
Younghusband's commentary was obviously partly influenced by his own antipathy for Rhoodie because a 
number of journalists felt that, during the early 1970s, there was a relative improvement in the Department
100. Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, 'The Washington Post & its reporting on South Africa: A case of intellectual 
dishonesty?', advertisement, Washington Post. 24 April 1977. The International Herald Tribune which 
also carried the Hoagland reports, had published Rhoodie's critique as, Eschel Rhoodie - 'A South 
African official replies to articles on his own country', International Herald Tribune. 18 April 1977.
See also Jtra Hoagland, Letter to the editor, International Herald Tribune. 20 April 1977: 'Even a 
professional propagandist for the South African government could not have composed the collection 
of cheap shots, bare-faced lies and ad hominem attacks the Herald Tribune published under the name 
of Eschel Rhoodie ... I can only conclude that a trouble-maker intent on satirizing or discrediting Mr 
Rhoodie has obtained the Secretary's letterhead stationary and perpetrated a hoax on your readers.'
101. William S. Ellis, ’South Africa's lonely ordeal', National Geographic. June 1977, pp. 780-819; 'What 
National Geographic did not say ...’, advertisement, Washington Post. 6 June 1977: ’These are some 
of the facts that National Geographic did not publish. The facts were made available to them but 
someone convinced the editors that facts are no longer sacred.'
102. Peter Younghusband, 'How Eschel Rhoodie fought the "paper curtain"'.The Capetonian. Vol. 1, No. 3, 
Feb. 1979, pp. 8-11.
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of Information's interaction with the international media.103 Deon Geldenhuys has suggested that 
'Information's often grandiose conception of international politics consisted of a strange compound of 
wishful thinking, naivete and hard-headed realpolitik.'104 Similarly, the Department's public relations 
operation can be summarised as demonstrating cunning and ignorance in almost equal measure. If cunning 
can be detected in the employment of frontmen or lobbyists, such as Sparrow and Donald deKieffer, who 
were married to people who were not white, ignorance, or perhaps, arrogance was consistently present in 
Rhoodie's endless attempts to draw attention to himself and the secret projects.105 Mervyn Rees believes that 
'... with or without the press, he was his own worst enemy because he was going to shoot himself in the foot 
eventually: the lifestyle, the abuses - he attracted attention, he invited it.'10S
Although the contradictions inherent in the Department of Information's interventions in the media were 
profound, and although they ended in exposure and scandal, some elements of the Rhoodie-Mulder 
programme were prescient. This can best be seen in South Africa's contribution to the establishment of the 
'New Right' network which was emerging during this period in Britain and the United States. Karen 
Rothmyer wrote in 1981, with regard to Richard Mellon Scaife, that 'No longer, as in Spiro Agnew's day, 
are the media seen simply as the enemy; rather, they are regarded as an institution which, like any other, is 
capable of being influenced as well as intimidated.' Later in the same article, she observed how '... layers 
upon layers of seminars, studies, conferences, and interviews can do much to push along, if not create the 
issues which then become the national agenda of debate.'107 In retrospect, it is clear that during the mid- 
1970s, Rhoodie had devised the rudimentary structure of a form of media manipulation that bears a striking 
resemblance to many of the practices which others later refined in the 1980s. It is also important to restate
103. Before leaving South Africa, Mike Keats, the UPI bureau chief, commented that he had '... 
experienced a  definite feeling of more understanding from people in services like the Department of 
Information.' ('Freest in Africa', South African Digest. 15 Feb. 1974, p. 3).
104. Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 119.
105. Sparrow was married to a Thai, deKieffer to a Japanese-Hawaiian. From 1976, the Department 
employed an African-American public relations representative in the United States. Andrew Hatcher 
had been an associate press secretary to President Kennedy in the early 1960s. ('South African 
propaganda in the U.S. increases', Southern Africa. Vol. IX, No. 8, Sept. 1976, pp. 14-15).
106. Interview with Mervyn Rees, 9 Sept. 1995.
107. Karen Rothmyer, 'Citizen Scaife', Columbia Journalism Review. July/Aug. 1981, pp. 45 & 48. Scaife
purchased a 50 per cent share in the Sacramento Union in 1977.
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that the full panoply of Information activities have not yet been exposed. Les de Villiers suggests that 
There were a lot of people who never ... came to the surface, who did things for us and who were very 
successful.'108
The South Africa Foundation and BOSS.
The South Africa Foundation [SAF] was founded in December 1959 in direct response to the 
establishment of the Boycott Movement (the precursor to the Anti-Apartheid Movement). In the assessment 
of those opposed to apartheid, by the early 1970s, '... the Foundation [had] proved itself to be one of the 
most effective propaganda organizations in the Western world.'109 The SAF did not attempt to defend 
apartheid, instead it concentrated upon keeping '... the Republic's international lines of communication 
open.’110 During the 1970s it also began to develop a scholarly veneer in order to disguise its propagandistic 
purpose. This proved particularly effective in attracting foreign journalists, many of whom were willing to 
accept 'assistance' from a supposedly non-political source.111 Under the Presidency of Jan Marais (1974- 
1977), the tone of the SAF annual reports became very close to that adopted by Rhoodie: There is no doubt 
that there is a strong politically based, well organised and liberally financed offensive against South Africa. 
This ... is the major sustaining factor in the campaign which has now been actively prosecuted for so many 
years.1112 During 1973, Marais in his role as chairman of the Trust Bank of South Africa financed two 
advertisements which featured Lucas Mangope and Lucy Mvubelo opposing the application of economic
108. Interview with Les de Villiers, 18 April 1996.
109. Ruth First, Jonathan Steele & Christabel Gurney, The South African Connection: Western 
Involvement in Apartheid (London, 1972), p. 222. See also Barry Cohen, 'Inside the "Club of Ten"', 
New African, May 1978, p. 54, which quotes Barbara Rogers as commenting: 'As an ostensibly 
independent organisation, the Foundation is accepted where representatives of the South African 
Government would not be.'
110. Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 175.
111. Journalists who were either guests of, or who were assisted by, the SAF, included William Raspberry, 
Louis Heren, Lord Chalfont, Walter Cronkite, Henry Grunwald, Graham Turner, William Buckley, 
William Rusher, John Davenport (contributing editor of Fortune). John Ellison (foreign editor of the 
Daily Express). Israel Wamala (editor of Focus on Africa. BBC World Sendee), David Taylor (Money 
Programme. BBC) and Ray Vicker (London correspondent of the Wall Street Journal).
112. 'Presidential address'. South Africa Foundation Annual Report. 1972 (Johannesburg. 1973), p. 1. See 
also 'Presidential address'. South Africa Foundation Annual Report. 1974 (Johannesburg. 1975), pp.
19: 'If the world news-media really want to embark on something worthwhile, here is a campaign they 
can launch - Comparative moralities and freedoms among nations.'
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sanctions against South Africa. The advertisements complemented those created by the Department of 
Information and were published in both British and American newspapers.113
The SAF retained offices and directors of operations in both London and Washington D.C.. Roy Macnab, 
an historian and poet, resigned from the South African foreign service in the 1960s and joined the SAF. In 
Britain, his work involved collaboration with the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association 
(UKSATA) and the provision of a subtle representation of South Africa's interests to both journalists and 
politicians.114Macnab also contributed occasional ’South African letters' to the Spectator, in which his 
byline described him as being, '... a South African author and former diplomat.'115 Although Macnab's 
articles could hardly be described as propaganda, it is notable that he did not reveal to the readers that he 
was the London director of the SAF. He recalls that following the publication of the articles, '... there were 
official complaints to the President of the Foundation that I wasn't being patriotic enough.'116 In the United 
States, John Chettle took a very active approach to his work. He recalls that during the late 1970s, for 
example, 'We did some research into the extent to which the U.S. media was concentrating on South Africa, 
as opposed to even the Soviet Union ... [We] gave it to Accuracy in Media and they made quite a bit of it.'117 
Beyond research, Chettle's other duties included: keeping in regular contact with Donald deKieffer, the 
Department of Information's lobbyist; testifying on behalf of the SAF at the Africa Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; and speaking on the subject of South Africa throughout North 
America.118
The similarities between the Department of Information and the SAF, in this period, were striking. In 1977, 
for instance, the SAF Annual Report noted th a t'... some subscribing members ... likened the situation to that
113. 'Economic sanctions make me shudder' & 'Don't isolate us', (advertisements), The Times. 20 & 25 
Sept. 1973; Jennifer Davis, 'Special: Black sell-outs sell apartheid', Southern Africa. Vol. VI, No. 8, 
Oct. 1973, pp. 8-10. See also Burgess et al, Great White Hoax, pp. 25-26,
114. South Africa Foundation Annual Report. 1976/77 (Johannesburg, 1977), p. 28.
115. Roy Macnab, 'As Vorster abandons Smith ...', The Spectator. 18 Jan. 1975, p. 59.
116. Interview with Roy Macnab, 26 Oct. 1996. Macnab's contributions to The Spectator ceased following 
the appointment of Alexander Chancellor as editor.
117. Interview with John Chettle, 23 May 1996. See 'Press Perverts Rights Picture', Accuracy In Media 
Report. Vol. VIII, No. 3, Feb. 1979.
118. Interviews with John Chettle, 23 May 1996 & Donald deKieffer, 12 April 1996.
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of a salesman with a product to sell. The Foundation was the salesman and South Africa's image the 
product. If a product had characteristics which made it unsaleable in a given market, you had to change 
either the product or the market.'119 No wonder then that Eschel Rhoodie is reputed to have described the 
SAF as an organisation '... which tries to do on a private basis what the Department of Infonnation is doing 
on an official basis.'120 Although many journalists availed themselves of the SAF's assistance, it is clear that 
a number of the correspondents in the Republic understood the true role of the Foundation. The 
(Johannesburg) Financial Mail reported in 1978 that 'At a press conference in Johannesburg this week, 
foreign pressmen peppered the Foundation's director-general, Peter Sorour, with questions about the 
organisation's stance on government policy. Obviously unsatisfied with Sorour’s answers, one journalist 
openly commented: "It's a camouflage job." Said another: "You seem to be double-heading the Department 
of I nformation."1121
The complementary role that BOSS played in relation to the Department of Information during the 1970s 
remains a grey area. It is clear, however, that van den Bergh worked closely with Rhoodie and Mulder. This 
was not merely limited to the provision of secret funds, unorthodox diplomacy in Africa and the creation of 
the Montreal 'blueprint'. Gordon Winter has claimed that Chris van der Walt, the Director of Information in 
London during the late 1970s was actually a '... BOSS propagandist.'122 Some years earlier, Adam Raphael 
made a similar accusation against Vlok Delport, van der Walt's predecessor.123 It is also a matter of record 
that the Information scandal, and the ensuing resignations of Rhoodie, van den Bergh and Mulder, were 
rapidly followed by a number of defections from the South African intelligence agency.124 Such defections
119. South Africa Foundation Annual Report. 1977/78 (Johannesburg. 1978), p. 1.
120. Burgess et al, Great White Hoax, p. 24, citing Eschel Rhoodie.
121. ’Shaky Foundation', (Johannesburg) Financial Mail. 17 March 1978, p. 817.
122. Gordon Winter. Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Middlesex, 1981), p. 469.
123. Adam Raphael, 'Club of 10's BOSS', The Guardian. 25 June 1974: '... D elport... is the head of 
operations for BOSS in the United Kingdom, according to informed diplomatic sources.'
124. The defectors included Gordon Winter, Alexander Lambert, Arthur McGiven and Ivan Himmelhoch. 
On Winter, see 'Interview with Gordon Winter', News, London Weekend Television, 29 June 1979;
Winter, Inside BOSS. On Lambert, see 'Portrait of a defector1, New African, Dec. 1979, pp. 40-41. On 
McGiven, see Arthur McGiven, 'Inside BOSS's "super spook" HQ', 'The British "targets" of BOSS' & 
'How army bugged BOSS spies', The Observer, 30 Dec. 1979-13 Jan. 1980. On Himmelhoch, see 
Martin Bailey, 'BOSS at work in Britain' & 'Foreign policy duality', New Statesman, 15-22 Aug. 1980, 
pp. 8-9 & 12.
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had previously been rare, and led within a few months to the exposure of Craig Williamson.125 Additionally,
as Eschel Rhoodie admitted in his interview with Mervyn Rees, BOSS was the major supplier of 
information to the Department of Information:
... infiltration [into anti-apartheid groups] was done by the Bureau of 
State Security and they would provide us with information ... The 
Bureau... produces a publication which is circulated only to the full 
Cabinet and I believe four or six people outside the Cabinet that 
included the Secretary for Foreign Affairs and myself ... [it] was a 
weekly and monthly and also a quarterly and annual summary ... a top 
secret summary of the state of the world in so far as it affects South 
Africa.116
South Africa, in conclusion, had two propaganda agencies (the Department of Information and the SAF) 
speaking on its behalf and an intelligence service which was directly concerned with the global 
representation of the Republic. Was ever a country better equipped to withstand the assault of an exiled 
opposition?
125. Hugh Lewin, Walter Schwarz & David Beresford, 'Pretoria’s agent was responsible for channelling 
secret funds to anti-apartheid workers', The Guardian. 23 Jan. 1980; Andrew Stephen, 'Scenes in the 
life of a super-spy', Sunday Times magazine, 8 Feb. 1981, pp. 20-30.
126. Mervyn Rees, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, p. 197.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ANTI-APARTHEID 
MOVEMENTS.
One of the weaknesses of the anti-apartheid movement in Britain and in 
the United States has been that whites have played most of the 
leadership roles. In most cases, the criticism that white American or 
English liberals are working out guilt complexes about their country's 
own situations by becoming deeply involved in fighting the battle for 
South Africa's blacks may be an overstatement. But it contains enough 
appearance of truth ... to damage their credibility on the issue.1
The Anti-AparLheid Movement is more than a pressure group: it is 
Britain's conscience on southern Africa.2
In chapter three, I examined the rise and fall of the South African Department of Information. In this 
chapter, I consider the activities of the anti-apartheid groups in Britain and the United States. Previous 
assessments of anti-apartheid campaigns have differed in their conclusions. David Wiley, for example, 
suggested, in 1979, th a t '... the movements in the Western nations have been fraught with divisiveness, 
sectarianism, and an inability of the protagonists to cooperate in common strategies of change. Frequently, 
the movements have more leaders than constituents and their interpretations of events in Africa frequently 
reflected more their own ideologies than the realities of the African needs and movements.'3 In contrast, 
Hugo Young commented of the Slop The Seventy Tour (STST) that 'It is hard to think of a single large 
political campaign which has had anything like so immediate an impact.4 In an attempt to explain these 
contrasting assessments, this chapter considers the organisations which opposed apartheid South Africa; 
their attempts to influence the media representation of the Republic; the coverage of, and the tensions 
within, the anti-apartheid movements; the historical precedent established by the Clapham Sect and the 
origins of the 'Free Nelson Mandela1 campaign.5
1. Jim Hoagland. South Africa: Civilizations in Conflict (London. 1973), p. 358.
2. Suzanne Cronje, ’Africa's British allies', Africa, No. 29, Jan. 1974, p. 66.
3. David Wiley, 'Anti-Apartheid Movements versus Government Policy in U.S. and U.K.' [a review of 
George W. Shepherd Jr., Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and Western Policy in the Liberation of 
South Africa (Connecticut, 1977)], Africa Today. Vol. 26, No. 1, 1979, p. 63. In the early 1970s, David 
Wiley was a spokesman for the Madison Area Committee on Southern Africa.
4. Hugo Young, 'Introduction', in Derek Humphry, The Cricket Conspiracy (London, 1975), p. 7.
5. There are, as yet, no independent, academic studies of the anti-apartheid movements, either in Britain or
in the United States, during the 1970s. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid is a useful account, but Shepherd was 
the (part-time) Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) from 1953-1955. For
infonnation on the ACOA during the 1960s, see John Joseph Seiler, The Formulation of U.S. Policy
Toward Southern Africa, 1957-1976: The Failure of Good Intentions', unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
University of Connecticut, 1976, pp. 108-120.
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Anti-apartheid activity during the 1970s.
The two major organisations spearheading the anti-apartheid pressure groups in Britain and the United 
Slates were the Anti-Apartheid Movement (A-AM) and the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), 
respectively.6 As George Houser, the Executive Director of the ACOA, later recalled, 'South Africa 
provided the spark which led to the foundation of the ACOA in 1953.7 During the 1960s, the ACOA 
published a magazine, Africa Today, which was relaunched in 1966 as a quarterly publication under the 
aegis of the University of Denver. By the 1970s, the organisation was primarily preoccupied with issues 
relating to southern Africa. As with the A-AM in Britain, the major campaigns of the 1970s were 
disinvestment, the sports boycott, the enforcement of the arms embargo, defence and aid activities, 
lobbying in Washington and at the United Nations, and South Africa's illegal occupation of South-West 
Africa-Namibia.
Anti-apartheid protest in Britain was originally voiced in the early 1950s by Reverend Michael Scott (the 
Africa Bureau) and Canon John Collins (Christian Action, and later Defence and Aid). As George Shepherd 
has noted 'Both the Africa Bureau and Christian Action have roots back into the Anti-Slavery Society, 
which was founded in 1906 and in turn emerged out of earlier antislavery groups.'8 In 1959, the Boycott 
Movement, was established in response to the call by Albert Luthuli, the African National Congress 
President, for sanctions against South Africa.9 The Boycott Movement lapped into the same tradition as the 
other organisations while also utilising the talents of a number of Indian South African exiles who were 
resident in London.16 Following the Sharpeville massacre (1960), the Boycott Movement was renamed the 
A-AM. The early 1960s was a relatively successful period for the A-AM: South Africa was forced to leave
6. The A-AM, International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) and African National Congress (ANC) archives 
were in transit during the period while the research for this thesis was being prepared.
7. George M. Houser, 'Meeting Africa's Challenge: The story of the American Committee on Africa1, Issue, 
Vol. VI, No. 2/3, Summer/Fall 1976, p. 16.
8. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, p. 33.
9. Abdul S. Minty, 'The Anti-Apartheid Movement and Racism in Southern Africa', in Peter Willetts (ed.), 
Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non- 
Governmental Organisations (London, 1982), p. 28.
10. Indian South Africans such as Vella Pillay played a major role in the A-AM until 1994. Many of the
Indian members of the A-AM were also members of the Indian National Congress (INC) and the South
African Communist Party (SACP).
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the Commonwealth in 1961 and the Labour government, elected in 1964, introduced an amis embargo 
against the Republic.11 The issue of economic sanctions, however, remained unresolved. From 1965, the A- 
AM published a monthly newspaper, Anti-Apartheid News. Assistance was provided in this venture by a 
number of journalists, most notably, Anne Darnborough, Bruce Page and Qus Macdonald.12
Although the A-AM and the ACOA were the two major organisations opposing apartheid South Africa, 
there were a number of other groups which campaigned with equal vociferousness. On the radical end of 
the American spectrum, the South African Committee (SAC) emerged '... out of a widespread student 
concern for research on imperialism and racial problems1.13 The SAC published a monthly magazine, 
Southern Africa, and members of the organisation founded Africa News.14 Jennifer Davis, a South African 
exile who worked for the ACOA and the SAC, recalls that 'Southern Africa magazine was where we had 
freedom ... there we really did work it as a collective ... the politics was more interesting, we pushed a little 
further left.'15 In Britain, the work of the A-AM was complemented by the International Defence and Aid 
Fund (IDAF). IDAF had originated from the British Defence and Aid Fund, an organisation established by 
Canon Collins in the mid-1950s in order to provide funds for those arrested and imprisoned during the 
Defiance Campaign in South Africa. By the 1970s, IDAF was also concerned with educational issues, 
information gathering, the promotion of links with sympathetic European groups and an extensive 
publishing programme. Other organisations involved in campaigns against South Africa included the 
African-American Institute (A-AI) in the United Stales, which published the magazine, Africa Report.16 The
11. Austin Mitchell, 'Pipe dreaming', New Statesman, 14 Feb. 1997, p. 16, citing Marcia Williams: '[Upon 
entering Number 10], The first thing he [Wilson] did was to put out an order that the Foreign Office and 
the Defence Department must be told that no amis be sold to South Africa.'
12. A friendly relationship was developed, in particular, between the A-AM and the Sunday Times, for 
whom Bruce Page worked. In the 1970s, Denis Herbstein became the major conduit for the A-AM at 
the Sunday Times. (Interviews with Bruce Page, 17 May 1996; Denis Herbstein, 7 Feb. 1996).
13. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, p. 42.
14. 'Organizational initiatives: Liberation in Southern Africa', Issue. Vol. Ill, No. 4, Winter 1973, p. 52: 
'Southern Africa ... is the only magazine in the United States that covers every month news concerning 
liberation struggles in Southern Africa, news of what is going on in South Africa, interpretations and 
news about what is going on in the rest of the world in relation to Southern Africa.'
15. Interview with Jennifer Davis, 8 Nov. 1996.
16. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, p. 33: '[The A-AI], founded in 1953 in Washington D.C. ... had from its 
inception a semiofficial character, as it derived much of its funding from United States government 
sources.1 See also Dan Schechter, Michael Ansara & David Kolodney, 'The CIA as an Equal 
Opportunity Employer', Ramparts, June 1969, p. 25-33.
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A-AI was suspected of having links with the CIA; Jennifer Davis comments that 'We regarded them as 
almost the other side.’17 In Britain, the Africa Bureau, established by Reverend Michael Scott and supported 
by David Astor and Colin Legum, campaigned with the purpose, among others, of opposing racial 
tyrannies in A frica... [and promoting] the achievement of nondiscriminatory majority rule in Africa.'18
The networks of organisations opposed to South Africa worked in conjunction (and sometimes in conflict) 
with a multitude of non-governmental organisations of which, perhaps, the most important were the 
churches. The decisions, in 1970, by the World Council of Churches (WCC) in favour of disinvestment, 
and in 1971 and 1973, to give humanitarian aid to the liberation movements, the ANC and the Pan- 
Africanist Congress (PAC), were particularly significant.19 However, despite the support of the WCC, 
profound divisions existed in the opposition to apartheid. In the main, these divisions were concerned with 
the issue of support for the ANC and the PAC and, by extension, support for the armed struggle.20 Kader 
and Louise Asmal, who were Vice-Chairman and Honorary Administrative Secretary of the Irish A-AM, 
respectively, believed that the A-AMs were '... partners of the liberation movements in joint campaigns to 
change public opinion and alter the policy of governments1.31 In contrast, Amnesty International (AI) 
refused to endorse the adoption of the armed struggle.22 In effect,
.. two different anti-apartheid strategies [emerged]: one in the direction 
of domestic reforms with minimal external pressure and the other in 
favour of disengagement and support for liberation. The former stems 
from the gradualist, reformist ideas institutionally expressed through 
the AAI ... and the Africa Bureau ... while the latter reflects the
17. Interview with Jennifer Davis, 8 Nov. 1996.
18. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, p. 35, citing 'AIMS', Africa Bureau, mimeographed, London, 1952. See also 
Richard Cockett, David Astor and The Observer (London, 1991), pp. 182-186. Mary Benson, a South 
African drnigre was a key figure within the Africa Bureau.
19. The church organisations did not interact with the media, preferring to demonstrate their support for the 
anti-apartheid cause through the usual A-AM and ACOA channels.
20. The technical brief of the A-AM was to oppose apartheid. The A-AM therefore purported to speak for 
both the ANC and the PAC, although in practice it was always closer to the ANC than the PAC. The 
ACOA adopted a similar position. (See George M. Houser, Letter to the editor, Christian Science 
Monitor, 15 Feb. 1977).
21. Kader and Louise Asmal, Anti-Apartheid Movements in Western Europe. United Nations Unit on 
Apartheid, No. 4/74, March 1974, p. 6.
22. Interview with Abdul Minty, 4 Oct. 1996. Minty was the Honorary Secretary of the A-AM. AI did not
publish a report on human rights in South Africa in the 1970s until Political Imprisonment in South
Africa: An Amnesty International Report (London, 1978).
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abolitionist pressures of the AAM, the ACOA, SAC, and particularly 
the American black activists.23
In the 1970s the collapse of the Portuguese empire, the intensification of military action in Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe and the Soweto uprising all transformed the terms of the debate regarding the armed struggle. 
By the mid-decade, it was clear that the moral questions associated with support or opposition to violent 
action were peripheral. Southern Africa was in turmoil. This brought with it fresh problems for the anti­
apartheid movements and, most dramatically, the introduction of the Cold War into the sub-continent. 
While there were many similarities between the campaigns of the ACOA and the A-AM, there were also 
fundamental differences between Britain and the United States as operating sites for pressure groups. In the 
United States, for instance, African-American politicians became, during the 1970s, crucial to the anti- 
apartheid campaign. The appointment of Congressman Charles C. Diggs Jr. to the posts of chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (1969) and the first Congressional Black 
Caucus (1971) was an important element in this process. Diggs was a supreme publicist of the liberation 
cause in South Africa. His ’Action Manifesto' of 1972, for example, was not afraid to address the thorny 
issue of violence: 'Our government, at present, decries violence as a means of liberation, without 
condemning the violence which the South African government uses to enforce the subjugation of the 
majority of the people. The United States must recognise that any means are legitimate so long as the 
recalcitrance of the South African government continues'.24
The annual Hearings of the Subcommittee on Africa into U.S. investment in Southern Africa (1971-1973) 
unleashed a flood of infonnation which complemented the A-AM disinvestment campaign and later proved 
useful to protest organisations as the disinvestment campaign spread through the American university 
campuses in the late 1970s. The marshalling of African-American protest by Diggs and others influenced a 
shift towards a more pronounced anti-apartheid position in George McGovern's Presidential campaign 
pledges of 1972.2S The importance of this shift among Democratic Party candidates was demonstrated by
23. Shepherd. Anti-Apartheid, pp. 43-44.
24. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., 'Action Manifesto', Issue. Vol. II, No. 1, Spring 1972, p. 52. The other major 
campaigner against apartheid in the U.S. legislature was Dick Clark, Senior Democratic Senator from 
Iowa.
25. C. Gerald Fraser, 'Nixon denounced on Africa policy', New York Times, 5 Nov. 1972.
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the priorities of the Jimmy Carter Presidential campaign in 1976.26 During the same year, the Black 
Leadership Conference on Southern Africa brought together more than one-hundred-and-twenly black 
organisations to draw up an African-American Manifesto on southern Africa which, amongst a welter of 
other proposals, endorsed the armed struggle. In July 1977, TransAfrica was established as a lobbying 
organisation for Africa and the Caribbean.27
In contrast, in Great Britain, the failures of the Labour governments (1964-1966 and 1966-1970) to fulfil 
its policy commitments regarding southern Africa contributed to a sense of resignation when a Labour 
government was elected in 1974.28 As Guy Arnold, the director of the Africa Bureau, commented: 
Traditionally there has always been far more sympathy with Black African causes among the ranks of the 
Labour Party than amongst the Tories. Sympathy is one thing, however, and action when in power is 
something quite different.'29 Although Joan Lestor, a Vice-President of the A-AM, was appointed to the 
position of junior Minister (with responsibility for Africa) in the 1974 Labour government, Labour policies 
towards South Africa rarely stretched beyond 'gestures'. The most significant of these was the 
announcement of Britain's withdrawal from the Simonstown naval base in 1974. However, as the debates in 
the newspapers made clear, this decision could be justified on economic, geopolitical or strategic grounds, 
thereby rendering the concession to the A-AM little more than a 'sop1.30 There were no Afro-Caribbean or 
Asian Labour Members of Parliament (M.P.s) during the 1970s. This was not unique to the Labour Party. 
The A-AM had a similar problem as it acknowledged: 'The AAM is still faced with the difficult task of 
mobilising in the black community in Britain. Some developments have taken place but there is much more
26. For Jimmy Carter's pre-election concerns regarding South Africa see 'Playboy interview: Jimmy Carter', 
Playboy, Vol. 23, No. 11, Nov. 1976, p. 70: 'It might be that now I should drop my campaign for 
President and start a crusade for black-majority rule in South Africa or Rhodesia'.
27. William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of 
Southern Africa (New York, 1986), p. 280.
28. For the A-AM's impressions of the Labour government (1964-1966), see Anne Darnborough, Labour's 
Record on Southern Africa: An Examination of Attitudes before October 1964 and Action since 
(London, 1967).
29. Guy Arnold, 'Britain and Southern Africa', Africa No. 36, Aug. 1974, p. 69.
30. See, for example, Henry Stanhope, 'Britain simply does not need Simonstown', The Times, 4  June 1974; 
Colin Legum & Andrew Wilson, 'The Simonstown Trap', The Observer, 10 Nov. 1974; Lord Chalfont, 
'Simonstown: what is all the arguing about?', The Times, 11 Nov. 1974. The Simonstown Agreement
was formally terminated in June 1975.
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to be done in this area.'31
The second major difference between anti-apartheid activities in Britain and the United States related to 
the number of South Africans in the respective countries, and the popular (or assumed) knowledge of the 
Republic. The large number of exiled (or South African-born) journalists working in the British media 
during the 1970s was discussed in chapter two. A similar number of South Africans could be found within 
the British organisations opposed to apartheid. Figures such as Ruth First, Ronald Segal, Abdul Minty and 
Ethel de Keyser were among the dominant voices in the campaign in Britain during the early 1970s.32 
Except for Jennifer Davis, Dennis Brutus and Dumisani Kumalo, there were few exiled or emigre South 
Africans within the American anti-apartheid movements. This difference in South African involvement was 
reflected in the different forms of the debate in the two countries. Popular knowledge (and perceptions) of 
South Africa in Britain, while contributing to its relatively high level of public exposure in the media, also 
meant that the work of the A-AM in Britain was regularly challenged by well-informed opponents. To a 
significant extent in the United States, the ACOA and the SAC were campaigning within a less informed or 
opinionated milieu.33
The third major difference between the operations of the anti-apartheid movements related to the political 
cultures of the respective countries. In Britain, the A-AM were able to organise a national campaign, due in 
part to the relative smallness and homogeneity of the country. The expansion of A-AM offices across 
Britain during the 1960s and 1970s laid the ground for the genuine mass movement which emerged during
31. Anti-Apartheid Movement. Annual Report of Activities and Developments: October 1977-September 
1978 (London, 1978), p. 24.
32. Other South Africans in key positions within the British anti-apartheid movements included Phyllis 
Altman, Hugh Lewin, Allen Brooks and John Sprack. The biographical details of a number of people 
involved in the anti-apartheid movements and the ANC can be found in Thomas Karis & Gwendolen 
M. Carter, From Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 
1882-1964, Gail M. Gerhart & Thomas Karis, Volume 4: Political Profiles, 1882-1964 (Stanford, 
1977); Frene Ginwala, The Press in South Africa. United Nations Unit on Apartheid, No. 24/72, Nov. 
1972, pp. 30-32. See also Shula Marks, 'Ruth First: a tribute', Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 
10, No. 2, April 1984, pp. 123-128.
33. Although the debate in the United States was less intense than that in Britain, the director of the South
Africa Foundation in Washington D.C. felt that 'The most effective critics of South Africa are
exceedingly well infonned about conditions in [South Africa]... it is no longer correct to assume that
their hostility arises from scant understanding.' (M.R. Christie, 'Foreign report: Washington', South
Africa International. Vol. 4, No. 3, Jan. 1974, p. 181).
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the 1980s. In the USA, the traditional core of anti-apartheid activity had been the East coast. This remained 
true during the 1970s, although the ACOA opened a new office in Chicago (under Lhe stewardship of Prexy 
Nesbitt) and there were pockets of activity in California.34 Although the movement spread throughout the 
universities of North America during the late 1970s, anti-apartheid never became an issue of national 
concern in the U .S .35 The final difference between Britain and the United States related to the continuing 
tensions within the anti-apartheid organisations. In Britain, the central division related to the willingness or 
otherwise of 'liberals' to work with Africans and 'communists'. This tension was at its most extreme 
amongst the South African exiles and emigres and was rooted in long-standing strategic arguments about 
the liberation struggle which dated back to the 1940s and 1950s.36 In the United States, communists played 
a less significant role in the anti-apartheid movement. There, tensions tended to be dominated by the issue 
of race.37 However, while there were structural racial distinctions between the anti-apartheid groups in the 
U.S., Jennifer Davis recalls that in the ACOA: '... in a sense, people were dealing with South Africa because 
they couldn't deal with American racism and so this was like a displacement.138
The major area of A-AM and ACOA activity during the 1970s was the United Nations. Newell Stultz has 
recorded that between 1963 and 1970, fourteen resolutions were passed by the General Assembly of the 
U.N. condemning apartheid. Between 1970 and 1976, this figure increased to sixty: 'Before 1970 all votes 
on South African issues in the General Assembly were to some degree split-votes, that is, non-unanimous. 
But from 1970 to 1976 there were six resolutions ... where either the voting was unanimous or there was no
34. The Washington office of the ACOA was reopened in 1972 as an independent Washington Office on 
Africa, sponsored by the ACOA and the Methodist, Presbyterian, United Church of Christ and 
Episcopalian churches.
35. On the spread of the anti-apartheid issue through the American universities, see Edward B. Fiske,
'South Africa is new social issue for college activists'. New York Times. 15 March 1978; Editorial, 
'Heading for the exit in South Africa', New York Times, 2 April 1978; Barry Mitzman, 'U.S. students 
vs. apartheid: The divestiture demonstrations', The Nation, 13 May 1978, pp. 563-567.
36. See David Everatt, 'The Politics of Non-racialism: White Opposition to Apartheid, 1945-1960', 
unpublished D. Phil, thesis, Oxford University, 1990, p. 275: The disputes which followed the rise of 
the ANC - over the place of class struggle, the efficacy of parliamentary action, and others - were 
fought out over the form that racial co-operation should take, and the place of whites in ''the struggle 
against apartheid".'
37. See, for example, the debate on the subject by two Washington Post columnists: William Raspberry, 
'Israel and South Africa: toward U.S. tension', Washington Post, 21 April 1976 and Stephen S. 
Rosenfeld, 'Blacks and Jews: tension over diplomacy', Washington Post, 23 April 1976.
38. Interview with Jennifer Davis, 8 Nov. 1996.
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recorded vote at all; that is, the motion was, as the record reads, "passed without objection".139 The increase 
in the passage of resolutions condemning South Africa was complemented by a series of conferences held 
by the U.N. on the subject of apartheid.'40 In 1972, the General Assembly accepted the principle of armed 
struggle in much the same language as Charles Diggs's Action M anifesto.4t A year later, the General 
Assembly declared '... that the South African regime has no right to represent the people of South Africa 
and that the liberation movements recognised by the Organization of African Unity are the authentic 
representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people.'41 In 1974, the General Assembly 
took the critical decision to suspend South Africa from the United Nations.43 While this resolution 
represented a vital stage in the isolation of South Africa, it also led to increased sympathy for the Republic 
in the columns of a number of Western newspapers.44
On 1 January 1976, the U.N. established the Centre against Apartheid at the United Nations 
Secretariat. Following the World Conference for Action against Apartheid held in Lagos during August 
1977, the tone of U.N. resolutions hardened, as the use of the phrase 'racist regime' in a Security Council 
resolution dated October 1977 indicates.45 Four days later, the General Assembly passed the most 
significant resolution of the decade pertaining to South Africa, enforcing a mandatory arms embargo
39. Newell M. Stultz, 'The Apartheid issue at the General Assembly: Stalemate or Gathering Storm',
African Affairs. Vol. 86, No. 342, 1987, pp. 37-38.
40. Before 1972, there had been two conferences or international seminars on the subject of apartheid. 
Between 1972 and 1979, the United Nations organised thirteen (seven conferences, five seminars and a 
symposium). The most significant of which were the International Conference of Experts for the 
Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid in Southern Africa, Oslo, 9-14 April 1973; and the 
World Conference for Action against Apartheid, Lagos, 22-26 Aug. 1977. See also the extensive 
publishing programme of the United Nations Unit on Apartheid.
41. The General Assembly referred to the legitimacy of struggle '... by any available means.' (Scott Thomas, 
The Diplomacy of Liberation: The Foreign Relations of the African National Congress since 1960 
(London, 1996), p. 117, citing RES. 2923 E (XXVII) 1972).
42. 'General Assembly resolution: Policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa - Situation in 
South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid', A/RES/3151 G (XXVIII), 14 Dec. 1973, The 
United Nations and Apartheid. 1948-1994 (New York, 1994), p. 328.
43. 'Ruling by the President of the General Assembly, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Algeria), concerning the 
credentials of the delegation of South Africa', A /PV.2281,12 Nov. 1974, The United Nations and 
Apartheid, p. 333.
44. See chapter three.
45. 'Security Council resolution: The question of South Africa', S/RES/417 (1977), 31 Oct. 1977, The 
United Nations and Apartheid, p. 347.
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against the Republic. As Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, stated in the Security Council: 'We have today 
clearly witnessed a historic occasion. The adoption of this resolution marks the first time in the 32-year 
history of the Organisation that action has been taken under Chapter VII of the Charter against a Member 
State.'46 The declaration that the period between 21 March 1978 and 20 March 1979 would be proclaimed 
International Anti-Apartheid Year brought to a close a period in which the anti-apartheid movements had 
made great advances on the international stage. These advances, however, were greatly assisted by 
escalating repression and resistance inside the Republic. As George Houser recalls, 'It was always in 
response to events in South Africa that it was possible to do things outside.'47
Media relations.
The A-AM and the ACOA were as different in their relations with the media as they were in their national 
contexts. The A-AM started the 1970s with a relatively high profile following its role in the sports 
campaigns of 1969 and 1970. Its success in conjunction with the ad-hoc group, Stop the Seventy Tour 
(STST), in causing the abandonment of South Africa's cricket tour of England (1970), had given the A-AM 
a much needed publicity boost. The direct action employed during the protests, however, also led most of 
the British media to demonise the campaign. As Peter Hain later noted, 'One of our failures, and one of the 
opposition's few successes, was that the public distinction between militant non-violence and violence 
became very blurred.'48 While the campaign to enforce a sports boycott attracted a new generation of 
younger activists to the A-AM, the media's treatment of the post-1968 generation exacted a degree of 
damage from the A-AM's carefully cultivated respectable image.49
Within months of its success in halting the cricket tour, the A-AM relaunched the sanctions campaign with
46. 'Statement by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim in the Security Council after the adoption of resolution 
418 (1977) concerning a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa', S/PV.2046,4 Nov. 1977, The 
United Nations and Apartheid, p. 348. The mandatory amis embargo against South Africa was the 
successful resolution to a campaign in which the A-AM and the ACOA had been engaged for fifteen 
years. (Interview with Abdul Minty, 4 Oct. 1996).
47. Interview with George Houser, 17 April 1996.
48. Peter Hain, Don't Play with Apartheid: The Background to the Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign 
(London, 1971), pp. 200.
49. The A-AM's respectability as an organisation was a crucial component in its attempts to win support for 
its cause amongst politicians and members of the British establishment. (Interviews with Ethel de 
Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995; Christabel Gumey, 6 Aug. 1996).
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a new focus on the withdrawal of British capital from the Republic. This fresh agenda was directly linked to 
the burgeoning campaign against Barclays Bank, which was gathering support throughout the universities 
of Britain. During 1972, Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney wrote The South African 
Connection, which would become the crucial anti-apartheid text of the period.50 However, as the wages paid 
by British companies entered the mainstream of media discourse, the A-AM, among the first instigators of 
the debate, was increasingly isolated by the development of the story.51 The years 1974 and 1975 were very 
discouraging for the A-AM and the liberation organisations. The forays of the South African Department of 
Information into the world of international diplomacy and the changed conditions in southern Africa 
following the fall of the Portuguese empire took the organisation by surprise: 'Events since the end of 1974 
have been well-publicised and the western press has made a special point of casting Vorster as Africa's 
Peace-Maker. Never before have we seen such a major and concerted offensive to cast South Africa in a 
favourable light. The Pretoria regime has taken every opportunity to exploit what it considers to be a more 
favourable climate of opinion.'52
In the United States, the ACOA experienced a similar degree of isolation, which Houser later described as 
'... the cooling enthusiasm toward Africa of the seventies ... [making] itself felt.'53 One area in which both 
the British and American anti-apartheid organisations could publicise their cause and, occasionally, 
influence the external coverage of South Africa was through the medium of publishing. During the 1970s, 
the production of anti-apartheid magazines and pamphlets escalated. The circulation of the A-AM's 
monthly newspaper, Anti-Apartheid News, remained at seven-thousand throughout the decade, 
approximately half of which were supplied to members of the Movement. Anti-Apartheid News was a
50. Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney, The South African Connection: Western 
Involvement in Apartheid (London, 1972). Steele recalls that the impetus for the book came from Ruth 
First. (Interview with Jonathan Steele, 15 Nov. 1994).
51. See chapter five.
52. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Annual Report on Activities and Development. October 1974-September 
1975 (London, 1975), p. 3. See also Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics 
of the National Party. 1948-1994 (Randburg, 1994), p. 192: 'So successful was the detente initiative that 
a senior ANC functionary later told me that by mid-1975 his organisation had begun to fear that it 
might be excluded from every African state south of the Sahara.'
53. George M. Houser, 'Meeting Africa's Challenge: The Story of the American Committee on Africa',
Issue. Vol. VI, No. 2/3, Summer/Fall 1976, p. 22.
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slightly haphazard publication, providing news, commentary, exposes, extracts from anti-apartheid books, 
statements by the A-AM and the ANC, details on campaigns, and, from the mid-1970s, critiques of the 
British media's treatment of South Africa. It was not a predictable newspaper, being, in effect, pragmatic 
and earnest in equal measure. Among the many journalists who contributed during the decade were 
Jonathan Steele, Antonio de Figueiredo, Paul Foot, Christopher Hitchens and Rupert Pennant-Rea.5*
Anti-Apartheid News was extraordinarily dependent upon the goodwill and talent of its volunteer 
contributors. An example of this dependence can be seen in the design quality of the newspaper's front-page 
which suddenly deteriorated during the mid-1970s. Christabel Gurney (the editor) recalls that a team of 
young advertisement designers led by Malcolm Gluck, who had originally been encouraged to assist the A- 
AM by Ethel de Keyser, withdrew when de Keyser left her position as the A-AM's Executive Secretary.55 
The only comparable magazine in the United States was the SAC's monthly publication, Southern Africa. 
The SAC was a less populist organisation than the A-AM and this could be detected in the style of the 
organisation's magazine. Southern Africa offered extensive analysis and a comprehensive survey of the 
coverage of South Africa in the global media, but rarely replicated Anti-Apartheid News' sense of a 
campaigning publication.
The ACOA did not publish a newspaper or magazine of its own during the 1970s, concentrating instead 
upon the production of pamphlets and briefing papers.56 IDAF produced the six-monthly Southern African 
Information Service, a survey of all references to South Africa in governmental publications and the media, 
until 1974. During 1975, IDAF launched Focus on Political Repression in Southern Africa, a news bulletin
54. Rupert Pennant-Rea later became the Deputy-Govemor of the Bank of England. The contents and 
direction of Anti-Apartheid News was overseen by an editorial board which included ANC-SACP 
members, Brian Bunting and Ruth First. Bunting was the Tass correspondent in London.
55. Interview with Christabel Gurney, 6 Aug. 1996. Gluck and his friends had previously designed the 
famous A-AM poster for the 1970 sports boycott campaign, which featured a white policeman beating 
an African and bore the legend, ’If you could see their national sport, you might be less keen on their 
cricket.’ An example of the poor front-page designs which followed Gluck's departure would be Anti- 
Apartheid News, July-Aug. 1976, p .l, which failed to feature a photograph of the Soweto uprising. 
Gurney recalls: 'I think we were so concerned with getting the message right that we didn't realise that 
what you needed was a picture - we were very keen on getting the words right.1
56. See, for example, Sean Gervasi, Continuing Escalation in the Angola Crisis. The Africa Fund & the
ACOA, New York, 19 Dec. 1975. See also David Martin, 'American warships are "off Angola"1, The
Observer. 11 Jan. 1976.
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which concentrated on reports of human rights abuse in the Republic. Throughout the decade, the ANC 
continued to publish Sechaba  and the South African Communist Party (SACP) issued the quarterly 
periodical, The African Communist. Neither publication was particularly effective at promoting the cause of 
the ANC-SACP to the uncommitted reader, which, perhaps, was not their purpose. During the mid-1970s, 
Sechaba was relaunched for a few years as a quarterly publication.157 The African Communist remained 
rigidly ideological throughout the decade, offering a Marxist analysis of events which gave little priority to 
the provision of information on the international struggle against apartheid.*8 There appears to have been 
little co-operation between the British and American anti-apartheid publications.
In addition to the pamphlets published by the A-AM and the ACOA, IDAF engaged in a concerted 
publishing exercise which addressed many areas of South African life. Exceptional examples which bore 
the IDAF imprint included Hilda Bernstein's study of the Biko inquest, Barbara Rogers's examination of the 
'Bantustans', and a survey of the activities of BOSS.59 The Africa Bureau also published pamphlets and in 
1976 financed The Great White Hoax, which proved to be the first comprehensive study of the secret 
operations of South Africa's Department of Information.60 Taken in its entirety, the published efforts of the 
underfunded anti-apartheid movements of Britain and the United States provided an abundance of 
information and posed a significant threat to the propagandists of South Africa.61 No wonder then that 
Eschel Rhoodie informed Mervyn Rees: 'As far as Britain was concerned we were mostly concerned ... with 
countering the operations of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain.'62 Despite the concerns of the
57. The editor of Sechaba and the ANC's Director of Publicity, M.P. Naicker died in 1977. He was 
succeeded by Francis Meli, an SACP member.
58. African Communist also featured a number of articles offering a historical perspective on the struggle 
and particularly venomous book reviews. Due to its quarterly periodical status, (as with Sechaba during 
the mid-1970s) it suffered from an inability to respond quickly, in print, to events within South Africa.
59. Hilda Bernstein, No. 46 - Steve Biko (London. 1978); Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's 
Bantustans (London, 1976); BOSS: The First Five Years (London, 1975).
60. Julian Burgess, Esau du Plessis, Roger Murray, Peter Fraenkel, Rosanne Harvey, John Laurence, Peter 
Ripken and Barbara Rogers, The Great White Hoax: South Africa's international propaganda machine 
(London, 1977).
61. IDAF and the ACOA published occasional fund-raising advertisements in the British and American 
newspapers. See, for example, IDAF, 'Remember Soweto', advertisement, The Times, 16 June 1977.
62. Mervyn Rees, interview with Eschel Rhoodie, 1979, transcript, p. 188. For an example of South African
'dirty tricks' against the A-AM, see Martin Walker, 'Anti-Apartheid finds forgeries', The Guardian. 14
March 1977; and Robin Lustig, 'Riddle of a "dirty tricks" petition', The Observer. 25 March 1979.
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Department of Information, relations between the anti-apartheid movements and the media in Britain and 
the United Stales were always problematic. The A-AM normally assessed this relationship in terms of the 
manner in which the media had reported the activities of the organisation. At times during the 1970s, the A- 
AM's tone could verge on the patronising:
The bulk of [the] reporting [on the 'detente' initiative] has tended to 
give a highly misleading impression of the situation and the Movement 
has endeavoured to correct this and to convey the true perspectives of 
the situation, through contact with individual reporters, through letters 
and numerous press statements. ... Of the national daily and weekly 
newspapers covering Southern African issues in depth, special mention 
must be made of the Morning Star, which also unfailingly reported 
A AM activities, The Guardian, Tribune and West Indian World. The 
Sunday Times, The Observer and The Times have also covered the issue 
though to a lesser extent. The Movement's connection with individual 
journalists in the press is maintained but a greater effort is needed in 
this field to ensure that the realities of the Southern African situation 
are reflected with greater accuracy.63
Placing articles by A-AM (or ANC) representatives in the British media was extremely difficult. The only 
newspaper which regularly found space for anti-apartheid comment was the communist daily, the Morning 
Star.6* During 1975, the 'women's page' of the Guardian carried an article on the ANC-SACP member, 
Hilda Bernstein.6* Following the Soweto uprising, the Guardian began to commission articles on South 
Africa from Bernstein.66 In 1978, an article on the conditions on Robben Island was republished in both the 
Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post.61 The key to the international media's acceptance of Hilda 
Bernstein's work was only partly an increased interest in the validity of the ANC position, however. The 
more significant factor was that Bernstein was a balanced and creative journalist.68
63. A-AM, Annual Report, 1975, p. 22.
64. The A-AM also sustained a productive relationship with Africa magazine, which carried articles by 
Ruth First, Frene Ginwala and Ethel de Keyser during the early 1970s. See also Editorial, 'Nuclear 
conspiracy: West Germany and South Africa', Africa, Oct. 1975, p. 7, which published an appeal by the 
ANC regarding South Africa's nuclear programme.
65. Suzanne Lowry, 'Miscellany', The Guardian, 29 Aug. 1975.
66. See Hilda Bernstein, ’Back to Black1, The Guardian. 4 Oct. 1976; 'Did he fall or was he pushed?', The 
Guardian, 22 Feb. 1977; 'The woman South Africa locks up in the place without a name', The Guardian. 
5 July 1977. See also M.P. Naicker, 'Demolishing the bridge-building myth', The Times, 8 Sept. 1976.
67. Hilda Bernstein, 'Inside Apartheid's gulag archipelago', Los Angeles Times, 29 Jan. 1978, republished 
as 'The relentless racism in S. African prison', Washington Post. 5 Feb. 1978. The article had originally 
been published as 'Two South Africans from the island', In These Times, 18-24 Jan. 1978, pp. 9-10. In 
These Times was a radical American weekly.
68. Bernstein suggests that it is possible that her reputation as a published author and public speaker made
her views more acceptable to the media. (Interview with Hilda Bernstein, 15 July 1996).
-106-
In America, penetration of the media by supporters of the anti-apartheid cause was equally tortuous. 
Francis Kornegay, a representative of the Washington Task Force on African Affairs, commented in 1973 
that 'One of the woefully neglected areas by Southern Africa groups and other organizations with interest in 
building an informed public on African issues has been, we feel, mass communications.'69 As with the A- 
AM, American organisations could not afford to employ a staff member whose sole task was to engage in 
public relations. George Houser describes the normal method of media relations for both British and U.S. 
anti-apartheid organisations when he recalls that 'We all had a finger in the pie.179 However, the British 
organisations did possess the advantage of operating in a country where the media was interested in South 
Africa. One cannot read George Shepherd's comments on the A-AM's relations with the press without 
detecting a touch of envy: '... press visibility has extended the influence of AAM into levels of British 
society not yet touched by counterpart groups in the United States.171 The ACOA (which was based in New 
York) retained useful contacts with journalists on the New York Times but found its most productive 
relationship to be with the African-American media.72
Neither the British nor the American anti-apartheid movement felt that it was fairly treated by its national 
media. The A-AM's assertion that 'The correspondence columns of The Times constantly ignore letters from 
the AAM and its supporters', was repeated by the ACOA in relation to the New York Times,13 The
69. 'Organisational Initiatives: Liberation in Southern Africa', Issue. Vol. Ill, No. 4, Winter 1973, p. 44.
70. Interview with George Houser, 17 April 1996. See also Suzanne Cronje, 'Interview Abdul Minty', 
Africa, No. 29, Jan. 1974, p. 69: 'We do not have a research department, not even a research officer. We 
don't have the resources to employ full-time personnel to sift publications, but we have individuals in 
Britain and elsewhere who send us material; and sometimes the press comes to us for comment, as a 
result of which we get to know what is happening.1; Jennifer Davis recalls that 'We always knew [that 
media relations] were important. We just didn't do much.1 (Interview with Jennifer Davis, 8 Nov. 1996).
71. Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid, p. 39.
72. Interview with George Houser, 17 April 1996. See also Daniel Schechter, 'Media myopia', More, Dec. 
1977, p. 31. A noted achievement for the ACOA was the publication of George M. Houser, 
'Communism and the war in Angola', New York Times, 14 Dec. 1975. SAC members and founders of 
Africa News, Reed Kramer and Tami Hultman had a degree of success in placing anti-apartheid articles 
in the U.S. publications. See, for example, Tami Hultman & Reed Kramer, 'Investing in South Africa is 
investing in Apartheid', Los Angeles Times, 9 April 1978.
73. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Annual Report of Activities and Developments. October 1975-September 
1976 (London, 1976), p. 23. See also 'South Africa courts U.S. through "back door" contacts and 
intensive propaganda'. Southern Africa, Vol. VII, No. 7, July-Aug. 1974: '... the fNew Yorkl Times did 
not publish letters received from Africa Fund researcher Jennifer Davis and lawyer Joel Carlson.' The 
Africa Fund was a subsidiary organisation of the ACOA. The Guardian regularly carried 
correspondence from the A-AM and the ANC.
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events of June 1976 caused some concern within the organisations over the relative invisibility of the 
ANC.74 Following Mike Terry's appointment to the position of Executive Secretary of the A-AM in 1976, 
the approach to media relations was re-examined. Terry recalls that although 'It took me quite some time to 
get on top of [media relations]', the eventual analysis was that the newspapers perceived the ANC as 
isolated and disconnected from events in South Africa. The new media programme was designed
... to try and shift the agenda about how news itself was reported from 
South Africa. Secondly, to try and ensure that the media heard the voice 
of the liberation movement ... thirdly, to try and get coverage of our 
own events ... Our task, above all, was to try and persuade people that 
[apartheid] was an evil system that they had to act against and that the 
fundamentals hadn't changed.75
There is no doubt that the A-AM's relationship with the British media was contradictory, In 1977, for 
example, the A-AM Annual Report confirmed that, 'For the first time in many years press coverage on 
political prisoners and detainees was fairly wide. Feature articles appeared in both The Times and the 
Observer, deaths in detention were covered by the daily press on many occasions and the TV documentary 
on deaths in detention, The iMwbreakers, was screened.176 Within days, however, in the aftermath of Steve 
Biko's death, Anti-Apartheid News commented: 'If the press had spoken out earlier against the torture and 
murder by the South African authorities, Steve Biko and the others who have died at the hands of the South 
African security police might be alive today.'77 Ethel de Keyser believes that the contradictions in the A-AM 
relationship with the media originated in the problem o f '... negotiating for peace and conducting a war.178
74. Ethel de Keyser recalls a logistics meeting called by the ANC during the late 1970s which was attended 
by five people including Frene Ginwala and herself: 'We sat down to work out how we could tell the 
people of this country [Britain] about the ANC because people didn't know [anything about the 
organisation].' (Interview with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995). The ANC and the A-AM concern 
regarding the media profile of the ANC was directly related to the Soweto uprising and the belated 
coverage of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). During the period June-Sept. 1976 barely any 
journalists or media organisations bothered to ask the ANC to comment on the unrest in South Africa.
75. Interview with Mike Terry, 14 Dec, 1995.
76. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Annual report on activities and developments. October 1976-September 
1977 (London, 1977), p. 12.
77. 'Steve Biko: AAM demands international enquiry', Anti-Apartheid News, Oct. 1977, p. 1. Anti- 
Apartheid News had not carried any significant reports on the Black Consciousness leader during the 
year before his death,
78. Interview with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995. The 'negotiations' were with the international media, the
'war' was the struggle against South Africa.
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In 1975, the Secretary-General of the ANC, Alfred Nzo, stated in a Secretariat Report that the 
imperialist news-media were prepared to sink to the lowest depths in an effort to confuse world public 
opinion ... into accepting the success of the 'detente' manouvre.'79 Following the Angolan war, Anti- 
Apartheid News began to carry commentaries upon the media.80 In 1977, the A-AM suggested in its Annual 
Report th a t'... the role of Anti-Apartheid, News has become more im portant... in counteracting the biased 
reporting of the national media.'81 Although it had always been a particularly unlikely ambition, the failure 
to meet one of the three targets of the post-1976 media policy - influencing the coverage within South 
Africa - led, eventually, to an almost blanket condemnation of the British media's correspondents in 
southern Africa.82 The BBC's coverage became, during the late 1970s, a constant (and quite possibly, 
justifiable) bone of contention. Anti-Apartheid News launched a campaign at the beginning of 1977 which 
urged readers: ’When you see or hear biased reporting of events in Southern Africa on television or 
radio, COMPLAIN!183 The insert contained the telephone numbers of various broadcast media with the BBC 
at the top of the list. Within twelve months the BBC broadcast a documentary film which '... highlight[edj 
Britain's role in bolstering Apartheid and tells you how you can help support the A-A struggle.'8*
Representations of the A-AM and individual tensions.
One of the stated functions of the A-AM's media relations was to encourage the press and television to
79. Alfred Nzo, 'The ANC fights back: abridged and edited version of the Secretariat Report submitted to 
the Special Extra-ordinary Meeting of the National Executive Committee of the African National 
Congress', Sechaba. Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1975, p. 16. See also B.J., 'Propagandists for Apartheid' [a 
review of The Great White Hoaxl, African Communist. No. 71, Fourth Quarter 1977, p. 109: 'Far too 
many communists ... underestimate the extent and significance of the lie machines which our opponents 
operate everywhere ... If this booklet does nothing else than make people aware of the danger of being 
brainwashed by the media of the bourgeoisie in all countries it will have served a useful purpose.'
80. Christabel Gurney, 'British press leaps to defence of Rhodesian racism' & J.S. Marsh, 'What the papers 
said on Angola', Anti-Apartheid News, April 1976, pp. 6 & 11.
81. A-AM. Annual Report. 1977, p. 21.
82. See, for example, 'Smith’s press puppets’, Anti-Apartheid News. Dec. 1977, p. 5. Beneath a photograph 
of a number of journalists 'being entertained at Rhodesian Breweries', Anti-Apartheid News 
commented: 'Foreign journalists in Rhodesia share the life style of the white minority'. For a more 
balanced form of media analysis, see Karen Rothmyer, 'U.S. Press: Telling it like it isn't', Southern 
Africa. Vol. XI, No. 10, Dec. 1978, p. 5.
83. Anti-Apartheid News. Jan.-Feb. 1977, p. 12.
84. BBC micro-fiche index at Caversham. Open Door: South Africa - The Rifle, the Saracen and the
Gallows. BBC 2 ,20  & 25 Feb. 1978. The programme was introduced by Neil Kinnock. Copies were
not available for viewing.
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report on the organisation and its campaigns. Beyond the BBC documentary in 1978, there is little evidence 
that the Movement was particularly successful in this task.85 As Abdul Minty recalls 'There wasn't 
continuous publicity [because] there wasn't [sic] continuous events.186 During the first half of the decade 
there appeared, to the media, to be no likelihood of any major social unrest in the Republic. Between 1976 
and 1980, the Cold War dominated any discussion of the subject, and the end of white rule in Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe was considered by most correspondents to be the essential story.87 The A-AM, therefore, had to 
attempt to influence a media which between 1972 and 1975 denied that a resistance movement existed, 
because there was little evidence of ANC activity within the Republic. During the second half of the 
decade, the A-AM had to defend itself against the accusation that it was little more than a communist front- 
organisation.*®
Les de Villiers claimed in 1975 th a t'... South Africa's foes have no problem in cornering the best part of 
any discussion programme on TV or obtaining reams of column inches in leading liberal journals for their 
vitriolic message.'89 In reality, the A-AM, as an organisation, received very little direct coverage. While the 
campaigns were reported by the media, the A-AM was rarely credited for its role in promoting information 
about South Africa, or its international and governmental lobbying. An article by Hugh Hebert in 
1974, on the occasion of the A-AM's fifteenth anniversary, cast the organisation as '... chipping away' at the
85. Abdul Minty and George Houser occasionally appeared on television as representatives of the A-AM 
and the ACOA, respectively. These television appearances were normally in opposition to South 
African propagandists.
86. Interview with Abdul Minty, 4 Oct. 1996. See also Ethel de Keyser's comment: 'What we did wasn't an 
issue every day.' (Interview with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995).
87. '[Rhodesia] was the prime pump of news from [Africa] for The Guardian and every other newspaper for 
that decade.' (Interview with James MacManus, 16 Oct. 1995).
88. Mike Terry was a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Ethel de Keyser, 
Executive Secretary of the A-AM until 1974 had not been a member of the SACP. See the friendly 
relationship between the A-AM-ANC and the Morning Star. See also Editorial, 'Making way for Marx', 
To The Point, 26 Sept. 1975, p. 22: 'Britain's Anti-Apartheid Movement has fallen on hard times 
compared with two or three years ago. Its present influence is a shadow of what it was during Peter 
Hain's "Stop the 70 Tour" campaign ... In recent months hard-line Marxists, having infiltrated the 
AAM, have been winning the power struggle. Whereas the movement originally stood mainly for 
multiracial sport at all levels, now ... the demand is for destruction of the entire SA political system.' 
Friends of the A-AM also believed that communists were playing too significant a role: 'As often 
happens to movements that go into remission or decline ... they get taken over by rather dreary second- 
rate, fellow travellers of the Communist Party.' (Interview with Christopher Hitchens, 15 April 1996).
89. Les de Villiers, South Africa: A Skunk Among Nations (London, 1975), p. 103.
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edifice of apartheid.90 Three years later, Jack Foisie (Los Angeles Times) visited the A-AM. The ensuing 
article was notably confused. It opened as follows: ’At the top of a wobbly staircase in a decaying house in 
West London is the headquarters of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. By the standards usually used to 
measure the strength of pressure groups, the movement appears to be as feeble as the house.'91 Predictably, 
friendlier articles on the A-AM were published in Africa magazine and the ANC journal, Sechaba?1 There 
was barely any coverage of the ANC in the British or American media except in the Morning Star.93 Ethel 
de Keyser was being generous when she recalled that 'The ANC at that stage was barely visible above the 
parapets.IM
In Foisie's article on the A-AM, he recorded that Peter Hain was '... the most publicized of the anti­
apartheid crusaders.'95 In fact, Hain's high public profile created a degree of tension within the A-AM. This 
stretched back to the days of the joint A-AM-STST campaign. In Don't Play with Apartheid, Hain stated: 
'My particular role was to act as public spokesman for STST and to coordinate activities. The fact is that 
the communications industry needs individuals to explain a movement and "public personalities" are
90. Hugh Hebert, 'Boer war veterans', The Guardian. 29 June 1974. See also 'Freedom Lock', Time Out,
No. 226,28 June 1974, p. 8.
91. Jack Foisie, 'Apartheid foes attack on many fronts', Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1977. The A-AM office 
was in Charlotte Street, W l, not in West London. Some months after Foisie visited the A-AM, the Wall 
Street Journal published a profile of the ACOA: Derek Reveron, 'Pamphlet power: Small group of 
activists puts pressure on big firms to get out of South Africa', Wall Street Journal. 23 Feb. 1978. The 
article reported th a t'... most of the faces around ACOA headquarters are white'; described the offices as 
'... unkempt'; and quoted Houser as saying: 'You fight for a lot of things you don't expect to happen.'
92. Suzanne Cronje, 'Africa's British allies' & 'Interview: Abdul Minty', Africa. No. 29, Jan. 1974, pp. 66- 
71; 'No collaboration with Apartheid', Sechaba. Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1974, pp. 14-18; 'AA: 20 years of 
struggle1, Sechaba. Sept. 1979, pp. 17-18.
93. Exceptions included Suzanne Cronje, 'South Africa Speaks', Africa, No. 27, Nov. 1973, pp. 32-39, this 
was an interview with Reg September, the ANC's representative in Britain; Martin Walker, 'ANC 
alarmed by Pretoria detente', The Guardian, 27 March 1975; Coliii Legum, 'African nationalist 
movement in crisis', The Observer, 28 Dec. 1975; Linda Melvem, 'Free aims for blacks - "We just ask'", 
Evening Standard. 29 July 1977. The first significant article on the ANC in an American newspaper 
was Gregory Jaynes, ’Blacks in exile can y on war against South Africa1, New York Times. 20 June 
1980. See also CBS Reports: The Battle of South Africa. CBS, 1 Sept. 1978. In his review of the film, 
Jim Hoagland commented: 'No African guerrilla organization - described on the program with the 
systematically loaded label of "liberation organization" - has ever received the exposure in America that 
the African National Congress gels from this edition of CBS Reports.' (Jim Hoagland, 'Battle of South 
Africa', Washington Post, 1 Sept. 1978).
94. In tend cw with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995.
95. Jack Foisie, 'Apartheid foes attack on many fronts', Los Angeles Times, 12 July 1977.
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simply the children of this need.'96 Ethel de Keyser felt that '[Hain] was an excellent public face but he 
shouldn't have got all the cred it... What people in the A-AM resented bitterly ... was when he published his 
book, because he really didn't credit the A-AM.'97 The tension over Peter Hain was an example of the A- 
AM's unwillingness to tolerate high-profile, semi-independent, spokespeople. This unwillingness was 
particularly apparent when the spokesperson was perceived by members of the A-AM as an 'interloper'. The 
problem with Hain was not his politics, it was his media status.98 de Keyser recalls that 'Anti-Apartheid was 
unaccustomed to being a member of anything, other groups were members of Anti-Apartheid. This was an 
attitude generated, I think, initially by Abdul [Minty].199 The failure to surmount (or at least, disguise) these 
tensions was one factor which contributed to the A-AM's reputation as a domineering and opportunistic 
organisation.100
Similar tensions emerged when Donald Woods arrived in Britain in 1978. Woods, having been the editor 
of the (East London) Daily Dispatch, understood the media and was eager to tell his story. During the first 
three months of his exile, Woods travelled extensively in Britain and the United States, speaking on the
96. Peter Hain, Don't Plav with Apartheid: The Background to the Slop The Seventy Tour Campaign 
(London, 1971), p. 202.
97. Interview with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995.
98. Hain continued to be a high-profile opponent of the South African government and a member of the A- 
AM. He was regularly called upon by the media to comment upon the sports boycott. In 1973, he stated: 
'I accept the arguments advanced by Ruth First and her co-authors in The South Africa Connection that 
the only way to fight apartheid is to disengage completely'. ('Interview: Peter Hain', Africa. No. 19, 
March 1973, p. 45). Hain was national chair of the Young Liberals, 1971-1973. He was subject to a 
letter bomb attack in 1973 and two prosecutions. In both cases he was found to be innocent: the first, (a 
private prosecution, financed from South Africa) in 1972, related to conspiracy over the STST 
campaign; the second, was concerned with a petty bank robbery in Putney. See Jackie Leishman, 'Hain: 
the inadmissible evidence1, The Guardian, 22 Aug. 1972; Humphry, The Cricket Conspiracy, Peter 
Hain. A Putney Plot? (Nottingham, 1986).
99. Intendew with Ethel de Keyser, 9 Nov. 1995.
100. Many journalists felt that the A-AM were too judgmental of journalists who were merely doing their
jobs: There was a feeling and it was very powerful in the A-AM that if you did any kind of analysis of
the National Party [which recognised that reform was slowly occurring] - you were going soft. So this
was a major discouragement.1 (Interview with Stanley Uys, 24 March 1995). Raphael felt that the A-
AM attempted to co-opt him following the publication of the wage starvation stories, see chapter five. 
(Interview with Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994).
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subject of South Africa. His personal campaign attracted extraordinary media attention.101 Sally Quinn
reported in the Washington Post:
'I am aware there's a "comment" quality about me now ... so I must say 
what I've got to say quickly ... There is a very strong likelihood that if I 
try to sustain this too long my colleagues will start looking for a new 
angle.' There are different ways to head this off, and Donald Woods, a 
close friend of the late black leader, Steve Biko, has chosen an unusual 
one. Woods is on a media blitz in America speaking to groups ranging 
from campus seminars to business organizations, to President Jimmy 
Carter ... 'This trip,' he says, 'is political. It is sponsored by the African 
American Institute to spread the word. To try and seriously bugger 
around people like Mr Van Rooyen and the South African embassy; a 
task to which we must all strive'.102
Woods's appearance as the first private citizen to address the U.N. Security Council and his call for the 
withdrawal of American business from South Africa complemented the burgeoning sanctions debate in the 
United States.103 However, in Britain, he was not particularly welcomed by the A-AM.101 This was strange 
because upon his arrival from South Africa, Woods had visited Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC, 
and offered his services to the liberation movement. Woods recalls that Tambo informed him that 'You can 
do us far more good as a non-ANC person - You can go to America; the U.N. Security Council have asked 
you to speak there ... it is so much more powerful for you to say "Let us have economic sanctions," if you 
are not saying it as a member of the ANC.I10S Ronald Segal's review of Woods's book, Biko, sheds more
101. See Donald Woods, 'Cry my beloved country'. The Observer. 1 Jan. 1978; Marcel Berlins, 'Fugitive 
editor fears civil war', The Times. 7 Jan. 1978; Donald Woods, 'No easy walk to freedom', The 
Observer, 8 Jan. 1978; Alexander MacLeod, 'Donald Woods: champion of the blacks', The Listener.
12 Jan, 1978, p. 49, adapted from Profile: Donald Woods, BBC Radio 4, Jan. 1978; William 
McWhirter, 'Critic in exile', Time, 16 Jan. 1978, p. 31; Peter Younghusband, 'The great escape', 
Newsweek, 16 Jan. 1978, p. 16; The two Observer articles were syndicated in the New York Times. 8 
Jan. 1978, Washington Post, 8-9 Jan. 1978 and Chicago Tribune. 15 Jan. 1978; See also Donald 
Woods, 'To an exiled South African editor, Apartheid is a "collective tyrant'", Los Angeles Times, 5 
March 1978; Paula Giddings, 'Exile with a mission', Encore American & Worldwide News, 20 March 
1978, pp. 16-21; Donald Woods, 'South Africa's Face to the World1, Foreign Affairs. Vol. 56, No. 3, 
April 1978, pp. 521-528; 'Biko's friend', New Yorker. 29 May 1978, pp. 21-23. Woods was named 
Editor of the Year in the Granada Television 'What the Papers Say awards'.
102. Sally Quinn, 'After escaping South Africa, Donald Woods hits back', Washington Post, 6 Feb. 1978. 
The reference to Retief van Rooyen refers to an argument which Woods had with van Rooyen at an 
impromptu press conference, following Woods's visit to the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, 
van Rooyen, who was the police's barrister in the Biko inquest, was 'visiting ' Washington at the time.
103. The text of Woods's speech to the U.N. was published as Donald Woods, 'Mobilizing effective moral 
force against Apartheid1, Objective: Justice. Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1977/78, pp. 14-19.
104. Anti-Apartheid News, for example, only carried one article on Woods's escape from South Africa and 
ensuing 'media blitz'. "'Ostracise SA" - Banned editor', Anti-Apartheid News. March 1978, p. 10.
105. Interview with Donald Woods, 19 June 1995.
-113-
light on the tensions which accompanied Woods's arrival. Segal's review opened with a comprehensive 
condemnation of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM): 'Its ideology was a rag-bag of protest 
thought... Its economic dispensation [wasj based on a more or less romanticised historical communalism ... 
It reflected and fed only a mood,' Although Segal acknowledged Woods's contribution and conversion to 
the cause of economic sanctions, he also asserted that: '[Woods] is likely to be disappointed. For he makes 
his call ultimately to the conscience and good sense of the W est... All this only serves to remind black 
South Africa once again that it must find its release in revolution.'106 Donald Woods, in effect, was 
perceived by some members of the A-AM not only as a high-profile white South African interloper, but 
also as an apologist for the recently-martyred leader of the increasingly criticised BCM.107
Similar tensions dominated the A-AM's relationships with journalists who were sympathetic to the anti­
apartheid cause but determined to follow a path of their own in the struggle. Barbara Rogers was, perhaps, 
the most active anti-apartheid journalist during the 1970s.1DS Her interest in South African propaganda and 
Britain's foreign investment in the country began when she was appointed to the South-West Africa- 
Namibia desk at the Foreign Office in 1969. She left the Foreign Office during 1970 and visited the 
Republic in 1971. During the years that followed, Rogers worked as an assistant (and speech-writer) for 
Congressman Diggs in the United States and wrote a large number of books, pamphlets and articles on a
106. Ronald Segal, 'Beyond grieving' [a review of Donald Woods, Biko (London, 1978)], The Guardian. 13 
April 1978. Segal was a long-standing ANC member, a close friend of Oliver Tambo and the editor of 
the Penguin Africa Library. Aida Parker, 'Secret U.S. war against SA: part six', The Citizen. 20 June 
1977, described him as '... the most dangerous propagandist against South Africa'.
107. Toussaint, 'Fallen among Liberals', African Communist No. 78, Third Quarter 1979, pp. 18-30, took 
the criticism of the BCM and the denigration of Donald Woods a stage further. The article concluded 
of Steve B iko ,'... that the path he was following led to a dead end', (p. 30). Woods's book on Biko is 
also condemned as a source: 'It contains much second hand account of things Biko is said to have said 
in the presence of Woods. For these there is only Woods' recollections ... such recollections may well 
be faulty due to the lapse of time, or even be unconsciously distorted by the selective memory of the 
writer.' (p. 19). Woods's reputation took another blow when he was condemned by the Writers 
Association of South Africa (WASA) for exploiting the memory of Steve Biko. (Patrick Laurence, 
'Blacks criticise exiled editor', The Guardian, 4 July 1978).
108. Barbara Rogers's work on South Africa included 'South Africa's propaganda machine', New
Statesman. 15 Jan. 1971, p. 69-70: South Africa's Stake in Britain (London, 1971): White Wealth and 
Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa (Connecticut, 1976): Divide and Rule 1976:
et al The Great White Hoax, 1977; with Zdenek Cervenka, The Nuclear Axis: Secret collaboration 
between West Germany and South Africa (London, 1978); The Image Reflected by Mass Media: 
Manipulations. The Nuclear Axis: A Case Study in the Field of Investigative Reporting (New York, 
1980). See also her articles in Sechaba, Africa Today, Anti-Apartheid News. Southern Africa and
Africa Report.
-114-
wide variety of subjects relating to South Africa. She recalls that The main problem trying to write about 
southern Africa, especially in Britain, was the deadening effect of the Anti-Apartheid Movement if you 
were not part of it, or if you wanted to express a different opinion from their line.'109
Len Clarke emigrated to South Africa from Australia in 1954. In 1966, he moved to Britain whereupon he 
wrote The Seeds o f Disaster, under the pseudonym, John Laurence.110 Throughout the 1970s, Clarke worked 
in advertising, while writing occasional articles for the Guardian and other publications.111 He also wrote a 
vast number of letters to the newspapers on the subject of South Africa. His letter-writing represented a 
small-scale example of what Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky have called, 'flak'.111 Clarke was a 
tireless campaigner and should have been a model member of the A-AM, yet his relationship with the 
organisation was not without its problems: 'When you've got a massively organised propaganda system, the 
best thing to do - and I tried to get the A-AM to understand this but they just ignored it - is to stress the fact 
that what you are hearing from the white side in South Africa is propaganda ... Therefore study what they 
are saying ... instead the A-AM was always concentrating on anti-propaganda, or their own sort of 
propaganda.'113 The failure to co-operate fully with committed anti-apartheid campaigners of the calibre of 
Rogers and Clarke was a major weakness of the A-AM. The ACOA and the SAC do not appear to have had
109. Interview with Barbara Rogers, 15 Dec. 1995.
110. John Laurence, The Seeds of Disaster (London, 1968). Barbara Rogers recalls that this book 
contributed to her interest in South African propaganda. (Interview with Barbara Rogers, 5 Dec.
1995).
111. Clarke's work on South Africa in the 1970s published under the name, John Laurence, includes 
Countering South Africa's Misleading Racial Propaganda. United Nations Unit on Apartheid, 18 
March 1972; 'Censorship by Skin Colour', Index on Censorship. Vol. 6, No. 2, March/April 1977, pp. 
40-43; etal, The Great White Hoax. 1977: Race. Propaganda and South Africa (London, 1979). See 
also the articles in Gemini. The Guardian and Anti-Apartheid News.
112. Edward S. Herman & Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass 
Media (New York, 1988), pp. 26-28: '"Flak" refers to negative responses to a media statement or 
program.' During the 1970s, Clarke wrote to nearly every British national newspaper and magazine.
He was able to read all the reports on South Africa, because the advertising agency at which he 
worked, subscribed to every newspaper. Clarke recalls that only a tiny percentage of all the letters that 
he sent to the media were ever published. During the second half of the 1970s, He became particularly 
concerned with the BBC: '... the BBC, to my mind, has been the main pro-South African propaganda 
organ in this country, particularly because it is ubiquitous ... and because of [the supposition that] the 
BBC is totally impartial.' (Interviews with Len Clarke, 22 June & 7 July 1995).
113. Interview with Len Clarke, 22 June 1995. See A-AM, Annual Report. 1976, p. 22: 'As the struggle 
intensifies, Anti-Apartheid News is becoming more important as the main propaganda weapon through 
which the Movement can put forward its distinctive view on the situation.'
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such a difficult relationship with individual writers or journalists or to have suffered from the power 
struggles which were a consistent feature of exile politics in London. Jennifer Davis believes that this was 
because the organisations in the U.S. were not as centralised as the A-AM: if you're not trying to control
everything, then every [contribution] is synergy.'114 It is, however, important to acknowledge that the 
American anti-apartheid campaigners were less directly concerned than the ANC and the SACP in Britain 
with a particular outcome to the South African 'revolution'.
The inheritance of a tradition and the origins of the Mandela campaign.
Having discussed the failings of the anti-apartheid movements at some length, it is only fair to conclude 
with the recognition that the organisations were faced with almost insurmountable obstacles during the 
1970s: lack of funding; a liberation struggle, which for long periods of time was barely visible within South 
Africa; a general public and media which espoused anti-racism while harbouring negative representations 
of Africa; governments that practised 'structural hypocrisy'; and the natural wastage of campaigners who 
volunteered their support, money and effort for a campaign which never seemed to end. As Christopher 
Hitchens recalls of the A-AM in the mid-1970s: ’... it was going through the motions ... you had that feeling 
of breaking rocks and treading water.'115 In addition, a distinct sense of resentment against the media had 
built up amongst long-term campaigners and the representatives of the liberation movements. Reg 
September, for example, justifies the stern, authoritarian tone of his correspondence with the press by 
explaining that 'For years we knocked on those doors ... Maybe I was affected by [that], I think we always 
recognised the power of the press, but ... we were always on the receiving end ... we didn't have the 
infrastructure of a slate.'116
The similarities between the A-AM and the anti-slave trade campaign, engineered by the Clapham Sect 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, are startling: the length of the campaigns; the 
employment of boycotts; the education, and later support, of the British public; the opposition of
114. Interview with Jennifer Davis, 8 Nov. 1996.
115. Interview with Christopher Hitchens, 15 April 1996.
116. Interview with Reg September, 17 May 1995.
-116-
entrenched British capital; the involvement of campaigners with local knowledge (South Africans and 
while 'West Indians'); and the association of the campaigns with a foreign ideology. Ernest Marshall Howse 
noted, in his study of the Clapham Sect, the debilitating effect that 'The cloud of republicanism' had on the 
campaign following the French Revolution of 1789,117 The Cold War caused similar problems for the A- 
AM-ANC during the 1970s. While there were, of course, many differences between the campaign to 
abolish the slave trade and the struggle to defeat apartheid, it is telling that the responses of the capitalist 
interests were so similar: exaggerated claims of the effects of abolition/withdrawal on the British economy; 
a slow and grudging acceptance of a policy of gradualism; and the assertion that life for the African was 
better than that described by the campaigners.118 In many ways both in its tactics and the opposition which it 
faced, the A-AM was a natural descendent of the Clapham Sect.
Although the 1970s was a particularly difficult decade for the A-AM, the organisation finally found a 
campaigning device which would eventually create a powerful resonance in Britain and the United States. 
Ironically, the idea for a 60lh birthday celebration for the imprisoned ANC leader, Nelson Mandela, 
originated from E.S. Reddy’s discovery of the date of Mandela's birthday. He contacted Mike Terry with
the suggestion that a celebration of Mandela's birthday might be an effective way to draw attention to the
plight of political prisoners in South Africa.119Anti-Apartheid. News and Sechaba duly carried tributes to the 
imprisoned leader.120There was little media coverage of the first Mandela campaign, but the A-AM Annual 
Report recounted the immediate success of the idea:
Special cards were distributed in Britain and internationally, and the 
South African press estimated that thousands were sent to Robben 
Island. The AAM also produced a blown-up card which was signed by 
many prominent figures in Britain, including several Cabinet members,
David Steel, Leader of the Liberal party, and trade union leaders. On 18 
July a delegation consisting of former AAM president Barbara Castle 
MP, Bob Hughes MP, AAM chairman, and Joan Lestor MP, AAM vice
117. Ernest Marshall Howse, Saints in Politics: The 'Clapham Sect' and the Growth of Freedom (London, 
1953), p. 45.
118. Ibid, p. 33; 'Lord Penrhyn ... assured the Commons that the tales of the Middle Passage were begotten 
in fanaticism and nurtured in falsehood, and that the captive slave looked upon the voyage from Africa 
as "the happiest period of his life".1
119. Interview with Mike Terry, 14 Dec. 1995.
120. 'Release Nelson Mandela!' & Sadie Forman, 'Another day in the life of Nelson Mandela', Anti-
Apartheid News, July/Aug, 1978, pp. 1 & 6; Editorial, 'Mandela - 60 Years Old', 'Nelson Mandela 
and our Revolution' & 'Life on Robben Island', Sechaba, Vol. 12, Third Quarter 1978, pp. 1-18.
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president, were refused permission to deliver the card at South Africa 
House. In Parliament the Prime Minister [James Callaghan] sent 
greetings to Nelson Mandela on behalf of the government.121
The 'Free Nelson Mandela' campaign, which in effect represented a personalisation of the liberation 
struggle, had begun.122 Mike Terry recalls that the idea had received the full backing of the ANC, while also 
noting th a t '... from some people's point of view, [it was] an attempt to try and put Mandela and the ANC 
into a new equation.'123 It was clear, towards the end of the 1970s, that the A-AM was beginning to break 
out of the 'stranglehold' that had kept the organisation in either a demonised or an isolated position 
throughout the decade. It would still, however, be a number of years before the emergence of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) in South Africa, and the ensuing development of a more productive relationship 
between ANC supporters and the foreign correspondents within the country.124
121. A-AM. Annual Report, 1978, p. 8. The birthday celebration was held on 18 July 1978. See also 
Nicholas Ashford, 'Prayers said for Robben Island prisoner No. 466/64', The Times. 18 July 1978; 
John F. Bums, 'Key Black leader turns 60 on South African prison isle', New York Times, 19 July 
1978; Observance of Mr. Nelson R. Mandela's Sixtieth Birthday, United Nations Centre against 
Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 23/78, Aug. 1978.
122. The Mandela campaign re-emerged in South Africa, two years later, in a campaign organised by Percy 
Qoboza through the pages of the African newspaper, Sunday Post. See Eric Marsden, 'Free Mandela 
movement grows', Sunday Times. 13 April 1980; John F. Burns, 'South African seeking freedom for 
"the Black Pimpernel"', New York Times, 21 May 1980
123. Interview with Mike Terry, 14 Dec. 1995.
124. 'The U D F... made a conscious decision to use the commercial press, the white press and to woo 
individual journalists.' (Interview with Patrick Laurence, 12 May 1995). The ANC, in exile, continued 
to experience difficulties with the media for a number of years. Denis Herbstein comments: 'It took a 
long time for them to get their act together.' (Interview with Denis Herbstein, 9 March 1995). See also 
Joseph Lelyveld, Move Your Shadow: South Africa. Black and White (London. 1985), pp. 336-337.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CASE-STUDY ONE: STARVATION 
WAGES’, 1973-74.
Starvation wages in South Africa - the most effective Guardian 
investigation in my time.1
... the one story that I remain genuinely proud of having written.2
Towards the end of 1972 and throughout 1973, African workers went on strike in South Africa. Most 
historians now accept that the Durban strikes, as they became popularly known, were the first major 
example of a revived African industrial resistance which had been crushed, but not destroyed, during the 
repression of the early 1960s.3 The international media failed to acknowledge the extraordinary significance 
of the African workers’ agency, devoting little more coverage to the subject than had been awarded to the 
(white) student unrest that had occurred during 1972. However, as the African National Congress (ANC) 
journal, Sechaba acknowledged: '... in Britain, the strike wave triggered off a great deal of soul-searching 
about the morality of British investment in South Africa ... it took the direct challenge of the workers 
themselves to the cheap labour system to jolt liberal consciences into realising the scandalous exploitation 
of the Black workers in South Africa, and to force foreign capital on to the defensive'.4
The payment of poverty wages to African workers in South Africa was of course not exceptional, having 
been common practice throughout the twentieth century. This chapter will demonstrate that the Guardian’s 
campaign on the subject of wage poverty was extraordinary in its handling, development and retreat from 
the implications of the original expose. The contradictions which emerged in the Guardian's campaign 
reflected the difficulties which news organisations experience when they challenge the liberal consensus. 
This chapter considers: the exposure of Adam Raphael's reports and the coverage which ensued; Raphael's 
sources and the precedents for, and contexts of, the story; the consequences and critiques of the campaign; 
and finally, the ambiguous tone of the treatment and the passive representations of Africans which came to 
dominate the story.
1. Alastair Hetherington, Guardian Years (London, 1981), p. 285.
2. Adam Raphael, Grotesque Libels (London. 1993), p. 143.
3. A vital precedent to the Durban strikes was the strike by contract workers in Namibia (1971-1972).
4. 'Black Workers' mighty movement', Sechaba. Vol. 7, No. 9, Sept. 1973, p. 18.
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The wage starvation treatment.
On 12 March 1973, the Guardian led with a story entitled 'British Finns pay Africans starvation rate'. The 
report was a summary of Adam Raphael's research undertaken during a three-month working vacation in 
South Africa. There had been previous stories broaching this subject in the British newspapers but none 
were delivered in such a sensationalist style, or with the full backing of the newspaper concerned. Raphael's 
front-page story opened by recording that
The majority of British companies in South Africa are paying 
substantial numbers of their African workers below officially 
recognised subsistence levels. An investigation of 100 British 
companies found only three - Shell, I Cl and Unilever - who were 
paying all employees above the minimum for an African family to 
avoid malnutrition. Some prominent British companies earning large 
profits in South Africa are paying between a third and a half of this 
minimum subsistence standard. 'If your income is below the poverty 
datum line (£10-£11 a week for a family of five) your health must 
suffer. In a real sense this is starvation,' said the research officer for 
Johannesburg's Non-European Affairs Department. This comment 
proved to be no exaggeration. On two wattle farms owned by Slater 
Walker SA, I saw several children suffering from open sores, distended 
stomachs and weakened limbs.5
The reporl listed nine other British companies (Associated Portland Cement, Tate & Lyle, Metal Box, 
Courtaulds, General Electric, Reed, Rowntree Macintosh, Chloride Electrical, Associated British Foods and 
British Leyland) whose subsidiaries were paying wages below the poverty datum line. Raphael's article was 
accompanied by two photographs which he had taken at the Boscombe estate wattle farm owned by 
Slater Walker.6 A supporting article explained the methodological determination of the poverty datum line 
and noted that American companies had a more progressive policy with regard to African working 
conditions. The article also punctured the argument that South African wages were fixed by apartheid law, 
by citing a British government Department of Trade advice document which stated that 'The impression 
that this legislation effectively prevents employers from improving the wages or conditions of service of 
non-white employees is mistaken: employers retain a good deal of flexibility in these areas.'7 The
5. Adam Raphael, 'British firms pay Africans starvation rate', The Guardian. 12 March 1973.
6. In addition to the photographs, Raphael also recorded a few minutes of 8mm film which were broadcast 
on First Report. ITN, 12 March 1973. Raphael's willingness to utilise different forms of media 
undoubtedly contributed to the impact of his expose. He recalls that 'At one time I had glamorous ideas 
of being a picture journalist.' (Interview with Adam Raphael, 13 Oct. 1995). See also Lunchtime News, 
ITN, & News at Ten. ITN, 12 March 1973.
7. Adam Raphael, 'The company we keep: Britain's shame in Africa', The Guardian. 12 March 1973.
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Guardian's editorial opened a debate on the 'scandal of African labour', by posing the question: 'What are 
we going to do about South Africa?'®
The other newspapers responded quickly. The Times acknowledged that 'The G uardian  is to be 
congratulated for bringing into prominence the fact that well-known firms whose head offices or holding 
companies are in London are among the worst employers in South Africa ... it will not do. How can it be 
stopped? The slave trade was stopped.,9The Financial Times suggested that 'The best policy would be to 
find the right mix between higher pay, better living and working conditions, and greater efficiency.1,0 
In contrast, the Daily Telegraph carried a news report which implied collusion between Raphael and the 
Anti-Apartheid Movement (A-AM): 'Most British companies are sensitive to charges of exploitation of the 
African worker levelled at them by anti-apartheid groups.'11 As the week proceeded, the Guardian 
persisted with coverage of the repercussions of the original story. These included calls for a debate and 
questions to the Prime Minister by Labour M.P.s in the House of Commons; responses by the directors of 
companies accused in the report; A-AM student campaigns designed to force universities to disinvest; 
demands for an inquiry by the British Council of Churches; a critical statement by Reg September, chief 
representative of the ANC in London; and an article by John Laurence on African infant mortality in South 
Africa.12 In addition, the newspaper ran two further editorials which attempted, rather unsuccessfully, to 
grope their way towards a resolution of the question, 'what is to be done?'13
8. Editorial, 'Scandal of African labour’, The Guardian. 12 March 1973.
9. Editorial, 'Connivance in wage slavery', The Times, 13 March 1973.
10. Editorial, 'Economic sense in South Africa', Financial Times. 13 March 1973.
11. John Miller, 'Pledge by British firms in S Africa over black wages', Daily Telegraph. 13 March 1973.
12. See Adam Raphael, 'Action after S.A. pay report', The Guardian, 13 March 1973; Adam Raphael, 
'Embarrassing study on Africans' wages', The Guardian, 14 March 1973; Patrick Keatley & Christine 
Eade, ’Thorpe wants M.P.s to act as 'vigilantes’ on S. Africa firms', The Guardian. 14 March 1973; Alec 
Hartley, 'Students step up battle', The Guardian. 14 March 1973; Reg September, Letter to the editor,
The Guardian. 14 March 1973; Ethel de Keyser, Letter to the editor, The Guardian. 14 March 1973; 
Adam Raphael, 'Finn promises wage rise for Africans', The Guardian, 15 March 1973; Adam Raphael, 
'More than 100 MPs condemn British pay in South Africa', The Guardian, 16 March 1973; John 
Laurence, 'From the cradle to the grave', The Guardian. 16 March 1973.
13. Editorial, 'The case to be answered', The Guardian. 14 March 1973; Editorial, 'Above the poverty line',
The Guardian. 16 March 1973.
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The other newspapers covered the scandal less intense!}' although there was a flurry of letters to the Times 
on the subject, including a defensive correspondence from the Chairman of Tale & Lyle followed by further 
evidence from Adam Raphael.14 On Sunday 18 March, the Observer contributed an editorial: 'The keen 
public response stirred by the Guardian's disclosures about starvation wages paid by many British firms in 
South Africa shows how strongly the British conscience feels about this country's involvement in the 
harshly discriminatory practices of apartheid.'15 Colin Leguin, in London, recognised the importance of 
South Africa's economic dependence on foreign investment but criticised the supposed impracticably of 
the disinvestment lobby: 'Then there is the call for full and complete disengagement, which is usually put 
forward vehemently. But how is this to be achieved, and if it were achieved, what would be the 
consequences? ... Would not such a development, in effect, throw away the West's 'economic lever'? To 
these crucial questions no sensible answers have been provided.'16 Three months later, Suzanne Cronje 
explained that
... Colin Legum ... is the chief activist behind ... the 'Study Project on 
External Investment in South Africa and South West Africa (Namibia)'
... The dubious nature of such work becomes clear when it emerges that 
it proceeds in close co-operation with those circles most anxious to 
maintain the status quo in the land of apartheid - the Foreign Office, the 
Confederation of British Industry, Barclays Bank, Rio Tinto Zinc, and 
similar concerns.17
Benjamin Pogrund, writing from South Africa, commented in the Sunday Times: '... it has all been reported 
ad nauseam and no one, either in South Africa or Britain, can possibly claim to have been ignorant of what 
was happening - particularly the large number of British businessmen busy making money there ... The 500 
or so British companies have h a d ... enormous capacity either to initiate progress or to maintain and bolster 
the status quo. They have constantly chosen the latter path.'18 The Sunday Telegraph reported that 'The
South African Government ... is delighted with the way in which the "hypocrisy" of the British, so
14. John O. Lyle, Letter to the editor, The Times. 15 March 1973; Adam Raphael, Letter to the editor,
The Times, 16 March 1973.
15. Editorial, 'Starvation wages', The Observer, 18 March 1973.
16. Colin Legum, 'The wages of apartheid'. The Observer. 18 March 1973.
17. Suzanne Cronje, 'Black wages', Africa, No. 22, June 1973, p. 59, See also Reverend Michael Scott, 
'Report on a Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia', Objective: Justice.
Vol. 7, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 1975, pp. 31-33.
18. Benjamin Pogrund, 'No one can say: we didn't know about black workers', Sunday Times. 18 March 
1973.
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ready to criticise apartheid, has been exposed.'19 The Sunday Mirror carried an editorial which reflected the
contradictions of the emerging debate:
The Guardian newspaper last week uncovered an unknown scandal that 
ought to be on the conscience of every caring person in Britain ...
Already the idiot lobby is demanding that all British firms should be 
compelled to pull out of South Africa. That wouldn't help anybody ...
The correct solution is for each company publicly and openly to raise 
African earnings at least to subsistence level as a first step - This won't 
bankrupt anyone! ... The vast pressure of public opinion will insist that 
every other company that has failed to maintain proper standards 
follows these examples ... Just as the Sunday Times came so brilliantly 
and successfully to the rescue of the thalidomide children, life will be
better for some of the poorest souls in the world - thanks to the
Guardian and its reporter, Adam Raphael.20
On 19 March, the Daily Telegraph published an editorial on the subject. Following an assessment of the 
possibility of strike activity leading to violent disorder, the editorial explained th a t '... there can be no
principle yet of equal pay for equal work between white and black in the complicated South African labour
field, but the movement must be to relate wages much more closely to subsistence.121 The media gaze of 
the daily and Sunday newspapers began to wane after the first week as the campaign became almost solely 
associated with the Guardian. None of the news-magazines viewed the scandal as worthy of cover-story 
status. The Economist, in its business section, cited a number of the warnings that the story was going to 
break. While contributing little new information, the magazine stated that 'The storm that has broken over 
the heads of British companies ... is largely deserved.'22New Society praised 'The Guardian's fine reporting 
on African wages - a tribute to the virtues of a near sensationalist approach in a quality paper.'23
The New Statesman published a three-page analysis which criticised the simplicity of newspaper
campaigns with regard to wages but offered little tangible alternative.24 The Spectator praised the '... tigerish 
tenacity [with which] the Guardian [had] followed up the story with more reports, interviews and a barrage 
of leaders.' Contextualising the wage reports in the aftermath of the Durban strikes, the article concluded
19. 'Behind the South African workers' row', Sunday Telegraph, 18 March 1973.
20. Editorial, 'The Unknown scandal'. Sunday Mirror. 18 March 1973.
21. Editorial, 'Wages in South Africa', Daily Telegraph. 19 March 1973.
22. They should have known someone would blow the gaff, The Economist. 17 March 1973.
23. Editorial, 'Capital illusion', New Society, 22 March 1973, pp. 631-632.
24. Adrian Guelke & Stanley Siebert, 'South Africa's starving work force1. New Statesman. 23 March 1973, 
pp. 407-409.
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with a powerful indictment: a first lesson to be learned by the British may be that one cannot touch pitch
without being defiled. It is no longer a secret that British investment buttresses the South African way of 
life.’28
At the beginning of the second week, the Guardian turned their campaign towards support for the Labour 
Party's demands for an investigation by a Parliamentary Select Committee. Adam Raphael reported the 
expose-related events and responses in Britain while Stanley Uys provided the supporting news from South 
Africa. In an editorial, the newspaper warned that The issue cannot again be allowed to drift into oblivion 
after a brief outcry, as some companies hope it will.’16 This editorial was accompanied by another 
supporting article by Adam Raphael which attempted to clear up any misunderstanding in potentially 
libellous statements which had been published by the newspaper during the preceding period.27 By the third 
week of the campaign, the Guardian's coverage was beginning to grow weary; reportable effects were 
decreasing and the government was only slowly moving towards an acceptance of the viability of a Select 
Committee. The paper seemed to imply as much in an editorial on 28 March, 'Enough has surely been said 
already to show that the facts need to be established.128 On 3 April, the Guardian, perhaps in the knowledge 
that Lhe government were about to give way on the investigation, ran the longest editorial to date; the text 
occupied the complete editorial space for the day: two-fifths of a page. The editorial announced that the 
newspaper would soon publish a revised version of Adam Raphael’s questionnaire for British businesses in 
South Africa to assist share-holders in the questioning of the boards of the relevant companies.29 Detailing 
the brutality of the apartheid state, the editorial commented on the recent South African Special Branch 
interrogations or a number of the students and staff of the University of Natal who had helped Raphael 
during his research. Having noted the World Council of Churches decision to disinvest in South Africa, the 
newspaper came to a different conclusion:
The right course is to work on a number of fronts simultaneously -
persuading employers to pay Africans a living wage, breaking down
25. Peter Rodda, ’Et tu, Britain’, The Spectator, 24 March 1973, pp. 362-363.
26. Editorial, ’A Select Committee soon’, The Guardian, 19 March 1973.
27. Adam Raphael, ’A chance now to look beyond the balance sheet’, The Guardian, 19 March 1973.
28. Editorial, Time to audit our shame', The Guardian. 28 March 1973.
29. 'Questions for shareholders’, The Guardian, 13 April 1973.
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job reservation, fighting the pass laws, discouraging any new white 
immigration to South Africa, looking hard at any proposals for further 
investment there, providing education and training for Africans, and 
maintaining the international ostracism of the South African 
government. The will of white South Africans to preserve apartheid 
may eventually be broken.30
On the facing page, the newspaper carried a full page of proposed improvements which could be 
introduced by British companies in South Africa. In effect, the Guardian was stating that it favoured
'involvement' rather than 'withdrawal', so long as certain conditions were met. In the 'Society Today'
column in the Financial Tunes, Joe Rogaly assessed the issues surrounding the question of starvation 
wages. While slating that it was essential that the pressure was kept up on British businessmen, he defended 
the campaign against critics on both sides:
Those who argue that economic forces will in the long run erode the 
barriers of apartheid may be sincere: the equally sincere reply is that 
after three-quarters of a century of increasingly rapid economic 
development in South Africa the barriers that keep Africans voteless, 
without security of tenure, forced to carry 'passes' and subject to the 
brutal attentions of the police whenever any of them step out of line, are 
still there. It is on this ground that some of those who favour revolution 
are horrified that any company might treat its black workers better, lest 
the fervour that is imagined to exist should die down. In my view 
paying Africans enough to live on will not make much difference to the 
timing of any revolt, either way: what it will do is make the lives of a 
number of individuals just that much more tolerable.31
Rogaly concluded by assessing that the starvation wages scandal had occurred because of '...a  curious 
conglomeration of circumstances: the publication of excellent reports about a long-standing injustice, 
coming at a (possibly brief) moment when at least the major British companies are conscious of a need to 
be seen acting decently.’ The Guardian's campaign reached its immediate conclusion on 9 April with the 
announcement of an inquiry by the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the House of Commons' Select 
Committee on Expenditure. On the same day, Slater Walker, the company most prominently named in 
Adam Raphael's original report, announced that they had doubled the wage rate of the lowest-paid African 
workers at their subsidiary company in South Africa.32 During the four weeks between the publication of
30. Editorial, 'South Africa does British money bolster apartheid?1, The Guardian. 3 April 1973; Editorial, 
'Apartheid: The long battle', The Observer. 8 April 1973, also favoured the 'multi-target approach'.
31. Joe Rogaly, 'The City's duly to black South Africa'. Financial Times. 3 April 1973.
32. Adam Raphael, 'Slater doubles the lowest African wages', The Guardian. 9 April 1973.
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the original story and the decision to launch the Parliamentary inquiry, the Guardian had published ten 
related editorials, an extraordinary number when one compares this to the single editorial which had 
discussed the Durban Strikes.33 The New York Times's correspondent was quite accurate when he reported 
th a t'... it makes the fuss about American involvement in South Africa seem mild indeed.'34
Sources, precedents and contexts.
Adam Raphael had started work at the Guardian in 1966. Between 1968 and 1972, he worked as its 
Washington correspondent, during which period he married Caroline Ellis, the daughter of a former editor 
of the Rand Daily Mail. In his memoir of the 'starvation wages' story he explains why he seized upon the 
idea of looking at British companies in South Africa:
Partly because I had married a South African, 1 was a keen observer 
during my years in Washington as the pressure increased on big 
American companies like Polaroid and IBM to justify their continued 
operations in the Republic. A Congressional Committee led by a black 
Congressman, Charles Diggs, began holding a series of hearings on 
Capitol Hill into the wages and conditions of African workers 
employed by American firms ... This spotlight of publicity ... achieved 
results. Under the pressure of public opinion leading American firms 
began to change their employment practices in South Africa.33
The second major influence on Raphael was The South. African Connection by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele 
and Christabel Gurney.36 The text's central thesis, that the apartheid state was unreformable and that 
disinvestment was therefore the only tenable strategy, was ignored by Raphael. He concentrated on the 
chapters which dealt with the dishonesty and hypocrisy of British companies, recognising that this 
information could transcend the investment/disinvestment debate. With three months holiday due, Raphael 
decided to visit South Africa with his wife and child, ostensibly to meet his in-laws. He comments: 'It was 
my first trip to South Africa and, heavily influenced by my American experience, I thought I should spend
33. Editorial, 'Why South Africa prospers1, The Guardian. 9 Feb. 1973.
34. 'South Africa lies troubling British', New York Times. 8 April 1973. See also John Allen May, 'British 
firms boost pay of South African blacks', Christian Science Monitor. 20 March 1973: "'The Guardian 
has done more for the Bantu people of South Africa in two days certainly in terms of income, than has 
been done in all the past ten years," my City of London informant declared.'
35. Raphael. Grotesque, pp. 143-144.
36. Interview with Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994. Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, Christabel Gurney, The South 
African Connection: Western Involvement in Apartheid (London, 1972).
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at least some of my time looking at the employment practices of British companies ...w Upon arriving in 
the Republic, Raphael paid a visit to South Africa's newly-appointed Secretary for Information, Eschel 
Rhoodie, who '... said something in passing which led me to suspect that I was on the right track: "There are 
a number of British companies in this country with prominent reputations in the world who are paj'ing their 
workers less than they should".'38 Although it is not clear what Rhoodie was attempting to achieve by 
making such a suggestion, there is little doubt that, as The African Communist observed: ’... some 
Nationalists were gloating that it was Durban, the English city, which was hardest hit by the strikes, thus 
demonstrating that the English, who were always blaming the Government for African poverty, were 
amongst the worst employers of Black labour.'69
Between 22 December 1972 and 25 February 1973, Raphael filed fourteen stories tor the Guardian on a 
variety of subjects, while researching the wages and conditions of African workers in British companies. 
Through the mediations of South African journalists, Stanley Uys, Donald Woods and Tony Heard, 
Raphael was introduced to African trade unionists, academic researchers and student activists.40 Uys 
remembers: H e was sitting down the corridor from me [in the Cape Times offices] and you could see that 
[the story] was gathering its own momentum, the more he inquired, the more he dug around ... he'd really 
struck a very rich seam.'41 After a visit to the South African Institute of Race Relations, Raphael decided 
that the best method forjudging the behaviour of British companies was by using the poverty datum line (a 
theoretical minimum wage fo ra  family to survive without malnutrition) as a yard-stick. Concentrating on a 
handful of companies with the worst reputations, he obtained information on the wages being paid 
through direct contact with the African workers,'... standing outside factory gates to get [their] pay slips'.42
37. Raphael, Grotesque, p. 144.
38. Ibid, p. 145.
39. Editorial, 'The Frame case', African Communist. No. 53, Second Quarter 1973, p. 10.
40. Raphael's investigation used as its central source, the research into farm workers' wages gathered by the 
Wages Commission at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg (UNP), 1972. However, having 
checked the material with Mike Murphy (the chair of the commission and co-ordinator of the research 
during 1972), he was then guided around the Natal Midlands by Marc Dubois (the chainnan in 1973). 
Dubois was at that time a lecturer in the UNP Geography Department. (Letter from Mike Murphy, 25 
July 1995).
41. Interview with Stanley Uys, 22 Sept. 1994.
42. Raphael, Grotesque, p. 146.
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He also drafted a questionnaire on wages and conditions which was sent to one hundred British 
companies and followed up with telephone calls. Answers were obtained from one-third. Upon his return to 
England, Raphael felt excited with the material he had gathered.
I'd never worked on a story for three months, I'd done a lot of work by 
the time I came back ... The foreign editor [Ian Wright] ... expressed 
boredom with the story and eventually said 'well, it might make a 
leader page article'. I did create a bit of a row - I mentioned to the 
editor that there was a news story there as well. It was going to go on 
the back page of the (Monday) Guardian and just by fluke, sheer fluke, 
the story that was meant to lead the paper was the French election 
results and for some reason they didn't come through and my story was 
promoted to the front page.43
However, it should also be acknowledged that Adam Raphael had an exceptional gift for 'placing copy', as 
Ian Wright recalls, 'He had a brilliant ability to aim a story at a particular part of the paper and get it there - 
which all of us envied.144 Raphael also possessed another skill, that of choosing his target carefully. The 
decision to focus the original story on the wattle farm owned by Slater-Walker S.A. was almost certain to 
garner a level of coverage not normally associated with an economic story.45 The precedents for Raphael's 
expose were legion, it was his execution and delivery which were original.46 In August 1970, for example, 
Neil Wates, the director of a large construction firm, had attracted media coverage for his decision,
43. Interview with Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994.
44. Interview with Ian Wright, 26 Oct. 1994.
45. For information on Slater-Walker, see Charles Raw, A Financial Phenomenon: An investigation of the 
Rise and Fall of the Slater-Walker Empire (New York, 1977). As evidence that Raphael chose Slater 
Walker S.A. for its usefulness as a target rather than the fact that it was the worst of the British 
employers, see B. Pogrund, 'African workers live in squalor, claim students', Sunday Times. 25 March 
1973. Describing the conditions on three wattle plantations owned by a subsidiary company of 
Courtaulds, Marc Dubois was quoted as saying, 'I think the conditions on this estate are far worse than 
on the estates owned by Natal Tanning & Extract Company [Slater-Walker S.A.].’
46. For the sake of brevity and because Raphael's reports failed to make any impact in the United States, 
this chapter will only detail the British precedents, although it should be borne in mind that the 
attention applied to U.S. investments in South Africa had been one of Raphael's inspirations for the 
investigation. Precedents in the United States included: Timothy H. Smith, The American Corporation 
in South Africa: An analysis (New York, 1970); The Polaroid 'experiment', advertisement, New York
Times. 13 Jan. 1971: U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa: Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, parts 1&2 (Washington D.C., 1972); J.H. Chettle, 'U.S. 
Corporations and South Africa', South Africa International, Vol. II, No. 1, July 1971, pp. 47-54;
Michael Reisman, 'Polaroid Power: Taxing Business for Human Rights', Foreign Policy, No. 4, Fall 
1971, pp. 101-110; Charles C. Diggs Jr., 'Action Manifesto', Issue, Vol. II, No. 1, Spring 1972, pp. 52 
-60; John Blashill, 'The Proper Role of U.S. Corporations in South Africa', Fortune, July 1972, pp. 48 
-91; Jim Hoagland, South Africa: civilisations in conflict (London, 1972), pp. 338-383; Frederic 
Hunter, 'Is slavery really dead?', Christian Science Monitor, 27 June 1972; Wilfred Jenks (Director 
General, International Labour Office), 'Labour and Wages in South Africa', Objective: Justice. Vol. 4, 
No. 4, Oct-Dec. 1972, pp. 20-26.
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following a visit to South Africa, that he was not prepared to invest in the country even though his company 
would undoubtedly have made huge profits from the exploitation of cheap labour.47 A few months after 
Wales's statement, Denis Herbstein, a South African-born journalist was visiting the Republic when he 
received a telephone call from the foreign department of the Sunday Times: 'Pogrund had put up this idea 
[to investigate working practices in British companies]... and they asked me to do it.,4S
Herbstein's research had been intended to include sixteen British companies and he managed to conduct 
interviews with ten, Herbstein's article was published on 18 April 1971. The Unilever director in Durban, 
T.B. Higgins, was quoted as commenting on Herbstein's inquiry: '... the article will be so
controversial you should consider whether you would be loyal to British interests by publishing it.'49 
Notably, by the time of Raphael's investigation, Unilever, whose pay was amongst the lowest in Herbstein's 
survey, had improved their performance. Herbstein's report possessed many of the elements that would later 
lie at the core of the Guardian's treatment: an equivalent measure to the poverty datum line; malnutrition 
('A survey showed that 80% [sic] of the unskilled labour force ... suffered signs of malnutrition'); 
insensitive quotations from managing directors ('In this country I couldn't careless about politics. We 
are here to make a profit.') The key differences between the two were in the areas of style and tone. Adam 
Raphael emphasised the negative in a style which was designed to make the story big news. Herbstein 
attempted constructive criticism, including an eight-point plan: 'If the British companies are serious about 
"bridge building," there are a number of girders and nuts and bolts they could use as a minimum 
programme which would not involve challenging the law yet would convince the black masses of their 
desire to help.1 The most significant difference between the articles, however, lay in the backing provided
47. Neil Wales's Report to the board of Wales Construction was reprinted as a pamphlet: Neil Wales, A 
Businessman Looks at Apartheid, United Nations Unit on Apartheid, Oct. 1970. Peter Hain recalls that 
Wates ’... said that the Stop The Seventy Tour campaign had made him much more aware - so when he 
went out to South Africa, he started looking at it through [new eyes].' (Interview with Peter Hain, 4 
March 1996).
48. Interview with Denis Herbstein, 17 Nov. 1994. This is confirmed in a letter from Pogrund, who says: 
'Yes, I remember passing this idea to Harry Evans. I can't recall how I got into this issue of what U.K 
companies were paying but I knew it was important and it was too big and needed too much time and 
travelling for me to handle.' (Letter from Benjamin Pogrund, 25 May 1996).
49. Denis Herbstein, 'South Africa: do British companies set a good example or just collect the profits?', 
Sunday Times, 18 April 1971 & all unattributed quotations from here. See also John Sackur, 'Casualties 
of the economic boom in South Africa', The Times, 26 April 1971.
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by their respective newspapers. Denis Herbstein's article was 'buried' in the business section and, with no 
supporting editorial or front page 'splash', was destined to be forgotten. He explains why this happened:
Harry Evans [the editor of the Sunday Times] who was quite close to 
Pogrund had said this was a top priority story ... unfortunately that 
week Harry was away. Everybody who saw it said that this is a great 
piece, although in 1971, South Africa was still a bit off the map ... I 
don't know what happened in the engine room of the Sunday Times, I'd 
only been at the paper for two or three years and this was the first big 
story I did ... it went into business news and that, I was told, was the 
decision of the deputy editor, Frank Giles ... [who] was really a Foreign 
Office man, he was close to South Africa House ... he very 
diplomatically placed [the story] where it would have less effect.50
Although Herbstein's report did not lead to a widespread debate in the British media, those concerned with 
promoting South Africa's interests were well aware of its implications. Roy Macnab, the South Africa 
Foundation's (SAF) London director, reported th a t'... both The Times and Sunday Times have had men in 
South Africa to report 011 the race relations record of British business subsidiaries there and a strenuous 
effort was made to shame them before public opinion at home. British business, however, appears to be 
tough enough to take it'.51 Following a visit to South Africa during May 1972, Jeremy Thorpe (the leader 
of the Liberal Party) gave a press conference in which he '... called on fellow MPs to buy shares in British 
companies operating in South Africa to improve conditions for African workers ... he said he was appalled 
by the "slave conditions1' [in the Republic].1 Thorpe was also quoted as stating that 'Those who call for the 
withdrawal of British investment in South Africa will achieve nothing.'53 Thorpe's employment of the 
slavery trope in conjunction with a moral vindication of further investment prefigured the eventual course 
of the Raphael/G/M7‘r/r<7» campaign.
Inspired by the need to develop the sanctions debate, Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney set 
about the task of compiling a text which would expose the degree to which Western (and especially, British
50. Interview with Denis Herbstein, 17 Nov. 1994. Hugo Young suggests that the reality might be less 
sinister and that the decision to place the story in the business section was probably due to Frank Giles's 
poor news judgement. (Interview with Hugo Young, 21 Nov. 1995).
51. Roy Macnab, 'Foreign report', South Africa International. Vol. 2, No. 1, July 1971, p. 65.
52. Thorpe urges pressure on Vorster with shares', Daily Telegraph. 2 June 1972. For the ANCs response 
to Thorpe, see ’Dear Eartha Kitt: An open letter to Jeremy Thorpe and Eartha Kitt with friends like 
these, who needs enemies', Sechaba. Vol. 6, No. 9, Sept. 1972, pp. 2-3. For Sechaba's contribution to 
the precedents to the Raphael story, see Barbara Rogers, The standard of living of Africans in South 
Africa', parts 1 & 2, Sechaba. Vol. 6, No. 7 & 8, July & Aug, 1972, pp. 22-24 & 21-24.
-131-
capital) financed and fortified the apartheid system. The South African Connection used as one of its 
sources, Denis Herbstein's unpublished notes for his article on British companies. Published in the autumn 
of 1972, the book served to expand the parameters of the economic argument and was widely reviewed. 
Douglas Brown (Sunday Telegraph) was critical: The authors, obsessed by racial politics, stand every 
socio-economic argument on its head. They ignore the universal experience that prosperity increases the 
power of a proletariat to the point that enables it to break out of any political straight-jacket.,M In contrast, 
Clifford Longley was impressed by the cogency of the book's argument: 'The case against many British 
businesses remains to be answered.'He continued: 'Is public opinion changing on the question of British 
investments in South Africa? Recent indications suggest that it may well be doing so.'5*
During October 1972, the A-AM announced in its annual report that it intended to intensify its campaign 
against British companies investing in South Africa.55 The penultimate precedent for the Raphael story 
was provided by the South African government, however: The Minister of the Interior, Dr C.P. Mulder, 
announced in October [1972] that he had had enough of foreign visitors' investigations of foreign 
companies’employment practices, and would in future refuse them entry to the country.®6 This was the 
metaphorical 'red rag to a bull'. By the beginning of 1973, the British media were primed for the 
emergence of a major story on the scandal of African wages in South Africa. In effect, the groundwork had 
been laid and the media could not claim ignorance of working conditions in the Republic. As Bridget
53. Douglas Brown, 'Economics and apartheid', Sunday Telegraph. 24 Sept. 1972.
54. Clifford Longley, 'Investment in South Africa: a manual for the opponents of apartheid', The Times,
29 Sept. 1972. Longley was the paper's religious affairs correspondent. See also Hugo Young, 'Any 
other business: the black facts about Britain's South African connection1, Sunday Times, 1 Oct. 1972; 
Melvyn Westlake, 'Barclays on the apartheid hook', The Times, 22 Nov. 1972; The Guardian carried a 
full page of excerpts from The South African Connection on 20 Sept. 1972; See also Ruth First, Foreign 
Investment in Apartheid South Africa, United Nations Unit on Apartheid, No. 21/72, Oct. 1972; Two 
pages of extracts from The South African Connection were also carried in Anti-Apartheid News, Nov. 
1972, pp. 6-7. See also Ruth First, 'Foreign Investment in Apartheid South Africa', Objective: Justice. 
Vol. 5, No. 2, April-June 1973, pp. 24-30.
55. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Annual Report, September 1971-August 1972 (London, 1972), pp. 11-12.
56. Muriel Horrell, Dudley Homer, John Kane-Berman & Robin Margo, A Survey of Race Relations in 
South Africa, 1972 (Johannesburg, 1973), p. 119. The final precedent was William Raynor, 'Our steel,
S. African stealth'. The Guardian. 19 Dec. 1972. This full-page article contained a crucial statement 
from a board member of the British Steel Corporation (International): 'We must always be able to 
defend our behaviour as a business in the international context.' In addition, the article carried a 
photograph of an ironic advertisement placed by the Garment Workers Industrial Union of Natal: 
'Wanted: Slaves At Starvation Wages.'
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Bloom commented some months after the wage starvation scandal had become public k n o w l e d g e , i t  was 
inevitable that sooner or later the spotlight would be turned in the British direction. The articles published 
in the Guardian ... were new in the manner they were presented rather than the facts they contained.157
As with any media story, the contexts within which the story breaks, prospers or dies, often reveal as much 
as the story itself. The early 1970s was a period in which investigative journalism was particularly 
fashionable. In effect, newspapers were slightly more prepared to take a risk with a well-researched story 
than might have been the case in more conservative times. Successful investigations during this period 
included Seymour Hersh's My Lai massacre expose, the Sunday Times's Insight team's Thalidomide 
stories and the concurrent Watergate revelations. In 1973, the Guardian did not have a resident lawyer and 
as Raphael points out, the copy was not read for libel:
... there was nothing cut out - the Guardian has a tradition that the 
writer has a high degree of control. Those pieces weren't read for libel 
and they weren't altered for libel either. It went in virtually unedited - 1 
do not remember any correction at all. I had total control over it. For a 
start no-one else knew anything about the story - 1 had all the stuff in 
my notebooks ... There was such a row after as to whether I had the 
proof to say what I had actually said - all those questions should have 
been asked before. It shows ... how accidental newspapers are.58
The appearance of the Guardian stoiy also related to the shifting British interests in Africa. Between 1971 
and 1973, British exports to South Africa decreased by 12 per cent and, during 1972, exports to African 
Commonwealth countries (most notably, Nigeria) exceeded those to South Africa for the first time.59 By 
1973, the Conservative government which had entered power in 1970 with a strong commitment to 
resume arms sales to South Africa was in the process of adjusting its foreign policy to match the new 
economic realities. One week, before the Raphael story appeared in the Guardian, Patrick Keatley had 
explained that 'The bitterness of a Radio Rhodesia commentator a few nights ago confirms that something 
significant is happening. British anxiety about oil supplies - Nigeria now provides 10 per cent of this 
country's needs - was, apparently more important than ancient ties of blood, he said. Kith and kin were
57. Bridget Bloom, 'Black workers blocked by the law', Financial Times, 4 Oct. 1973.
58. Interview with Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994.
59. Muriel Horrell & Dudley Homer, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa. 1973 (Johannesburg, 
1974), p. 106; 'The way the cookie crumbles', The Economist 4  Aug. 1973, p. 31.
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going to be "thrown to the wolves".'60 In addition, Britain's entry to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) on 1 January 1973 had transformed the terms of its trade with South Africa. The 45 per cent of South 
African exports to Britain which had previously been admitted duty free or at a reduced tariff would now 
incur the increased rates of the EEC's Common External Tariff. Although, there was a transitional period of 
two years of reduced EEC tariffs until 1 January 1975, the traditional relationship between Britain and 
South Africa had changed significantly. Douglas Evans observed, 'As Britain buys 75 per cent of South 
Africa's canned fruit and ... imports more than the whole of the rest of the EEC, these are far from trifling 
issues.'61
An additional context of the wage starvation reports related to the question of the 'social responsibility1 of 
capital. Originating from Ralph Nader's one-man campaigns in the United Slates, the issue of corporate 
responsibility (especially with regard to the environment) had entered the public consciousness. The 
concept of companies being answerable to their share-holders, and to a certain extent the media and the 
general public, was not extraordinary in 1973. Indeed, an organisation known as Counter-Information 
Services (CIS) had been publishing 'anti-reports' on major British companies since the previous summer.62 
The first of CIS's targets had been Rio Tinto-Zinc, the mining company with extensive interests in 
Namibia.63 The second report issued by CIS targeted the General Electric Company. As the Guardian 
reported, 'In a 36-page booklet modelled on the company's own annual report, CIS accuses GEC of creating 
large-scale unemployment, under-paying its South African black workers, and of supplying 
equipment for the Vietnam war.'6*
However, the most important context for the Guardian's campaign were the ambiguous responses of the
60. Patrick Keatley, 'U-tums, no signals', The Guardian, 5 March 1973. See also Suzanne Cronje, 'Black 
African backlash’, New Statesman, 26 May 1972, pp. 695-696.
61. Douglas Evans, 'Many happy returns from South Africa', The Times, 15 March 1973.
62. Hugh Geach, one of the two founders of Counter-Information Services had also been one of the 
instigators of the Stop the Seventy Tour campaign. Geach was involved in Young Liberal activity with 
Peter Hain.
63. Counter-Information Sendees, The Rio-Tinto Zinc Corporation Limited Anti-Report (London. 1972). 
See also 'The anti-report on RTZ', Financial Times, 18 May 1972.
64. 'Radicals hit out at GEC', The Guardian, 14 Sept. 1972. Counter-Information Sendees, The General 
Electric Company Limited Anti-Report (London, 1972).
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South African government, (white) population and media to both the Durban Strike and the wage 
revelations. Stanley Uys, reporting from the South African Parliament in Cape Town on 9 February, noted 
that 'Mr Vorster was in unusually sombre mood when he spoke about the strikes ... [he] said there was a 
lesson to be learned in them by everyone - the Government, Government-appointed wage boards, and 
employers'.65 Five weeks later, Uys quoted a statement that the National Party M.P., and later prime 
minister, F.W. de Klerk, had given to the Afrikaans-language newspaper, Rapport:. 'In so far as the present 
storm in the British press cleaves open the hypocrisy of these employers and helps to force them to pay fair 
wages to their black employees one is inclined to welcome the campaign in Britain.'66
In the aftermath of the Durban strikes, Ian Waller commented ’The most remarkable feature of the Durban 
strike, which undoubtedly hastened a settlement, was the upsurge of support for the Africans from white 
South Africans, who suddenly realised how African workers were being exploited.'67 Researching his story 
on starvation wages during this period provided Raphael with the insight to reflect the ambiguous concerns 
of white South Africa. Following the Guardiails publication of Raphael's story, the Rand Daily Mail 
declared: 'When an overseas company accused of paying starvation wages to its African employees in 
South Africa says it didn't know, we find such a confession almost as disturbing as the initial accusation ... 
Mr Slaterfs] ignorance of how his South African companies treat black workers is typical of many overseas 
enterprises operating here - particularly British enterprises.'68 In retrospect, it is clear that the Durban strikes 
represented a significant juncture in the context of the British media's treatment of South Africa. However, 
it also displayed profound contradictions. As Stanley Uys explains:
I don't think any of us really got a feel of the historical movement, 
looking back on it now. I think you saw the media at its best in the first 
couple of decades (the initial opposition to apartheid) ... and then a 
certain confusion set in, particularly when the blacks started flexing 
their muscles. I think also there was a certain ambivalence on the part 
of Rhoodie and others in the Department [of Information], they felt that 
firstly there was Raphael attacking the British employers - that in a 
sense what he was saying was that these were the worst of South
65. Stanley Uys, 'Whites rethink after Durban', The Guardian. 10 Feb. 1973.
66. Stanley Uys, 'South African M.P. hits out at British employers' "hypocrisy"', The Guardian. 19 March 
1973.
67. Ian Waller, 'S. Africans learn lesson of Durban, Sunday Telegraph. 11 Feb. 1973.
68. Editorial, 'Their business to know', Rand Daily Mail. 15 March 1973.
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African employers - in a way he was exonerating the Afrikaners. On the 
other hand they realised that this was a kind of Achilles heel...®
Consequences and critiques.
The short-term effects and long-term consequences of the international media's treatment of the wage 
starvation story were varied. For Adam Raphael the story was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity; he was 
feted on television and awarded the Granada Investigative Journalist of the Year and British Press Awards 
Journalist of the Year prizes for 1973.70 For the Guardian, the story opened up a series of problems relating 
to litigation and advertising revenue. Alastair Hetherington recalled in his memoir that following the 
publication of the wage starvation stories,'... there was undoubtedly a levelling off after a period of good 
growth in advertisement volume.'71 Legal action and the threat of further litigation also served to 
enforce a level of moderation on the Guardian's continuing treatment of the wages story.73 Herein lies the 
explanation for the shift after the intensity of the first week's coverage towards the more restrained
campaign for a Parliamentary Select Committee and the ensuing transformation of the story from expose
to domestic standard news (the reporting of a parliamentary inquiry).73
For the British businesses in South Africa which had been vilified by the media and were facing a degree 
of embarrassment in front of the Parliamentary inquiry, the immediate response was a scramble to 
introduce marginal wage increases for African workers. Hetherington recalled in his memoir, the case of 
Lord Stokes, the chairman of British Leyland: 'When he said that his company accepted "custom and 
practice" in South Africa, he was asked whether, if he had been in the cotton industry in the early 
nineteenth century, he would have accepted slavery as inevitable.74 However, by March 1974, W.E. Luke,
69. Interview with Stanley Uys, 22 Sept. 1994.
70. Raphael was 'banned' from re-entering South Africa in Oct. 1973.
71. Hetherington, Guardian, p. 42.
72. For details on the legal action, both actual and threatened, against Adam Raphael and The Guardian, see 
Raphael, Grotesque, pp. 150-153, 158-163.
73. The Guardian did, however, continue to cover the story more intensely than any other newspaper. See 
Adam Raphael, 'All in black and white', The Guardian, 8 May 1973, on the plight of Ovambo workers 
in Namibia; David McKie, 'UK firms "still paying below poverty level'",The Guardian. 13 June 1973, 
which carried extracts from Raphael's written evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee.
74. Hetherington, Guardian, p. 291.
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the chairman of the United Kingdom-South Africa Trade Association (UKSATA) could claim an increase, 
on average, of over 50 per cent in the wages of African workers employed by British companies. He seized 
the opportunity to enjoy a sneer: 'Not fast enough for the Guardian but fast enough for most other people.176 
It bears repetition to slate that the increases in African wages were nevertheless minimal, raising wages 
only marginally above the poverty-datum line.76 The effect on the Church of England General Synod was 
ambiguous and no conclusive decision was reached on the question of the sale of shares in British 
companies operating in South Africa. The British Trades Union Council's (TUC) response to the scandal 
was to send a delegation (during October 1973) to investigate trade union conditions in the Republic. The 
TUC delegation published their report on the mission to South Africa on 15 December 1973. The report 
disappointed the A-AM by declaring a willingness to reconsider the TUC opposition to British investment 
in South Africa, if British businesses could show '... in a practical way that they were encouraging and 
recognising genuinely independent trade unions for African workers'.77
The report of the Trade and Industry Sub-Committee of the House of Commons'Select Committee on 
Expenditure, Wages and conditions o f African workers employed, by British firm s in South Africa, was 
presented on 6 March 1974. Under the chairmanship of William Rodgers (Labour M.P.), the inquiry found 
that 63 of 141 British companies investigated had been paying wages below the poverty datum line. A 
small number of companies, whose names were not released, had refused to take part in the investigation. 
The report's main recommendations were firstly, that a new code of practice should be established for 
British firms operating in South Africa; secondly, that British companies should create a time-table towards 
the payment of all African workers at the minimum effective level (50 per cent above the poverty datum 
line); and finally, that the practice of lawful collective bargaining between companies and African 
employees should be established. The Sub-Committee referred directly to the media when it staled, 'The
75. Raphael, Grotesque, p. 155.
76. The 50 per cent increase in wages raised the rate to the 'minimum effective level'. This raised wages 
from a subsistence level (the poverty datum line) to the bare minimum acceptable for the purchase of 
food, heat, light and clothes. See Christian Concern for Southern Africa (CCSA), British Companies in 
South Africa (London, 1974), pp. 5-9.
77. Muriel Horrell, Dudley Horner & Jane Hudson, A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa, 1974 
(Johannesburg, 1975), p. 318. For a trenchant critique of the TUC delegation's comments, see Suzanne 
Cronje, 'White-faced trade unionism', New Statesman, 2 Nov. 1973, p. 642.
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expectation that employment practices will be subject to public scrutiny would seem to be a potent 
force for progress.’78
The proposals issued by the British government amounted to a voluntary code of conduct for British 
companies. In this respect, the report resembled the code adopted by the EEC and the Sullivan principles 
announced in the United States of America in 1977. The significance of these principles or codes of 
conduct, in the opinion of William Minter, was th a t '... they fitted within parameters judged acceptable to 
the South African government, and diverted attention from the issue of apartheid's survival as a system to 
the narrower question of conditions within specific companies.'79 Commentators described the report as '... a 
damp squib1, 'the firework that didn't' and '... a mouse.'80 This was partly due to the fact that the report was 
published in the interval between the British general election and the assembly of Parliament and therefore 
there was no debate on the subject or questions to Ministers. Although the immediate impact of the 
Parliamentary Select Committee appeared to be relatively innocuous, it did, however, contribute to a 
tightening of focus on all things South African. As Malcolm Brown explained, 'If anything has been 
achieved in these early months of the campaign ... it is a change in the ground rules of the argument. It has 
been established that financial involvement in South Africa is a moral question.' [original emphasis]81
The South African Department of Information's response to the Raphael/Guardian campaign demonstrated 
a number of ambiguities. During the immediate aftermath of the expose, To The Point, suggested that 'The 
present outcry for better wages is a clear defeat for the disinvestment lobby. The pendulum seems to be 
swinging towards the advocates of greater involvement. To this extent, we may approve it.'82 A year later, 
following the publication of the report, a second editorial commented that 'We must overlook the subtle
78. Adam Raphael summarised the report in 'Fair-play code for British firms in South Africa', The 
Guardian, 7 March 1974. See also Joe Rogaly, 'Lombard: British companies in South Africa', Financial 
Times, 19 Aug. 1974: 'The public reminders keep on coming and they will continue to keep on coming.'
79. William Minter, King Solomon's Mines Revisited: Western Interests and the Burdened History of 
Southern Africa (New York, 1986), p. 288.
80: Benjamin Pogrund, 'How the whites see it', Sunday Times, 10 March 1974; 'The firework that didn't', 
The Economist. 16 March 1974; Jonathan Steele, "'Pleasingly moderate" report welcomed by 
white South Africans', Anti-Apartheid News, April 1974, p. 7.
81. Malcolm Brown, 'Apartheid: the screw turns', The Times 15 March 1974.
82. Editorial, 'Black wages', To The Point. 7 April 1973, p. 19.
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moralising tone which underlies reports like these, regarding them tolerantly as a remnant of the days of 
paternalism ... What, then, is the positive aspect of the report? It puts the British Labour Government firmly 
behind the idea of influencing the South African economic and political structure rather than isolating it.'83 
However, other voices within the Department of Information were preoccupied with negating and 
neutralising the campaign. Les de Villiers, for instance, claimed that 'It became abundantly clear, as this 
campaign developed, that wages were not the major concern. It was simply a way of getting at South Africa 
and embarrassing British business into either fighting "the system" or pulling out of the country.'84 While 
detailing his perception of the 'over-the-top' coverage devoted to the subject, de Villiers' criticised the fact 
th a t '... other areas where Britain had business interests and paid much lower wages remained almost 
hidden from public view.'84 The suggestion that South Africa was not alone in playing host to exploitative 
foreign business had accompanied the Raphael story almost from the beginning.85 Patrick Wall 
(Conservative M.P.) picked up the theme during a televised debate,'... why aren't we sending our teams to 
India [to] see what British firms are doing there? American firms are paying much less to their workers I 
am told in India, than they are in South Africa.187 [my emphasis]. Two months later, the Club of Ten 
placed a half-page advertisement in the Times which reiterated the theme.88
83. Editorial, ’A shift of emphasis', To The Point, 17 May 1974, p. 19. Roy Macnab, of the SAF, was 
equally unconcerned: 'The fact that the Guardian, followed by the media generally, by its action - and 
its apparent success - has become willy-nilly an agent towards amelioration, must be a blow to them ... 
Political parties and the Press may argue ad infinitum the issues involved in contact with South Africa 
... but in the City of London commercial considerations remain and, significantly, a South African share 
is still called by a name that is unmentionable in any other context.' [original emphasis]. (Roy Macnab, 
'Foreign report: London', South Africa International, Vol. IV, No. 1, July 1973, pp. 58-59). South 
African shares continued to be referred to as 'kaffir shares' during the 1970s.
84. Les de Villiers, South Africa: A skunk among nations (London. 1975), p. 159.
85. Ibid, p. 161.
86. See, for example, David Blundy, 'Coloured seamen paid £4 a week on British ships', Sunday Times, 1 
April 1973.
87. Money at work: The South African connection (Part 2), BBC 2 ,4  May 1973. Patrick Wall was a noted 
friend of South Africa. A few weeks later, the Sunday Telegraph instituted an examination which 
supported Wall's position. Staff Writers (including A.J. Mcllroy), 'Close up investigation: Is the black 
boss any better than the white?' & 'Cures for Africa's black exploiters', Sunday Telegraph, 27 May-3 
June 1973.
88. The Club of Ten, 'Does Britain have a conscience?', The Times, advertisement, 28 July 1973. See
appendix B. iv. a. During Aug. 1973, Gordon Winter visited Hong Kong (on the advice of General van
den Bergh) to research a story on the wages paid by British companies to Chinese employees. Gordon 
Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's secret police [Middlesex, 1981], pp. 421-426). See Gordon 
Winter, 'British shame in Hong Kong', (Johannesburg) Sunday Express. 9 Sept. 1973. The story was
repeated by Richard Hughes, 'Children in scandal of 36,000 jobs', Sunday Times, 16 Sept. 1973.
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There was also criticism of the Guardian's campaign from another direction. Within days of the original 
appearance of the story, Nkomo Kairu stated in a letter to the editor: 'Why the white liberal patronage for 
Southern Africa now? By any chance a desire to mend, reform and sophisticate so white capitalism remains 
firmly on top considering the now threatening resurgence of black masses?89 Jonathan Steele, who was 
writing for the Guardian on the subject of Eastern Europe during the period of the newspaper's campaign, 
recalls that,
I felt that there was an element of show-business about this whole 
campaign. ... First of all, we didn't look at the wider context of the 
South African economy. ... The second thing that was unfortunate was 
that we tended to come out with the message that bad though British 
companies were, they were better than South African companies ... 
there was a sort of relativity that came into th a t... and ipso facto, that 
we could lead the way in civilising the South African labour market. ...
The third thing, which was perhaps really the most important, was that 
it defused the disinvestment campaign.90
Nor was this statement made simply with the benefit of hindsight. In a letter to the Guardian in 1974, 
Steele noted that both the media campaign and the Parliamentary inquiry had been side-tracked by the 
question of starvation wages ('which are not unique to South Africa'), and in the process failed to expose 
the central scandal of the growing gap between white and African wages.91 While continuing to support the 
disengagement option in his letter, Steele diplomatically made no reference to his own experience of the 
Guardian's unwillingness to discuss British economic withdrawal from South Africa, 'I did submit an 
article to the editor which was arguing the disinvestment case ... and it was turned down ... it was a political 
decision and it was explained as such.192 This was the only time in Jonathan Steele's thirty-year career at the 
Guardian that he had an article rejected on political grounds! Reg September, the ANC’s representative in 
London, offered a further criticism of the Guardian's stance. Noting the newspaper's editorial comment that 
The answer seems to be that British investment in South Africa is an odious necessity both for Africans 
and for us', September described the Guardian's faith in employers, to encourage and recognise African 
trade unions, as astounding and naive. Significantly, September also referred to the sub-text of the South
89. Nkome Kairu, Letter to the editor, The Guardian, 24 March 1973.
90. Interview with Jonathan Steele, 15 Nov. 1994.
91. Jonathan Steele, Letter to the editor, The Guardian. 9 March 1974. See also Suzanne Cronje, 
'Whitewashing apartheid', Africa, No. 33, May 1974, pp. 68-69.
92. Interview with Jonathan Steele, 15 Nov. 1994.
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African Department of Information’s response to the coverage, South Africa is now very worried 
about the question of investments, judging by their international advertising and publicity campaigns.'93
Passivity and ambiguity.
The Guardian campaign was eventually forced to face the contradictions of its origins. By focusing on the 
brutal exploitation of the passive, 'starving', African, Raphael had invoked a representation which would 
strike a powerful chord with the readers of the British newspapers. In this respect it is not surprising that the 
story should be carried by the liberal Guardian. The passivity of Raphael's portrayal conjured up images of 
both the slave and the colonised victim. Although genuinely effective at rousing public opinion in Britain, 
this passive representation was fundamentally inaccurate. Without balancing the representation of the 
(passive) suffering of African workers in the context of active responses, such as the Durban strikes, which 
only a small amount of the coverage actually did, the end result was bound to be paternalistic, external, 
superior and separated. The passive nature of the representation also affected the journalists who followed 
Raphael. Few bothered to consult the African workers upon the question of wages, preferring to consult the 
managers of the British companies or subsidiaries.94 Raphael himself cannot be held responsible for this 
as his original article did not refer to slavery, and he did consult Africans on the subject of their conditions 
of employment. Nevertheless, the lasting representational tone of the story was one of passivity. This 
dominant theme of passivity was exemplified by the fact that the Parliamentary Committee '... managed to 
avoid taking evidence from a single black South African ... after some pressing, the committee ... agreed to 
accept written evidence from the Anti-Apartheid Movement ... As for the African National Congress and 
the numerous South African exiles now living in London, the committee did not bother to consult them.'95
93. Reg September, Letter to the editor, The Guardian, 9 March 1974; Editorial, 'Our employees in South 
Africa', The Guardian, 4 March 1974. For previous ANC or A-AM statements on the issue of wage 
starvation, see Reg September, 'Withdraw now, says ANC', Anti-Apartheid News, May 1973, p. 3; A- 
AM, 'Poverty wages', Sechaba, Vol. 7, No. 6, June 1973, pp. 21-22. See also Alan Brooks, 
'Parliamentary Committee defends British capital', Anti-Apartheid News, April 1974, pp. 6-7.
94. An exception was David Taylor's report for Money at Work: The South Africa Connection. BBC 2, 27 
April 1973. Having utilised the same guides as Raphael, Taylor visited a sugar plantation owned by 
Tate & Lyle. In response to Chief Buthelezi's comment that South Africa had a 'tradition of slavery', 
Taylor asserted,'... the African worker is no longer a passive slave figure. The Durban strikes prove 
this.'
95. 'Open File', The Guardian. 29 Dec. 1973. See also Alan Brooks, 'Parliamentary Committee defends
British capital1, Anti-Apartheid News, April 1974, p. 7.
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While the passive tone of the coverage was both somewhat offensive and misleading, passivity as a 
representational device did mobilise a reaction in the British press, amongst the British public and, finally 
achieved a form of recognition in the parliamentary report. The most dramatic aspect of this passivity was 
the media's repeated use of slavery tropes. Even Anti-Apartheid News included the word 'slavery' in a sub­
heading within the newspaper.96 In her seminal account of British identity and popular consciousness in the 
18th and early 19th centuries, Linda Colley has noted the ambiguous impact of the anti-slavery campaign: 
the solidification of a sense of moral integrity which effectively negated the extension of the public debate. 
Colley's description of the parliamentary debates on the abolition of the slave trade as being '... as 
riddled with national pride and complacency as they are with genuine humanity,1 is strikingly similar to the 
ambiguity that dominated the entire British media's coverage of the wage starvation scandal.97 The 
resilience of the slavery trope in the context of South Africa was not completely destroyed until the Soweto 
uprising and the well-publicised re-emergence of African agency.
Beneath the surface of the Guardian's campaign, a struggle was being waged between those who were 
committed to the reform of South Africa and the business interests that suggested that increased investment 
would eventually transform the lot of the African worker and break down the apartheid ideology. The 
theory of reform through investment was developed by Michael O'Dowd, an official of the Anglo- 
American Corporation, and was often dubbed the 'Oppenheimer thesis'. As Barbara Rogers has observed, 
the thesis '... played a useful role for investors in dividing and confusing the critics of financial support for 
South Africa.’98 In addition, South African capital (and international capital invested in South Africa) had 
benefited from a period of extraordinary growth during the 1960s. This growth had been accompanied by
96. '"Respectable" firms who cash in on slavery', Anti-Apartheid News. May 1973, p. 7. There was 
obviously a significant degree of confusion within the A-AM representation of the wage starvation 
subject: the cover of the same edition of Anti-Apartheid News displayed a portrait of 'active' striking 
workers, with the subtitle: 'When massive T.V. and newspaper exposure can't persuade greedy British 
bosses to pay African workers a living wage, don't they deserve what's coming to them?' Only the 
South African Communist Party journal, African Communist, managed to avoid all mention of slavery.
97. Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation. 1707-1837 (New Haven, 1992), p. 358. For example, Colin 
Legum, 'The wages of apartheid', The Observer. 18 March 1973. 'Not since the early part of the 
nineteenth century, when the campaign for the abolition of slavery was led by an influential part of the 
Establishment, have British businessmen had to face such a moral challenge to their right to profit from 
black men's sufferings as they face now over their role in South Africa’s economy.'
98. Barbara Rogers, White Wealth and Black Poverty: American Investments in Southern Africa 
(Connecticut, 1976), p. 70.
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favourable media reports which reflected O'Dowd's theory in slogans such as 'Richer is Lefter,' and the
assertion that 'South Africa's economic growth must continue to surge forward, bringing a rapid increase in 
the standard of living of all its peoples.'95 In 1970, Frederick Johnstone, a radical political scientist, had 
demonstrated the many fallacies in the Oppenheimer thesis, most notably the miserable poverty which 
afflicted the vast majority of African workers. As he noted
All of the major white interest groups share responsibility for these 
conditions; they are not the product of apartheid policies alone. The 
employers, who in the prevailing thesis are pictured to be basically in 
conflict with white supremacy, in fact play an important role in 
determining African wage rates. The very low wages of African 
w orkers,... indicate what the response of employers to the rightlessness 
of African workers has tended to be. They have sought, and obtained, 
cheap labour.100
The contradictions inherent in the theory of reform through investment were brought into stark relief by the 
Durban strikes and the ensuing publicity devoted to African poverty. The Guardian campaign, therefore, 
served a dual function: on one level, the attention which was focused on British companies represented a 
warning of the potential for a public campaign in favour of disinvestment; on another level, the coverage 
defused the demand for a full-scale disinvestment campaign.101 The response of both the British government 
and the opposition was to bury the subject in an inquiry. As Alan Watkins commented in the New  
Statesman,'... Lhe inquiry is an exercise, at the lowest, in hypocrisy and, at the highest, in evading an issue. 
For the issue - and to say this is not to depreciate Mr Raphael or the Guardian - is surely not what wages 
firms pay in South Africa but whether they should be there at all.'102 This ambiguity was reflected in the 
Guardian's own decision to retain its company's pension fund investments in South A frica1... provided
99. Norman Macrae, 'The Green Bay Tree', survey. The Economist 29 June 1968, pp. x & xlvi. See also 
Norman Macrae, 'Foreign report: what will destroy apartheid?', Harper's Magazine. March 1970, pp. 
30-42. 'It is known that both Nixon and Kissinger read Norman Macrae’s version of the O'Dowd 
thesis.' (Rogers, White Wealth, p. 159).
100. Frederick A. Johnstone, 'White prosperity and white supremacy in South Africa today1, African 
Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 275, April 1970, pp. 135-136. Johnstone also observed that the real value of 
African wages had actually decreased during the period of exceptional South African economic 
growth, (p. 135).
101. Voices favouring disinvestment were extremely rare in the mainstream British media. One notable 
exception was Money at Work: The South African Connection. BBC 2, 27 April 1973, which included 
an interview with David Hemson in which he stated that 'I do feel that the right line is to withdraw 
British capital because it's the only way in which we will really get change.' Hemson was 'banned' by 
the South African government on 1 Feb. 1974.
102. Alan Watkins, 'Spotlight on Politics: South Africa and The Commons', New Statesman, 4 May 1973, 
p. 638.
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that the fund's influence is exerted to improve pay and conditions.11111 This decision left the Guardian open 
to charges of hypocrisy. Indeed, Private Eye had commented within days of the original appearance of the 
Raphael story:
The reek of humbug is strong over the Grays Inn Road offices of the 
Grauniad [Guardian], following the paper's pious crys [sic] of horror at 
the low wages paid to South African labourers by British firms ...
Unfortunately for the G raun iad 's virgin-white conscience, the 
employees of the paper are not themselves free of the matter ... the 
Grauniad 's pension ... fund is run ... by Rothschilds the bankers and 
these wise and enterprising City men have seen fit to invest the 
Grauniad's money where the pickings are richest, ie. in South Africa ... 
nor can the Grauniad offer up the flimsy excuse that, like Jim Slater, 
they knew nothing about this. The issues was raised at an NUJ meeting 
over two years ago since when nothing has been done.104
In some ways the Raphael/Guardian campaign had marked an aberrant moment in the British media's 
treatment of South Africa. For a short period, the opportunity had been available to extend the reformist 
debate regarding South Africa into more radical areas. However, the Raphael story did have one long-term 
consequence: its example as a recurring reminder to international capital in South Africa that there was now 
a partial measure for the duplicity of international capital. As William Rodgers had suggested in 1974, 
'Public scrutiny and a live public conscience are the best means of ensuring that the recommendations of 
my Committee continue to produce results.'105 Following the expose in 1973, the wage starvation story 
continued to reappear at regular intervals in the British media.106
103. The Guardian, 16 May 1973. Out of two hundred-and-six potential National Union of Journalists 
(NUJ) voters, one hundred-and-fifty-five actually voted. Of these, eighty-two voted for the motion; 
thirty-eight voted for disinvestment and fifteen voted ’... for keeping the investment solely to maximise 
the return.'
104. Private Eve. No. 294, 23 March 1973, p.5. The term 'Grauniad' was a joke which referred to the 
regular printing errors in The Guardian. See also 'Gnome', Private Eve, No. 294, 23 March 1973, p.5; 
Private Eve. No. 340, 10 Jan. 1975, p. 4: 'Never mind the wages, feel the dividend.'
105. British Companies in South Africa, p. foreword.
106. Joe Rogaly, 'Society ToDay: Questions British firms should answer'. Financial Times. 18 Nov. 1975; 
Following a fresh survey by CCSA: Adam Raphael, 'Firms ignore black pay call’ & ’Why the law must 
act on this neglect1, The Guardian. 26 April 1976; Denis Herbstein & David Blundy, 'Apartheid: The 
workers Britain betrayed1, Sunday Times, 16 May 1976; Following an analysis of company 
information sent to the Department of Trade: Adam Raphael, 'Starvation wages from firms in South 
Africa' & Editorial, 'The wages of shame', The Observer. 18 Dec. 1977; During the same month,
Anglia Television (ATV) broadcast a documentary film made by Antony Thomas which examined 
working conditions in British companies in South Africa: The South African Experience. ATV, 21 
Dec. 1977. Tate & Lyle Ltd. objected to their representation in the documentary and attempted to have 
the programme withdrawn. They also placed an advertisement to protest: 'An Announcement by Tate 
& Lyle Limited', Daily Express, 14 Dec. 1977.
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CASE-STUDY TWO: THE SMALL 
MISTAKE', 1975-76.
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A mixture of secrecy, propaganda, outright lies and obstruction from 
both sides has made coverage of the war a nightmare of frustration. 
None of the three factions has yet permitted reporters to accompany its 
troops along the shadowy battlefronts, nor witness any of their reported 
engagements ... only the accidents of the war - the capture of some of 
its participants - have indicated who is fighting it and where it is being 
fought.1
The world's knowledge of the war comes from reporters sitting in cities 
usually many miles from the fighting, assessing how much truth there is 
in the inflated claims being pressed on them and then sending their 
stories to editors who have to look at reports from all sides and attempt 
to see where the truth lies.2
The previous chapter examined Adam Raphael's wage starvation expose and discussed the debate that 
ensued. Raphael's story originated from an individual's research, was confined to the British media and, 
despite its precedents, was a genuine aberration. In contrast, the coverage of the war in Angola represented 
no more than another chapter in the long history of war correspondence. South Africa's military 
intervention in a neighbouring country, although extraordinary in 1975, became a regular event during the 
1980s. The original 'incursion'in Angola, however, remains the subject of speculation. Genuinely reliable 
sources are rare, while official sources are still closed, but it is possible to construct a chronology (albeit, 
contested) from the media reports of the period, memoirs and academic studies,3 The chronology that
1. Tom Lambert, 'Angola War: secrecy and propaganda', Los Angeles Times. 16 Jan. 1976.
2. Will El Is worth-Jones, 'Messages from the front', Sunday Times, 8 Feb. 1976.
3. A number of the most important sources originally appeared in the media, these include: Gabriel Garcia 
Marquez's account of the Cuban engagement in Angola which was published in the Mexican weekly 
publication, Proceso, Jan. 1977. (Washington Post. 10-12 Jan. 1977, republished extracts in translation; 
New Left Review, No. 101-102, Feb.-April 1977, pp. 123-137, published the full article in translation); 
Robert Moss, 'Castro's secret war exposed', Sunday Telegraph. 30 Jan.-20 Feb. 1977, contained extensive 
information gathered during a major investigation. See also Gerald Shaw, ‘The Cape Times and the 
Angola War: Aug. 1975-March 1976', unpublished summary of events; Ryszard Kapuscinski. Another 
Day of Life (London. 1987), originally published in Polish, 1976. Official sources include: the South 
African Defence Force version of events which was released on 3 Feb. 1977, in response to Moss's 
series. ('The Angolan War', South African Panorama March 1977, pp. 6-7); Willem Steenkamp, South 
Africa's Border War 1966-1989 (Gibraltar, 1989), contains new information on the SADF; John 
Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York, 1978), is an account by the CIA officer 
directly responsible for Angola. Stockwell resigned from the CIA in 1977. Academic sources include: 
Gerald Bender, 'Kissinger in Angola: Anatomy of Failure', in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy 
in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance (Washington D.C, 1978), pp. 65-143; Colin Legum & 
Tony Hodges, After Angola: The War over Southern Africa (London, 1976); John A. Marcum, The 
Angolan Revolution Volume II: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-19761 (Massachusetts. 1978); 
R.W. Johnson, How Long will South Africa Survive? (London, 1977), pp. 137-163; Graeme Norris 
Addison, 'Censorship of the Press in South Africa during the Angolan War: A Case Study of News 
Manipulation and Suppression', unpublished M.A. thesis, Rhodes University, 1980.
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emerges from an amalgam of these sources suggests that the South African Defence Force (SADF) entered 
Angola as early as June 1975.4The paucity of references to Cuban involvement during the summer of 1975 
reveals that the long-standing debate regarding who intervened first: the Cubans or the South Africans, was 
at best, a distraction and at worst, a smokescreen.3 This distraction had the effect of disguising (and 
indirectly justifying) the internationalisation of the Angolan war, thereby promoting the supposition that 
both the Cubans and the South Africans were functioning as proxy representatives of the Soviet Union and 
the United States, respectively.
In 1977, Robin Hallett wrote an article for African Affairs entitled The South African Intervention in 
Angola, 1975-76'. While acknowledging the '... official smoke screen [or] deliberately created miasma' 
which accompanied the war, he expressed his trust in '... having at his disposal a remarkably wide range of 
press reports, the work of enterprising and level-headed observers, drawing their material from a wide 
range of informants.'3 However, Hallett did not consider it necessary to investigate the backgrounds or 
identities of these 'level-headed observers'. Robert Moss, for example, was far more than '... an Australian 
journalist based in London' who just happened to be 'an ardent supporter of Savimbi'PMoss was suspected 
of having extensive intelligence contacts and his books, Chile's Marxist Experiment and The Collapse o f  
Democracy had provided '...the rationale for extreme Right-wing government in Chile and Britain,
4. Marcum, Angolan Revolution, p. 268. Francis Campredon, Agence France Presse (AFP). 10 June 1975. 
See also Nathaniel Davis, 'The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, 
No. 1, Fall 1978, p. 121. There appears to have been more than a small degree of confusion during the 
intervention in June, SADF soldiers attacked National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola 
(UNITA), MPLA and South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) forces, before withdrawing 
to Namibia.
5. Although, Cuban advisors are reported to have been in Angola since early 1975, the majority of 
commentators accept that Cuban combat troops did not arrive in Angola until late Sept. 1975.
6. Robin Hallett, 'The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76', African Affairs. Vol. 77, No. 308, 
July 1978, p. 347. Hallet’s core sources were the accounts listed in footnote 3: Gabriel Garcia Marquez, 
Robert Moss and the official statement of the SADF. Hallet's primary 'observers' included Jane Bergerol 
(Financial Times), Bruce Loudon (Daily Telegraph] & Stanley Uys (The Guardian & The Observer). 
Secondary correspondents included Nicholas Ashford (The Times), James MacManus (The Guardian). 
A.J. Mcllroy (Daily Telegraph), Will Ellsworth-Jones (Sunday Times) and David Martin, Tony Hodges 
& Colin Legum (The Observer).
7. Hallett, 'The South African Intervention', p. 348.
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respectively1.8
The media coverage of the South African invasion of Angola is examined in this chapter through a 
consideration of the problems of reporting from areas controlled by the MPLA and UNITA; the exposure of 
the South African involvement; the shifts in the positions adopted by the commentators and editorial- 
wri ters; and the partiality of the coverage.
The problems of reporting in Angola.
The coverage of the Angolan war falls somewhere between what has been regarded as the 'open' access 
of the Vietnam war and the 'closed' nature of the Falklands and Gulf wars. In some respects, the 
manipulation of reporting in Angola represented the first stage in a process which would be developed 
further during the war in Afghanistan. The journalist in Angola undoubtedly faced many problems. Bridget 
Bloom, reporting from Luanda, commented on the eve of Independence that
... communiques are infrequent and hardly informative ... all 
information is strictly controlled ... Trying to find the source and 
particularly to examine the truth of the multitude of rumours is what 
journalists should be doing here just now, but the task is far from easy 
... Just as important in terms of news gathering is that there is (for 
obvious reasons) no contact with the rival liberation movements ... and, 
less understandable, now that we all have our credentials reaffirmed 
very little with the MPLA itself - it was announced for example on 
Wednesday [5 Nov.] that no one in Government would grant interviews 
until after independence [11 Nov.].9
While the situation in Luanda was undoubtedly critical during the period of Bridget Bloom's visit, the 
MPLA does appear to have had a particularly antipathetic relationship with Western journalists. This was 
demonstrated by the number of journalists expelled from Luanda: a BBC Panorama team were arrested and
8. R.W. Johnson, How Long?, p. 139. Robert Moss, Chile's Marxist Experiment (Newtown Abbot, 1973); 
The Collapse of Democracy (London, 1975). Moss was the editor of The Economist's confidential 
Foreign Report, the spokesman for a right-wing pressure group, the National Association for Freedom 
(NAFF) and the author of Mrs Thatcher's 'Iron maiden' speech. See also Peter Chippindale & Martin 
Walker, 'Only the views we want you to read', The Guardian. 20-21 Dec. 1976; Jane McLoughlin, 'This 
disturbing case of the writer and the CIA', Daily Mail. 22 Dec. 1976; The spies who went out of the 
fold', Private Eve, No. 393,7 Jan. 1977, pp. 17-18; Crispin Aubrey, 'NAFF And The Tory connection', 
Time O ut No. 380, 8 July 1977, p. 5. Within a month of the Sunday Telegraph's publication of Moss's 
'history' of the Angolan war, the Club of Ten had placed an advertisement which reproduced the last page 
of the Moss series in The Times. The Guardian, New York Time and Washington Post. See appendix B. 
iv. f. Other journalists whose impartiality was questionable will be discussed in the conclusion to this 
chapter.
9. Bridget Bloom, 'Independence at gunpoint', Financial Times. 10 Nov. 1975.
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expelled at the beginning of November 1975; a CBS television crew were detained on 22 November; 
Reuters had no representative in Luanda from 16 November; and during February 1976, A.J. McIIroy and 
an ITN film crew were ordered to leave the country.10 Perhaps, the most powerful example of the MPLA's 
poor relationship with the international media was the harassment which occurred during the night of 4 
November 1975. Nicholas Ashford reported that
I was awakened at 4.30 am, with a loud knocking on the door. When I 
opened it two Africans in civilian clothes burst into the room 
brandishing automatic pistols ... I was forced to get dressed at gun 
point while the soldiers conducted a cursory search of my room. I was 
then taken downstairs and made to wait in the hotel lobby for about 
three hours. Eventually, having inspected my press credentials, they 
allowed me to return to my room. Other journalists were not so 
fortunate. Some who were staying in a neighbouring hotel, including 
the correspondents of the New York Times and he Monde were taken 
away and kept in cells until about 10 am.11
As the critical period of November 1975 passed and the invading South African force became stalled, the 
MPLA developed a structure designed to aid the distribution of news.12 Will Ellsworth-Jones who covered 
Luanda for the Sunday Times, between January and February 1976, explained how the media relations 
system functioned during this period: '... reporters were effectively divided into four categories for the 
purpose of getting anywhere near the fro n t... first [in] were the Cuban reporters ... next came the Eastern 
bloc ... third in line came the Western sympathisers ... last came the Western reporters who usually 
made it a minimum of two weeks after any town had been captured1.13 However, journalists who had been 
in Luanda at the time of independence commented in their articles on how much less restrictive the
10. UPI, The Guardian, 30 Oct. 1975; Reuters, 'Angolans release two CBS newsmen', New York Times.
12 Dec. 1975; Reuters, 'Luanda regime ousts Reuters for shooting-incident report', New York Times, 16 
Nov. 1975, Nicholas Ashford, 'Luanda launches attack on Reuters', The Times, 28 Jan. 1976; 'MPLA 
expel Telegraph reporter', Daily Telegraph, 3 Feb. 1976. See also A.J. McIIroy, 'Angola threatens 
shipping lanes', Daily Telesraph. 6 Feb. 1976; 'ITN news team ordered out of Angola', Daily 
Telegraph, 4  Feb. 1976.
11. Nicholas Ashford, 'Police swoop on foreign journalists in Angola', The Times. 5 Nov. 1975. Bridget 
Bloom remembers that night as '... one of the rather scariest incidents in my whole life as a journalist.' 
(Interview with Bridget Bloom, 21 March 1995).
12. J.S. Marsh, 'What the papers said on Angola', Anti-Apartheid News. April 1976, p. 11, later commented 
uncritically, 'Early on, MPLA recognised the dangers o f ... unsubstantiated reporting and issued 
warnings to newsmen about false reports and distortions, eventually taking control of the 
communications media to check the dispatches leaving Luanda.'
13. Will Ellsworth-Jones, 'Messages from the front', Sunday Times, 8 Feb. 1976.
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reporting process had become.14 In contrast to the MPLA, Jonas Savimbi seemed to thrive on
publicity, as Chris Munnion explains:
Savimbi had a natural flair for public relations. Hacks attempting to 
cover the situation in Angola were meeting great resistance from the 
government in Luanda which, if they approved a visa, would lay on a 
strictly regimented 'programme'. The South Africans were similarly 
discouraging about visits to the northern border of Namibia and 
Angola. The flam boyant and vain Savimbi found foreign 
correspondents only too willing to visit him in the territory he 
controlled and, inevitably, to put across his case and his views.15
Savimbi was, in reality, trapped within a public relations contradiction. He needed positive publicity in 
which he would be applauded as an 'anti-communist' in order to appease his international 
backers, but he could not afford his links with the South Africans (or the Portuguese) to be made public.16 
Before December 1975, UNITA's media relations team managed to control the representation of their 
organisation and leader with some success. The claim that Savimbi was the 'peace candidate' (he had 
entered the war after the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [FNLA] and MPLA), was promoted 
alongside the assumption that UNITA would win a democratic election (and by extension were therefore 
democratic).17 Perhaps most significantly, Savimbi's willingness to be interviewed helped to convince the 
journalists that he was '... a rather friendly character with not loo much in the way of pure doctrine to 
impede him in negotiations'.18 As Savimbi's relationship with the South Africans began to become apparent, 
especially following the display of the South African prisoners by the MPLA (13 December 1975),
14. Michael T. Kaufman, 'Luanda confident', New York Times. 23 Jan. 1976.
15. Chris Munnion, Banana Sunday: Datelines from Africa (Rivonia. 1993), p. 366.
16. UNITA's international backers included the U.S. and Great Britain: Nicholas Ashford, 'Amis race 
among rival factions turns the Angola conflict into an international issue1, The Times, 25 Sept. 1975; 
Leslie H. Gelb (Diplomatic correspondent), 'U.S. aides tell of covert European help to Angolans', New 
York Times, 10 March 1976. For details on Savimbi's links with right-wing elements within the 
Portuguese colonial administration, see William Minter (ed.), Operation Timber: Pages from the 
Savimbi Dossier (New Jersey, 1988).
17. For the first instance of this claim, see Charles Mohr, 'In Angola's political manoeuvering, a moderate 
gains support', New York Times, 24 April 1975, wherein Mohr suggested that UNITA would win 45 
per cent of the vote, the MPLA 30-35 per cent and the FNLA 20-25 per cent. His source for this appears 
to have been an earlier poll conducted by a domestic newspaper in Luanda. These figures are based on 
the assumption that Angolans would vote solely according to ethnic groups.
18. Will Ellsworlh-Jones, 'What Marxism means in Luanda', Sunday Times. 11 Jan. 1976. Ellsworth-Jones 
had not been to UNITA-territory and was therefore summarising the opinions of the other 
correspondents, the contents of the cuttings files and information provided in background briefings.
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UNITA's propaganda became confused. This confusion involved completely contradictory statements.19 To 
compound the problem, Jorge Sangumba (the foreign spokesman of UNITA) began to permit large 
numbers of journalists to report from UNITA-territory. While the majority of the correspondents continued 
to be hypnotised by Savimbi's 'charm', others began to discover a darker side to UNITA.2® Henry 
Kanim, for instance, noted that journalists and photographers were having their camera films '... seized at 
gunpoint'.21
Although J.S. Marsh asserted that 'Prevented from filing the stories they liked from Luanda, the press ... 
decamped to UNITA territory', this failed to recognise that most reporters found it equally difficult to 
perform their task in UNITA-territory. Michael Kaufman quoted a French photographer who had recently 
been in Huambo, as saying: 'I've been waiting for two weeks to see action ... They promise and they 
promise and meanwhile they take me for tourist junkets to nice towns and cities where the people come 
out to cheer their leaders.122 Sinister evidence also began to emerge that journalists who disobeyed 
regulations were locked up and forgotten. During a visit to intendew three Cuban prisoners held by UNITA 
in Silva Porto, journalists reported th a t'... Two white men who had not been seen before emerged with the 
Cubans. They were barefoot, wearing ragged clothes and looking extremely dejected ... Journalists
19. See, for example, 'Unita denies aid from South Africa', The Times, 9 Dec. 1975. Obfuscation was the 
normal method adopted by UNITA whereas the South Africans favoured domestic censorship and 
international denials. The international media were briefed by the South African government in Pretoria 
on 27 Nov. and taken on a forty-eight-hour visit to southern Angola on 2-4 Dec. 1975. Journalists were 
encouraged to believe that South African support consisted mainly of 'advice and logistical support'. 
(Addison, 'Censorship of the Press', p. 216).
20. Peter Younghusband, 'A prophet who strikes back1, Newsweek, 19 May 1975, p. 15: '[Dr Savimbi 
possesses] an easy charm that attracts all who meet him.1 See also Max Hastings, 'No brakes on the line 
to Luso', Evening Standard. 19 Jan. 1976: '[Savimbi] is an advertising man's dream of an African 
guerrilla leader: beard, green beret, bangles and bracelets and pistol and black leather jacket - charm, 
charisma, sexuality and physical presence.' For the 'dark side1 see Tom Lambert, 'Angola War: secrecy 
and propaganda', Los Angeles Times, 16 Jan. 1976: 'In eight days in central Angola, this reporter spent 
most of the time as a courteously treated near-captive of UNITA.1
21. Henry Kamm, 'Southern Angola found under uncertain control', New York Times. 22 Jan. 1976. On 21 
Jan., Francois Campredon (AFP) reported seeing '... half a dozen soldiers in South African brown 
combat uniforms inspecting a rail bridge over the Cuanza River’, he also recalled th a t'... UNITA had 
recently confiscated film shot by two American television teams of a convoy carrying white soldiers'. 
(Addison, 'Censorship of the Press', pp. 40-41). See also Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A key to 
Africa (Edinburgh. 1986), p. 166.
22. J.S. Marsh, 'What the papers said on Angola', Anti-Apartheid News, April 1976, p. 11; Michael T.
Kaufman, 'Sight and sound of war prove elusive in Angola', New York Times. 31 Dec. 1975.
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questioned them and they replied in French, that they also were journalists.'23
On the whole, the media's treatment of Jonas Savimbi was sympathetic. One example of this was the UPI 
report which commented that UNITA's public-relations efforts have either been totally incompetent or 
deliberately infiltrated by enemies. There have been a series of inexplicable and highly embarrassing 
incidents recently to fuel these fears.124 The UPI reporter did not suggest that Savimbi and his supporters 
had been engaging in attempts to manipulate the media. Following UNITA's defeat, very few journalists 
followed up the reports of the discovery of mass graves in the liberated territories.25 By this point, the 
representation of Savimbi as an anti-communist guerrilla fighter had been well-established.26 To summarise, 
while the war (and the South African involvement in it) was by no means a secret, it did possess a certain 
'Alice in Wonderland' quality. Few, if any, journalists actually witnessed any fighting, and only a few 
seconds of film of the South Africans ever appeared.27 This surreal quality was exaggerated by the 
journalists' dependence upon sources in Lusaka, Kinshasa and Pretoria and the fact that these sources 
were consistently manipulated by bogus statements issued by the CIA, amongst other intelligence 
agencies.28 As journalists became aware of the degree of covert propaganda, all official statements became 
suspect. This eventually meant that any statements from the FNLA, UNITA or the MPLA were considered
23. Pooled dispatch, 'French journalists held in UNITA prison’, The Times, 8 Jan. 1976. The majority of the 
newspapers carried this report but otherwise accepted Savimbi's explanation without further 
examination. Reports are only ever 'pooled' when the journalists are either incapable of transmitting the 
story through the usual channels, or as a form of collective protection against potential punishment. 
Eight days after this pooled dispatch, Max Hastings reported that 'Two French journalists are in jail for 
asking embarrassing questions about the South Africans.' (Max Hastings, 'War for carcase of Angola1, 
Evening Standard, 16 Jan. 1976).
24. UPI, The quest for facts in Angola1, New York Times, 18 Jan. 1976.
25. See AFP, 'MPLA show "mass graves" found in Angola’, The Times, 16 Feb. 1976; ’MPLA consolidates 
despite massacres', Africa News. Vol. VI, No. 8, 23 Feb. 1976, p. 2; Jane Bergerol, 'Civilians were 
slaughtered in Angola retreat', The Observer, 29 Feb. 1976.
26. Elaine Windrich, The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi. the U.S. Media and the Angolan War (New 
York, 1992), suggests that the construction of 'Savimbi' took place during the late 1970s. In 1973, Leon 
Dash, 'The War in Angola1, Washington Post, 23-26 Dec. 1973, provided a crucial contribution to the 
early representation of Savimbi. Dash was an African-American journalist who had attended university 
with Jorge Sangumba. He was awarded a Pulitzer Prize in 1974.
27. Addison, 'Censorship of the Press', p. 40, suggests that 'the war became a field for investigative 
journalism whose object was to expose those involved.'
28. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 191-202.
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problematic until verified and, as has been noted, verification was often impossible.29
In his book, The First Casualty, Phillip Knightley maintains that the changes in news-gathering 
journalists experienced in Rhodesia, in the late-1970s, originated in the theory that the correspondents in 
Vietnam had been responsible for the American defeat: ’Throughout the world governments took note ... 
[and] saw the danger of giving the media unfettered access to the war zone, and made contingency plans to 
control the flow of information if war should come. Suddenly, from Rhodesia to Afghanistan, 
correspondents found doors closed to them.'30 Angola represented a very early stage in this process; this 
partly explains the 'wonderland' quality of its war. The available evidence also suggests that the CIA used 
Angola as a testing ground to see whether the media could be manipulated during a civil war. Roger 
Morris, who had been Henry Kissinger's former African Affairs assistant in the U.S. National Security 
Council, quoted a source as saying 'I think Kissinger saw [Angola] as the place to find out if you could still 
have covert operations.'31 It is also significant that the turnover of journalists in Angolan was rapid. Only a 
handful of correspondents saw both sides of the conflict; the vast majority made one-off visits to either 
Luanda or Huambo.32 Indeed, journalists who managed to stay in the same place for an extended period 
often filed for a number of different news organisations.33 The fact that very few British or American 
journalists spoke Portuguese also benefited UNITA at the expense of the MPLA. Jane Bergerol believes 
that 'The British and American press ... are powerless to appreciate any situation where English is not a
29. 'One of the most bizaire aspects of the war in Angola is that hardly anyone has seen i t ... information 
on the fighting is limited to secondary sources.' (Kaufman, 'Sights and sound of war prove elusive in 
Angola', New York Times, 31 Dec. 1975).
30. Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty. From the Crimea to the Falklands: The War Correspondent as 
Hero. Propagandist and Myth Maker (London, 1989), p. 428.
31. Roger Morris, The Proxy War in Angola: pathology of a blunder', The New Republic, 31 Jan. 1976, p. 
21 .
32. Only senior correspondents such as Michael Kaufman, Nicholas Ashford, Peter Younghusband and 
Chris Munnion saw both sides of the conflict. Ingeborg Lippman, an American photographer who 
worked as a stringer for the New York Times remained in UNITA-territory for many weeks. She recalls 
that the vast majority of foreign correspondents barely stayed any longer than one night. Many 
correspondents, only remained in Huambo for two or three hours, before returning to Lusaka.
(Interview with Ingeborg Lippman, 14 Aug. 1996).
33. Jane Bergerol in Luanda filed copy for the Financial Times, The Observer, The Economist and BBC 
Africa Service.
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vehicle ... The MPLA did not speak good English and therefore were at a major disadvantage.'34 As if to 
confirm the importance of the language issue, Max Hastings commented in one of his reports th a t '... we 
had dinner with two young UNITA officers, both educated ... both of whom spoke English well.'33
Exposing the South African invasion.
The first report in the international media on the subject of South African troops in Angola appeared in the 
Diario de Noticias (a Lisbon daily newspaper) on 11 August 1975.35 The Economist's response was to 
suggest that the South Africans might intend to annexe the Ruacana dam.37 The Financial Times reported 
the MPLA's fears that South Africa might take advantage of the civil war to encourage a 'balkanisalion' of 
the country: '. . .a  "Katanga-type" solution.*8 Nevertheless, during the months of September and October 
1975, very few British or American journalists examined South African military activity in southern 
Angola; the handful who did comment noted that South Africa had not interfered with Mozambique's 
independence. In addition, as Antonio de Figueiredo reported from Lisbon, 'Conflicting reports of South 
African and mercenary activity in Angola meet with indifference here because everyone is too absorbed 
with Portugal's internal situation.'39
34. Interview with Jane Bergerol/Wilford, 22 May 1995. Exceptions included Bruce Loudon (Daily 
Telegraph) and Barry Hillenbrand (Time), both of whom were reporting from UNITA-territory.
35. Max Hastings, 'No brakes on the line to Luso', Evening Standard. 19 Jan. 1976.
36. David Ottaway, "'Free Angola now" call', The Guardian. 13 Aug. 1975. Addison, 'Censorship of the 
Press', p. 209, records that the censorship of news in the domestic South African media, relating to 
South African military activity in Angola, was introduced on 11 Aug. 1975. Some weeks earlier, on 14 
July, the SADF had again intervened in Angola and engaged in combat with both the MPLA and 
UNITA. The South African force had retreated and adopted a defensive position near the Ruacana Falls 
hydroelectric project. (The project was South African financed and still in the process of being built).
37. 'Flight from Angola', The Economist. 16 Aug. 1975, p. 36. South African spokespersons during this 
period regularly claimed that the SADF were engaged in 'hot pursuit' of SWAPO guerrillas.
38. 'South Africa sends troops into Angola to protect river project'. Financial Times. 23 Aug. 1975. For 
other reports on the South African intervention, see 'Angola rivals fighting to control port', Washington 
Post. 17 Aug. 1975; David B. Ottaway, ’Angola's grim civil war shakes Africa', Washington Post. 24 
Aug. 1975; Reuters, 'International implication seen in Angola clashes', Washington Post, 31 Aug. 1975; 
Dial Torgerson, 'Angola invasion by unidentified force reported', Los Angeles Times, 1 Sept. 1975; 
Africa Service, BBC Radio, 2 Sept. 1975: '... gave wide currency to reports of a movement of South 
African troops into Angola with armoured cars and helicopter cover.1 (Gerald Shaw, The Cape Times & 
...', p. 1).
39. Richard Gott & Antonio de Figueiredo, 'Uneasy silence over Angola's "invaders'", The Guardian, 4 
Sept. 1975.
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Leslie Gelb's investigative account of CIA activity in Portugal and Angola neglected to mention South 
Africa, although South African activity in Angola was actually intensifying during this period.40 ’White 
mercenaries’ were occasionally referred to in reports, but these were normally assumed to be Portuguese. 
The emphasis of articles continued to be influenced by 'well-informed sources' in Lusaka. An example was 
a report in the Times (24 October) in which it was suggested that 1400 to 1700 Cubans were either in, or 
on their way to, Angola. Almost as a footnote, the newspaper recorded that 'A military spokesman for 
MPLA ... said in a radio broadcast that the "massive" South African force was moving towards the town 
of Sa da Bandeira, some 130 miles north of the border with Namibia.'41 Disregarding this announcement, 
the international media continued to downplay MPLA claims (or 'accusations').42 During early November, 
as the South African column drew closer to Luanda and the number of correspondents in the city 
increased due to the Angola's impending independence, a handful of journalists began to unearth details 
which implied (even if they did not prove) direct South African involvement.43
Fred Bridgland's (Renters) first visit to Angola had been on 21 September. He recounts in his uncritical 
biography of Jonas Savimbi that 'Very little attention was being paid to Angola. Rhodesia, the aftermath of 
Vietnam, Mrs Indira Gandhi's suspension of democracy in India, and the ever-simmering Middle East
40. Leslie H. Gelb, 'U.S., Soviet, China reported aiding Portugal, Angola1. New York Times. 25 Sept. 1975. 
See Basil Davidson, 'Report on Angola now', West Africa, 29 Sept. 1975, p. 1139, which included the 
prescient observation that 'South Africa's intervention ... can now be made good only by a major 
invasion of South African troops.1 During mid-Sept., 20 South African infantry corps instructors had 
arrived in Silva Porto. On 5 Oct., the South Africans and a UNITA force clashed with the MPLA. On 
14 Oct., the South African-commanded 'Zulu' column invaded Angola from Namibia.
41. 'Cuban mercenaries reported to be helping MPLA to keep its grip on Angola until independence', The 
Times, 24 Oct. 1975. MPLA spokespeople had been condemning South Africa's invasion since Aug. 
1975. Neto announced the existence of the Zulu column during a speech on Radio Lisbon. 19 Oct.
1975. (Legum & Hodges, After Angola, p. 15. See also 'South Africa invades Angola, seeking 
guerrillas'. Africa News. Vol. V, No. 24, 20 Oct. 1975, pp. 9-10). The Times report was the first major 
reference to the Cubans in the international media.
42. 'Pretoria silent on "Invasion"', The Guardian. 25 Oct. 1975. One exception was Richard Kershaw who 
interviewed Jonas Savimbi, in London, during this period: 'Kershaw: "It's been charged that South 
Africa has made a direct military intervention into the South of A ngola... Is that charge true or false?" 
Savimbi: "That is not true ... it is a false allegation".' (Newsday, BBC 2 ,28  Oct. 1975). See also Jane 
Bergerol, 'White force aiding Angola guerrillas, say Portuguese', Financial Times. 31 Oct. 1975; 
'Angola's quagmire1. Africa, No. 50, Oct. 1975, pp. 80-81.
43. See David Martin, ’Mercenaries head for Angola battle’, The Observer. 2 Nov. 1975: 'No one is sure 
who the mercenaries are. But a Portuguese captain who talked with them at Angola's southern port of 
Mocamedes ... says the column is led by English-speaking officers who, he believes, are South 
Africans.'
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attracted international media attention ... when a UNITA representative in Lusaka offered a flight into the
country, it sounded like an interesting diversion from Rhodesian nationalist politics.'44 Bridgland, 
accompanied by Nicholas Ashford, lodged in the former Portuguese governor's residence in Silva Porto. On 
the next day, they interviewed Savimbi. Bridgland was impressed and remained in Angola until 7 October, 
when, disappointed by UNITA's refusal to take him to the military front, he returned to Lusaka. Three 
weeks later, following the reports of the military successes of the anti-MPLA forces, Bridgland relumed to 
Angola '... to try to discover what had turned the tide in UNITA's favour.'45 Arriving at Silva Porto on 1
November, he spotted two trucks towing brand new armoured cars and approached one of the drivers,
I greeted him in Portuguese. When that brought no response I asked 
him in English what language he spoke. 'English' he replied - except 
that the gravelly accent was a product of southern Africa, not some 
genteel English county. I asked him where he came from and he replied 
grudgingly and gutturally: 'I am from Inger-land.' I sauntered to the 
second armoured car where another young white sat in the driving 
compartment... when I asked him where he came from he said: 'I am a 
mercenary.’ Good, but from which country? - 'I cannot say.' However, 
the accent, obviously developed at his mother's knee south of the 
Orange and Limpopo rivers, spoke for him.45
Four days later, Bridgland returned to Lusaka to file his report, which at this lime made no mention of 
the South African 'mercenaries': '... two or three armoured cars whose white drivers declined to confess they 
were South African soldiers were insufficient evidence to back up a story for my international news agency 
of an invasion of another country by Pretorian hordes.'47 Bridgland's companion on this flight was Robert 
Moss, who later provided an account of his visit for the Spectator. Moss's article referred to the '... 
allegations of South African and Western backing for the "rebel" movements', and claimed that the MPLA 
'... propagandists were shifting tack in an attempt to blame their reverses on the intervention of the South 
African and Portuguese "mercenaries".'48 Michael Nicholson (ITN) had also arrived at Silva Porto on 1
44. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi, p. 16. The only way for journalists to enter UNITA-territory was to obtain a 
flight on Savimbi's Hawker-Siddeley 125 executive jet. The aeroplane had been loaned to Savimbi by 
Tiny Rowland and Lonhro.
45. Bridgland. Jonas Savimbi, p. 129.
46. Fred Bridgland, The War for Africa: Twelve Months that Transformed a Continent (London, 1990), p. 
6. See also Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-South Africans', Reuters, 15 Nov. 1975.
47. Bridgland. Jonas Savimbi, p. 138.
48. Robert Moss, 'Behind the lines', The Spectator. 15 Nov. 1975, p. 626.
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November. After two days of waiting in the governor's mansion, Nicholson decided to investigate for
himself:
I walked to UNITA's headquarters at the airfield and wandered from 
empty room to empty room until I heard voices. A door was open. I 
saw an official at his desk. I entered, and very quickly the door was 
held firm, blocking me, but I had already seen the leg: a long, tanned 
leg ... It didn't mean, of course, that the South African military were 
there in any numbers but having sighted one of them, all we needed to 
do was to find his friends and we had something of a sensational story 
to send home.49
Nicholson returned to Lusaka on 9 November, sharing his flight with Fred Bridgland. The two journalists 
pooled their suspicions of the South African incursion and decided that they would work together in an 
attempt to unravel the riddle.50 On 10 November, they returned to Angola with Andrew Jaffe {Newsweek), 
ostensibly to report UNITA's independence celebrations. The flight landed at Huambo and Jaffe was 
encouraged to leave the aeroplane.51 The pilots who had befriended Nicholson during the previous evening, 
allowed Bridgland and Nicholson to remain on board while the aeroplane detoured to the Caprivi Strip in 
Namibia for refuelling: 'The pilots said they would show us something which would interest us as 
journalists. The conditions were that we agreed not to report either the flight or anything we saw or ask too 
man)' questions.152 The sight from the aeroplane window convinced Nicholson and Bridgland that they were 
at the military staging post for South Africa's war in Angola. Many years later, Bridgland commented, 'It 
seemed slightly unreal: for some reason best known to themselves, for we never asked them, the pilots had
49. Michael Nicholson, A Measure of Danger: Memoirs of a British War Correspondent (London, 1991), 
p. 176.
50. Nicholson and Bridgland's accounts differ in a number of important respects: both claim that they 
informed the other of the South African incursion; both claim that the film was shot in different places 
and at different times; and both cite different reasons for not announcing the existence of South African 
troops in Angola before 11 Nov.. The version that follows is based upon interviews with Michael 
Nicholson, 13 Feb. 1995; Fred Bridgland, 9 May 1995; Tony Hodges, 23 Jan. 1995; and Andrew Jaffe, 
18 April 1996; it tends to correspond relatively closely with the Bridgland version in Jonas Savimbi.
51. The pilots requested that Nicholson and Bridgland encourage Jaffe to leave the aeroplane. (Interview 
with Fred Bridgland, 9 May 1995). See also Andrew Jaffe, 'Hot and cold warriors', Newsweek, 24 Nov. 
1975, p. 25: 'The British pilots ... shrugged when asked who had hired them. "You can say we work for 
MI6-and-a-half," one quipped.' Jaffe comments in retrospect: 'I was trying to convey that all around me 
were all those murky "spooks" [intelligence operatives]. I remember that when I got to Huambo ... I 
ended up lodging with four American "pilots". They were all armed to the hilt, they wouldn't tell me 
where they were from ... and when I started to gel to know one of them and I said: "You're CIA aren’t 
you?" ... he said: "Go easy on that".' (Interview with Andrew Jaffe, 18 April 1996).
52. Bridgland, War for Africa, p. 8.
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guided us directly to the firmest evidence possible of South Africa's involvement in Angola.'53 Returning to 
Huambo, the aeroplane picked up Jaffe, and Nicholson's camera crew, and continued to Benguela. During 
the drive from the airstrip to the town, their bus was stopped at a roadblock which was manned by twenty 
white soldiers: 'One ... was unmistakably South African. There were no identification marks on his uniform 
... even the man's name - normally stencilled over the right-hand breast pocket - had been inked o u t... Nor 
were we looking at mercenaries, but neat, spruce, young men with clipped hair and pressed uniforms - 
conscripts, who made up the bulk of the South African army.'54 While returning to the aeroplane, 
Nicholson's cameraman, Alan Downes, managed to record some film of the South African soldiers.55 The 
journalists proceeded to Huambo in order to cover the independence celebrations. On 12 November, they 
returned to Lusaka.
In order to gather more supporting evidence for their scoop, Bridgland and Nicholson returned to Angola. 
They managed to find Savimbi in Lobito and, during a press conference, questioned him on the subject of 
South African involvement. Savimbi, however, continued to shroud his answers in ambiguity: '1 need 
people to fight with armoured cars that we cannot operate ourselves, maybe they are South African [or] 
Rhodesian, but there are more French ... The MPLA they had Russians with them. We had to address 
ourselves to people who could match them.'56 Eventually, Savimbi lost patience with his questioners. 
Grabbing Jaffe's arm, he said: ’Here I am fighting Communism. Trying to stop the Russians from taking 
over Angola. And instead you hold me up to ridicule over the whites. You do this to your own Presidents 
too, don't you? What's the matter - don't you want to live in a democracy?'57 Bridgland's and Nicholson's 
reports were filed simultaneously on 14 November in keeping with their agreement to release the news at 
the same time. Although both journalists had achieved the expose of the Angolan war, somewhat
53. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi. p. 139.
54. Nicholson, Measure, p. 177.
55. Alan Downes's most famous film to date had been the ITN news report from Vietnam in 1972 which 
featured '...a  naked Vietnamese girl, Kim Phuc, screaming in pain, on fire from napalm dropped by an 
American aircraft.' (Sandy Gall, 'Obituary: Alan Downes'. The Independent, 10 Oct. 1996). Downes was 
bom in 1938.
56. Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-South Africans', Reuters, 15 Nov. 1975.
57. Andrew Jaffe, 'Hot and cold warriors', Newsweek, 24 Nov. 1975, p. 25. For a different version of 
Savimbi’s comment, see Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-South Africans', Reuters, 15 Nov. 1975.
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surprisingly the immediate impact was not that great. One explanation can be found in the fact that 
Nicholson's film was not particularly convincing: the 'snatched' film was only 25 seconds long and the 
(two) white faces in long-shot were only 011 the screen for 11 seconds. In addition, Nicholson's report began 
with a survey of the conquest of Lobito in which there was no mention of Cuban troops, although one 
Soviet-made weapon was held up to demonstrate how totally reliant the MPLA is on Russian supplies.'58
Tony Hodges, who had been at Benguela with Nicholson, Bridgland and Jaffe, filed his report for the 
Observer?9 The story was not considered worthy of front-page treatment. Andrew Jaffe's commentary lor 
Newsweek failed to state that South African soldiers were fighting inside Angola.50 Bridgland records that 
when he submitted his copy on 14 November, Reuters ’... were still nervous about stating categorically 
that South Africa had invaded Angola,' so the news agency retained the 'white mercenary' safety clause.61 
The story received by the international subscribers opened as follows: 'Columns of armoured vehicles 
manned by whites are rolling across wide stretches of Angola through the defences of the MPLA, informed 
sources said, amid reports of a build-up of Russian, Cuban and Mozambican troops in the MPLA 
stronghold of Luanda. The major unanswered question remains the origin of the white soldiers.1 Towards 
the end of his report, Bridgland quoted a Portuguese informant, working with UNITA, as stating that 'The 
South Africans are doing a good job. They are professionals.'62 The overall effect of Bridgland's story was 
not clarity but confusion. Six days later, Reuters capitulated and ran a more assertive report: 'South African 
regular troops are fighting many hundreds of miles ... inside Angola'.63
58. First Report, ITN, 14 Nov. 1975. Previous film reports by Michael Nicholson from Angola had been 
broadcast on ITN on 7, 9, 10, 12 and 13 Nov. 1975.
59. Tony Hodges & David Martin, 'South African troops join Angola civil war', The Observer. 16 Nov. 1975.
60. Andrew Jaffe, 'Hot and cold warriors', Newsweek, 24 Nov. 1975, p. 25.
61. Bridgland. Jonas Savimbi, p. 142. AP and UPI appear to have been even more nervous than Reuters.
The problem was the lack of an authoritative source.
62. Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-South Africans', Reuters, 15 Nov. 1975, Versions of this report were published 
in The Times. 15 Nov. 1975, Los Angeles Times. 16 Nov. 1975 and the Chicago Tribune, 17 Nov.
1975.
63. Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-Forces', Reuters, 21 Nov. 1975.
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Following the publication of Bridgland’s (unabridged) report in the Washington Post, John Stockwell the 
CIA Chief of the Angola Task Force, commented in his memoir, 'The propaganda and political war was lost 
in that stroke. There was nothing the Lusaka station could invent that would be as damaging to the other 
side as our alliance with the hated South Africans was to our cause.'64 Yet although Stockwell, Bridgland 
and Nicholson, among others, believed that the 14 November scoop established a negative image of 
UNITA, the evidence tends to suggest something quite different. It was in fact the conjunction of Cuban 
reinforcements, and disinformation from the CIA stations in Kinshasa and Lusaka that transformed the war 
from a struggle between three African factions (and their backers) '... over an obscure piece of African 
real estate,' into a chapter in the Cold War.65 An example of this was the editorial in the New York Times 
published under the title, 'Angola Intervention': 'There was a time when the United States would have 
responded to such a massive and menacing intervention with its own show of force, but that is something 
that the American people would never countenance now.'66 This diatribe against Soviet imperialism did not 
mention the South Africa engagement. To a certain extent, the escalation of the war shielded the South 
African state from global recrimination. While the majority of the observers of the Angolan war became 
distracted by the Cold War implications, only the vigilant few concentrated on the South African presence.67
The British and American press treatments.
Marsha Coleman's study of elite American newspapers’ coverage of the Angolan war correctly asserts that 
'... the US press underreported the fact of South African intervention and when it did report this, failed to do 
so in the same negative and emotional terms in which it reported the Cuban involvement.'68 However,
64. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 202; Fred Bridgland, 'S. African regulars fight inside Angola', 
Washington Post, 23 Nov. 1975, p. 18; This did not stop the CIA from trying to negate the Bridgland 
story. Indeed, Fred Bridgland, 'Angola-Forces', Reuters. 21 Nov. 1975, had also noted that 'UNITA 
today reported it had taken 20 Soviet soldiers prisoner'. See David Ottaway, 'Angola group claims 
capture of 20 Russians, 35 Cubans', Washington Post, 22 Nov. 1975; Reuters, 'Angola unit says it holds 
Russians', New York Times, 22 Nov. 1975.
65. 'Angola: detente under fire', Newsweek. 19 Jan. 1976, p. 6.
66. Editorial, 'Angola intervention', New York Times, 26 Nov. 1975.
67. See, for example, Len Clarke, Letter to the editor, The Guardian. 29 Nov. 1975. On Clarke, see chapter 
four.
68. Marsha Lynne Coleman, 'Prestigious American Newspapers' Coverage of African Political Crises
Events', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1982, p. 2.
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Coleman's thesis neglected to acknowledge either the dominance of the Cold War paradigm or the relative 
transformation which the American media underwent in their treatment of Angola following the reporting 
of the South African invasion. This shifting position was directly related to the
... unprecedented series of 'leaks' to the press by various members of 
Congress and other opponents of US intervention in government 
agencies ... Over the next two months [from 7 Nov.] there were so 
many leaks about American covert activities in Angola that, according 
to one knowledgeable source in State Department intelligence, only 
minor details escaped the attention of the public; 'all of the essential 
facts were published in the newspapers'.69
While the impact of this process was slow and the U.S. media were guilty of both '... simplistically 
portraying the Angolan conflict as "Communism" versus "anti-Communism"' and '... uncritically 
parroting the administration's distortions of events in Angola,'the American media did manage to adjust 
their treatment as new information emerged.70 The catalysts for this change included Oswald Johnston 
and Seymour Hersh's investigative journalism which suggested that the United States had been the 
first to escalate the conflict by supplying secret funds to the FNLA; an increasing sense of the 
complexity of U.S. involvement as demonstrated by David Anable's article for the Christian Science 
Monitor exposing Gulf Oil's relationship with the MPLA: 'Ironically,... American elements are aiding and 
bankrolling opposite sides'; and the realisation that the United States was deeply involved in an alliance '... 
with the perpetrators of apartheid, the white rulers of the Republic of South Africa', and the potential 
diplomatic damage that this could cause to relationships with other African stales, not least, Nigeria (at that 
time the United States' second major source of foreign oil).71
The spectre of Vietnam was consistently invoked by the American media alongside a vast number of other
69. Bender in Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy, p. 99.
70. George M. Houser, 'Communism and the war in Angola', New York Times. 14 Dec. 1975; Editorial, 
'Angola', The Nation. 27 Dec. 1975, p. 676.
71. Oswald Johnston, 'Who intervened first? U.S. move in Angola seen as spur to Russia', International 
Herald Tribune. 10 Dec. 1975; Seymour M. Hersh, 'Angola-aid issue opening rifts in State Department', 
New York Times, 14 Dec. 1975; Seymour M. Hersh, 'Early Angola aid by U.S. reported', New York
Times, 19 Dec. 1975; David Anable, 'American involvement in Angola deepens', Christian Science 
Monitor. 15 Dec. 1975. See also 'Gulf places in special fund $125 million due Angola to bypass 
warring factions', Wall Street Journal. 23 Dec. 1975; Editorial, 'Rethinking Angola ...', New York 
Times, 26 Dec. 1975; Nigeria recognised the MPLA as the government of Angola on 27 Nov. 1975.
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historical analogies: the Congo crisis, the Spanish civil war, the Biafran war and the Cuban Missile crisis.72 
Of comparable importance to the Vietnam analogy in influence during this period were the ongoing 
revelations of the Pike Committee into CIA activity.73 Slowly, senior political commentators began to 
express doubts about U.S. involvement in Angola. These included both Anthony Lewis and Walter 
Cronkite.74 During this period of American introspection, the MPLA displayed four South African 
prisoners to the press in Luanda (13 December). Five days later, the U.S. Senate in a crucial vote (54 to 
22), decided to impose a complete ban on further aid to UNITA and the FNLA. Almost immediately, the 
media treatment adjusted to reflect the new realities. This did not mean that the U.S. media suddenly 
became sympathetic to the MPLA but it did become more balanced. Leslie Gelb, for example, reported on 
the fact that Pentagon officials were unhappy with the U.S.'s growing identification with South Africa.75 
Condemning President Ford’s denunciations of Cuba, an editorial in the Washington Post, stated: '... we do 
not hear Mr Ford criticising Zaire or South Africa, which have soldiers in Angola backing the "American" 
side. For the Post’s part, we oppose all foreign intervention in Angola. But Cuba can at least make the claim 
on solid racial grounds (as Fidel Castro just has) that the blood of Africa "runs abundantly through our 
veins".'76
A few journalists even permitted themselves the indulgence of imagination: Anthony Lewis, for instance,
72. See, for example, Conrad, 'The battle over Angola', cartoon, Los Angeles Times. 17 Dec. 1975: 'If you 
liked Vietnam, you'll love this one! Angola: Produced and Directed by Henry Kissinger, starring the 
CIA at a cost of millions!'
73. The secret report of the Pike Committee was leaked and published as 'The CIA Report the President 
doesn't want you to read', Village Voice. 16 Feb. 1976. See p. 88, on the issue of U.S. support for 
UNITA-FNLA: 'Mr Aspin: "And why are the Chinese backing the moderate group?" Mr Colby [Head 
of the CIA]: "Because the Soviets are backing the MPLA is the simplest answer." Mr Aspin: "It sounds 
like that is why we are doing it." Mr Colby: "It is".'
74. Anthony Lewis, 'No questions, please', New York Times, 15 Dec. 1975; CBS television ran a week of 
nightly segments on Evening News, focusing on the question of Angola, hosted by Walter Cronkite, 
during the week of 14 Dec. 1975. These programmes examined the similarities between the Vietnam 
war and the Angolan conflict. Cronkite stated that the series was designed'... to try to play our small 
part in preventing that mistake this time.' ('The battle over Angola', Time. 29 Dec. 1975, pp. 19-20). 
NBC also provided heavy coverage of the Angolan war during the same week.
75. Leslie H. Gelb, 'There is no basic text with the lessons of Vietnam', New York Times, 21 Dec. 1975.
76. Editorial, 'Havana's men in Angola', The Washington Post, 30 Dec. 1975. See also Editorial, 'The wrong
African policy’, Washington Post. 28 Dec. 1975; John D. Marks, 'The fallacy of our Angolan
involvement', Los Angeles Times. 17 Dec. 1975; Editorial, 'The courting of disaster', Los Angeles
Times. 28 Dec. 1975.
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hypothesised, 'Suppose the United States had immediately objected when South African troops entered 
Angola in force last October. This country would now have a degree of credibility in Africa as a friendly, 
disinterested power.’77 The Wall Street Journal also reflected the shift in U.S. coverage. On 19 December, 
an editorial had tentatively suggested support for the Ford administration's plan to increase the funds for 
UNITA-FNLA.78 Four days later, following the passage of the Tunney-Clark amendment, a staff writer 
commented, '... the outlook for American interests isn't particularly brigh t... the U.S. is backing the less 
competent, more poorly organized side. It is also the side with the weaker political credentials - 14 African 
nations have recognised the MPLA regime so far. "The MPLA have the brightest people, and most of 
Angola's management skills," concedes one U.S. official.179 By early January, the American media had 
undergone a major shift in the consensus regarding U.S. involvement in Angola. While this was 
undoubtedly due to the 'several key miscalculations’ made by the U.S. strategists, it is revealing that the 
Washington Post considered one of these miscalculations to be the underestimation of '... the degree to 
which the United States would be impaled publically as "the collaborator" of racist South Africa when 
Pretoria's troops entered the conflict, even prior to Havana's.'80 The factor which made this shift in the 
consensus in the United States's coverage particularly extraordinary was that President Ford continued to 
talk 'tough' 011 the Angolan question throughout the period.81
77. Anthony Lewis, 'How to arrange disaster1, New York Times, 15 Jan. 1976.
78. Editorial, 'Dithering over Angola', Wall Street Journal. 19 Dec. 1975.
79. Robert Keatley, 'Uneasy choices in Angola', Wall Street Journal, 23 Dec. 1975. In the weeks that 
followed, the Wall Street Journal earned two diametrically opposed commentaries on Angola: Karen 
Rothmyer, 'Angola and some African memories', Wall Street Journal, 8 Jan. 1976, posed the following 
question: 'Remembering my own ineptness, my own insensitivity, my own ignorance [on the subject of 
African life]. I wonder: How can the US know what is best for Angola ... ?’ Bowen Northrup, 'Jungle, 
fighter: In South of Angola, guerrilla with a PhD is something of a god', Wall Street Journal. 22 Jan. 
1976, was possibly the most inept reporting of the war, it contains the following massive 
understatement, 'It's an odd civil war they're having in Angola.’
80. Murrey Marder, 'The Angolan involvement: U.S., Soviets caught in a Byzantine conflict', Washington 
Post, 6 Jan. 1976.
81. 1976 was a presidential election year. With the primaries due in Feb. and challenging candidate, Ronald 
Reagan promoting a proactive role on Angola, President Ford persisted with the belligerent language. 
Among the American columnists who remained unreservedly ’hawkish’ was Patrick Buchanan, 'We’re 
"hip deep in pygmies'", Chicago Tribune. 23 Dec. 1975: victory in Angola for Soviet arms and
Cuban mercenaries will send a message to the world: the West has no "strategic reserve".1 See also 
James Burnham, 'The Protracted Conflict - Angola: The national disinterest', National Review. 6 Feb. 
1976, p. 80.
-163-
The British media did not moderate its stance in tandem with the Americans, as might have been expected. 
Indeed, a number of 'liberal' commentators sustained a position which can only be described as violently 
anti-communist. The Guardian, which had been running an editorially-based anti-MPLA campaign even 
before detailed knowledge of South African involvement emerged, barely adjusted its tone. This was 
peculiar because in general the work of the newspaper's correspondents and columnists was balanced. An 
editorial on 22 November led on the UNITA statement that twenty Russian soldiers had been 
captured, a statement which was later proved to have originated from the CIA disinformation unit in 
Lusaka.82 By 16 December, editorial suggestions were beginning to resemble ideas emanating from South 
Africa: 'The UNITA leader, Dr Savimbi, sees in the conduct of South Africa a desire that Angola should 
be balkanised ... "Balkanisation" is the emotive word for "partition"; unless Angola is to be fought over by 
the Big Powers and their proxies, this is the only solution worth pursuing.'83 On 6 January 1976, the 
Guardian carried a letter from an African reader offended by the editorial position:
Your persistent opposition to a total MPLA victory ... and your equally 
persistent support for the other factions supported by South Africa and 
America (sorry - Kissinger, CIA and Ford) shocks me as an African, 
especially when your paper hitherto has enjoyed wide respect in Africa 
... Your paper is backing obvious losers and the sooner you realise it 
and become objective about Angola the better ... It is South Africa 
which should be condemned and forced to withdraw.84
No such transformation was forthcoming: the very next day, an editorial condemned Father Adrian 
Hastings, who had had the effrontery to suggest, in a letter to the limes, that a swift MPLA victory might 
not be a bad outcome.85 The Guardian persisted with this editorial position until Huambo had fallen to the 
MPLA (9 February) and UNITA had announced their reversion to guerrilla activity. During this period, 
Geoffrey Taylor wrote the editorials on Africa for the newspaper. James MacManus later recalled that 
'Geoffrey became the object of hostility by a group at the Guardian who thought he was getting it all
82. Editorial, 'The crucial struggle for Africa', The Guardian. 22 Nov. 1975. See also Stockwell, In Search 
of Enemies, p. 194-195.
83. Editorial, 'Better split than twisted', The Guardian, 16 Dec. 1975.
84. M. Gumbo, Stobhill General Hospital, Glasgow, Letter to the editor, The Guardian, 6 Jan. 1976.
85. Editorial, 'As Africa casts its vote', The Guardian, 7 Jan. 1976. Adrian Hastings, Letter to the editor,
The Times. 30 Dec. 1975. Father Hastings also attracted criticism from Michael Nicholson, Letter to the 
editor, The Times. 6 Jan. 1976: 'I can give him documented evidence that the Russians were sending in 
vast quantities of military aid to the MPLA as far back as April 1975'.
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wrong.'86 In December 1975, Taylor had suggested that if the conflict were to spread to the borders of South
Africa, 'That situation would present the West with the ultimate in unpopular choices: whether to support 
the Soviet Union or South Africa.'87 In other words, the choice would have been between institutionalised 
communism and institutionalised racism. Taylor's editorials on Angola, during this period, demonstrate 
clearly which position he would have adopted. At the Observer, there appears to have been a similar 
degree of conflict. In December, David Martin wrote a powerful condemnation of the allegations around 
the question of the South African engagement:
... the propaganda continues. The MPLA is described as Marxist, which 
it is not. True, the movement includes some Marxists. But it prefers to 
call itself 'progressive', a word the Western press refrains from using, 
but one which indicates the varying ideological tendencies. South 
Africa's invasion, CIA funding and all other Western involvement is 
described as a response to the Soviet arms build-up. Again this is 
untrue. Russian arms began to arrive in May [1975] in clear response 
to the September 1974 plot to exclude Neto and the November 1974 
FNLA military moves. And it must be added that Cuban troops training 
the MPLA's expanded army did not become involved in the fighting 
until early November south of the railhead at Benguela, when the South 
African column was already 800 kilometres inside Angola.88
However, this article which directly contradicted the editorial position of the Observer, was published by 
the Observer Foreign News Service (OFNS), not the British newspaper.89 Martin recalls that while Legum 
was responsible for the composition of editorials on Africa and the stories which went in the newspaper, he 
could not exert any influence over the stories carried by the OFNS.50 Within a few weeks, Legum had taken 
the opposing argument into the international arena with an article published in The New Republic. He 
continued to propagate the myth of Savimbi's support, charisma and all-round pliability, while condemning 
the isolationism displayed by American liberals in relation to Angola. Legum also suggested that liberal
86. Interview with James MacManus, 16 Oct. 1995. MacManus suggested that Richard Gott and Jonathan 
Steele were the '... prime movers' in this protest. Interviews with Richard Gott, 14 May 1996 &
Geoffrey Taylor, 24 March 1996, reveal that Peter Niesewand was the leading protester. Niesewand had 
been bom in South Africa and was imprisoned in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe in 1973 (see Peter Niesewand, In 
Camera: Secret Justice in Rhodesia [London, 1973].) He won the International Reporter of the Year 
award twice (1973 and 1977). Niesewand died in 1983. ('Obituary', The Guardian. 7 Feb. 1983).
87. Editorial, 'Angola: the aid that helps most’, The Guardian. 20 Dec. 1975.
88. David Martin, 'Little chance of OAU deal on Angola', Observer Foreign News Sendee. 24 Dec. 1976, p. 
3.
89. Editorial, 'Innocence is not enough', The Observer. 21 Dec. 1975.
90. Interview with David Martin, 4 Sept. 1996.
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America's treatment of Henry Kissinger was unfair, he continued, 'I don't need reminding of the stupid 
errors made by Kissinger and Nixon in southern Africa - errors that some of us have tried (but mostly 
failed) to get liberals to pay serious attention to because of preoccupation with Vietnam.'91
The failure of the liberal newspapers in Britain to adjust their position following the news of the South 
African invasion, facilitated a shift to the right by the Daily and Sunday Tele graph. However, this shift and 
its associated support for South Africa was partly disguised by a series of attacks on the weakness of the 
American (and British) response to the advance of communism. Peregrine Worsthorne declared that 
'For the first lime since the end of the war, the American will has been tested and found wanting. Nor has 
Britain helped in this dire moment of strain, despite the fact that Southern Africa is an area where the 
British role could have been highly influential. This failure, too, needs to be exposed with ruthless rigour.'92 
Two weeks later, a columnist on the Daily Telegraph addressed the issue of apartheid: 'Apartheid might be 
vicious in practice, it might be evil in fact, but, if the alternative to this system really is bloody chaos such 
as we have seen in other parts of Africa, do we in a relatively secure England, have the moral right to urge 
such a course?'93 This conclusion had been made acceptable in the context of the (liberal) debate over 
communism versus racism. As if to demonstrate the anti-communist tone in the British press, on the day 
following the fall of Huambo, Max Hastings composed an 'obituary' for UNITA:
In any internal power struggle in Africa the personal risks for those 
involved of execution or exile have always been high. So when entering 
such a struggle, everybody likes to be sure that their side has at least a 
remote chance of winning. The message of Angola is that it pays to be 
on the side of the Russians. They win. Whatever amiable mutterings the 
American Ambassador whispers into receptive ears, when it comes to 
the crunch he cannot deliver the cash, votes or guns from Washington 
to back them.94
91. Colin Legum, 'A Letter on Angola to American Liberals', New Republic. 31 Dec. 1975, p. 16. See also 
Colin Legum, 'When the war is over, what next for Angola?1, New York Times. 15 Feb. 1976.
92. Peregrine Worsthorne, 'How Angola went East', Sunday Telegraph, 4 Jan. 1976. See also Peter Simple, 
'Way of the World: Paralysed', Daily Telegraph. 9 Jan. 1976: 'Paralysed by guilt, accepting as an article 
of faith that South African apartheid is the most fiendish system of tyranny ever seen on earth ... we 
have made ourselves powerless to resist the advance in Africa ... of a system of tyranny a million times 
worse.'
93. Michael Harrington, 'Apartheid or bloody chaos?', Daily Telegraph, 16 Jan. 1976; See also Ian Lloyd, 
Conservative M.P., Letter to the editor, The Times, 22 Jan. 1976, most notably his assessment of 
apartheid as '... a comparatively mild form of social failure'.
94. Max Hastings, 'The bear hug wins in Africa too', Evening Standard. 10 Feb. 1976.
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The coverage of the Angolan war represents one of the lowest points in British journalism's treatment of 
African news. Only the Financial Times sustained a consistent level of balance in its coverage and as we 
shall see even this was problematic.
Partiality, emphasis and intelligence.
British correspondents were the most obviously partial during the Angolan war. Fred Bridgland's 
attachment to Jonas Savimbi is clear from the biography of the UNITA leader which he wrote in the mid- 
1980s. 96 Michael Nicholson confessed in his memoir that '... I wanted Savimbi to win, and was loath to 
make public a story [the SADF expose] that could do him such damage.'96 It is one of the enduring 
ironies of the coverage of the Angolan war that Bridgland and Nicholson's desire for news was, in the end, 
greater than their sympathy for Savimbi, A.J. Mcllroy reporting from Luanda, covered the MPLA and their 
Cuban allies with antipathy. Commenting upon a Cuban officer, he descended into cliche: 'A Havana cigar 
clenched unlit in a mouth that flashed silver teeth when he smiled ...'97 Following a visit to Cabinda, 
Mcllroy filed a report which claimed that the MPLA were planning to nationalise the oilfields.98 This was 
not only incorrect, it was also completely illogical: the future revenues from Gulf Oil were essential to 
the survival of the government in Luanda. Mcllroy was duly expelled from Angola on 2 February 1976. 
Although the Daily Telegraph dedicated an editorial to the subject of Mcllroy's expulsion, it was no 
surprise to his contemporaries, amongst whom his nickname was 'A.J. Make-it-up'.99
Bruce Loudon was the only correspondent in Angola officially to 'recognise' the UNITA-FNLA 
'government'. For a few days in early December 1975 his byline read 'Huambo, provisional capital, 
UNITA-FNLA Democratic Republic of Angola.'100 Loudon's previous career partly explains his partiality. 
Until 1974, he had been the Financial Times and Daily Telegraphs stringer in Lisbon. Following the
95. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi. Bridgland covered Angola continuously until the late 1980s when he finally 
discovered UNITA's 'dark side.' (Interview with Fred Bridgland, 9 May 1995).
96. Nicholson, Measure, p. 179.
97. A.J. Mcllroy, 'When the Cubans fight, they use their guns well', Daily Telegraph. 19 Jan. 1976.
98. A.J. Mcllroy, 'Takeover of off-shore oilfields planned by MPLA', Daily Telegraph. 2 Feb. 1976.
99. Editorial, 'Defeat1, Daily Telegraph. 7 Feb. 1976. David Martin suggests that Kenneth Kaunda originally 
gave Mcllroy the nickname. (Interview with David Martin, 4 Sept. 1996).
100. See Loudon's reports in Daily Telegraph. 5-8 Dec. 1975.
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Portuguese revolution, reports emerged in the Portuguese press that Loudon's relationship with the Caetano 
regime had developed far beyond the realm of normal journalistic practice. These reports had been inspired 
by copies of correspondence sent by Loudon, in 1973, to Portuguese government officials.101 Upon the 
receipt of translations of the transcripts of the Portuguese articles, J.D.F. Jones, the foreign editor of the 
Financial Times, telephoned Loudon and summarily dismissed him with the admonition that he '... 
would never get a job with any respectable newspaper again, ever.'102 The Daily Telegraph, however, 
retained Loudon's services. In 1976, Time Oh? gained access to the letters:
Upon his return to Lisbon [in 1973], Loudon started a correspondence 
with Dr Pedro Feytor Pinto, 'Director of Information' at the Portuguese 
dictatorship's Secretariat of State for Information and Tourism. 'Above 
all else," Loudon wrote, 'I have the deep conviction that allegations such 
as those in connection with "massacres" in Mozambique gain rapid 
international acceptance because of the consistent failure of Portugal to 
launch effective counter campaigns.' Loudon believed, he wrote, that 
'something must be done very urgently to combat this propaganda 
campaign, and to present the realities of the situation in Mozambique in 
a positive and effective manner.' What was needed, Loudon proposed, 
was 'a daily flow of information from Mozambique to a central point in 
Lisbon, from which it can be disseminated both to the international 
news media and to Portuguese representatives, as well as to other 
opinion formers.' ... Though he was only a 'humble foreigner', Loudon 
wrote, 'I stand ready to help in any way I can over the next few critical 
months.'103
One can only concur with Time Outs conclusion: 'In view of his relationship with the former Portuguese 
dictatorship, it would seem that Loudon would be one of the least impartial men to send to cover the war in 
Angola.'104 Partiality was also apparent amongst more liberal reporters. Jane Bergerol, the Financial Times 's 
stringer in Luanda, had her articles heavily edited in order to remove biased comment.106 As Bridget Bloom
101. For evidence of Loudon's ability to control a damaging story, see Father Adrian Hastings, 'Portuguese 
massacre reported by priests', The Times, 10 July 1973; Bruce Loudon, 'No massacres, say Tete 
tribesmen', Daily Telegraph, 13 July 1973; Bruce Loudon, 'Priests do not know of massacre', Daily 
Telegraph, 14 July 1973. For the impact of Loudon's efforts, see James J. Kilpatrick, 'The Portuguese 
atrocity that didn't happen', National Review, 10 May 1974, pp. 525-527.
102. Interview with J.D.F. Jones, 3 Nov. 1995.
103. 'Telegrafted Tales', Time Out. No. 308, 6 Feb. 1976, p. 5.
104. Ibid, p. 5.
105. Bergerol's reports apparently became more radical as the war progressed. Her reports for BBC World 
Service were cancelled with no explanation during the spring of 1976. (Interview with Stanley Uys, 5 
Jan. 1995). Bergerol remained in Angola for many years after the war, eventually abandoning
journalism in order to study medicine. For allegations regarding other partial journalists of the liberal 
-left, see 'Letter from Angola1, Private Eve, No. 418, 23 Dec. 1977, p. 8.
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remembers, 'It was impossible for the Financial Times - it was virtually propaganda for the MPLA ... it was 
not the sort of thing we could have published in the Financial Times without losing out completely on 
objectivity.'106 The Financial Times's sub-editors certainly performed their task with great skill; Bergerol's 
published reports appear to be amongst the most objective of the war. While partiality was most obvious 
in the work of British journalists, the most disturbing element of the international media's coverage of the 
South African invasion of Angola was its emphasis. Throughout the period in question, the majority of the 
British and American correspondents and commentators accepted the version of events which blamed the 
South African incursion 011 Soviet-Cuban escalation. The Times, for example, commented as late as mid- 
January 1976 that 'The South Africans are the only military force that can check a determined Russian- 
Cuban-MPLA advance; yet South African intervention has been disastrous for the western position. It 
should have been discreet - it was almost as blatant as the Russian-Cuban, which it followed.'10’
The U.S. media, hampered by the strictures of objective journalism and the importance of sources, 
consistently underplayed the role of South Africa while focusing on the grander Cold War implications. 
Attempts to understand the planning behind the South African incursion were mainly confined to the 
British media, although these interpretations were normally influenced by the belief that the South 
African action was reactive rather than proactive.10* To what extent this emphasis was exaggerated by 
confidential British and American government sources remains difficult to assess. As the American 
academic, Gerald Bender, acknowledged in the Los Angeles Times, however: The stream of government 
information on the number and type of Russian arms shipments to Angola has been so voluminous and 
detailed that one wondered if the supply sergeants of the ... MPLA were as knowledgeable about their 
Russian stocks as the average American newspaper reader.'109
106. Interviews with Bridget Bloom, 21 March 1995 & J.D.F Jones, 3 Nov. 1995. Bergerol's retort is 'They 
were told to water it down ... The Foreign Office put pressure on the Financial Times on more than 
one occasion.' (Interview with Jane Bergerol/Wilford, 22 May 1995).
107. Editorial, 'Russia's African empire'. The Times, 14 Jan. 1976.
108. Notable exceptions include 'South Africa and Angola: The reason why', Financial Times. 29
Dec. 1975; Nicholas Ashford, 'Marxist slams "Africa traitors'", Sunday Times. 11 Jan. 1976; Nicholas 
Ashford, 'South Africa's costly blunder in sending troops to Angola', The Times. 2 Feb. 1976; Jane 
Bergerol, 'Heading towards the thin White line1, Financial Times. 12 Feb. 1976; Stanley Uys, 'UNITA 
begged Vorster to send troops into Angola', The Guardian. 16 Feb. 1976.
109. Gerald J. Bender, 'Angola: a new quagmire for U.S.?1, Los Angeles Times. 21 Dec. 1975.
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Equally difficult to assess is the influence of the Western intelligence agencies in Angola, although this 
does seem to have been important. Far from working in unison, there appears to have been no small degree 
of tension between the British Secret Intelligence Services (SIS), the CIA, the French Service de 
Documentation Exterieure et Contre-Espionage (SDECE) and South Africa's BOSS. Stockwell later 
recalled that 'The South Africans and French accepted voluminous intelligence reports and detailed 
briefings from [the Pretoria and Paris] CIA stations but never reciprocated with much information about 
what the}' were doing in Angola.'110 It would appear that one of the repercussions of the Pike Committee's 
investigation into the CIA was a partial breakdown in the relations between the international intelligence 
agencies. An article in To The Point explained the difficulties of the period: '... spies and their organisations 
are going through a tough time. Those that used to cooperate now mostly distrust each other.'111
The lack of co-operation can be seen in a number of strange incidents which occurred during this period in 
which intelligence and journalism were merged. Stockwell notes that the CIA arranged the expulsion from 
Kinshasa o f '... one European reporter, whom we knew only as Germani.'112 Hans Germani was actually an 
employee of To The Point, a long-standing front-organisation of South Africa's Department of Information. 
Equally strange, was an article in the Washington Post's series on spies, by the newspaper's London 
correspondent, Bernard Nossiter: 'An unknown number [of SIS officers] are posing as journalists. "Fleet 
Street relies on the secret vote to keep its operatives in the field these days," one authority insists. The 
secret vote is the figure publically published for the SIS budget.'113 Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald 
later commented: 'Most of the British intelligence officers who arrived in Angola had been spotted fairly 
quickly, although one or two posing as journalists had a certain amount of success.1114
110. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, p. 181.
111. 'Survival of the fittest in the world's scramble for secrets', To The Point. 5 Dec. 1975, p. 7.
112. Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, pp. 200-201.
113. Bernard Nossiter, 'Other cloaks, other daggers II - Britain's spies: muddling through', Washington 
Post, 22 Dec. 1975. Some days later, Louis Heren (the foreign editor of The Times') appeared on 
Today, BBC Radio 4, to debunk the Nossiter report. ('London Diary', New Statesman, 16 Jan. 1976, p. 
66). For information on the CIA's employment of journalists, see Miles Copeland, Letter to the editor, 
New York Times, 30 Sept. 1977; Carl Bernstein, 'The CIA and the Media', Rolling Stone. No. 250, 20 
Oct. 1977, pp. 55-67.
114. Jonathan Bloch and Patrick Fitzgerald, British Intelligence and Covert Action: Africa. Middle East and 
Europe since 1945 (Co. Kerry, 1983), p. 194,
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The failure of the South African intervention in Angola had an immediate effect in the Republic. The tone 
of the Club of Ten advertisement, 'The Free World today stands in greater danger than at any time since the 
darkest days of World War II', which appeared in February 1976 suggested genuine desperation.115 Eschel 
Rhoodie later commented that 'From a propaganda point of view the Angolan "mistykie" [i.e. little mistake] 
was, in fact, a God-send to our enemies. Diplomatically speaking it was an equal disaster.'116 The 'little 
mistake' was disastrous for a number of additional reasons: it destroyed the pretence that South Africa's 
policy was one of non-intervention in foreign countries; and it contradicted the prior image of South Africa 
as the 'military strongman' of the continent. West. Africa magazine declared: '... when the dust has cleared, it 
will be remembered in Africa only that the South Africans were worsted in their first encounter with an 
African army.'117 Within South Africa, the failed intervention served as a form of inspiration for man)' in the 
African population, as Benjamin Pogrund noted in an article for The Spectator.
... all the factors which make for white dismay act in reverse in regard 
to the country's blacks. On the specific issue of Angola there would 
seem to be considerable support for the MPLA - if only because South 
Africa is opposing it. In more general terms, blacks feel that the 
succession of events in the sub-continent is on their side, that the tide of 
history is flowing in their favour. Black confidence is slowly mounting, 
and greater assertiveness and aggression are likely.118
Angola had also attracted the full attention of the international media. The war convinced many columnists 
and commentators that southern Africa would succeed Vietnam as the epicentre of the Cold War. A number 
of specialist war correspondents were duly dispatched to report from Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, South Africa, 
Angola and Mozambique. The central expose of the Angolan War, the revelation that South African combat 
troops were in the country had been the work of a news agency reporter (Bridgland) and a television 
broadcaster (Nicholson). Within two years, all the major broadcasting companies in Britain and the United
115. The Club of Ten, 'The Free World stands today in greater danger ...', advertisement. The Times. 6 
Feb. 1976. See appendix B. iv. e.
116. Eschel Rhoodie, The Real Information Scandal (Pretoria, 1983), p. 146.
117. 'Four faces of Angola', West Africa, 2 Feb. 1976, p. 130. See also Editorial, 'South Africa loses'. New 
Society, 19 Feb. 1976, p. 370: 'For the first time since the Treaty of Vereeniging, 1902, white 
Afrikaner South Africa has lost a war'.
118. Benjamin Pogrund, 'A gloomy outlook for South Africa', The Spectator, 7 Feb. 1976, p. 6. See also 
Editorial, 'Angola's lesson for South Africa', African Communist No. 65, Second Quarter 1976, pp.
11-12: 'The era of the South African revolution has opened. Are we ready fo r  it? ... If we fail to strike 
when the iron is hot, we may have to wait years for another chance.' [original emphasis].
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States would open bureaus in Johannesburg. Despite the confusion and contradictions in the reports, the 
Angolan War had transformed the South African 'story'. During the next three years, South Africa would be 
subjected to a degree of coverage not hitherto experienced in its history.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CASE-STUDY THREE: THE 
CHILDREN'S REVOLT', 1976.
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'I could take you down this street,' said a student whose home is in 
Soweto, 'and you'll find they all talk about Black Power. Vietnam will 
be nothing to this. Even with all the arms the white man has, I fear the 
day when the Africans take their revenge. The cruelty will be terrible. 
On the surface, it is quiet, but below there is a volcano.'1
Whatever is stirring in South Africa is taking place more among whites 
than the blacks. It is not revolution nor violence ... The two elements 
indispensable in any popular uprising are both missing in South Africa. 
One is a deep fury of resentment, and the other is freedom to strike at 
the governing system. There is no tension in South Africa today as the 
Middle East and Asia know it.2
Dan O'Meara has commented that 'Like "Munich" or "Suez", Soweto was one of those rare historical 
catalysts which irreversibly transform the political landscape, whose very name becomes a metaphor for 
lessons learned by an entire society.13 It Is now accepted that the Soweto uprising represented a crucial 
juncture in contemporary South African history. In effect, the protest by African schoolchildren against the 
introduction of Afrikaans-language instruction, which developed into eighteen months of intermittent 
unrest, signalled the end of twelve years of mainly muted African submission in the face of the repression 
of the South African state. The Soweto uprising inspired a resurgence of the industrial unrest already 
evident in 1972-1973, and, eventually, the domestic reappearance of the ANC; it also possessed a 
millenarian quality which would reappear in the 1980s. 'Soweto' signified the emergence of a revitalised 
African agency and it sounded the first death knell for the apartheid regime.
This chapter examines the international media's coverage of the Soweto uprising and reveals that although 
the correspondents in South Africa and the commentators in Britain and the United States recognised the 
importance of the re-emergence of violent unrest in the Republic, the ensuing coverage demonstrated a 
profound ambiguity. The cause of this ambiguity was the media's desire for an ordered resolution to the 
crisis in southern Africa and the conflict between this desire and the undisguised agency of the African 
students. The two widely differing assessments of African opinion in South Africa just before the uprising,
1. Graham Turner, 'Behind the mask of black South Africa', Sunday Telegraph. 28 March 1976.
2. Jerome Caminada, 'In South Africa, the major issue is citizenship for the blacks', The Times. 14 June
1976. See also Jerome Caminada, 'Looking for answers in South Africa', South Africa International, 
Vol. VII, No. 2, Oct. 1976, pp. 95-100.
3. Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years: The apartheid state and the politics of the National Party. 1948-1994
(Randburg, 1996), p. 180.
-174-
that preface this chapter, suggest that if a correspondent or commentator wished to discuss (and report on) 
African life in South Africa, it was advisable to talk to Africans. Neither writer was a 'liberal' but Graham 
Turner had visited Soweto and Jerome Caminada had not. The central lesson of the Soweto uprising for 
journalists in South Africa was that communication with Africans was essential. It would no longer be 
possible for a correspondent to depend on the domestic English-language press supplemented by occasional 
conversations with domestic workers and taxi-drivers. This chapter considers: the coverage of the first ten 
days of the unrest; the importance of the photographic and television images of the struggle; the role 
played by African journalists in relaying the story through the structures of the South African press, and the 
international media’s utilisation of that story; and the contradictions which emerged in the developing 
representation of the uprising. On 28 March 1960, Richard Dimbleby introduced the BBC's programme, 
Panorama, by drawing comparisons between the Sharpeville massacre and '... Guernica and Lidice, Belsen 
and Hola and Little Rock.14 The international media made no such comparison in 1976.
The instant treatment, 16-26 June 1976.
Although the signs that unrest was intensifying in the schools of Soweto had been apparent for some time, 
most of the correspondents and stringers were caught unprepared by the events of 16 June 1976.5 The 
uprising, as it developed, represented an archetypal 'breaking story' during which the journalists' inability to 
witness the events made their dependence upon sources more than usually crucial. As these sources (the 
South African police and the African journalists) contradicted one another, the reports remained relatively 
confused. Nick Ashford, who had attempted unsuccessfully to see the unrest for himself, opened his first 
report with the police's version of events ('Police opened fire on the students who had started pelting them 
with stones ...'), before providing a degree of balance through a citation of Sophie Tema's account.6 Robin
4. Howard Smith, 'Apartheid, Sharpeville and "Impartiality": the reporting of South Africa on BBC 
television, 1948-1961', Historical Journal of Film. Radio and Television. Vol. 13, No. 3,1993, p. 253.
5. Exceptions included Bridget Bloom, 'Potential flashpoints in South Africa', Financial Times. 23 April 
1976: 'By mid year it is thought that 8 per cent of the African workforce will be unemployed. It would 
not be surprising if this leads to an escalation of unrest and protest among Blacks.'; Nicholas Ashford,
'Mr Vorster rejects Dean's plea', The Times, 15 June 1976: 'He feared South Africa might soon reach a 
point of no return beyond which nothing would stop events moving to a bloody denouement.'; Desmond 
Tutu, 'An open letter to Vorster', The Guardian. 16 June 1976.
6. Nicholas Ashford, 'Six die after South African police open fire on rioters', The Times, 17 June 1976. See 
also Sophie Tema, '"World" car rushes shot schoolboy riot victim to clinic1, The World. 17 June 1976.
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Wright quoted an unnamed but prescient Western diplomat who had commented: The damage has been 
done. This is an important signal of what the future may hold in store for South Africa. Blacks have shown 
they will actively protest government policy. This could be only the beginning.17 A number of other reports 
relayed the explanation provided by a police officer: 'We fired into them. It's no use firing over their 
heads.'8
The first editorial on the subject appeared in The Times. It focused on the wider ramifications of the 
language edict: 'It is in English that Africans can listen to the radio (east or west) and read the world's 
magazines and newspapers published in many countries ... [This is] precisely why the Afrikaners try to 
enforce their language. They do not wish to train the rising black generation to read the world’s press or 
even the Johannesburg English press.'9 The Daily Telegraph suggested that the world had changed since 
1960 and that South Africa had failed to keep pace,'... the South African Government is in the wrong, both 
as to the cause of the riots and as to their handling.'However, the editorial also suggested that the riots'... 
may have been organised in the background by adults (and they must have been),' before enquiring why the 
South African police had not used water cannon instead of bullets.10 In the American newspapers, only the 
Christian Science Monitor discussed the subject at this stage: '... it is just such instances as Soweto that 
could unify the usually passive black majority community into an all-out effort to take by force what it 
cannot obtain otherwise under the present system.'11
Coverage on the second day of the unrest continued to be limited by the inability of the foreign journalists 
to enter the townships. John Burns referred to the correspondents' dependence '... on information from the 
police and government officials'.12 Resourceful journalists used the telephone to contact residents of 
Soweto.13 On 19 June, a number of correspondents visited Alexandra township before the area was sealed
7. Robin Wright, 'S. Africa blacks riot, 23 die', Washington Post. 17 June 1976.
8. Alain Cass & Stewart Dalby, 'Six killed, 40 injured in S. Africa rioting', Financial Times. 17 June 1976.
9. Editorial, 'From Shaipeville to Soweto'. The Times. 17 June 1976.
10. Editorial, 'South African nemesis', Daily Telegraph. 18 June 1976.
11. Editorial, 'South Africa's dark cloud', Christian Science Monitor. 18 June 1976.
12. John Burns, 'South Africa toll rises to 58 dead; nearly 800 hurt1. New York Times. 18 June 1976.
13. Alain Cass & Stewart Dalby, 'Vorster faces storm in Cabinet as riot toll mounts', Financial Times. 18 
June 1976; 'Soweto', Africa News. Vol. VII, No. 2 ,28  June 1976, p. 7.
-176-
off by the police. Peter Younghusband reported that he had witnessed police shooting into crowds: 'I saw
police open fire on a group of black youths, who were clearly hostile, but not attacking - or, at that moment,
doing any damage to property.114 However, the most detailed report was filed by Nicholas Ashford, who
visited the northern perimeter of the township in the company of Stewart Dalby and Alain Cass of the 
Financial Times:
One of the soldiers ran towards us. 'Go back, go back, or they will kill 
you', he cried. In fact, the Africans looked considerably less menacing 
than he did, so we decided to talk to them. When they heard we were 
British journalists they became friendly and talked openly to us, 
expressing their hatred of the system under which they were forced to 
live ... While we were talking we suddenly heard a burst of gunfire 
from the group of policemen who by that time were about 200 yards 
away down the road ... One of my colleagues saw one of the policemen 
fire, apparently unprovoked into a crowd of Africans. Certainly we saw 
no sign of any stones being thrown at the police.13
As if to balance Ashford's treatment, the Times also carried a report by a stringer, Richard Cecil, who had 
managed to enter Soweto on the same day. Cecil's report displayed little of the desire for accurate 
representation which dominated Ashford and Dalby's work, preferring instead to rely on the cliches of 
traditional foreign correspondence: 'I narrowly escaped death from a mob of angry Africans in the heart of 
Soweto this morning. "If we slow down now we're both dead", said my driver, as we accelerated towards a 
group of African youths ...,16 Meanwhile, the New York Times demonstrated its irritation at not having been 
supplied with any interview material from its correspondent, John Burns, by carrying two reports directly 
from the news agency wires.17
The editorials in the American press were primarily mediated by the regional imperatives of the Cold
14. Peter Younghusband, 'South Africa on the brink', Daily Mail, 19 June 1976.
15. Nicholas Ashford, '"Go back or they will kill you" warning', The Times. 19 June 1976; Stewart Dalby, 
"'Time has come for bursting o u t...'", Financial Times. 19 June 1976. Alain Cass was the foreign news 
editor of the Financial Times, from 1976. See also Christopher Munnion, Banana Sunday: Datelines 
from Africa (Rivonia. 1995), p. 446.
16. Richard Cecil, 'Mobs bring terror to Soweto', The Times. 19 June 1976. Lord Richard Cecil, second son 
of the Marquis of Salisbury, had served with the Grenadier Guards and the SAS before turning to 
journalism. At this point, he was working as a stringer for The Times. He was killed by African 
guerrillas in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe on 20 April 1978. See Munnion, Banana Sunday, pp. 10, 384, 394 
-395; Ed Harriman, Hack: Home Truths about Foreign News (London, 1987), pp. 124-125.
17. UPI & Reuters, 'Moments of kindness in blacks and whites', New York Times. 19 June 1976.
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W ar.18 The New York Times argued that The deadly riots - the worst South Africa has ever known - 
underscore, however, that there is no hope for permanent order when the law does not promise justice and 
equality.'19 The Los Angeles Times echoed the concern with order: '... the riots represent no triumph for the 
moderation and orderly change that should be the hallmarks for a just settlement of differences between 
southern Africa's blacks and whites.120 Meanwhile in Britain, the Sunday Express launched the first tentative 
defence of the South African government's response to the uprising: '... no one should imagine that the 
rioting was spontaneous. It was clearly timed to sabotage Dr. Vorster's meeting with the US Secretary of 
State, Dr Kissinger ... There are evilly disposed individuals who do not want agreement in Southern Africa, 
who for their own political purposes are willing to sacrifice the blood and the lives of Africans.'21
In addition to the editorials, the columnists began to comment on the subject. Anthony Lewis, for example, 
contributed a detailed account of the restrictions imposed upon Africans in South Africa. His conclusion 
stands as an important stage in the rehabilitation of the reputations of previous African leaders: The 
situation is about as intractable and as dangerous as could be imagined, and it is made the worse by the 
absence of responsible black leadership. The natural black leaders have mostly been pinched [sic] off by the 
Government: Nelson Mandela in prison, Robert Sobukwe restricted to a remote town, many student leaders 
prosecuted or in detention.122 In contrast, Peregrine Worsthorne expressed his 'awed respect' at what he 
perceived to be a demonstration of white South African strength. Worsthorne continued, '... the South 
African whites are not like most of the rest of Western mankind, whose will to defend itself has been 
softened by liberal inhibitions, post-imperial guilt and the fear of thermonuclear destruction encapsulated in
18. An exception was the Boston Globe. During the summer of 1976, Benjamin Pogrund was on a work 
exchange between the Boston Globe and the Rand Daily Mail. Following the events in Soweto, he was 
requested to write articles and editorials on the subject. (Interview with Benjamin Pogrund, 12 Sept. 
1995). See Editorial, Tragedy in South Africa'. Boston Globe. 19 June 1976.
19. Editorial, 'Somber warning', New York Times. 20 June 1976.
20. Editorial, 'A signal, but no triumph', Los Angeles Times. 20 June 1976.
21. Editorial, 'Folly', Sunday Express. 20 June 1976.
22. Anthony Lewis, 'South Africa's apartheid, a violence-prone policy'. New York Times. 20 June 1976.
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the phrase "better Red than dead." For them it is most emphatically not a case of "better black than dead".'23
Among the reports which summarised the week's events, Christopher Munnion's analysis depended the 
most closely 011 South African police sources. He suggested '... that some sections of the demonstrators 
were anticipating violence. Many groups of youths were carrying batons, shields and knives when they 
joined the march. And some groups of young blacks had started stoning cars and looting before the police 
arrived on the scene.' [original emphasis]24 No conclusive evidence to support this contention was ever 
presented. In the Chicago Tribune, reporters who had recently conducted a lour of southern Africa offered 
their explanation for the unrest: 'It's easy to understand what lay behind the Fames and gunfire and looting. 
All you have to do is stroll around [Soweto] with your eyes open. It's a massive sprawling dump.'25 Denis 
Herbstein attempted to extend the coverage to include the projected independence of the homelands. He 
suggested that 'If protests against Afrikaans can spark off a momentous rebellion like last week's there is 
one issue which could take it further still. When the Transkei becomes "independent" in October, all 
Xhosas living in white cities will become citizens of that homeland, whether they want to or not,’26
Keith Waterhouse, in the Daily Mirror, adopted a facetious tone in order to attack the apologists of South 
Africa: 'Just because there are black bodies lying about all over the township of Soweto, there is no need to 
get an isolated and highly publicised incident out of perspective. As anyone who has ever been to South 
Africa will tell you, you have got to go out there and see schoolchildren being shot at first hand before 
forming an opinion.'27 Waterhouse's column may well have been directly aimed at the editorial which
23. Peregrine Worsthorne, 'Black day for black S. Africa', Sunday Telegraph. 20 June 1976. It appears as if 
the Sunday Telegiaph's sub-editors felt that Worsthorne's position required a degree of balance. 
Worsthome's article was illustrated by a South African Tourist Corporation advertisement: a picture of 
wild animals with the words 'Discover South Africa' superimposed upon it; alongside the advertisement 
was a reproduction of Sam Nzima's photograph of the dying Hector Pieterson with the same words 
superimposed. For the Nzima photograph, see appendix c. i. a.
24. Christopher Munnion, 'What one man knew about his own death', Sunday Telegraph. 20 June 1976. 
Munnion attempted to confirm the allegation some days later,'... independent corroboration ... came 
from a Johannesburg newspaper editor who found pictures of stone-throwing youths placed at his desk 
at about the same time the police fired their first shots.' (Christopher Munnion, 'Soweto's troubles will 
not go away', Daily Telegraph, 2 July 1976).
25. James Yuenger & Clarence Page, 'Wheel of hatred turns, S. African town explodes', Chicago Tribune. 
20 June 1976.
26. Denis Herbstein, 'Why a white language law ignited a black powderkeg', Sunday Times. 20 June 1976.
27. Keith Waterhouse, 'Horses' mouths', Daily Mirror. 21 June 1976.
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appeared in the Daily Mail on the same day. The editorial obliquely criticised the ’double standard1 which
rated the murder of schoolchildren (or 'black rioters') in Soweto above the slaughter in Cambodia.
Paradoxically, the newspaper proceeded to suggest that the scale of the coverage was testament to the 
freedom of the press in South Africa. The conclusion of the editorial beam repetition for its logic:
As we view with apprehension and sorrow the future for South Africa 
and all its people, we have one moral duty above all others. Not to feed  
false hopes. There is no virtue in encouraging the black bondsmen of 
South Africa to cast off their chains, if they are to exchange them for a 
well-aimed police bullet in the head. It would be as cruel and heartless 
as to ask the Czech people to rise up and take on the Soviet tanks. ...
The West must maintain its contacts with South Africa. Only through 
contact can pressure be exerted, [original emphasis]28
The arrival of Michael Kaufman in South Africa, from Nairobi, had an immediate effect on the coverage in 
the New York Times. The newspaper’s correspondent, John Burns, had previously relied upon official 
statements and media sources. Inspired by Kaufman, the two journalists engaged in 'dozens of 
conversations' with ordinary South Africans.29 At a press conference on 20 June, Kaufman asked Jimmy 
Kruger, the Minister of Justice, why the police had not used rubber bullets. Kruger's reply that rubber 
bullets 'make people tame to the gun' became the first of his many widely-reported insensitive 
statements.30 As the intensity of the unrest in South Africa decreased, the international media continued to 
publish articles which examined the background to and the potential consequences of the conflict.31 Bernard 
Levin's comments were among the more extreme. He suggested that Kruger's remarks, '...richly deserved 
wiping from the speaker's lips with a blow', and attacked the English-speaking whiles of South Africa for
28. Editorial, 'We have a duly not to feed false hopes', Daily Mail. 21 June 1976.
29. Interview with Michael Kaufman, 9 Sept. 1995. See John F. Burns, 'Despite alarm over racial violence, 
most White South Africans seem to support the status quo' & Michael T. Kaufman, '10 reported slain in 
riots in townships of Pretoria', New York Times. 22 June 1976.
30. Interview with Michael Kaufman, 9 Sept. 1995. Chris Munnion incorrectly credits this question to 
Charles Mohr. (Munnion, Banana Sunday, p. 426). Kruger's insensitive statements multiplied in the 
fifteen months that followed, culminating with his comment that Biko's death 'leaves me cold.' (Ray 
Kennedy, 'S. African editor demands apology from Kruger', Daily Telegraph. 17 Oct. 1977).
31. Examples included Max Hastings, 'The dream factory still can't smell smoke', Evening Standard. 22 
June 1976; Norman Sklarewitz, 'Soweto: a preview of things to come?', Los Angeles Times. 22 June 
1976; Donald Woods, 'Dress rehearsal in South Africa', New Statesman. 25 June 1976, pp. 833-834; 
Nadine Gordimer, 'Apartheid, the "agitator"', New York Times. 27 June 1976; See also Alan Paton,
The Beloved Country cries again ...', Daily Express. 18 June 1976; Alan Paton, 'South Africa', New 
York Times, 24 June 1976, republished in the Los Angeles Times. 27 June 1976; 'South Africa: Black 
explosion', Time. 28 June 1976, pp. 1, 10-13; Peter Younghusband, 'Sharpeville to Soweto', Newsweek, 
28 June 1976, pp. 6-8.
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what he considered to be their hypocrisy and selfishness:
Many of the English there have been among the worst defenders of the 
vilest excesses of apartheid, and without even the mad ideology that is 
to be found somewhere embedded in Nationalist cruelty; for the 
English who live off apartheid while looking down on the uncouth 
Afrikaner there has rarely been anything more theoretical than 
selfishness involved. In the end, the black majority in South Africa will 
have to strike the shackles from its own wrists.32
Some representatives of the international media were allowed to re-enter the townships on 24 June as the 
South African police judged the unrest to have abated. Correspondents began to refer to the lack of obvious 
leadership amongst the students. In an article which compared the U.S. race riots of the 1960s with the 
disturbances in South Africa, Michael Kaufman commented that the major difference was ’... that while in 
American cities there were black organizations and individuals who articulated the feelings and motives of 
mobs and looters, none exist here.'33 Robin Wright later expanded this point, '... no clear statement was 
made by any articulate spokesman during five days of violence, so it is difficult to understand what 
specifically the "minorities" would accept as interim steps in the "right" direction.134 Denis Herbstein used 
the opportunity provided by the apparent cessation in the unrest to attempt a refutation of South African 
police disinformation. In response to the police reports of random anarchic violence, Herbstein countered 
that only four homes had been attacked, and asserted '... it is clear from the targets that the hatred was not 
mindlessly expressed.135 Christopher Munnion signalled the aftermath of the unrest by including a joke in 
the final paragraph of his report: 'An opposition spokesman in Parliament suggested that less trouble might 
be caused if black townships were given "English-style corner pubs" instead of large soul-less beer halls. 
Soweto wags now talk of meeting their friends down at the old "Clenched Fist" or popping over for a pint 
to "The Imperialist Running Dog",116 The New Statesman's editorial acknowledged that the British media 
treatment of South Africa had shifted significantly since the Sharpeville massacre:
Few developments have been more depressing over the past decade
32. Bernard Levin, TA lesson still unlearned as the dead are counted', The Times. 22 June 1976.
33. Michael T. Kaufman, The tragedy of Soweto'. New York Times, 25 June 1976.
34. Robin Wright, 'Change: elusive concept in S. Africa', Washington Post, 28 June 1976.
35. Denis Herbstein, 'S. Africa bans mass burial of Soweto schoolchildren', The Guardian, 25 June 1976.
36. Christopher Munnion, 'Minister accuses whites of inciting Soweto riots', Daily Telegraph. 25 June 
1976. Munnion apparently included this fictional joke in the final paragraph of his report, expecting it
to be removed by the sub-editor. (Interview with Chris Munnion, 10 May 1995).
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than the way in which racial oppression in South Africa has coine to be 
accepted by the world community as a fact of life - uncomfortable, no 
doubt, but something we must all learn to live with in an unemotional 
way. The change has perhaps been most striking in Britain. Sixteen 
years ago there was no doubting the universal sense of outrage - uniting 
Left and Right alike - that greeted the Sharpeville massacre; this week 
Mr Vorster was to be heard from Germany not only actually quoting 
with approbation from the Sunday Express but also congratulating 'all 
the British newspapers' on the tone of their comments on the latest 
police carnage - a tone, he said, that he found ’an agreeable contrast1 to 
the reaction of the press in his own country. The truth, sadly, is that 
even the British liberal conscience has long since put South Africa on 
the back-bumer ... those on the Left are told today to 'face facts' and to 
'come to terms with reality'. But what has happened in Soweto and 
Alexandra and the other townships over the past week should at least 
enable us to realise just what the 'reality' is that we are being asked to 
accept. For all the bland advertising of bodies like the 'Club of Ten',
South Africa stands starkly revealed as being today just as ruthless a 
police state as it ever was in Dr Verwoerd's time.37
Stanley Uys, who had not been in the Republic during the first period of the unrest, suggested th a t'... the 
Western world acknowledges ... that control in South Africa is firmly in the hands of Mr Vorster's 
Afrikaner Government, that the Government has the capacity to wreak immense havoc in Southern Africa, 
and that the time has passed for the simplistic response of putting South Africa beyond the pale - that 
somehow it has to be brought within the reach of rational argument.138 Another reason for the shift in the 
coverage from 1960 to 1976 related to the concurrent decline in Western optimism regarding sub-Saharan 
Africa. The fundamental difference between Sharpeville and Soweto, however, lay in the nature of the 
protests. In March 1960, African protest was non-violent and the protesters were shot in the back. 
Therefore, the international media represented the protest as passive. The schoolchildren in Soweto could 
not, and were not, considered to be passive; their agency was apparent for all to see. In effect, the 
juxtaposition of African agency and the challenge to order which the riots represented encouraged a 
contradictory and, in comparison to Sharpeville, muted response from the international media. As Eschel 
Rhoodie later informed Mervyn Rees, 'Had the riots lasted a week and been confined only to Soweto, the
37. Editorial, 'Naught for Dr Kissinger's comfort', New Statesman. 25 June 1976, p. 831. The Sunday 
Express responded to Vorster's comments, by demanding '... If Mr Vorster likes the style and fairness of 
the Sunday Express so much, why does he not take the advice given to him in that same leader? And 
stop trying to force the archaic Afrikaans language down the throats of Bantu children?' Editorial, 'End 
it', Sunday Express. 27 June 1976. The almost racist, anti-Afrikaner, tone of the Sunday Express's 
editorial was a feature of much of the coverage of this period. See, for example, the selection of 
cartoons in appendix C. ii.
38. Stanley Uys, 'Why Dr. K plays footsie footsie', (Johannesburg) Sunday Times. 4  July 1976.
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media would have dropped the matter.U9 Indeed, South Africa's propagandists were relatively pleased with
the 'interesting divergences and ambiguities' in the coverage of the initial unrest:
Despite conventional Whitehall statements about deep shock to public 
opinion and opposition to apartheid, there is unexpected confusion in 
the British attitude. This confusion stems partly from Britain's image of 
John Vorster as statesman-realist who would put the screws on 
Rhodesia's Ian Smith ... From Washington it is reported that US 
officials are saying privately that every sovereign nation has the right to 
maintain civil order and that, regardless of ideology, any other 
Government would have had to operate the way South Africa did when 
the riots erupted.40
Photographic icons and the impact of television.
Modern historical events are nearly always accompanied by iconic images which stand as powerful but 
simplified versions of the incidents being reported. The Soweto uprising was no exception. As has been 
noted, few, if any, British or American reporters or photographers were present when the language protest 
erupted into violence. The first mediators in the struggle were the African photographers whose images 
came to symbolise the events of June 1976. As the Today programme on BBC Radio 4 commented, by way 
of introduction on the morning of 17 June: 1 don't know how many of you have had the chance yet to read 
your morning paper but most of them carry the somewhat horrifying pictures of schoolchildren in the South 
African town of Soweto being shot dead by South African police.'41
Three photographs, which were taken by African photographers and syndicated by the news agencies, were 
reproduced on the front-pages of newspapers around the world.42 Each image, however, offered a different 
interpretation of the conflict. The most famous of these photographs, Sam Nzima's picture of the dying
39. Mervyn Rees & Chris Day, Muldergate: The Story of the Info Scandal (Johannesburg, 1980), p. 186.
40. 'How other nations reacted', To The Point 2 July 1976, p. 60. See also 'The riots: British views' & 'U.S. 
Responses’, The South Africa Foundation News. Vol. 2, No. 7, July 1976, p. 1: '[British] Coverage of 
events in Soweto has been wide and fair.'; 'American reaction to the black riots in South Africa has been 
relatively calm and unsensational.'
41. Today. BBC Radio 4, 17 June 1976.
42. For reproductions of the photographs, and details of which newspapers the photographs appeared in, see 
appendix C. i. AP and UPI possessed long-standing agreements to share their material with The Argus 
Group and SAAN, respectively. The arrangement provided Argus and SAAN with access to the AP and 
UPI wire services, while AP and UPI retained the option to pick up stories or photographs from Argus 
or SAAN for a minimal fee. (Interview with Larry Heinzerling, 19 Sept. 1995). African photographers 
did not receive syndication bonus payments. (Interview with Peter Magubane, 20 May 1995).
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Hector Pieterson, symbolised the brutality of the South African state and the passive (or victim-like) status 
of the schoolchildren. In this respect, Nzima's photograph portrayed Soweto as an extension of the 
Sharpeville massacre. He later recalled that although his colleagues and editors had been delighted with the 
photograph, informing him that 'You put The World on the map', he had also been subject to '... a lot of 
harassment from the police. They phoned my editor and said they wanted me because I had "sold" this bad 
image of South Africa to communist countries.'43 Following months of such intimidation, Nzima abandoned 
photo-journalism in 1977. The second photograph, which he is also thought to have taken, was of African 
policemen shooting their hand-guns at a target which was not visible in the picture.44 This image might be 
interpreted to represent the restoration of order, in the process acknowledging the brutality of the South 
African state while avoiding the issue of the agency of the African protesters. The fact that the policemen in 
the photograph were Africans led Mr Robert Stovall, an analyst with Reynolds Securities, to suggest that 
because of this 'black-on-blackT image the New York Stock Exchange had not lost its confidence in the 
South African economy.45
The third photograph, Peter Magubane's treatment of the students running at the camera, represented them 
as active or, in the words under the original reproduction in the Rand Daily Mail, '... happy-go-lucky'.46 
However, the photograph was deeply ambiguous and could also be read as a representation of a violent and 
threatening mob. The Magubane picture was the antithesis of the Nzima-Pieterson image, symbolising 
strength and energy, where Nzima recorded misery and destruction. The decision to focus solely on the 
students and to dispense with the South African police transformed the photograph into a classic 
representation of black consciousness, or perhaps more accurately, black power. Alternatively, the image 
could be interpreted as symbolising the Soweto uprising as a race riot: black versus white. In effect, the 
three pictures represented differing instant interpretations of the Soweto uprising. Sam Nzima's portrait of 
the death of Hector Pieterson captured the last moments of the previously dominant representation of
43. Mark Gevisser, 'Three lives in black and white.' The Observer magazine. 17 April 1994. p. 32.
44. The provenance of the 'hand-gun' photograph is still uncertain. A number of people believe it was taken 
by Nzima. (Interviews with Nat Serache, 4  Oct. 1996 & Don Mattera, 20 Sept. 1996).
45. 'Not a Sharpeville, say U.S. observers', The Star (Johannesburg), 18 June 1976.
46. 'The demo that boiled over', Rand Daily Mail. 17 June 1976.
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Africans as passive, docile, weak and defeated. Peter Magubane's treatment of the running students 
symbolised a new portrayal of active resistance, albeit interpretable as random, anarchic violence. The 
'hand-gun' picture represented the violence of the state and the South African government's co-option 
of compliant Africans. It pointed towards the desperate attempts at the manipulation of existing tensions 
which would occur during August 1976.
Television had been introduced into South Africa during February 1976.47 The Soweto uprising was one of 
the first major stories that the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) had been called upon to 
cover. Erik Van Ees commented some weeks after the beginning of the unrest th a t'... television screens and 
newspaper photographs have given many whites their first look into Soweto, Mamelodi, Alexandra, and the 
other squalid communities where their employees and servants live.149 The vision that greeted them was 
brutal:
The state-owned South African Broadcasting Corporation last night 
screened scenes from the Alexandra riots showing uniformed police, 
kneeling to take aim, firing at three rock-throwing blacks. After hurling 
one fist-sized stone at the police, a man in a blue sweater danced back 
and forward, found another rock, and was taking aim when his hand 
dropped to the sound of gunfire. He jolted sideways and keeled over ...
Scores of bleeding blacks were led away by police in the television 
films.50
Although it seems to run against the South African government's usual tendency to attempt to control the 
media, the SABC images of the violent unrest were supplied to the international media.51 There arc three 
possible explanations. The first contends that far from reflecting the media naivete of the SABC, graphic 
films were broadcast as an early stage in what Deborah Posel has called the '... battlefield of perceptions - 
an ideological contest between competing versions of events.152 By representing the African protesters as a
47. For the best study of the debates surrounding the introduction of television in South Africa, see Rob 
Nixon, Homelands. Harlem and Hollywood: South African Culture and the World Beyond (New York, 
1994), pp. 43-76.
49. Erik Van Ees (UPI), 'Riots open eyes in S. Africa', Chicago Tribune, 19 Aug. 1976.
50. Denis Herbstein, 'Vorster warns Africans as riots spread', The Guardian. 19 June 1976.
51. 'TV coverage seen abroad', Rand Daily Mail, 19 June 1976: 'The contribution was fed into the European 
news pool and all countries in Europe and in America had access to the film.'
52. Deborah Posel, 'Symbolising Violence: State and Media Discourse in Television Coverage of Township 
Protest, 1985-7', N. Chabani Manganyi & Andre du Toit (eds.l. Political Violence and the Struggle in 
South Africa (Basingstoke, 1990), p. 154.
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leader-less, unthinking, mob, engaged in stone-throwing and destructive violence, the films could 
emphasise the opposition between supposedly "traditional"/"primitive" and "civilised" behaviour.' In this 
context, police violence could be interpreted as '... a reasonable, restrained defence against the barbarism of 
mindless mobs.'*3 A significant number of viewers in Britain and the United States, however, did not 
perceive either the unrest or the response of the police through the lens of a white South African's cultural 
experience. The South African government thus discovered that the 'battlefield of perceptions' was subject 
to ambiguous interpretation. Alternatively, the SABC may only have been fulfilling its contractual 
obligations with the international broadcasting networks, and earning revenue in the process.54 Perhaps the 
most likely explanation is that the SABC genuinely believed its own version of events and failed to 
recognise that the films could be viewed differently.
The significance of the SABC footage lay only partly in its brutal images. The films also acted as a magnet 
for the international broadcasters. An article published in The World suggested that the U.S. media were 
forced by the events in South Africa to undergo a rapid education in the subject: 'On a reference blackboard 
in the New York Times editorial offices are the boldly scrawled words: "Soweto" and "King Williamstown." 
In a television network's tape bank, a South African voice is on tap to pronounce "Soo-oo-lch-too", 
"Buhfootuhwanuh" and "Melkbawsstrunt".155 Although the international media did not establish bureaus in 
the Republic until 1977, a Thames Television film crew did manage to enter the country soon after the 
initial unrest and returned with a report which Anti-Apartheid News described as '... stark and straight, 
unembellished by balancing tricks in which "the other side" is represented. It seemed too short, but that is a 
comment which comes from gratitude.'56 The documentary which had been made at a ’secret location1 in 
South Africa '... showed the most graphic film footage yet of the scale of the township violence.'57 The film 
also featured an extended interview with Tsietsi Mashinini, former executive member of the South African 
Students' Movement and president of the Soweto Students' Representative Council.
53. Posel, 'Symbolising Violence', in Manganyi & du Toit (eds.), Political Violence, pp. 161-165.
54. Fortieth Annual Report of the South African Broadcasting Corporation: 1976 (Johannesburg, 1977), p. 
87-88.
55. 'South Africa is right in the news', The World, 13 Sept. 1976.
56. Sadie Forman, 'Reviews', Anti-Apartheid News. Oct. 1976, p. 11.
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Mashinini's comments dramatised the passage of African passivity and the emergence of a confident 
agency: 'I really believe that five years will be too much. If South Africa does not change within the course 
of this y ear... it means that South Africa will have riots as its daily meal and then it may change from riots 
to something more drastic. For now riots are centred in black townships. Some day or other the target will 
be made residential suburbs'.58 In London, the complaints of Chris van der Walt (the Director of 
Information at the South African Embassy) fell on deaf ears. David Elstein, the producer of the programme 
stated: 'I hope they go ahead with their complaint to the IBA. The answer will be, I feel, that we fulfilled 
our professional role by getting this very important story and bringing it to the public even though our way 
was blocked by the censorial attitude of the South Africans. I would not hesitate to smuggle a crew in again 
if I had to.159 Within South Africa, the film also had a powerful impact. Both the Rand Daily Mail and 
The World published reports which included extensive quotations from Mashinini's interview.60 In effect, 
British television had provided a method for by-passing the censorship regulations.
To what extent the coverage broadcast by the SABC and the reports published by the South African 
newspapers actually contributed to sustaining the protests remains an open question. On 17 June 1976, The 
World reported that 'When the CNA truck arrived with copies of The World, there was a free-for-all. 
Nobody bought papers. They were just grabbed and the streets were cluttered with papers flying in all 
directions.'61 Six months later, Jim Hoagland started an article with the following cautionary tale:
Standing quietly in the yard, the African workers gazed in through the 
living-room window at the new television set in the foreman's house, 
where the white farmer's wife obligingly swept the curtains back for 
two hours each night. This nightly scene began on a large farm in the 
Eastern Cape Province a year ago, when the government finally 
permitted television here. It stopped abruptly in August after, as the 
foreman's wife said in a trembling voice to a friend, 'Soweto came to 
the farm.' Sheds on this and other white-owned farms in the region 
went up in flames that night.61
57. 'Embassy slams film of hunted student', Rand Daily Mail. 3 Sept. 1976.
58. 'South Africa: There is no crisis', This Week. Thames Television, 2 Sept. 1976.
59. Ian Hobbs, 'S. A. envoys to hit back at "smear" campaign in U.K.', Rand Daily Mail. 20 Sept. 1976. See 
also 'The law-breakers', World in Action. Granada Television, 6 Dec. 1976.
60. 'Tsietsi speaks out', The World, 3 Sept. 1976; 'Embassy slams film of hunted student', Rand Daily Mail. 
3 Sept. 1976.
61. 'Free for all as rioters grab "World" from van', The World, 17 June 1976:
62. Jim Hoagland, 'Black power vs. White power: whites get taste of fear', Washington Post, 13 Jan. 1977.
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If this episode was being repeated more widely, perhaps, the people [who were] buying transistors, 
tape decks and television sets, as if suddenly eager to latch onto a few small pleasures in life,' in the Time 
report of June 1977, were making a political purchase, despite William McWhirter's assessment that it was 
a sign of a new kind oflife in Soweto, a spirit that is not limited to political consciousness.'63
African journalism: Speaking through the international media.
African journalism in South Africa had a long and respectable history.64 During the 1950s, Drum magazine 
served as a beacon for a particularly innovative new form of populist journalism. As Shaun Johnson has 
observed: 'Whilst retaining ... an element of thorough investigative reporting documenting black 
grievances, and nurturing some of South Africa finest writers, the magazine was a step away from the 
original pioneering black publications.'65 Although repressed in the 1960s, African journalism once again 
embraced radicalism, in the fonn of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), during the 1970s. In 
1971, thirty journalists in Johannesburg formed the Union of Black Journalists (UBJ). Hairy Mashabela (an 
ex-Drum  writer) was elected as the first president. The UBJ quickly formed a close bond with the South 
African Student Organisation (SASO). In 1973, Mashebela was replaced as president by Joe Thloloe. 
During 1975, the UBJ published their own tabloid periodical The Bulletin, which according to Anti- 
ApartheidNews was '... an attempt to counter the "complete control" which ... whites have over the opinion- 
making machinery which conditions the altitudes of South African blacks.'66
Meanwhile, Percy Qoboza, appointed editor of The World and Weekend. World in 1974, had been spending 
a year as a Nieman Fellow at Harvard University. Towards the end of the period of his Fellowship, Qoboza 
stated in an interview with the Washington Post: The Black journalist in South Africa must ask himself: 
"What comes first, my personal comfort or ... the broad black consciousness movement?" 1 have decided I
63. William MeWhirter, 'Soweto: The children take charge', Time. 27 June 1977, p. 18.
64. See Les Switzer & Donna Switzer, The Black Press in South Africa and Lesotho: a descriptive 
bibliographic guide to African, Coloured and Indian newspapers, newsletters and magazines. 1836 
-1976 (Boston. 1979).
65. Shaun Johnson, 'An Historical Overview of the Black Press', in Keyan Tomaselli & P. Eric Louw (eds.), 
Studies on the South African Media: The Alternative Press in South Africa (London, 1981), p. 23.
66. 'Journalists condemn S.A. television', Anti-Apartheid News. Dec. 1975, p. 5.
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am part of the struggle.'67 Qoboza returned to South Africa on 8 June 1976 as the first African editor to be in 
complete control of a newspaper owned by the Argus Group; previous editors of The World, had had their 
work overseen by a white editorial director. Seizing the opportunity, he moderated The W orld's 
sensationalist tone and concentrated on providing a voice which could mediate between the African parents 
and students. Additionally, as Qoboza later commented, it had '... [fallen] on the shoulders of black 
journalists to keep South Africa and the outside world informed about what was going on [in Soweto].'6*
During the first days of the Soweto uprising, African journalists found some sections of the British media 
were keen to publish their insights. The Daily Express started this process by commissioning a special 
report from the veteran (Johannesburg) Star reporter in South Africa, Langa Skosana.69 Two days later, the 
Sunday Times, in place of an editorial, explained that 'We give our space and our comment today to a 
black reporter on the Rand Daily Mail, Nat Diseko.170 On the same day, the Observer carried a report by Alf 
Kumalo, a photographer on the (Johannesburg) Sunday Times?1 The Soweto uprising had thus immediately 
transformed the significance of the African journalists. As Caryle Murphy commented some time later, '... 
black South African journalists had traditionally been consigned the role of "leg men," the unsung gatherers 
of facts who turned over their notes to white reporters who generally got the byline - and the credit - for the 
story.'72 The events of 1976 and the inability or the unwillingness of white journalists to report from the 
townships led to a situation where '... many [representatives of the foreign media] turned to The World ... 
"The BBC was calling five times a day," recalled World editor Percy Qoboza. "I finally had to tell them I 
was also trying to run a newspaper".'73 Although African journalists undoubtedly exerted a mediating 
influence on the international media's coverage, they paid a large price for this influence. At the end of July,
67. Steward Dill McBride (Christian Science Monitor). 'Editing a Black newspaper in a White-ruled 
country', Washington Post, 7 March 1976.
68. Percy Qoboza, The Press as I see it', South African Conference on the Survival of the Press and 
Education for Journalism (Grahamstown. 1979), p. 4.
69. Langa Skosana, '50 dead as children's fury tears a town apart', Daily Express. 18 June 1976.
70. Nat Diseko, 'A black man in Soweto', Sunday Times. 20 June 1976.
71. Alf Kumalo, 'Children who died'. The Observer. 20 June 1976.
72. Caiyle Murphy, 'S. Africa's black reporters move up', Washington Post, 28 July 1978.
73. Robin Wright, 'Black South African newsmen find fame in coverage, jail' [sic], Washington Post, 20
Oct. 1976.
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the South African police detained Harry Mashabcla.74 At the lime of his arrest, he had taken leave of 
absence from his job as a reporter on the (Johannesburg) Star to write a book about the unrest with fellow 
reporter, Graeme Addison. In Mashabela's account, which was eventually published eleven years later, he 
recalled that the first question he was asked by the police related to the book project.75
The second stage of violent unrest erupted on 4 August and the townships were immediately sealed, 
making entrance by white journalists virtually impossible.76 The intimidation of their African 
contemporaries continued apace: a petrol bomb was thrown at Peter Magubane's house on 5 August.77 Less 
than a week later, he suffered a compound fracture of the nose after being beaten by the South African 
police.78 Nonetheless, African reporters continued to bring exceptional stories out of Soweto. Jan Tugwana 
(Rand Daily Mail), for example, reported that he had spent the night of 24 August hiding in a coal box. 
While there he had overheard the following statement: 'We didn't order you to destroy the West Rand 
(Administration Board) property, Zulus ... You were asked to fight people only.'79 The next day, another 
Rand Daily Mail journalist, Nat Serache, managed to slip inside Mzimhlope hostel disguised in 'Zulu 
dress': 'There I saw a policeman in a camouflage su it... Through an interpreter, [he] said: "You are warned 
not to continue damaging the houses because they belong to the West Rand Administration Board. If you 
damage houses, you will force us to take action against you to prevent this. You have been ordered to kill 
only these troublemakers".'80 The Tugwana-Serache stories were supported by reporters on other
74. 'S. African journalists held under Terrorism Act', The Times. 30 July 1976.
75. Hairy Mashabela, A People on the Boil: Reflections on Soweto (Johannesburg, 1987), p. 45.
76. Nicholas Ashford, 'Soweto in grip of violence for third day', The Times. 7 Aug. 1976. Stanley Uys 
reported that 'A woman journalist who blackened her face and put on a wig to enter Soweto returned 
with her car windows smashed to say she had had a "terrifying" experience.' (Stanley Uys, 'Soweto 
killings raise the white nightmare', The Guardian. 5 Aug. 1976).
77. Nicholas Ashford, 'New demonstrations in Soweto', The Times. 6 Aug. 1976. A petrol bomb was 
thrown at Winnie Mandela's house on the same evening.
78. Helen Zillie, '"Mail" photographer assaulted by police', Rand Daily Mail. 11 Aug. 1976.
79. Jan Tugwana, 'Stop raid, police warned', Rand Daily Mail, 26 Aug. 1976. Tugwana recalls that he spent 
the night in the coal-box because his parents lived close to the hostel and he was concerned for their 
safety. When he took the story to the Rand Daily M ail,'... [they] couldn't believe it. They asked: "Are 
you sure?"' (Interview with Jan (Gabu) Tugwana, 20 Sept. 1996).
80. Nat Serache, 'Police repulse 1000 on hostel "rescue raid'", Rand Daily Mail, 26 Aug. 1976. Serache,
who was not Zulu, accepted that being in disguise was dangerous, however, he justified the risk because
'I needed that story.’ (Interview with Nat Serache, 4 Oct. 1996).
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newspapers. The Star (Johannesburg), for instance, reported that one of its journalists had overheard an 
African policeman instructing hostel dwellers to '... eat and drink well so they could "kill on full 
stomachs".181
A number of stringers and foreign correspondents duly relayed the story of the Zulu hostel dwellers' 
collusion with the South African police.82 An equal number, however, found the traditional representation 
of 'the Zulu' too powerful to ignore.83 Only Robin Wright felt that further explanation was needed: '... 
ironically, many of the residents who fought the Zulu migrant workers and a large share of the black 
police who tried to restore order were also Zulu.'84 The American media, in particular, devoted a series of 
columns and editorials to the subject of 'black-on-black' violence. The liberal position was taken by Tom 
Wicker in the New York Times: 'Even police efforts to set one group of blacks against another, while 
producing more violence, did not succeed in bringing the boycott to an end,'85 Conservative commentators 
barely acknowledged the link between the second mass 'stay-at-home' which had begun on 23 August and 
the encouragement of the migrant workers' retaliation. The Chicago Tribune suggested that
South Africa's troubles are no longer simply a matter of blacks rioting 
and white police trying to restrain them. We now find blacks fighting 
blacks ... This is the clearest refutation yet of the myth of Black 
solidarity in South Africa. Those who call for early black majority rule 
there also insist on believing in this myth - for without it their 
prescription would mean an Angola-type civil war and chaos.86
81. 'Soweto gangs run wild', The Star (Johannesburg), 26 Aug. 1976. It is assumed that the uncredited 
journalist responsible for this piece was Langa Skosana. See also Marion Whitehead, 'The Black 
Gatekeepers: A study of Black journalists on three daily newspapers which covered the Soweto uprising 
of 1976', unpublished B.A. (Hons.) dissertation, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978: The Star ... 
omitted part of Langa Skosana's report on the Mzimhlope killings which referred to the police standing 
by while hostel dwellers attacked Soweto residents.'
82. See Stanley Uys, 'Soweto Zulus defy call to end reprisals', The Guardian. 26 Aug. 1976. See also 'Strife 
between Zulu workers and strikers in Soweto is declining', New York Times. 27 Aug. 1976, wherein 
the reporter misquotes the Rand Daily Mail, and suggests that Serache had hidden in the coal box.
83. See Christopher Munnion, 'Zulu mob in Soweto tribe war', Daily Telegraph. 26 Aug. 1976: The Zulus, 
members of Africa's most renowned warrior tribe, took to the township streets ... yesterday, stoning, 
burning, raping and killing other Blacks in what one official described as "Soweto's civil war".'
84. Robin Wright, 'Unity eludes S. African blacks', Washington Post. 27 Aug. 1976.
85. Tom Wicker, 'Reaping the whirlwind in Southern Africa', New York Times, 27 Aug. 1976. See also 
Editorial (Benjamin Pogrund), 'African black on black’, Boston Globe, 27 Aug. 1976.
86. Editorial, 'Soweto blacks against blacks', Chicago Tribune. 27 Aug. 1976.
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The importance of the work of the African journalists can be gauged from the fact that equivalent 
examples of South African police collusion in Cape Town during Christmas 1976 were not reported in the 
Cape newspapers.87 The reporters who worked for the Rand Daily Mail, however, continued to be subject to 
a humiliating degree of editorial interference. Serache, for example, felt that his copy was being '... 
butchered1.88 Patrick Laurence claimed at the time that 'Blacks were less inclined to question eye-witness 
accounts and were more likely to give credibility to police brutality. White reporters in supervisory 
positions were more critical.'89 Mike Dutfield later informed Les Payne that'I collected the blacks'stories 
and wrote articles for the white edition [of the newspaper]. The black reporters were out in Soweto risking 
their necks and 1 was back in the office getting credit for the stories in the paper. For a while it was getting 
hostile. The blacks didn't like the set-up, and I don't blame them.'90
If the South African white newspapers failed to fully appreciate the exceptional talents of the African 
journalists, the South African police did not. The UBJ's periodical, The Bulletin, was banned and Peter 
Magubane was detained on 26 August.91 The UBJ's president, Joe Thloloe was detained on 2 September, 
with Nat Serache and Jan Tugwana following him into custody on 3 and 9 September, respectively.92 Clive 
Em don, vice-president of the South African Society of Journalists, commented at the time: 'Black 
journalists who recorded the events in Soweto in the past weeks displayed amazing courage and performed
87. Report by the Ministers' Fraternal of Langa, Guguletu and Nyanga, Role of the South African riot 
police in burnings and killings in Nvanga, Cape Town, Christmas 1976. United Nations Centre against 
Apartheid, Notes and Documents No. 6/77, Feb. 1977. See Alan Brooks & Jeremy Brickhill, Whirlwind 
before the storm: The origins and development of the uprising in Soweto and the rest of South Africa 
from June to December 1976 (London, 1980), p. 143: 'None of the daily papers in Cape Town seemed 
to use black journalists who could work in the townships and report at first hand what they observed.' 
See also Andrew Silk, A Shanty Town in South Africa: The story of Modderdam (Johannesburg, 1981), 
pp. 98-100.
88. Interview with Nat Serache, 4 Oct. 1996.
89. Whitehead, 'The Black Gatekeepers', dissertation, 1978, p. 87.
90. Les Payne, 'Most facts off-limits to South African press', Newsdav. 6 Feb. 1977.
91. Llewellyn Raubenheimer, 'From Newsroom to the community: Struggle in Black journalism', in 
Tomaselli & Louw, The Alternative Press, p. 98; Peter Magubane, Magubaiie's South Africa (New 
York, 1978), p. 13.
92. Nat Serache, 'Journalist tortured by Security Police', Anti-Apartheid News. June 1977, p. 6. Following 
his period in detention, Serache was appointed President of the Black People's Convention. Following a 
further period of imprisonment, he fled the country in 1977. Detentions of African journalists continued 
apace through the autumn of 1976, see Nicholas Ashford, 'South African "round-up" of reporters 
condemned', The Times. 25 Sept. 1976; Nicholas Ashford, 'Black journalists are held without trial', The
Times. 4 Nov. 1976, '12 black journalists now held in South Africa', The Times. 9 Nov. 1976.
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a job in the greatest traditions of the Press. It was because they felt their reports and pictures were not 
properly used in the 'White-owned Press' that they saw the need for [a] bulletin which would tell the whole 
truth.193 During the uprising, however, African reporters experienced a transformation in their status within 
the townships. Journalism began to be perceived by young Africans as a possible avenue lor resistance.94 
The dramatic increase in The World's circulation from 105,000 to 200,000 copies, before the newspaper 
was banned in October 1977, demonstrated the importance of Qoboza and his staff's achievement. 
Recalling the transformation in 1978, Sophie Tema commented: 'In the past, people used to shun you, used 
to say, "Journalists, oh, they are liars," ... It's different now ... They will help you and even come and tell 
you things. But they also put more pressure on us, too. They demand to know more from us and want us to 
inform them.'95 The mere fact that the international media's reports from South Africa were full of stories 
which originated with the African journalists was a testimony of a different type. By the autumn of 1976, 
diligent foreign correspondents slowly began to explain the role played by the African journalists in 
updating and authenticating the coverage of the Soweto uprising.96
Order and the contradictions of agency.
The images of the unrest in South Africa and the reports of the African journalists served a useful function 
in moderating the coverage in the international media. However, for the British and American 
correspondents and commentators, the primary theme of the coverage was the dichotomy of order and
93. Mike Ndlazi, 'Police detain leader of Black S.A. journalists', Rand Daily Mail. Township edition, 2 
Sept. 1976. Copies of The Bulletin are now very difficult to find. Mike Norton, the first national 
organiser of the UBJ recalled that i t '... carried some "brilliant" eyewitness accounts by young black 
journalists who could not get their copy used on other newspapers. One such reporter, Willie Bokala, 
was photographed trying to stem the flow of blood from someone's bullet wound by putting his finger 
in the bullet hole. The picture was carried on the front page of The Bulletin.' (Llewellyn Raubenheimer, 
'A Study of black journalists and black media workers in union organisation, 1971 to 1981', 
unpublished B.A. (Hons.) dissertation, University of Cape Town, 1982).
94. Chris More, for example, was a student in 1976. Following a period of detention, More started work as 
a journalist. During the early 1980s, he was employed by Joe Lelyveld (New Y ork Times') as an 
interpreter and assistant. (Interview with Chris More, 27 May 1995).
95. Caryle Murphy, ’S. Africa's black reporters move up', Washington Post. 28 July 1978.
96. See Graham Leach, 'Southern African Blacks', From our own correspondent. BBC Radio 4 ,4  Sept. 
1976; Robin Wright, 'Black South African newsmen find fame in coverage, jail' [sic], Washington Post. 
20 Oct. 1976. At the end of 1976, Peter Magubane became the first African journalist to be awarded the 
Stellenbosch Fanners Winery Press Award for enterprising journalism. Although in prison at the time 
of his award, Magubane was given the prize by Walter Cronkite upon his release in 1977. See also C. 
Gerald Fraser, 'A Black photojoumalist depicts apartheid life', New York Times. 14 May 1978.
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disorder. This theme was one which affected the entire southern African region. The Cuban involvement in 
Angola, the burgeoning conflict in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe and the negotiations over South-West Africa- 
Namibia had, in effect, been given priority over South Africa in Kissinger's post-Angola initiative. The 
fundamental problem, apartheid, was thus condemned, but not directly challenged. As the Washington Star 
observed in June 1976, 'The turmoil is an unwanted complication in the meeting planned in West Germany 
this week between Secretary of State Kissinger and South African Prime Minister John Vorster... Increased 
pressure on South African apartheid, at this moment, could reduce the chance for detente and, with it, the 
incentive to promote a Rhodesian settlement.197 This impression that Vorster and the South African 
government were no more than supporting players in a sub-continental crisis was echoed in some of the 
cartoons of the period.98
The meetings between Kissinger and Vorster which framed the central period of the unrest in South Africa 
were treated by the international media as if they were only tenuously linked to the violence in the 
townships.99 For students in South Africa, the American focus on southern Africa undoubtedly provided the 
greatest opportunity to publicise the iniquities of apartheid since the early 1960s. By organising 
demonstrations and strikes, which were normally met with police brutality, the protesters both willingly and 
unwillingly contributed to the representation of disorder. Although this was effective in '... destroy[ing] the 
impression of South African stability and invulnerability' and was a critical factor in the process of 
transforming the representation of the African population, it also assisted in the creation of an image of the 
protesters as a leaderless, amorphous mass, incapable of negotiation.100
The confusion engendered by the student protest had a particular effect on 'liberal' South African 
commentators. In August 1976, Stanley Uys commented that 'The attitude of many black youngsters is 
significantly different from that of their parents. They are patently not interested in improving their
97. Editorial, 'The Afrikaans complication', Washington Stan 20 June 1976.
98. For a selection of cartoons on the Soweto uprising, see appendix C. ii.
99. The Kissinger-Vorster meetings were held between 20-22 June in Bavaria, 4-6 Sept. in Zurich & 17-20 
Sept. in Pretoria.
100. Editorial, 'South Africa's horizon', Daily Telegraph, 14 Aug. 1976.
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condition: they want an explosion, a catharsis.1101 He picked up the theme two weeks later: 'Whereas the 
black militants of the 1950s and 1960s were united politically by their opposition to apartheid, today's 
young blacks are united emotionally by their hatred of whites. It's a subtle, but terrifying, difference.'102 
Benjamin Pogrund (writing from America) recognised the problem facing liberal journalists: '... the battle 
lines between whites and blacks are being drawn more sharply, and attitudes on both sides are hardening by 
the day. That is cause for deep despair among the liberals. Even while the need for their mediation becomes 
more vital, they are conscious of being made increasingly irrelevant.'103The tensions and fears bound up in 
this sense of increasing irrelevance exerted a powerful influence over the less experienced correspondents. 
John Burns, for instance, commented that 'Unlike Mr. Mandela, who is the son of a tribal chief, most of the 
new leaders were born and peered [sic] in black townships. Most are in their 20's and their heroes are the 
heroes of American radicals - Mao Tse-Tung, Che Guevara, Malcolm X. Whereas Mr. Mandela opted lor 
violence only as a last resort, these young people speak calmly [olj terrorism against whites.'104
The Soweto uprising had, in effect, forced South African liberals to face the contradictions of their 
position. Alan Paton's widely syndicated assessment of the situation in the Republic was riddled with a 
terror of unrestrained African agency: 'I fear for the future of Afrikanerdom. I fear it is going to be 
destroyed ... I have my own fears too. If Afrikanerdom is destroyed, there will be no room here for any 
white person.'105 Right-wing newspapers and commentators in Britain and the United States were equally 
concerned with the question of order, although they tended to perceive the problem only in relation to the 
South African government's ability to exercise control. The representation of African agency, far from 
instilling panic or philosophical angst in the commentaries of the international media, demonstrated the 
scale of the resistance to the apartheid system. As the unrest persisted, South Africa's natural sympathisers
101. Stanley Uys, 'Mr. Vorster's debt throws', The Guardian. 3 Aug. 1976.
102. Stanley Uys, 'Is this the start of the final phase in the struggle for South Africa?', The Observer. 15 
Aug. 1976.
103. Benjamin Pogrund, 'In South Africa, white liberals lose hope', Los Angeles Times. 29 Sept. 1976.
104. John F. Bums, 'White South Africans seem untouched by black strife', New York Times. 8 Aug. 1976.
105. Alan Paton, 'Must everything be destroyed?', New York Times magazine, 19 Sept. 1976, p. 18. An
earlier version of Paton's article had been published as 'My African nightmare', Daily Express. 17 Aug.
1976. The syndicated article was also earned by the Los Angeles Times. 19 Sept. 1976 and The
Observer magazine. 31 Oct. 1976.
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began a process of re-evaluation. In the National Review , James Burnham refuted South Africa's often-
stated claims th a t '... the non-whites are satisfied with the system and the gradual improvement in their lot 
occurring under it, and ... the government chosen by the white electorate has things well in hand.'106 The 
Sunday Telegraph acknowledged in an editorial t h a t M r .  Vorster's Government has given the impression 
of reacting to events rather than imperturbably controlling their course.1107 Following the extensive bannings 
and detentions of African leaders, and the organisation of the second mass strike, the Daily Telegraph's 
impatience with the Vorster administration was tangible:
Outside observers of current events inside South Africa, however
sympathetic to the cause and rights of white South Africans, could be
excused for wondering whether the Nationalist Government of Mr 
Vorster is getting out of its depth. Has it a policy, other than that of 
sheer physical repression? ... Mr Vorster's Minister for Police, has 
expressed the view that the current unrest, of which there was more in 
Soweto yesterday, is due to agitators. Of course there are agitators, just 
as there were in Tsarist Russia, but they have a richly fertile ground in 
which to operate.108
By September, the Daily Mail had also come to terms with the need for fundamental change in southern 
Africa, 'The never-ending riots in the townships have exposed the pretence that the blacks accept apartheid 
... Kissinger's timing is ruthless. It is also right. For now, i f  ever, is the moment fo r  white southern Africa to
come to terms. Had he tried sooner, they would have fe lt too secure to listen. Later will be too late.'
[original emphasis]109 As the editorial position of the conservative media began to moderate, voices in 
support of the apartheid regime became somewhat isolated within the newspapers.110 It rapidly became clear 
that the credit which Vorster had built up during the period of South Africa's detente with Black Africa had 
run out. One indication of this shift in tone was the Guardian's decision to publish Richard Gott's polemical 
article in favour of the South African 'revolution': 'When I see photographs of the black radicals engaged in
106. James Burnham, The Protracted Conflict: The expendables', National Review. 23 July 1976.
107. Editorial, 'Red over black', Sunday Telegraph. 8 Aug. 1976.
108. Editorial, 'Has Vorster got a policy?', Daily Telegraph. 24 Aug. 1976.
109. Editorial, 'Is this Kissinger's last odyssey?', Daily Mail. 2 Sept. 1976. See also Editorial, 'Facing the 
realities'. Daily Express. 24 Aug. 1976.
110. Examples include Peregrine Worsthorne, The other South Africa', Sunday Telegraph. 19 Sept. 1976; 
Honor Tracy, 'Personal View: In praise of South Africa', Daily Telegraph. 10 Sept. 1976; Both 
Worsthorne and Tracy blamed 'the media' for the negative representation of South Africa. The only 
equivalent in the U.S. media was William A. Rusher, 'Cold eyeball to cold eyeball on Southern 
Africa', National Review. 6 Aug. 1976: 'Let the effete clerks of Whitehall and Foggy Bottom ring 
down all the curtains they want to. "Inevitable”? Balderdash.'
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resistance in the townships, I fear for them. But I want them to win. I want them to destroy the evil system 
that the white man has created. I think they are going to be successful.'111
If the theme of order/disorder eventually inspired a degree of pragmatic comment in the international 
media, the overall commentary remained reactionary in comparison to that which had appeared following 
the Sharpeville massacre. The reactionary tone was, in part, a sluggish response to the widely-commented 
upon African agency. In the immediate aftermath of the initial unrest, Robin Wright reported a conversation 
in Soweto as follows: "'Don't believe for a minute it's over," the handsome 23-year-old African declared, a 
smug smile across his face. "There's no way they can stop it now." They? "The whites." The white 
government? "No, every damn white. None of them mean anything".'112 Three days later, Michael Kaufman 
quoted 'a young black salesman' as saying that There is a feeling that Soweto has showed that we are not 
quite so docile as the whites believed.1113 Wright and Kaufman's reports symbolised two different 
transformations in the representation of Africans which would be employed in parallel by the international 
media during the months that followed June 1976. Wright's snide tone and her selective quotation of the 
'twenty-three year old' invoked an early twentieth century representation of African confusion, irrationality, 
anger and ignorance. Her patronising description of the man as both 'handsome' and 'smug' would also have 
not been out of place seventy years earlier. Kaufman's 'salesman' is a completely different character who 
merely acknowledges the obvious, that the attribution of passivity to Africans and Coloureds was 
inaccurate. The Soweto uprising had clearly destroyed that particular trope. As Percy Qoboza stated 
categorically some weeks later: '... the days of the good Kaffir and obedient Bantus belong to the ox- 
wagon era which is never to return.'114 However, this did not stop the Daily Telegraph, for example, from 
suggesting that 'No doubt the rioters ... will retreat into a sullen passivity when enough of them have been 
killed.'115
111. Richard Gott, 'Rising hopes', The Guardian. 27 Aug. 1976. See also A.J.P. Taylor, 'London diary',
New Statesman. 27 Aug. 1976.
112. Robin Wright, 'Soweto: defiance amidst the ruins', Washington Post. 25 June 1976.
113. Michael T. Kaufman, 'Witnesses tell what they saw when riots came to Soweto', New York Times,
28 June 1976.
114. Nicholas Ashford, 'Springbok victory shines in darkening S. African scene', The Times. 7 Aug. 1976.
115. Editorial, 'South Africa's horizon', Daily Telegraph. 14 Aug. 1976.
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Z. Nkosi observed in The African Communist t h a t w h a t  died at Soweto ... was not the black hope of 
liberation but the white hope of pacification and eternal domination.1116 The international media's 
interpretation of the uprising was fundamentally ambiguous. While the unrest had destroyed the South 
African government's reputation for authority, it had also inspired representations of African brulalily, 
cruelty and primitivism. The shifts and fluctuations in the international media's coverage were, as we have 
seen, directly related to the complicated and contradictory representations which appeared in the domestic 
South African press. These representations were only partly balanced by the influence of the reports of the 
African journalists. The dependence of the foreign correspondents on the domestic media was of paramount 
importance in the development of the coverage.
Nadine Gordimer has remarked that 'Black children traditionally have been the object of white 
sentimentality; it is only after the girls grow breasts and the boys have to cany the passbook that chocolate 
suddenly turns black.'117 The emergence of schoolchildren who were willing, in the words of June Goodwin, 
to 'vote with their lives', sent white South Africa's representations of African children, and by extension the 
representation of the African population, into flux.118 This confusion unleashed the archaic colonial 
representations which were duly relayed by many within the international media. It also emphasised the 
simple but significant representational message that 'Passivity is gone'.119
116. Z. Nkosi, The lessons of Soweto', African Communist. No. 68, First Quarter 1977, p. 18.
117. Nadine Gordimer, The children who face bullets', The Observer, 12 Dec. 1976.
118. June Goodwin, 'South Africa after Soweto riots', Christian Science Monitor. 26 July 1976.
119. Jim Hoagland, 'Young black powerleads the battle against apartheid', International Herald Tribune. 28 
Jan. 1977. This observation was added by a sub-editor, as a sub-heading, during the reproduction of 
Hoagland's article, which had originally appeared in the Washington Post. 12 Jan. 1976.
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CHAPTER ICxIIT1
MANIPULATION & 
INTERPRETATION.
If we in the West as a result of a bovine obsession with racial equality 
pressurise South Africa and Rhodesia into a debased form of our own 
democracy, we will see not liberal democracy but a black tyranny 
replacing a white one ... The truth is that South Africa, for all its faults, 
is part of the West. And its enemies are after a system which will lake 
South Africa out of this community. Surely we are not so gutless as to 
refuse to stand up and fight against our enemies? The South Africans 
have got the guts. They will lake the guilt upon their sturdy shoulders. 
What kind of men are we who condemn them, not for their cowardice 
but for their courage?1
I found all [the correspondents] without a single exception, to possess 
either a rank colonialist outlook or a rank American racist outlook.2
This thesis has examined the forces which attempted to influence the media coverage of South Africa 
during the 1970s. The three case-studies have demonstrated the confusion, contradictions and ambiguous 
representation inherent in the reports that ensued. This final chapter will examine the dependence of the 
British and American correspondents on the South African domestic English-language press; the 
transformations in the working conditions of the foreign journalists during the decade; the allegations of 
media manipulation and the examples of the expulsion of reporters. It concludes with a consideration of the 
similarities and differences between the British and American interpretation of the apartheid story.
The dependence on the South African press.
At the beginning of the 1970s, more than half of the reports which emerged from South Africa were 
written by South African stringers employed by the British and American media. There were a number of 
reasons for this state of affairs, not the least being the obduracy of South Africa's Department of 
Information in refusing to permit foreign news organisations to establish bureaus in the country.3 While 
South African citizens could be 'banned', they could not be expelled, refused entry to the country or be 
denied visas or work permits, like a staff correspondent. Local 'hires' were also significantly less expensive, 
usually being employed by the news organisations for little more than a monthly retainer. However, South 
African stringers carried with them their own prejudices and perspectives. These were particularly
1. Editorial, 'The decadence of Western politics', Daily Express. 25 Oct. 1977.
2. Interview with Les Payne, 8 Nov. 1996.
3. Other reasons included the fact that many news organisations did not view South Africa as a particularly 
dynamic news story, especially as internal resistance had been relatively quiet since the mid-1960s.
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problematic because not only were white South African journalists, however liberal, the purveyors of a 
white interpretation of events, their reports for the foreign press were also subject to the shifting domestic 
censorship regulations.4 The white South African perspective continued to exert a powerful mediating 
influence over the news from the Republic throughout the decade.
Benjamin Pogrund described the inherent contradictions in the South African press, in 1975, in the 
following terms: 'The press is free and yet unfree. It is a press choked by restrictions imposed by the 
Afrikaner Nationalist government yet it enjoys an extraordinary degree of freedom. It is often a courageous 
press; it is also often cowardly.'5 In effect, the South African press was fundamentally ambiguous. This 
ambiguity was in part a response to the complexities of the South African system of press controls. It was 
also due to the complicity of many South African journalists who practised self-censorship in order to avoid 
government harassment. Peter Bernstein, an American student who spent six months during 1974 working 
for the Pretoria News, Cape Argus and Cape Herald, described the legal difficulties of writing any story, 
which addressed the lives of the African population, as being similar to '... a kaleidoscopic picture ... it is 
an exacting job to surmount all the fractured obstacles and forge a coherent image. The pieces and the parts 
are always changing. The picture is never the same, but it is always similar.'6
In addition to the state's attempts to control the press, the South African English-language newspapers were 
also subject to another form of control: that coming from the owners of the press groups. In 1972, the Argus 
Printing and Publishing Company had amongst its directors nominees of the Rand Mines Group, the 
Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company, the Barclays and Standard Banks and the Anglo- 
American Group.7 South African Associated Newspapers (SAAN)'s majority shareholder was the Abe 
Bailey Trust and Estate. Despite a Rand Daily Mail-{Johannesburg) Sunday Express expose into corruption
4. For a list of the laws affecting the press in South Africa, see 'The South African Press: and the laws that 
govern it', Sechaba. Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan. 1973, pp. 13-14. On the continuing threats, during the 1970s, 
made by the South African government against the domestic press, see William A. Hachten & C.
Anthony Giffard, The Press and Apartheid: The Role and Plight of the Press in South Africa (London, 
1984), pp. 66-75.
5. Benjamin Pogrund, 'The South African Press', Index on Censorship. Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 1976, p. 10.
6. Peter Bernstein, 'Reporting in Pretoria', Index on Censorship, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1975, p. 48.
7. Frene Ginwala, The Press in South Africa, United Nations Unit on Apartheid: Notes and Documents,
No. 24/72, Nov. 1972, p. 12.
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in the Department of Information, which eventually led to the resignation of a number of the Republic's
leaders, no English-language newspaper engaged in equivalent investigations into the operations of the 
mining companies in South Africa. South African journalists were, in effect, subject to two slightly 
different forms of control: on the one hand, there were the encroaching restrictions of the apartheid stale, 
and on the other, the corrupting sponsorship of the British capital interests. These dual forces of influence 
were replicated in the two propaganda agencies which spoke for South Africa: the Department of 
Information and the South Africa Foundation. Paradoxically, the South African English-language print 
media, despite these almost intolerable pressures, was a dynamic force during the 1970s. In some respects,
this was due to the legacy of Laurence Gandar, the Rand. Daily Mail's editor between 1957 and 1966,8
Martin Walker suggests that Gandar
... inspired a new generation of South African journalists: Allister 
Sparks, later editor of the [Rand Daily M.aiT\ \ Rex Gibson, later editor 
of the Sunday Express; Harry O'Connor, later editor of the Eastern  
Province Herald-, and his own successor, Raymond Louw. This team of 
politically liberal (if not all Progressive) journalists was exhilarated by 
the changes that Gandar introduced to the South African press.
Hitherto, there had been no combative editorials, no philosophizing in 
the leaders, 110 firm statements that the press had a right and a duty to 
lead South African political thinking, rather than just comment on the 
thoughts of the politicians. 'It had a galvanizing effect on those of us 
who worked for him. It seemed the first injection of intellectual content 
into the political debate. Newspapers suddenly seemed to stand for a lot 
more than just the news,' Allister Sparks said.9
During the 1970s, Gandar's proteges and a number of other South African journalists, such as Donald 
Woods, Tony Heard and the veteran commentator, Stanley Uys, struggled to introduce a genuinely critical 
component to the domestic South African press. They were, however, a liny, if powerful, minority. The 
majority of South Africa's journalists were journeymen (and women) with little real commitment to either a 
free press or a free South Africa. As Martin Schneider, the political editor of the Rand Daily Mail observed 
in More magazine: 'The [Rand Daily] Mail has gained a considerable international reputation for its 
exposure of government malpractices and cruelties in the implementation of apartheid. But, like the other 
English-language newspapers, it has seldom made any practical commitment to its strong editorial stand
8. Following the publication of a series of articles by Benjamin Pogrund on the conditions inside South 
African prisons (July 1965), Gandar was effectively removed from the editorship of the newspaper.
9. Martin Walker, The Powers of the Press: The World's Great Newspapers (London, 1982), p. 324.
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against discrimination.'10
Eschel Rhoodie believed that the South African English-language press was directly responsible for the 
negative international image of South Africa. In his memoir, he insisted that 'The foreign press corps in 
South Africa lived on the Rand Daily MaiL Some foreign journalists hardly bothered to change a word. The 
opinion of millions of people in two dozen countries were being shaped not by the independent observation 
of the foreign press in South Africa but by the Rand. Daily Mail,'u On this, if nothing else, the ANC journal, 
Sechaba, was in agreement with the Department of Information: 'The news published in newspapers outside 
the countiy, at least in the West, is all culled from the local newspapers with the result that the international 
media is as guilty of omission and distortion as newspapers like the Rand Daily M ail.'12 There was some 
truth in these accusations but there was also a degree of hyperbole. Foreign coirespondents naturally read 
the domestic press; they were expected to gravitate to the best possible source of news. In South Africa, 
where the restrictions of apartheid complicated the development of African contacts, the Rand Daily Mail 
served as a useful short-cut. The newspaper's influence actually spread far further than being a source for 
stories; it was a central location on the 'liberal tour' which so many foreign commentators and visitors to 
South Africa embarked upon.13 Before the emergence, in 1976, of The World as a more authentic African 
voice, the Rand Daily Mail also supplied African journalists as guides to visiting foreign journalists.14
However, the correspondents in the Republic were also concerned about their dependence on the domestic
English-language press. This concern was focused upon the problem of gaining access to leading National
Party politicians. In 1977, Gerry Suckley, the chairman of the Foreign Coirespondents' Association (FCA),
wrote to the prime minister:
This Association, representing virtually the entire foreign press corps in 
the Republic, respectfully draws to your attention the generally poor 
level of co-operation extended to our members by various departments
10. Martin Schneider, 'Truth victim of press laws', More, Dec. 1977, p. 14.
11. Eschel Rhoodie, The Real Information Scandal (Pretoria, 1983), p. 314.
12. 'The Press in S.A.', Sechaba. April 1980, p. 19.
13. Beyond the Rand Daily Mail, visitors on the 'liberal' tour normally spoke with Helen Suzman, Robert 
Sobukwe, Gatsha Bulhelezi, Donald Woods, Alan Paton and Laurence Gandar. (Interview with Graham 
Hovey, 17 April 1996).
14. Interview with Nat Serache, 4 Oct. 1996.
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of your Government, and appeals to you to take steps to improve the 
situation. Due to this lack of co-operation and access to news 
information, our members are being compelled to rely to an increasing 
extent on reports in the South African newspaper's, and since few of our 
members have fluent command of Afrikaans, being, in the main, on 
fairly short-term assignments to SA, these newspapers tend to be the 
English-language ones. This state of affairs, we are sure you will agree, 
is unsatisfactory for all concerned.15
Despite the FCA's concern, in practice the Rand Daily Mail had come to represent a sort of totem for 
foreign correspondents in South Africa. In this respect, it was not dissimilar to the role played by Alan 
Paton, the celebrated 'liberal' author of Cry, The Beloved Country.16 Although Paton had once been an anti- 
apartheid campaigner, by the 1970s and in old age, he had become distinctly right-wing and fatalistic. His 
opinions on the events in South Africa, however, continued to be regularly published, particularly in 
American newspapers and news-magazines. During April 1977, for example, the Los Angeles Times carried 
an article based upon an interview with Paton conducted by Barbara Hutmacher:
Everybody, it seems, is urging change upon South Africa. I, too, would 
like to see some change: a common society, for instance, instead of the 
separate societies we have now. But I don't think this will ever come 
about, not without armed revolution, resistance to the revolution and, 
ultimately, the desolation of the entire country. The black radical would 
say; 'The hell with it. Let's smash everything. What does it matter?
Everything is rotten. Let's knock it all down and start again.' But, of 
course, I'm not black and I'm not radical and I couldn't possibly bring 
myself to agree with that position - much less advocate it.17
Paton, the elder statesman, demonstrated the paternal nature of his position in his willingness to put words 
into the imaginary black radical's mouth; some younger South African journalists were, however, becoming 
aware of the importance of allowing Africans to speak for themselves. During 1978, Donald Woods was 
questioned by Paula Giddings about the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa: 'Woods said he 
could not speak for them but could relay what they have told him.'ls This was a small but significant step in
15. G.A. Suckley, Letter to John Vorster, 8 Aug. 1977. (FCA Archive).
16. Alan Paton, Cry, The Beloved Countiy (London, 1948). A similar iconic figure of South African letters 
was Laurens van der Post. See Laurens van der Post, 'Last liner from the Cape' & 'The human face of 
South Africa that need not fear the rest of the world', The Times. 24 Sept. & 21 Nov. 1977. See also 
Edwin N. Wilmsen, 'Primitive Politics in Sanctified Landscapes: The Ethnographic Fictions of Laurens 
van der Post', Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 21, No, 2, June 1995, pp. 201-223.
17. Barbara Hutmacher & Alan Paton, '...while novelist Alan Paton suggests change (for the better)', Los 
Angeles Times, 21 April 1977.
18. Paula Giddings, 'Exile with a mission', Encore American & Worldwide News. 20 March 1978, p. 18.
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the South African context.
The Department of Information's belief that the foreign media were completely dependent upon stories 
published in the South African press eventually served to justify the establishment of a pro-government 
English-language newspaper, The Citizen, which it was hoped would go some way to balance the perceived 
liberalism of the Rand Daily Mail. Before the exposure of The Citizen as a secret government-funded 
project in 1978, the newspaper had little impact on the coverage of the Republic, offering as it did neither 
insight into the vagaries of the Afrikaner polity nor a short-cut to the previously smothered African voice. 
Translations of editorials and significant articles in the Afrikaans press had long been available through the 
South African Press Association {SAPA) or, from 1974, in the Department of Information publication, 
Comment and Opinion.19 In January 1978, Doreen Nussey, the wife of Wilf Nussey, an ex-editor of the 
Pretoria News and Argus Africa News Service, instigated a daily summary and translation of the news in 
Die Vaderland, Bee Id, Die Transvaler and Rapport as a commercial venture. 'From the Afrikaans Press' 
normally stretched to between five and eight pages of densely packed text.20 The majority of the staff 
correspondents became subscribers.
The foreign press showed little interest in the Afrikaans-language newspapers for the simple reason that 
they were searching for an opposition view-point. While Afrikaner newspaper editors such as Piet 
Cillie were familiar figures on the government organised tours of the country, few foreign journalists felt 
the need, as Peregrine Worsthorne did, to publicise the role of the Afrikaner journalist.21 The crucial 
influence of the English-language press was in the area of self-censorship. Cultures of deception and
19. SAPA, through its relationship with all the newspapers of South Africa, republished (in English) the 
first news reports it received, regardless of whether the report had originated with an English-language 
or an Afrikaans publication. Comment and Opinion was incorporated within SA Digest in 1976.
20. The 'From the Afrikaans Press' archive is stored at the University of the Wilwatersrand.
21. Worsthorne wanted to publicise the Afrikaner cause through the medium of the Afrikaner journalist,'... 
just as Anthony Sampson did it with Drum for the black journalists.' (Interview with Sir Peregrine 
Worsthorne, 15 Jan. 1996). See also Peregrine Worsthorne, 'The other South Africa', Sunday Telegraph, 
19 Sept. 1976: '... almost all visitors - and none more than journalists - find it so much easier in South 
Africa to listen to the voice of opposition than to the voice of government, to the voice of dissent, 
criticism and despair, than to that of agreement, commendation and hope, since the former is in English, 
which almost everyone can understand, while that of the latter is in Afrikaans, a language totally 
incomprehensible except to the Afrikaners themselves.' See also P.J. Cillie, The case for Africa's white 
tribe'. New York Times magazine. 12 Dec. 1976, pp. 34-124, republished in The Saturday Evening 
Post. March 1977, pp. 90-103.
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restriction are insidiously infectious, and there can be little doubt that foreign correspondents in South 
Africa were rapidly and sometimes sub-consciously instilled with the fears and concerns of the local 
journalists. As an anonymous correspondent informed Richard Poliak in 1978, 'There is also the problem of 
self-censorship ... A good deal of it goes on all the time, no doubt about it.'” In 1952, Horace Flather, the 
editor of the (Johannesburg) Star, described the problems of editing a newspaper, under the South African 
press restrictions, as being '... like walking blindfold through a minefield.'23 To extend the metaphor, the 
problems of utilising the English-language print media, which all the foreign correspondents did to one 
degree or another, was something akin to handling a live mine.
Transformations in the society of the foreign correspondent in South Africa.
At the beginning of 1972, the news from South Africa in the international media was produced by a dozen 
reporters, all of whom were white and male; more than half were South Africans. By the end of the decade, 
the FCA listed sixty-five members, of whom the majority were British or American, and eight were 
women.24 In the interim, South Africa had developed from being a location from which correspondents 
travelled to cover other African countries, to being '. . .a  country no longer at peace and not yet at war.'25 
The quality of life in the Republic had also changed for the correspondents. In 1973, Virginia Waite 
observed that 'The professional and social links between [the staff-writers] seem far stronger in South 
Africa, perhaps because they arc such a small, exclusive group.'26 Waite demonstrated the closeness of these 
links, on the final page of her colour supplement article, when she revealed that she was married to John 
Osman, the BBC's radio correspondent. By the end of the decade, the escalation of people employed by the 
news agencies, the establishment of television news bureaus, the arrival of American journalists (there had 
only been one American correspondent in the Republic in 1972) and the emergence of independent
22. Richard Poliak, Up Against Apartheid: The Role and Plight of the Press in South Africa (Carbondale & 
Edwardsville, 1981), p. 89.
23. 'The South African Press: and the laws that govern it', Sechaba. Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan. 1973, p. 14.
24. In 1972, there were only two foreign journalists representing the non-Anglophone media in South 
Africa. By the end of the decade, Chinese, Dutch, Swedish, Canadian, Japanese, German and French 
reporters covered the Republic for more than a dozen news organisations.
25. David Halberstam, 'The fire to come in South Africa', Atlantic Monthly, May 1980, p. 87.
26. Virginia Waite, 'Men who write us up', (Johannesburg) Sunday Times magazine. 18 Nov. 1973, p. 30.
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freelance reporters had destroyed the correspondents' previously cosy culture of exclusivity.
The coverage of the eight years between 1972 and 1979 can be divided into four stages. Between January 
1972 and April 1974, the news from South Africa was relatively quiet, punctured only by the occasional 
dramatic event such as the Durban strikes (February 1973) or the shooting of African miners at the Western 
Deep Level mine, Carletonville (September 1973). The South African story returned to prominence in April 
1974 following the collapse of the Portuguese empire. As a prescient editorial in the New York Times 
suggested, 'After April 25, things may never be the same again, not only in Portugal's African territories but 
in Spain, Greece, Rhodesia and South Africa.'27 However, during the twenty-six months up to June 1976, 
the coverage of the Republic was primarily concerned with the apartheid regime's relations with its newly 
liberated neighbours (Angola and Mozambique) and its potential role in the resolution of the crisis in 
Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. The most significant domestic South African story was perceived by the international 
media to be John Vorster's promise to introduce reforms.28 Following the Angolan War, American 
newspapers began to establish bureaus in South Africa in the expectation that the region would become the 
site of military action in the years that followed.29
The Soweto uprising came as a major shock to most correspondents and ushered in the third period of 
coverage in this study.30 Between June 1976 and December 1977, the rioting and unrest in South Africa 
attracted exceptional attention in the British and American media. This coverage intensified following 
Henry Kissinger's visit to the Republic (September 1976) and the election of President Jimmy Carter 
(November 1976). During 1977 and in the light of an increasing number of deaths in South African prisons, 
the country became one of the testing-grounds of President Carter's commitment to human rights. As the 
demand for news from the Republic increased, so the international news agencies expanded their staff and 
the television companies established bureaus in the country. However, following the murder of Steve Biko
27. Editorial, 'Tremors from Lisbon ...', New York Times, 28 April 1974.
28. See Michael Knipe, 'Mr Vorster asks the press for a year's grace to realize his internal and external 
reform plans', The Times. 7 Nov. 1974.
29. In 1975, a number of correspondents were moved directly from Vietnam to South Africa. It is clear that 
some foreign editors believed that southern Africa might develop as the next epicentre of the Cold War.
30. See, for example, Chris Munnion, Banana Sunday: Datelines From Africa (Rivonia, 1995), p. 445: 
'When the youngsters of Soweto took to the streets on June 16th, 1976 ... I was on a besieged farm in 
the north-eastern area of Rhodesia.'
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in police custody (September 1977) and the ensuing election victory of the National Party in December 
1977, reporting from South Africa tended to dampen down. This was particularly apparent in the U.S. 
media, where the extraordinary attention given to the Biko inquest and the abandonment of the South 
African story happened in a matter of weeks.
In November 1977, American columnist, Nicholas von Hoffman, observed that The spigot has been turned 
on and the mass media ... has kept us up to date on every lie and evasion concerning the murder of Steve 
Biko ... Prime Minister Vorster ... can be seen almost every weekend, repeating his intransigencies on the 
public affairs programmes.'31 Yet by the beginning of 1978, Michael Kilian opened an article for the 
Chicago Tribune by asking 'Whatever happened to South Africa?132 There were a number of reasons for the 
decline in coverage during the fourth period of this study (1978-1979) but the primary cause was 
undoubtedly the decline of violent unrest in South Africa. This led many reporters to shift their attention to 
the transformation of Rhodesia into Zimbabwe which was rapidly perceived as a more significant story. As 
Bill Nicholson, the Chairman of the FCA commented at the beginning of 1980: 'I am entertaining ideas that 
we change our name to the Zimbabwe Foreign Correspondents' Association, because so many of us seem to 
be spending so much time there.'33 The sheer number of journalists who were now technically based in 
South Africa, however, meant that incidents such as the Crossroads squatter-camp clearance (1978) and the 
Information scandal (October 1978-June 1979) received comprehensive coverage.
The experiences of the correspondents and stringers who reported from South Africa during the decade 
were as varied as one might imagine possible amongst a group of one hundred people. Some reporters were 
careerists, perceiving South Africa as no more than one step in their journey up the journalistic ladder, 
others were iconoclasts, happy to operate with some distance between themselves and their news 
organisations. Some of the journalists were lazy, others were gifted. Some became politically engaged by 
the struggle against apartheid, others enjoyed the racially privileged life of the white population
31. Nicholas von Hoffman, 'The energy hotch-potch', The Spectator. 12 Nov. 1977, p. 9.
32. Michael Kilian, 'For Carter, South Africa got so big it vanished', Chicago Tribune, 3 Jan. 1978.
33. Bill Nicholson, Letter to members of the FCA, 7 Feb. 1980. (FCA Archive).
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of South Africa. Some reporters were alcoholics, others were adulterers or homosexuals.34 The majority of 
them were in their mid-thirties and a significant number of the staff correspondents who had arrived in 
South Africa between 1975 and 1977 went on to become senior figures on their newspapers and news 
organisations in the years that followed. However, there was one particular attribute which none of the 
journalists possessed: they were not black.
Michael Knipe recalled of his period in South Africa (1972-1975) that 'It wasn't easy to talk to Africans ... 
There was no natural source of African opinion.05 On BBC radio in December 1977, Bridget Bloom (the 
Africa editor of the Financial Times) acknowledged that South Africa '...is an extremely difficult country 
to try to report [from], in that you are only really seeing the white side ... There is no black voice that it is 
easy to go and talk to.'36 Three years later, Michael Beaubien commented in Southern Africa '... that one 
way to overcome the Africans' natural hesitance to talk freely with Europeans would involve a greater use 
of African stringers or the employment of more African-Americans as correspondents in southern Africa.'37 
Between 1972 and 1979, none of the British or American newspapers, news agencies, broadcasting 
companies or news-magazines stationed (or to the best of my knowledge, attempted to station) an 
African-American or an Afro-Caribbean correspondent in South Africa. Indeed, only one news 
organisation, the BBC World Service, employed an African stringer in the Republic during the entire 
period.
While the racial oppression of the South African state was severe, the failure of the international media to 
attempt to breach the racial divide was by no means the sole responsibility of the Department of 
Information. During 1976, for example, three African-American reporters were granted visas to enter the
34. There is no particular significance in this, beyond demonstrating that the correspondents and stringers 
were normal human beings, subject to normal human frailties. The extent to which these frailties left the 
journalists vulnerable to manipulation or blackmail by the Department of Information or BOSS is very 
difficult to assess.
35. Interview with Michael Knipe, 12 April 1995.
36. Between the Lines. BBC Radio 4, 10 Dec. 1977.
37. Michael Beaubien, 'Telling it like it isn’t: U.S. press coverage of Zimbabwe1, Southern Africa, July-
Aug. 1980, p. 3.
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Republic.38 The third of these reporters was Les Payne, a Pulitzer prize winner employed by Newsday.39 
Having gained editorial approval for his application to visit to South Africa, Payne appealed to the tennis 
player, Arthur Ashe, who had visited the country some years earlier, to mediate with the South African 
government minister, Piet Koomhof, on his behalf. Payne's visa application was successful and he spent 
three months in the Republic in the autumn of 1976. During his time in South Africa, he was often 
accompanied by Andrew Hatcher, an African-American who was employed by the Department of 
Information through its contract with the American public relations company, Sydney S. Baron. Payne 
recalls that 'I found my colleagues ... were very resistant to my presence there as an African-American 
journalist.'40 He felt that some of the correspondents were concerned about his competitive advantage; 
Payne could easily slip into the townships without being noticed. In one of the (eleven-part series of) 
articles which he wrote upon his return to the United States, Payne discussed the
... prize-winning foreign correspondent for a large East Coast paper 
[who] gleaned anecdotes from conversations between blacks and 
usually, without the aid of notes, misreconstructed accounts for his 
paper. Before we talked about the treatment of Africans, he was 
prepared - after the Soweto riots - to file a series detailing how much 
racial progress South Africa had made since he last visited the country 
in 1971: 'Blacks couldn't ride the elevators back then,' he said.41
Jim Hoagland, who appears to have been the beneficiary of Payne's information, told More magazine, one 
year later, that '"... When I arrived in late October, I realized that [Soweto] had been an essentially 
unreported story ... 1 asked wire-service people if they had ever gone into Soweto, but they hadn't." 
Hoagland also noted that no American newspapers, to his knowledge, employed black stringers who might 
have had greater access to the townships.142 Nat Serache (Rand Daily Mail) had the honour of being the first 
African stringer hired by the international media. In 1973, Graham Mytton, of the BBC World Service, had 
arrived in South Africa, hoping to interview Winnie Mandela. He asked the Rand Daily Mail to supply an
38. Paula Giddings visited during the spring of 1976, see Paula Giddings, 'Inside South Africa today', 
Encore American & Worldwide News. 2 Aug. 1976, pp. 16-20. Clarence Page visited South Africa 
some weeks later, for the Chicago Tribune.
39. Newsday. at this time, had no overseas bureaus.
40. Interview with Les Payne, 8 Nov. 1996.
41. Les Payne, 'White power, black rage - a report from South Africa: reporter's notebook', Newsday. 30 
Jan. 1977. The series ran in Newsday from 30 Jan.-9 Feb. 1977.
42. Cited by Daniel Schechter, 'Media myopia', More. Dec. 1977, p. 30.
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African journalist who could facilitate an introduction. Serache recalls that Mrs Mandela was very 
selective about who [she] would [let] bring people to her. You had to be politically acceptable to her, to 
bring a journalist to her.'43 Following Mytton's successful interview, he offered Serache work as a stringer 
for the BBC World Service. Serache continued to report regularly for the BBC during the next three years. 
In 1976, following his arrest and detention, the BBC string was passed on to Serache's fellow Rand Daily 
Mail journalist, Jan (Gabu) Tugwana.44
When questioned, correspondents and editors of the newspapers and news-magazines that covered South 
Africa during the 1970s provided two reasons for their unwillingness to employ African stringers. The 
majority stated that they had been concerned that the employment of an African might endanger the person 
and attract unwanted police attention. Bearing in mind that Serache was a BBC stringer for three years 
before his arrest, and that his arrest was directly related to his work for the Rand Daily Mail, not the 
international media, this defence does not hold up. The second reason was the belief, as Colin Legum 
explains that 'While African journalists were good at getting the news, they were bad at writing.'45 This 
disdain for the abilities of African reporters was one of the more pernicious legacies of the influence of the 
domestic press. As a perpetuation of South African racism, it was possibly the most significant failing of 
the international media in the Republic during the decade. As this thesis has demonstrated, those foreign 
journalists who interviewed Africans often discovered fascinating insights into the struggle. Some 
reporters, however, did not consider it necessary to talk to Africans. As Geoffrey Taylor explained, when 
asked why he had not quoted any Africans in his four-part series on South Africa: 'The Africans were at 
that point powerless and ... it was more important to know if there were any changes in the solid opposition 
to African aspirations, than in listening to the aspirations, which you could get in London anyway, by
43. Interview with Nat Serache, 4 Oct. 1996.
44. Tugwana and Serache had jointly exposed police collusion with the Zulu hostel dwellers in Aug. 1976 
(see chapter seven). Following Tugwana's arrest and detention, the string was passed to Thami Mazwai.
45. Interview with Colin Legum, 15 June 1995. Peter Gregson (Reuters') suggests that 'It was actually a 
problem because they could write about the townships but they wrote in a different way to an 
international news agency - they wrote for a different audience.' (Interview with Peter Gregson, 26 May 
1995). Raymond Louw, the editor of the Rand Daily Mail until 1976, referred to '... errors of language' 
in the African journalists' copy. (Interview with Raymond Louw, 20 Sept. 1996).
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listening to the ANC.'4<
There were many changes in the working practices of the correspondents and stringers during the period in 
question. In 1972, the Times and Daily Telegraph staff correspondents were based in Cape Town, primarily 
in order to report the news from the South African Parliament. As the decade progressed and more news 
organisations airived in the country, bureaus tended to be moved to Johannesburg which was then thought 
to be the epicentre of the crisis in South African race relations. Traditionally, British journalists had been 
allowed to enter South Africa without being required to apply for any documentation. One of Rhoodie's 
innovations was that, from 1973, British correspondents had to apply for six-monthly work permits. Other 
international journalists were also forced to apply for visas, which normally covered a three-month period. 
If they wished to stay in the country, they then had to apply for a multiple re-entry visa. In addition they 
required a six-month work permit and a police press card. If granted, the multiple re-entry visa had to be 
renewed annually and the work permit was subject to reconsideration every six months.47 The system, of 
course, was a subtle form of intimidation which probably encouraged some journalists to be over cautious 
in their coverage. There was one bonus, however; journalists who operated in South Africa on a visa or a 
work permit basis either did not pay any tax, or paid tax at a reduced rate. In his book, Banana Sunday, 
Chris Munition recalled broaching the subject of the work permit renewals with Eschel Rhoodie:
... there was this tedious business of regular renewal of work permits, a 
process that took sometimes several days of valuable time. Could it not 
be speeded up? The real Eschel Rhoodie was suddenly before me. He 
scowled. ’You'll just have to live with that,1 he snapped. 'It's all to do 
with this double taxation business.1 If there's one word that will stop 
any foreign correspondent in his tracks it is 'tax'. My new friend had 
just mentioned 'double tax'. I made my excuses and left.43
Journalists in South Africa during the 1970s also faced other forms of intimidation, perhaps the most 
significant of which was related to the activities of BOSS. Patrick Keatley, the diplomatic correspondent of 
the Guardian noted in 1976 that he was '... careful never to cross [the South African] frontier carrying 
anything as naive as an address book, or even a sheet of paper with names of prospective contacts ... this is
46. Interview with Geoffrey Taylor, 24 March 1996. See Geoffrey Taylor, 'Afrikanerdom in a sea of 
change', The Guardian, 15-18 Nov. 1976. While journalists in London might have been 'listening' to the 
ANC, very few reported the ANC's viewpoint (see chapter four).
47. Poliak, Up Against Apartheid, pp. 79-80. British correspondents and stringers did not require a visa.
48. Munnion, Banana Sunday, pp. 447-448.
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standard practice for all correspondents bound for South Africa.149 Few reporters, however bothered to 
comment upon the subject. There can be only two reasons for this silence. Either the degree of intimidation 
was no more than '... the routine, mild harassment that reporters come across in all such states,1 as John 
Humphrys suggests, or the lack of coverage demonstrated the success of the intimidation; journalists do not 
like to draw attention to their weaknesses or the factors which directly restrict their work.50 The 
correspondents who did comment on the subject tended to be those whose liberal positions were well- 
known. Caryle Murphy, for instance, wrote a humourous article in 1978 which recounted her experience of 
being 'tailed* by the security police throughout a visit to East London. Her article concluded:
Whites and blacks who live in these small towns and who consistently 
show opposition to South African government policies are used to these 
experiences. They never say anything important on the telephone, 
confidential conversations are held outdoors, out of range of listening 
devices ... With mixed emotions I returned to the freer atmosphere of 
cosmopolitan Johannesburg, where most foreign correspondents in this 
security-conscious country are based. On the one hand, I was relieved 
since the security police here - outside of routinely bugging phone calls 
- do not have the time to regularly follow the moves of all foreign 
reporters. On the other hand, I missed all the attention I was getting.51
Continuous pressure from BOSS was complemented by the fear that the South African government might 
institute some form of censorship of the correspondents' work. This fear intensified in the period following 
the South African government's clampdown in October 1977. However, the situation was, as always, 
contradictory: 'There may be members who believe as I do that pressures will mount against foreign 
correspondents. (Conversely, with the recent banning of people, organisations and newspapers with total 
disregard to the country's image, one may feel that the authorities will not be too concerned about what 
these correspondents write.)'52 The sense of relief in the next annual chairman's report was profound: 
'Finally I would say that we may not have had a good year but we have survived, which is more than we
49. Patrick Keatley, 'Living with the Boss-eyed monster', The Guardian. 11 March 1976.
50. Letter from John Humphrys, Nov. 1995.
51. Caryle Murphy, 'Letter from Johannesburg: keeping a watch on South Africa's security policemen', 
Washington Post. 8 March 1978. June Goodwin was also followed when she visited East London 
(Poliak, Up Against Apartheid, p. 86.) For evidence of the security police's intimidation of foreign 
correspondents, see Paul Erasmus, 'Nocturnal paint bombs - gun-toting neighbours', [Weekly] Mail & 
Guardian, 30 June 1995.
52. Gerry Suckley, Chairman's Report, Dec. 1977. (FCA Archive.)
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can say for Dr. Rhoodie and his Department of Information.'53
As it became clear that South Africa would become one of the running stories of the 1980s, an additional
burden was added to the correspondents' shoulders. In effect, they needed to protect their news
organisations' 'investment' in the country. In March 1978, for example, Time magazine organised a 'news 
tour’ of the Republic, during which they '... took thirty-one high level American businessmen to South 
Africa, where they met with among others, the ... Prime Minister, John Vorster, and five members of his 
Cabinet.154 Both the Time correspondent, William McWhirter, and the magazine's stringer, Peter Hawthorne, 
were very impressed by this demonstration of institutional power.55 It is, perhaps, no surprise that 
McWhirter did not view the risk of expulsion as being beneficial to his career:
We were well past the point where people who were expelled from 
their beats were regarded as domestic heroes for bravery and courage.
That disappeared when we started making accommodations with 
Moscow and China. No editor who can not even watch or monitor you 
in a place like South Africa wants you to screw things up over things 
that he doesn't know and can't defend. You become an administrative 
embarrassment - You become a competitive disadvantage... and then ... 
they've got to go around and kiss ass for six months with the South 
Africans and send somebody else in on a weaker basis ... No one gets 
points for being expelled.56
Expulsions and manipulation.
In comparison to the 1960s and the 1980s, the South African government did not expel very many 
journalists during the 1970s. This can be partly explained by the fact that certain coirespondents were 
already placed on a prohibited list and others were banned after they had left the Republic.57 Stanley Uys 
felt that the Department of Information was '... always very sensible. [They would] look at what the reaction 
was going to be - if they thought it was going to [cause] too much trouble outside ... they'd keep their hands
53. Peter Hawthorne, Chairman's Report, 22 Nov. 1978. (FCA Archive).
54. E.J. Kahn Jr., 'Annals of international trade: a very emotive subject', New Yorker. 14 May 1979, p. 121.
55. Interviews with William McWhirter, 6 April 1996 & Peter Hawthorne, 16 May 1995.
56. Interview with William McWhirter, 6 April 1996. See Mort Rosenblum, Coups and Earthquakes: 
Reporting the World for America (New York, 1981), p. 95: 'An expulsion is not necessarily a badge of 
honour'. See also interview with Bill Nicholson, 9 April 1996: 'We're there for the long haul. Its not up 
to us to be on a mission ... we're there to cover the news.'
57. Colin Legum (The Observer) was on the prohibited list throughout the decade. Adam Raphael (The 
Guardian) was banned from returning to South Africa, following his wage starvation expose in 1973.
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off you.'is There is little doubt that being accredited to a major news organisation, or being a well-known 
figure such as Uys himself, provided a degree of security from South African government pressure which 
freelancers and casual stringers did not possess. Following the establishment of the FCA in November 
1976, members could call upon the support of the Association. However, the records indicate that the 
FCA's assistance was very limited.59
In 1976, Arnaud de Borchgrave, Newsweek's senior foreign correspondent, was expelled from South Africa 
following the publication of an article in which he had suggested t h a t k e y  officials' in BOSS favoured a
more radical approach to South Africa's problems than that being currently practised by John Vorster. The
article concluded, 'Will the boss [Vorster] listen to BOSS? Many observers conclude that he will not. Such 
a display of leadership and imagination, they believe, is beyond him.'60 de Borchgrave's source for the 
article had been an off-the-record briefing by Hendrik van den Bergh, the head of BOSS.61 van den Bergh 
later informed To The Point magazine that ’... de Borchgrave must have been dreaming, or off his rocker.'62 
Six months earlier, de Borchgrave had published an inteiview with John Vorster in which he had asked the 
prime minister: 'Would it also be accurate to say you received a green light from Kissinger for a military 
operation in Angola ...?' He quoted Vorster, as replying, 'If you say that of your own accord, I will not call 
you a liar.'63 de Borchgrave accepts that it is possible that the prime minister's office had asked for this 
sentence to be struck from the published version of the inteiview, but he had felt that the answer was too 
significant to be subjected to South African censorship.64 Following his expulsion, de Borchgrave's 
photograph was included, with those of Donald Woods, Eric Marsden and Philip Jacobson, in a Sunday 
Times report on relations between the foreign press and the Department of Information, de Borchgrave later 
commented: 'I was a little shocked to find my picture with those people because I had nothing in common
58. Interview with Stanley Uys, 22 Sept. 1994.
59. See the variety of appeals in the FCA Archive.
60. Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'The way the BOSS sees it', Newsweek. 25 Oct. 1976, p. 20.
61. Inteiview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, 14 Nov. 1996.
62. Carol Birkby, 'Vorster on journalist: "blow him sky-high'". To The Point 29 Oct. 1976, p. 59. Vorster 
dismissed de Borchgrave as '... an untrustworthy journalist' and '... a liar'.
63. Arnaud de Borchgrave, 'We can trump Russia', Newsweek. 17 May 1976, p. 23.
64. Inteiview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, 14 Nov. 1996.
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with their approach.'65
During November 1976, Eric Abraham, a South African citizen, anti-apartheid campaigner and BBC 
stringer, was banned and placed under house-arrest. He had returned to the Republic in 1975 in order to 
establish the Southern African News Agency {SANA), having worked for Amnesty International in England 
for a number of years. He later explained:
[SA/VA] grew out of what I perceived as the need for an in-depth and 
factual information service to reflect the views and opinions of the 18 
million blacks ... The local press and the Western Agencies seemed to 
have neglected the fact that threequarters of the South African 
population was black. It was, and still is, far too easy for foreign 
correspondents to rely on the validity of the communiques from the 
South African politicians and the Nationalist Government's Ministries 
of Information, Justice and Police ... During the first half of 1976 every 
SANA bulletin was banned as prejudicial to State security.66
Although effectively silenced, Abraham and SANA established links with a number of African journalists 
and photographers, such as Peter Magubane, Nat Serache and Thenjiwe Mtintso.67 Following a number of 
unsuccessful appeals to the South African government to lift his banning order and permit him to leave the 
country, Abraham fled through Botswana at the beginning of 1977. In almost every respect the South 
African stale's treatment of Abraham, and his ensuing departure into exile, anticipated Donald Woods's 
experiences twelve months later. A completely different case was that of Daniel Drooz, an Israeli citizen, 
who had arrived in South Africa in 1976 and claimed to be stringing for the Chicago Sun-Titnes, U.S. News 
and World Report and Maariv “  Drooz was a somewhat mysterious figure who was either not a particularly
65. Interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, 14 Nov. 1996. See Denis ITerbstein, 'South Africa turns screw on 
pressmen', Sunday Times. 31 Oct. 1976. Herbstein's application for a work permit extension was 
refused a few week later and he was forced to return to Britain.
66. Eric Abraham, 'Flight from a coming race war', The Guardian, 10 Jan. 1977.
67. During March 1976, Abraham interviewed Mrs. Winnie Mandela. The interview was later published as 
’Profile in Courage: Mrs. Winnie Mandela’, Objective: Justice, Vol. 10, No. 1, Spring 1978, p. 32.
68. Drooz was registered as a founding member of the FCA. (FCA Archive). His strings were listed in 
’South Africa orders out U.S. journalist', The Times, 30 Aug. 1978. However, there is no evidence in the 
Chicago Sun-Times or U.S. News & World Report of Drooz having ever written for these newspapers.
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able journalist, or was involved in intelligence activity/9 The Times report recording his expulsion in 
August 1978, noted th a t'... he had run into trouble over three stories published abroad - one on Israeli amis 
sold to South Africa, one on black education and a third on the scandal within the Department of 
Information.170
The most dramatic example of South African attempts to manipulate the media, beyond those discussed in 
chapter three, occurred in London in 1976. During a period of three days, the Guardian and the BBC were 
both victims of elaborately hoaxed reports which eventually left both news organisations wary of 
publishing or even investigating anti-South African stories. The two hoaxes were directly related to the 
current Jeremy Thorpe scandal and Harold Wilson's related statement to the Parliamentary Press Gallery, 
on 12 May 1976, that 'Overseas anti-democratic forces have conspired for years to undermine the political 
situation of individuals and parties that have opposed arms to South Africa.'71 Three days later, the 
Guardian 's front-page carried a story which claimed that a South African diplomat had attempted to 
purchase a pornographic film which featured a British politician.72 The source for the story, Andre Thome, 
later confessed to the Sunday People that the entire story had been fiction.73 Meanwhile, the BBC Nine 
O'clock News, on 18 May, broadcast an interview with a 'Colonel' Cheeseman who claimed that he had 
seen evidence in South Africa relating to the campaign against senior Liberal politicians.74 Within days it 
was established that Cheeseman was also a hoaxer.75
69. In 1977, Drooz had been accused by a South African government official'... of spying for both the 
Central Intelligence Agency and the Israelis.' (Poliak, Up Against Apartheid, p. 87). Larry Heinzerling 
recalls Drooz 'fishing for information', he felt that Drooz was probably an intelligence man, using 
journalism as a cover. (Interview with Larry Heinzerling, 19 Sept. 1995). Tiuu Lukk/Litwik, who was 
in South Africa at the same time as Drooz, believes that he was merely an inept reporter (Interview with 
Tiuu Lukk/Litwik, 6 Nov. 1996).
70. 'South Africa orders out U.S. journalist', The Times, 30 Aug. 1978.
71. Julian Burgess, Esau du Plessis, Roger Murray, Peter Fraenkel, Rosanne Harvey, John Laurence, Peter 
Ripken & Barbara Rogers, The Great White Hoax: South Africa's International Propaganda Machine 
(London, 1977), p. 39. Jeremy Thorpe was the leader of the Liberal Party. In 1976, the press revealed 
that ten years earlier he had been involved in a homosexual relationship.
72. Peter Hillmore, 'South Africa's man and the dirty story', The Guardian, 15 May 1976.
73. Terry Lovell & William Dorran, 'I lied about that blue film1, Sunday People, 23 May 1976.
74. Nine O'clock News. BBC 1,18 May 1976.
75. Norman Luck & Don Coolican, 'Colonel Bogus: "I admit it - spy tale was all lies'", Daily Express, 20
May 1976.
-217-
As the Sunday Times commented in an editorial: 'It has been a good week for South Africa and especially 
for BOSS ... the discrediting of South Africa's critics could hardly have been better managed if BOSS itself 
had been manipulating it.176 The investigations into what William Raynor and Geoff Allen later called 'the 
English Watergate', were dealt a death-blow by the Thorne and Cheeseman hoaxes.77 In the years that 
followed, the majority of investigations into Harold Wilson's allegations against the South Africans 
concluded that they had no substance.78 This is particularly strange because both Thorne and Cheeseman 
later retracted their retractions.79 Indeed, Peter Deeley recalled at the time that during an investigation into 
BOSS organised by the Observer in 1971, Three times in as many weeks we were ''fed'' false information 
which, if it had been published, would have destroyed the credibility of the case we had built up.'80 Ian 
Wright (the Guardian's foreign editor in 1976) recalls that the newspaper was '... deeply, deeply scarred by 
[the experience], I thought we've got to be careful with these bastards.'81
The South African government possessed other methods for manipulating foreign correspondents in the 
Republic. Many South African journalists believe that the late Tertius Myburgh, the editor of the 
(Johannesburg) Sunday Times, colluded with BOSS, during the 1970s, and its successor intelligence
76. Editorial, The real scandal1, Sunday Times, 23 May 1976.
77. William Raynor & Geoff Allen, 'Smear: The Thorpe Affair', unpublished book, p. 1.
78. See, for example, Peter Kellner & Tony Rocca, 'Insight: The plot that never was1, Sunday Times. 15 
May 1977; Barrie Penrose & Roger Courtiour, The Pencourt File (London, 1978); and the BBC’s 
unbroadcast documentary investigating the subject: 'It showed beyond doubt that the South African 
allegations were baloney.' (The Tale of Jeremy Fishier', Private Eve. No. 413, 14 Oct. 1977, p. 18).
79. Thorne's pom "set-up"', Time O ut No. 333,6 Aug. 1976, p. 5: 'The South Africans asked me to set up 
The Guardian,’ Raynor & Allen, 'Smear', p. 162: '[Cheeseman] said that it had been necessary to "stop 
the train," of the smear story to normalise Anglo-South African relations before the first Kissinger 
Vorster meeting ... [Cheeseman] acknowledged, "It was a brilliant manipulation of the press".' See also 
David Norris & Nicholas Roe, 'South African "plot to discredit BBC'", Sunday Telegraph, 23 May 
1976; Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Middlesex, 1981), pp. 468-472; Peter 
Hain. Sing the Beloved Country: The Struggle for the New South Africa (London. 1996), pp. 111-112: 
'A former British Intelligence officer, Colin Walace, told me in 1987: "The Colonel Cheeseman saga is 
known in intelligence circles as the 'double bubble' because it contains a second dimension in deception 
and not only deflects attention from the main target, but also 'bursts', leaving the investigator doubting 
everything he has uncovered so far".'
80. Peter Deeley, Letter to the editor, The Times. 22 May 1976.
81. Inteiview with Ian Wright, 26 Oct. 1994.
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agencies in the 1980s. There is undoubtedly considerable evidence to support this supposition.82 If true, 
Myburgh would have been in a particularly powerful position to manipulate both news and opinion. As the 
editor of South Africa's largest-selling and only genuinely national newspaper, he was the country's leading 
newspaperman. As a Nieman Fellow and occasional stringer for the New York Times, he could exert a 
powerful influence in the United States. He was also apparently a likeable fellow who was regularly 
approached by foreign journalists who were delighted to gain access to the thoughts of a 'liberal' Afrikaner. 
The Washington Post correspondent, Sanford Ungar, paid tribute to Myburgh’s influence in the 
acknowledgements section of his book, Africa: 'I was introduced to one part of Africa by Tertius Myburgh 
... without [him] this book truly would not have been possible.'83
Although South Africa's media manipulation was rarely successful at diverting the international media's 
coverage of African issues, it does appear to have steered both the correspondents inside the country and 
the editorial staff of the news organisations in Europe and North America away from the subject of South 
African 'dirty tricks'. In 1978, when the Information scandal began to emerge, no foreign correspondents in 
South Africa engaged in research in support of the Rand Daily Mail and the (Johannesburg) Sunday 
Express 's investigations. To a certain extent this was because the domestic exposes were difficult to expand 
upon or even to get verified. However, one would have imagined that the foreign correspondents would 
have been interested in developing a story that dealt, in part, with attempts to corrupt foreign journalists and 
their news organisations. As Anthony Sampson, one of the few journalists genuinely to engage with the 
story, observed: 'Journalists, who are so active in investigating other businesses, are often oddly ignorant of
82. 'In 1976 H.J. van den Bergh told me that BOSS had thirty-seven South African journalists on its 
payroll. Three of these were parliamentary correspondents, one was an editor in chief, and eight 
worked on news desks in one capacity or another.' (Winter, Inside BOSS, p. 578); 'I confronted the 
editor who was most mentioned in the rumours, and he said; "Tony when I die and they look at my 
papers, they will find that I was on the level." He warned that he would sue anyone repeating the 
rumour.' (Tony Heard, The Cape of Storms: A Personal History of the Crisis in South Africa 
[Johannesburg, 1990]); Interviews with Tony Heard, 23 Sept. 1996; Raymond Louw, 20 Sept. 1996; 
Stanley Uys, 19 Jan. 1996. See also June Goodwin & Ben Schiff, unpublished inteiview with John 
Horak, 4 May 1992. (Unpublished extract from June Goodwin & Ben Schiff, The Heart of Whiteness: 
Afrikaners Face Black Rule in the New South Africa [New York, 1995].).
83. Sanford Ungar, Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent (New York, 1985), p. 7. Bill 
Deedes also commented upon his friendship with Myburgh (Interview with Lord Deedes, 16 Nov. 
1995).
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the control of their own.’84
There is little evidence to suggest that any of the British or American correspondents and stringers in the 
Republic were actively funded by the Department of Information but it does seem possible that a number of 
reporters may have been compromised through contact with South African government money. Richard 
West, for instance, commented in the Spectator, that 'The Department... offered each journalist a first-class 
return ticket [to the Transkeian independence celebrations] and some £1,000 in cash for expenses.fSS While 
it proved impossible to find any correspondent who would admit to accepting such a ’gift’, Larry 
Heinzerling (AP) did recall that his first thought on hearing of the Information scandal, was thank God I 
didn't take the money to go to the Transkei.’86 Whether journalists were actually bribed, as West suggested, 
remains unproved. However, bearing in mind the large amount of money expended by the Department of 
Information and the scale of secret front-organisalions in operation, there seems little doubt that a number 
of reporters and commentators had been the innocent recipients of South African largesse.87 With a few rare 
exceptions, the various investigations into the Information scandal by British and American-based 
freelance journalists and staff-writers received little support from the mainstream international news
84. Anthony Sampson, 'The General's white lies', The Observer, 21 Jan. 1979.
85. Richard West, 'A family affair', The Spectator. 24 June 1978, p. 8. See also Ray Kennedy, 'South Africa 
offered journalists money', The Times, 17 April 1978.
86. Interview with Larry Heinzerling, 19 Sept. 1995.
87. See, for example, Supplementary Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Irregularities in the 
Former Department of Information (Pretoria, 1979), Chapter 5.42 & 5.43, p. 18, which reported that 
Hennie Serfontein had received money from the Foreign Affairs Association (a Department of 
Information front-organisation) as payment for a book on John Vorster's detente with black Africa. 
Serfontein, who had worked for the (Johannesburg) Sunday Times and the Rand Daily Mail and was an 
occasional stringer for The Observer (1978-1979) and Africa, recalls that as a freelance journalist he 
accepted funds without asking too many questions. He did not, however, suspect that the money 
originated with the Department of Information. The projected book was never completed. (Interview 
with Hennie Serfontein, 3 Oct. 1996); See also Patrick Laurence, 'Botha scraps S.A. front', The 
Guardian, 23 Nov. 1978, which revealed that Lord Chalfont had been a guest of the Foreign Affairs 
Association (FAA). Chalfont claims that he had no idea that the FAA was financed by the South 
African government. (Interview with Lord Chalfont, 12 March 1996); Nicholas Ashford, 'Freedom 
Foundation named as Pretoria funded front', The Times, 25 Nov. 1978, revealed that Robert Moss had 
been a guest of another Information front-organisation, the South African Freedom Foundation.
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organisations.88 Muidergate remains a riddle awaiting re-examination.
Conclusion.
The British and Amei'ican interpretation of apartheid.
Although the central thrust of the Department of Information's programme of manipulation was aimed at 
the U.S. media, Britain remained '... in terms of psychology if not so much in real terms of the greatest 
importance to South Africa.'89 Indeed, on Fleet Street, South Africa was the subject of continuing 
fascination for many journalists and columnists. Apartheid, however, was often handled in a style which 
refused to permit linkage with race issues in Britain. In effect, South Africa was treated as a decolonisation 
story that had somehow gone wrong. William Davis commented in an editorial for Punch in 1977, 'The 
plain fact is that men like Kruger have nothing but contempt for Western liberal opinion. So for that matter, 
has Idi Amin, but somehow we can't quite bring ourselves to accept reality: we want to believe that white 
tribes have more sense. They are decent chaps because they are white, or so we like to think.' [original 
em phasis]90 Although South Africa had been forced to leave the Commonwealth in 1961, its while 
population were consistently portrayed in the British media as being, to a certain extent, the responsibility 
of Great Britain. British commentators were the most vociferous members of the international media in 
their resistance to sanctions and in their encouragement of dialogue with the South African government, 
even though the Afrikaners were often represented as a peculiar African 'tribe'. For the most part, the
88. For examples of the international media's investigative research into the Information scandal, see 
Anthony Sampson, 'The General's white lies', ’The spymaster and the playboy' & The long reach of the 
arms men', The Observer. 21 Jan.-4 Feb. 1979; David Dimbleby, Interview with Eschel Rhoodie., 
Tonight Special, BBC 1, 21 March 1979; Anthony Sampson, 'South Africa's scandal spreads to the 
West' & Bernard D. Nossiter, 'South Africa P.R. is a $650,000 plum'. Washington Post, 25 March 1979; 
Anthony Sampson, 'Pretoria's scandal: special report1, Newsweek. 2 April 1979, pp. 1, 20-24; Anthony 
Sampson, "'Muidergate" and Zurich', New York Times. 8 April 1979; Peter H. Stone, 'Muidergate on 
Madison Avenue' & Karen Rothmyer, 'Apartheid Trib', The Nation. 14 April 1979, pp. 390-393; David 
Beresford, 'The disastrous course of South Africa's flying propaganda circus' & 'How Pretoria planned 
its undercover operations', The Guardian. 7-8 Aug. 1979; Karen Rothmyer, 'The McGoff grab', 
Columbia Journalism Review. Nov./Dec. 1979, pp. 33-39; Donald K. Thrasher & James G. Newland 
Jr., 'South African story involves SerVaas, "Post"' (five-part series), The Indianapolis Star. 23-27 March 
1980; Karen Rothmyer, 'The South African lobby', The Nation. 19 April 1980, pp. 455-458; Jonathan 
Bloch & Andrew Weir, The adventures of the brothers Kimche', The Middle East, No. 90, April 1982, 
pp. 25-26; Derek Knight, Beyond the Pale: The Christian Political Fringe (Lancashire, 1982).
89. Roy Macnab, 'Foreign report: London’, South Africa International. Vol. 5, No. 2, Oct. 1974, p. 107.
90. Editorial, 'Vorster's laager'. Punch. 23 Nov. 1977, p. 967.
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British media fluctuated between a form of paternalist panic and post-colonial ennui on the subject of South 
Africa and apartheid throughout the decade.
The American media reflected a number of different concerns. There was a profound sense in the United 
States that the South African story had gone unreported for too long. Tom Wicker, for example, recalling 
his visit to South Africa in 1978 and 1979, felt that 'It was such virgin territory. People hadn't written about 
this, they hadn't been down there (at least not many that I knew of) and interviewed black school teachers 
and so forth.'91 The magazine, Town and Country introduced a twenty-four page article on the Republic in 
June 1977 with an assessment that: 'What we hear or read about South Africa is always secondhand, based 
largely on various interpretations of political action. We know little, if anything, of what that country's 
people really think about their land and its problems.'92 The American interest in South Africa was triggered 
by two key factors, the Angolan War and its role as a microcosm of the Cold War, and the re-emergence of 
violent African unrest (or agencj') during the Soweto uprising. In 1973, before these events had occurred, 
Ken Whiting (A P , 1967-1974, and the only American resident reporter in the Republic) observed that 
during his term in South Africa,
I haven't seen as many political changes as you might expect, and 
putting over trends about a party that has been entrenched for 25 years 
isn't easy to readers accustomed to elections with landslides one way or 
the other. In any case, there isn't that much interest in the States about 
South Africa. American editors remain interested in Indo-China,
Europe, problems in the Middle East and South America. I guess Africa 
conies after all that lot.92
American reporters and commentators during the second half of the 1970s permitted their coverage to be 
mediated, in part, through the British interpretation of the Republic. Sanford Ungar, in his study of the 
differences between the British and American 'reactions' to the subject, acknowledged that 'South African 
developments are covered more regularly, in greater detail, and in more depth in the British than in the
91. Interview with Tom Wicker, 19 Sept. 1995.
92. Stephen R. Conn, 'Apartheid from the top', Town and Country. June 1977, p. 47. The 'country's people' 
interviewed in Conn's article included Gatsha Buthelezi, Harry Oppenheimer, Piet Cillie, Jan S. Marais, 
Jimmy Kruger, Helen Suzman, Gary Player, Dr. Christiaan Barnard, J.N. Reddy (chairman of the South 
African Indian Council), Richard Maponya (an African businessman), Des and Dawn Lindberg (South 
African folk singers), Franklin Sonn (the coloured President of the Cape Teachers Professional 
Association) and Alan Paton.
93. Virginia Waite, 'Men who write us up', (Johannesburg) Sunday Times magazine, 18 Nov. 1973, p. 34.
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American press. Americans who follow South African affairs feel obliged to read serious British 
newspapers and other periodicals.'94 The fundamental difference between the coverage of the two countries, 
however, lay in the American journalists1 references to race relations in the U.S.. The treatment presented to 
the American reader demonstrated few of the variations on colonial paternalism or ennui common in the 
British media; instead, in general, the U.S. media representated the South African story as a metaphor for 
the racial problems of the United States. In 1977, the anti-apartheid campaigner, E.S. Reddy, acknowledged 
that the central difficulty for the United Nations with regard to southern Africa was '... the intertwining of 
colonialism and racism.’95 In recognition of their own respective histories, the British and American media 
divided upon the importance of these two subjects. Beyond these racial and colonial contexts, there was 
little dramatic difference between the British and American representations of apartheid. Ungar's 
conclusion in his analysis of the portrayal of South Africa in the U.S. media is equally applicable to the 
British press:
It is safe to say that most American news organizations have and 
convey a negative perception of South Africa ... There is an abhorrence 
of apartheid, a distrust and mockery of the homelands policy and other 
South African attempts to put a euphemistic face on its social order, 
and an impatience for the time when South Africa will finally begin to 
move in the direction of one-man, one-vote. But while this basic 
establishment view rejects the South African government's handling of 
the country's racial situation, it also tends to reject violent solutions.
The mainstream press holds a persistent - perhaps naive - view that 
peaceful change is still possible in South Africa and that it is the role of 
the United States to help promote it.96
The international media's coverage, as described by Ungar, often tended to become confused through its 
continuing dependence on the voices of white South Africa. Daniel Schechter, an anti-apartheid 
campaigner, noted in 1977 that the American newspapers''... stance towards the country's white minority is
94. Sanford Ungar, 'The American Scene: An Overview', in Alfred O. Hero Jr. & John Barratt (eds.), The 
American People and South Africa: Publics. Elites and Policymaking Processes (Lexington, 1981), p. 
171. The breadth of the debate in the British newspapers was significantly larger than that available in 
the U.S. media. See for example the following polemical positions adopted during the Soweto uprising: 
Peregrine Worsthorne, 'Black day for Black S. Africa', Sunday Telegraph. 20 June 1976; Richard Gott, 
'Rising hopes', The Guardian, 27 Aug. 1976. (See chapter seven). Columnists and commentators in the 
British media also appear to have been quicker than the Americans at recognising and instigating shifts 
in representation.
95. Enuga S. Reddy, 'The United Nations and the International Campaign against Apartheid', Objective: 
Justice. Vol. 9, No. 4, Winter 1977/78, p. 9.
96. Sanford Ungar, 'South Africa in the American Media', in Hero & Barratt (eds.), The American People, 
pp. 42-43.
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schizophrenic. Despite a clearly pervasive anti-apartheid bias, the dictates of professional neutrality often 
appear to lead to reports which equate the Afrikaner position with majority claims.’97 The fact that South 
Africa was a partial democracy offering freedom within limits to members of the white population 
complicated the story for foreign reporters. As this chapter has explained, correspondents and visitors to the 
country could be relatively easily misled by the duality of South Africa under apartheid. John Bums (New 
York Times) recalls, perhaps with some degree of hindsight, that
South Africa was ... extremely misleading. Every morning you could 
get up and there were newspapers which looked pretty much like the 
newspapers we read at home. The countiy worked. If you could simply 
forget the eighteen million blacks, you could imagine yourself to be in 
New Zealand ... I think to be properly prepared for all of this you really 
had to understand just how much of a deceit all of that was and how 
much more significant than the fact [that] they had a National 
Assembly... was the fact that they had a secret police which was on 
every measure as devious and evil as the KGB ever was.98
It is also useful to compare the international media's consensus on South Africa with the existing public 
opinion polls on the subject. In December 1977, a Harris Survey of 1,498 adults in the United States found 
that while 63 per cent of people polled fe l t '... that the system of apartheid ... [was] "unjustified"', 76 per 
cent opposed '... the U.S. "urging blacks inside South Africa to engage in guerrilla warfare against the while 
government".' On the question of American investment, the polling organisation found that while 51 per 
cent of those polled opposed '... any move "to force all U.S. businesses now in South Africa to close their 
operations there’", 46 per cent favoured '... getting U.S. companies now in business in South Africa to put 
pressure on the South African government.' As Louis Harris noted in his conclusion to the evidence in the 
poll, 'To a remarkable degree, public opinion in this country directly parallels that of the Carter 
administration.'99 The only guide to British public opinion on South Africa during the 1970s was a BBC 
radio programme entitled You The Jury. Following a debate between Donald Woods and the Conservative 
M.P., Eldon Griffiths, on the proposition that Britain should cease trading with South Africa, the 100 
members of the 'jury1 returned a verdict of 45 per cent in favour, 54 per cent against, with one person
97. Daniel Schechler, 'Media myopia’, More. Dec. 1977, p. 31.
98. Interview with John Bums, 19 Nov. 1996.
99. Louis Harris, 'Harris Survey: U.S. public opposes apartheid', Chicago Tribune. 12 Dec. 1977. The full 
figures were, on the justification of apartheid: 63 per cent to 12; on urging violent African resistance: 
76-to-4 per cent; on the withdrawal of U.S. companies: 51-to-21 per cent; on U.S. companies applying 
pressure to the South African government: 46-to-28 per cent.
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undecided.100
The two opinion polls appear to demonstrate that the range of the consensus in the British and American 
media coverage of South Africa matched British and American public opinion quite neatly. Whether the 
same can be said of the representations constructed by the international media is less simple to assess. The 
case-studies in this thesis have shown that the representations of South Africa and South Africans 
constructed by the Western journalists did not emerge from an historical vacuum. Indeed, the 200-year 
history of the racial 'other' continued to exert a powerful influence on the construction of news and news- 
features in SouLh Africa in the 1970s. The similarity between the interpretations, and the methods of 
interpretation employed by foreign correspondents and visiting staff-writers and those of white travellers to 
Africa in the nineteenth century, suggests that although 'the imperial gaze1 might have become blurred (or, 
perhaps, been averted) in the post-independence period of the 1960s, by the 1970s it was re-applied with 
vigour. In his seminal work, Orientalism , Edward Said discussed the shifting image of 'the Arab' in 
American popular culture since the Second World War. The international media's coverage of South Africa 
during the 1970s demonstrated that 'the African' and 'the Afrikaner’ were equally able '... to accommodate 
the transformations and reductions - all of a simply tendentious kind - into which [s/Jhe is continually being 
forced.'101
This thesis has demonstrated that the international media treatment of South Africa during the 1970s was 
influenced by (and mediated through) many opposing forces. These included South Africa's propagandists, 
the anti-apartheid movements, the British and American governments and intelligence agencies, the South 
African press and the legacy of historicised representations. The ensuing coverage of the Republic reflected 
the struggle for representation of these influential voices. The consensus on South Africa which emerged 
within the international media demonstrated many of the contradictions of liberalism. An examination of
100. You the Jury. BBC Radio Four, 22 Feb. 1978. The witnesses in the debate in favour of the proposition 
were Abdul Minty and Neil Wates. Peter Adler (a petroleum technician and active member of the 
ASTMS union) and Justus Tshungu (an African South African) argued against withdrawal. Before the 
'trial', the jury was divided 42 per cent in favour, 56 per cent against, with 2 per cent undecided.
101. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London, 1978), p. 285.
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these contradictions exposes a multitude of ideological tensions. It also demonstrates that the international 
media treatment of South Africa reveals at least as much about the international media, as it does about 
South Africa.
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APPENDIX A.
i). A brief biographical index of the newspaper correspondents and stringers in 
South Africa,
ii). A guide to the syndication systems which interlocked the news organisations.
iii). Newspaper circulation figures (1970s).
iv). Editors and Publishers of the major British, American and South African 
newspapers and news-magazines.
v). Additional details relating to the interviews conducted for the thesis.
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Appendix A. i. Correspondents and Stringers.
This list of correspondents and stringers is by no means comprehensive. If one included all the journalists 
employed by the news agencies and the freelance reporters who covered South Africa during the 1970s, the 
number would stretch to more than one hundred people. The thirty-six journalists whose brief biographical 
details appear below were amongst the most regularly published. All unspecified quotations are from the 
interviews conducted for this thesis. Other stringers or visiting staff-writers are provided with supporting 
biographical data within the relevant chapters. For further information on the editors and columnists of the 
newspapers, see Who's Who 1996: An Annual Biographical Dictionary (London, 1996), Who's Who in 
America; 1996. Volumes 1 & 2 (New Jersey, 1996) and Dennis Griffiths, The Encyclopedia of the British 
Press. 1422-1992 (London, 1992). The charts which follow this biographical index list the bureau chiefs of 
the news agencies and American broadcasting companies, the Africa correspondents of the Christian 
Science Monitor, the stringers of the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Tim es, and the BBC radio 
correspondents.
Resident Staff Correspondents.
1. Michael Knipe. The Times, to 1975. Southern Africa.
Based in Cape Town, where he shared an office with Stanley Uys and David Loshak, Knipe was the second 
Times correspondent to report from South Africa following the re-opening of the newspaper's bureau in 
1968. His previous posting had been New York (1969-1971). The first Times correspondent in South 
Africa had been Dan van der Vat, who was not an Afrikaner but a Briton of Dutch extraction. Following his 
three years in South Africa, Knipe became the Times correspondent in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe (1975-1977). 
Knipe was bom in 1939.
2. David Loshak. Daily & Sunday Telegraph, to 1973. South Africa.
Loshak's previous postings had been in West Africa (mid-1960s) and India. He did not find covering South 
Africa a particularly happy experience due to personal problems and the sense of international isolation in 
the Republic. Loshak recalls that Stanley Uys exerted a benevolent influence over his work at the time. He 
returned to London to become the Daily Telegraph's Health correspondent. Loshak was bom in 1933.
3. Christopher Mimnion. Daily & Sunday Telegraph, from 1974. Southern Africa.
Like David Loshak, with whom he had competed for postings, Munnion was one of the 'rising stars' of the 
Daily Telegraph during the late 1960s. However, unlike Loshak, Munnion specialised in 'fireman' 
reporting; brief visits to 'trouble-spots'. His first visit to Africa had been in 1967. He recalls that he barely 
covered South Africa before the unrest of 1976: 'The Telegraph's priority was Rhodesia.' His position on 
South Africa was in line with that of the Telegraph. (See, for example, Munnion's articles in favour of 
Vorster's policies following the South African prime minister's 'give me six months' speech in 1974: 
'Christopher Munnion, 'Vorster's long trek to realism', & 'South Africa's path to dignity', Daily Telegraph. 
18 March & 5 May 1975.) In 1977, Munnion began to write a 'quickie' book on Biko with James 
MacManus (The Guardian). The book was abandoned when Donald Woods's account of the murdered 
black consciousness leader was published. Munnion continued to be the Telegraph’s correspondent in South 
Africa throughout the 1980s. In 1993, he wrote Banana Sunday: Datelines From Africa, a humorous 
discourse on the decline of the traditional foreign correspondent. Munnion continues to live in 
Johannesburg.
4. Tom Lambert. Los Angeles Times, 1974-1976. Southern Africa.
Lambert was a veteran correspondent who had served in World War II. After the war, he worked for AP. 
Time and the New York Herald-Tribune covering the Chinese revolution, the Korean war, West Germany 
and the Soviet Union. He joined the Los Angeles Times in 1963 and served as diplomatic correspondent 
and bureau chief in Tel Aviv and London. He arrived in South Africa in 1974 to open the Los Angeles 
Times bureau before his retirement in 1976. Lambert died in 1996, aged eighty-three.
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5. Nicholas Ashford. The Times, from 1975. Southern Africa.
Ashford was certainly amongst the most gifted of the correspondents who covered the Republic during the 
mid-1970s. Within a few months of arriving in the country, he interviewed Robert Sobukwe, who was 
subject to a banning order. The ensuing article, ’The silent triumph of a black South African', The Times. 27 
Oct. 1975, '... conveyed the flavour of banishment [in Kimberley, and] was an accurate summation of the 
thinking of a man whom the government wanted to consign to political oblivion. It was a report which no 
one else had dared write, and yet Nick did it - and with such skill that he could not be accused of flouting 
the banning restrictions.' (Benjamin Pogrund, 'Obituary: Nicholas Ashford', The Independent. 12 Feb. 
1990). During the extended strike at the Times (1978-1979). Ashford contributed articles to the Spectator. 
Ashford left South Africa in 1981 to take up the post of Washington correspondent. He died in 1990, aged 
forty-seven.
6. John Burns. New York Times, from 1976. Southern Africa.
Bums was a Canadian who had been educated in England. He had previously covered China for the 
Toronto Globe and Mail. He joined the New York Times in 1974 and in 1976 was sent to South Africa as 
the first New York Times resident correspondent in the Republic since the expulsion of Joseph Lelyveld, 
ten years earlier. Burns ran into trouble immediately following his arrival in the country when the veracity 
of an article in which he had quoted Eschel Rhoodie (John Burns, 'South African aide bars military role in 
Rhodesia', New York Times. 14 May 1976) was challenged by the aforesaid Secretary for Information. 
Bums understood his (and the New York Times's] message to the South African government to be: 'We are 
not South Africa's enemy. Our job is to tell South Africa's story, black and white - on both sides, as fully as 
we possibly can.' During an average year, Bums would spend up to one third of his time in Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe and other southern African countries. He was the only foreign correspondent to publish an 
interview with Steve Biko before his death (John F. Burns, 'A jailed black relays warning to Kissinger', 
New York Times. 19 Sept. 1976). However, Bums was described by one anti-apartheid activist as '... 
sound[ing] like a public relations man for the South African government... he rarely interviews [Africans] 
unless the man is seated in an office wearing a coat and tie ... Burns might easily win an award for the worst 
continuing coverage of South Africa.' (Karen Rothmyer, 'U.S. Press: Telling it like it isn't', Southern Africa. 
Dec. 1978, p. 26). Bums recalls that the South African government'... never allowed me to forget that the 
axe was not far away.' John Bums was bom in 1945.
7. June Goodwin. Christian Science Monitor. 1976-1979. Africa.
June Goodwin was a Christian Scientist (as indeed were the other Christian Science M onitor 
correspondents of the period). She recalled that she was naive about the subject of apartheid before arriving 
in the country: 'Before I left N airobi... I told my roommate, a black American, "Look, I'm going to be very 
objective about South Africa. Those white people must have reasons for what they do and I want to find out 
what they are".' (June Goodwin, Crv Amandla! South African Women and the Question of Power [New 
York, 1984], p. 3.) Goodwin was one of the few correspondents who became politically engaged by the 
struggle in South Africa. By the end of her term in South Africa, she was later told th a t '... one of the editors 
at the Monitor said that I was becoming too involved.' As a journalist who had interviewed Steve Biko 
(although the interview was not published until after his death), she recalls her amazement at the discovery 
that the Reuters' chief correspondent had never heard of the African leader. In 1977, Goodwin was given 
the Overseas Press Club Madeline Dane Ross award for international reporting that showed a concern for 
humanity. During the same year, she also developed a productive friendship with Thenjiwe Mtintso, an 
African political activist and journalist on the (East London) Daily Dispatch. (For details on Goodwin's 
relationship with Mtintso, see Goodwin, Crv Amandla, pp. 4-6, 13-23, 199-200). In 1978, Karen Rothmyer 
suggested that '... June Goodwin ... would be a strong contender for an award for the best [continuing 
coverage of South Africa].' (Karen Rothmyer, 'U.S. Press: Telling it like it isn't', Southern Africa, Dec. 
1978, p. 26).
8. Jack Foisie. Los Angeles Times, from 1976. Southern Africa.
Foisie was a veteran reporter who started his journalistic career during World War II and served extended 
terms in Vietnam and the Middle East. He arrived in South Africa in the midst of the Soweto uprising. He 
tended to spend two-thirds of the year in the Republic, and one-third elsewhere. David Lamb (Los Angeles 
Times correspondent in Nairobi, from 1976) describes Foisie thus: 'Jack wasn't a political reporter ... [he] 
was more of a street reporter - he was comfortable with average people - on the street, in the bush - and not 
necessarily in government offices.' Foisie, feels, in retrospect, that it took him some time to get on top of 
the South African story. He recalls, in particular, that 'I wasn't as good as I should have been at cultivating 
black sources.' In 1979, Foisie was criticised for writing like a nineteenth century commentator in his
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coverage of the war in Shaba. (Robert Cuddy, 'An analysis of Los Angeles Times coverage', Ufahamu, Vol. 
IX, No. 1, 1979, p. 20).
9. Quentin Peel. Financial Times, from 1977. Southern Africa.
Johannesburg was Quentin Peel's first overseas posting for the Financial Times. In the Republic, he retained 
the assistance of the Financial Mail reporter, Bernard Simon, while relinquishing the majority of the other 
local Financial Times stringers. Unlike his predecessor, Stewart Dalby, Peel was a full staff correspondent. 
Visits from Bridget Bloom (the Africa editor) and the foreign editor declined accordingly. Unlike a number 
of his contemporaries, Peel concentrated his attention on the Republic, although Rhodesia-Zimbabwe was 
also a prime concern. He also widened the focus of the Financial Times's coverage, adding a variety of 
political and social stories to the usual economic analysis. (See, for example, Quentin Peel, 'Condemned to 
silence', Financial Times. 28 Nov. 1977).
10. Eric Marsden. Sunday Times, from 1977. Southern Africa.
Marsden was appointed staff correspondent in South Africa by the Sunday Times during the autumn of 
1976. Between 1957 and 1970, Marsden had worked for the East Africa Standard, ending his association 
with the newspaper as deputy-editor. From 1970 to 1976, he was the Middle East correspondent of the 
Sunday Times. Marsden's first attempt to enter South Africa was, however, thwarted by the Department of 
Information, who refused his application for a work permit. He finally settled in the Republic in 1977. He 
recalls: 'What I found in South Africa was that whatever I wanted to do, there were red hot local reporters 
and foreign correspondents who were already ahead of me. It wasn't the kind of situation where you could 
unearth something that nobody was going for and so I was much less effective in South Africa than I 
wanted to be, or than I had been in the Middle East.1 Marsden was fifty years old when he arrived in South 
Africa.
11. Michael Nicholson. ITN, from 1977. Africa.
Nicholson had been an ITN war correspondent since 1968. In the years before 1977, he had functioned 
mainly as a 'fireman' in countries as varied as Nigeria, Jordan, India, Israel, Cyprus, Vietnam, Cambodia 
and Angola. He opened the ITN bureau in Johannesburg in 1977, although the bulk of his coverage was 
concerned with Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Nicholson later wrote an account of his years as a war correspondent, 
A Measure of Danger: Memoirs of a British War Correspondent (London, 1991). Only a handful of pages 
are devoted to his days in South Africa. He recalls with some regret, however, that the television 
representations constructed by ITN were loaded with stereotypes. I f '... you interviewed the whites in South 
Africa, you always interviewed them by the [swimming] pool.' In the case of Africans, '... you'd go to the 
worst part of Soweto and sit them outside a pile of garbage.'
12. William McWhirter. Time, from 1977. Southern Africa.
McWhirter arrived in South Africa with Time's editor, Henry Grunwald, in 1977 to re-open the Time 
bureau, fifteen years after the news-magazine had been excluded from the country. He had previously 
covered the war in Vietnam. He felt that life in Sandton was too distant from the South African story and 
relocated to a five-star hotel in the centre of Johannesburg. He found that his hotel accommodation made 
him more accessible to visiting celebrities and African sources. McWhirter left research on sensitive 
subjects, such as military intelligence to T im e's stringer, Peter Hawthorne. He recalls th a t '... everybody 
knew what I was saying and saying in a journal that went outside South Africa.'
13. John Humphrys. BBC, from 1977. Africa.
Humphrys had previously been the BBC's correspondent in the United States, where he had covered the 
Watergate scandal. He recalls that his term in southern Africa was dominated by the story in Rhodesia- 
Zimbabwe. He felt that the situation in the Republic was heading towards an apocalyptic conclusion: 'There 
is a temptation, after one's initial exposure to the South African system, to curse the government for its 
stupidity as much as its brutality in removing from circulation so many men who might - just might - help 
reduce the risk of confrontation in favour of consultation. The bannings must end scream the instant 
experts. Nelson Mandela and company must be released if there is to be any hope of avoiding the 
bloodshed. Perhaps, but, after three years in South Africa, I am coming to believe that such a reaction - 
however well-meaning - misses the point. The purpose of discussion is to reach a compromise. I do not 
believe that the South African government is in search of such a compromise.' (John Humphrys, 'Farewell 
to South Africa: 'A country not yet at war, but no longer at peace', The Listener. 7 Aug. 1980). Humphrys 
was thirty-three years old when he arrived in South Africa.
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Visiting Staff Correspondents.
14. Charles Mohr. New York Times, to 1975. Eastern and southern Africa.
Refused a residency visa for South Africa, Mohr covered the Republic on an annual or twice-yearly basis. 
His previous career had involved a stint for Time in Vietnam (1962-1963) following which, he left in 
protest at the magazine's editorial position. (David Halberstam, 'Time Inc.'s internal war over Vietnam1, 
Esquire. Jan. 1978, pp. 94-131). He then returned to Vietnam for the New York Times. Mohr was 
apparently offered the opportunity to be the New York Times's correspondent in South Africa (1975), but 
the Department of Information were not willing to permit him to be accompanied by his adopted 
Vietnamese daughter. He died in 1989, aged sixty.
15. Bridget Bloom. Financial Times. Africa.
Bloom made her reputation reporting the Biafran War. In 1968, she joined the Financial Times. In 1969, 
she started a twelve-year term as Africa editor for the newspaper. She recalls that she didn't turn her 
attention to South Africa until 1973. However, in the years before the Financial Times placed a 
correspondent in the country (1977), Bloom visited the Republic regularly. She felt that the newspaper's 
dependence upon stringers from the (Johannesburg) Financial Mail occasionally led to timid reports: 'While 
they were very good, they were much like the FT at that lime - rather cautious.' Bloom worked closely with 
Stewart Dalby while he was resident in South Africa. Her relationship with John Vorster was particularly 
difficult. The South African prime minister once walked out halfway through an interview which Bloom 
was conducting with him.
16. Colin Leguin. The Observer. Africa.
Legum was born in South Africa and emigrated from the country following the election of the National 
Parly in 1948. He had previously been active in the South African Labour Party. In Britain, Legum joined 
The Observer, where he was eventually appointed to the post of Commonwealth correspondent. He also 
had a long association with the Africa Bureau. By the 1960s, Legum was considered by some to be '... the 
doyen of Western African correspondents, making The Observer an unrivalled centre of intelligence and 
enterprise on African issues'. (Richard Cockett, David Astor and The Observer [London, 1991], p. 182). 
Although Legum was opposed to apartheid, the scale of his influence over the coverage of Africa, attracted 
some criticism from younger journalists and anti-apartheid campaigners. In addition to his work for The 
O bserver. Legum also edited the annual Africa Contemporary Record. He was a passionate anti­
communist.
17. James MacManus. The Guardian, from 1974. Africa.
Having reported on the activities of BOSS agents in London ('Campus spy returns to South Africa', The 
Guardian. 26 March 1973), MacManus was refused a work permit to enter South Africa in 1975, following 
his appointment as Africa correspondent by The Guardian. In the spring of 1977, MacManus was allowed 
to enter South Africa and he returned regularly over the next two years. MacManus travelled widely 
throughout Africa during the late 1970s.
18. David Ottawav. Washington Post from 1974. Africa.
Ottaway had covered the Algerian war during the early 1960s. He returned to Africa, as the Washington 
Post's successor to Jim Hoagland in 1972. Two years later he was upgraded to staff correspondent status. 
Ottaway's experiences with South African visa and work permit regulations were very similar to James 
MacManus's. He was finally permitted a multi-entry visa in 1976. When Ottaway was visiting South 
Africa, his reports tended to take priority over the work of the Post's stringers, Robin Wright and Caryle 
Murphy.
19. David Martin. The Observer & BBC, from 1974. Africa.
Martin, a British citizen, had been resident in Africa since 1964, during which time he had reported for a 
number of different news organisations. From 1974, he reported solely for The Observer and the BBC's 
Africa Service. During the Angolan War, Martin reported from both MPLA and UNITA territory. 
However, his coverage of South Africa was limited by the fact that he remained banned from entering the 
Republic throughout the 1970s. There was one exception to this banning: Martin was allowed to 
accompany David Owen, during the British Foreign Secretary's tour of South Africa. Although not 
permitted to enter the country, Martin still managed to break a number of South African-related stories 
from Lusaka and London.
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20. A.J. Mcllroy. Daily (& Sunday) Telegraph, from 1976.
Mcllroy was a Telegraph 'fireman', whose basic job description appears to have been to be available to 
cover disparate stories at a moment's notice. In 1973, Mcllroy had reported from Nairobi. During the 
Angolan war, he covered the conflict from Luanda until he was expelled in Jan. 1976 (see chapter six). He 
reported from South Africa on a number of occasions during the late 1970s, when Christopher Munnion 
was on vacation or in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Mcllroy later covered the Falklands War.
Resident South African Stringers.
21. Stanley Uys. New Statesman (to 1976), The Guardian, The Observer. BBC & ITN.
Uys was somewhat of a legend amongst journalists in South Africa. His multitude of strings, which had 
been more extensive during the 1960s, was only equalled by Peter Hawthorne. Uys was a liberal Afrikaner 
who had been appointed political correspondent of the (Johannesburg) Sunday Times in 1949. During the 
1950s, he had been the stringer for the News Chronicle. His speciality in South Africa was the study of the 
vagaries of Afrikaner politics; he was, in effect, a South African version of a 'Kremlinologist'. Uys's foreign 
editors on the liberal British publications viewed him as something more than a mere stringer because the 
newspapers in question were not permitted to employ a staff correspondent in the country. Uys also wrote 
and broadcasted extensively for the Irish, New Zealand, Australian and Indian media. He left South Africa 
in 1977, in order to become the SAAN bureau chief in London. Uys continued to write a column in the 
Rand Daily Mail, and comment on South Africa in the British media.
22. Benjamin Pogrund. Sunday Times, to 1976; Boston Globe & New Republic, from 1976.
Pogrund possesses the distinction of being the first 'African Affairs reporter’ to be appointed by any 
newspaper in South Africa. This historic event occurred during the 1950s when Pogrund was employed by 
Laurence Gandar of the Rand Daily Mail. In the mid-1960s, Pogrund was prosecuted during the infamous 
prisons trial. Although he was not imprisoned, his passport was withdrawn for a number of years. By the 
early 1970s, he was the night editor of the Rand Daily Mail and stringer for the Sunday Times. Pogrund 
recalls th a t '... either [the Sunday Timesl would send me a request, but more often, I made the running - 1 
made an offer - 1 promoted the story.' In addition to his work for the Sunday Times, he also contributed the 
occasional article to a multitude of publications from The Spectator and The Economist to Africa Report 
and the Atlantic Monthly. In 1972, Pogrund was given a nine-month suspended sentence for possessing 
copies of banned publications which he needed for an academic thesis on which he was working. Four 
years later, while on a work-exchange between the Rand Daily Mail and the Boston Globe, Pogrund found 
himself interpreting the Soweto uprising for Boston. For six months he explained the situation in the 
Republic to television viewers, Nieman fellows and the readers of the Boston Globe. He later recalled that 
there was alm ost'... total ignorance of South Africa' in the U.S.. Returning to South Africa in 1977, he was 
appointed deputy editor of the Rand Daily Mail. He continued to write for American publications, although 
as he remembers: '... with the Globe. I usually had to do a harder sell [than with the Sunday Timesl.'
23. Peter Youiighusband. Washington Post (to 1974), Newsweek & Daily Mail.
Younghusband was an Afrikaner who adopted the nom de plume of a famous correspondent from the 
nineteenth century. Following an extended period as the Daily M ail's representative in Africa, 
Younghusband added the Newsweek and Washington Post strings to his workload. Christopher Munnion's 
book. Banana Sunday recollects a number of Younghusband's amusing adventures. Within South Africa, he 
attracted the venom of the Department of Information (see chapter three). Although as Younghusband 
recalls: 'There was nothing [Rhoodie] could do about me because I was a South African. He couldn't deport 
me. I had, in effect, become Newsweek's Trojan Horse.' Younghusband, was perhaps most renowned 
amongst the correspondents and stringers in South Africa for possessing an ability to stretch any story to its 
maximum number of words. His political position might best be described as apolitical.
24. Allister Sparks. The Economist.
Sparks had a long track history as a political columnist in the South African press, in which he had made 
his name in the 1950s and 1960s. He was The Econom ist's chief contributor throughout the 1970s. He 
rarely wrote for any other foreign publication at this time, concentrating his attentions on editing the 
(Johannesburg) Sunday Express (1976-1977) and the Rand Daily Mail (from 1977). While at the Rand 
Daily Mail, he bore the brunt of the opprobrium which was associated with publishing the details relating to
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the Muldergate scandal.
25. Humphrey Tyler. Christian Science Monitor.
Tyler gained recognition when he was the first journalist to report the Sharpeville massacre (March 1960). 
At the time he was writing for Drum. By 1962, he was the editorial director of the African newspaper, The 
World. His recollections of these days have recently been published as Life in the Time of Sharpeville - and 
wayward seeds of a new South Africa (Cape Town, 1995). During the 1970s, Tyler divided his time 
between being assistant editor of The Arcus (Cape Town) and the chief stringer for the Christian Science 
M onitor. As the M onitor rarely had a staff correspondent resident in South Africa until 1976, Tyler's 
observations of the news in South Africa were carried relatively regularly by the newspaper.
26. Donald Woods. New Statesman & The Observer. 1976-1977.
Woods was, thoughout the first half of the 1970s, the editor of a regional South African newspaper: the 
(East London) Daily Dispatch. He began to report for the foreign press following the Soweto uprising. 
However, judging by the small number of articles which appeared under his byline during the sixteen 
months until his banning in Oct. 1977, it would be an accurate assessment to conclude that Woods was not 
particularly concerned with 'selling the story'. He recalls that writing for the foreign press was a minor 
consideration. One article on Steve Biko, however, was widely syndicated by the international media: 'By 
normal standards, I am a fairly conservative sort of bloke, not unduly naive and not easily impressed by 
politicians. But I'll tell you one thing - make a note of the name Steve Biko and remember it well. One way 
or another it will be writ large in the South Africa of tomorrow.' (Donald Woods, 'Remember the name 
well', Rand Daily Mail. 27 Aug. 1976). Woods played a very important role in facilitating links between 
African journalists and the international media and introducing Steve Biko to the foreign press; he arranged 
John Burns's meeting with Biko, for example. Following the murder of Steve Biko in Sept. 1977, Woods 
abandoned the constraints of journalism: 'On 12 September [1977], I stopped being a journalist and became 
an activist.' (See chapter four). Woods published Biko (London, 1978).
27. Patrick Laurence. The Guardian, from 1977.
In 1973, Laurence received a suspended jail sentence for quoting a banned person (Robert Sobukwe) in an 
article which he had attempted to smuggle out of South Africa for publication in The Observer. (Stanley 
Uys, 'S. African journalist sentenced', The Observer. 5 Aug. 1973). By 1976, he had moved from the 
(Johannesburg) Star to the Rand Daily Mail, where his primary function was to rewrite the copy of African 
reporters. As he informed Marion Whitehead: 'Blacks were less inclined to question eye-witness accounts 
and were more likely to give credibility to police brutality. White reporters in supervisory positions were 
more critical and subjected news reports to tests, for example, talking to the reporters, getting police 
comment and comparing the two reports.' (Marion Whitehead, 'The Black Gatekeepers: A Study of Black 
Journalists on Three Daily Newspapers which Covered the Soweto Uprising of 1976', unpublished B.A. 
thesis, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, 1978, p. 87.) Laurence inherited Stanley Uys's Guardian string in 
1977, although he was far less prolific in his output. Richard Gott, the Guardian's foreign news editor at the 
time, recalls that Laurence was '... a very nice guy but his copy didn't sing.'
28. Roger Ornond. New Statesman. 1977-1978.
During the 1970s, Omond worked as an editorial writer and assistant editor for the (East London) Daily 
Dispatch, the newspaper he had joined as a graduate in the 1960s. He began to write regularly for the 
international media in 1976. In 1978, he followed the Daily Dispatch's editor, Donald Woods, into political 
exile in Britain: 'It looked as though we were back into post-Sharpeville.' He continued to write and 
campaign against apartheid. Omond died in 1996, he was fifty-one.
Resident Stringers.
29. Peter Hawthorne. Time, Daily Express. New York Times & BBC. Southern Africa.
After concluding his national service in Kenya during the 1950s, Hawthorne (a British citizen) joined the 
South African Argus Company and proceeded to report from various African countries. In 1962, in the 
aftermath of the exclusion of many news organisations from South Africa, Hawthorne began to collect the 
various remunerative strings which would later provide his income. In 1964, he ended his relationship with 
the (Johannesburg) Star, to concentrate on his stringing activities. Two years later, he was appointed by 
Joseph Lelyveld to operate as a stringer for the New York Times, during the newspaper's exclusion from
-233-
the country. Following a short period, in which (in conjunction with Ray Kennedy), Hawthorne appears to 
have been responsible for the majority of print reports emerging from South Africa, he settled down to the 
four strings listed above. He summarises the style and subject matter of the reports which were required as 
follows: BBC: brief and concise - 150 words or one-and-a-half minutes; Tim e: a detailed report; Daily 
Express: a concentration on sensational racial stories; New York Times: 'I'd make it read like my insurance 
policy ... because [the New York Times wasl so d u ll... just let it run and run.' The telegram which was sent 
to him by the BBC on 16 June 1976 read: 'Interested in Agency Reports that 10,000 school-children rioted 
in Soweto.’ Hawthorne felt that some of the innovations in press relations introduced by the Department of 
Information during the 1970s were beneficial: 'Suddenly for the first time we were recognised as a resident 
force to be acknowledged.' He also believed that television coverage of the Republic transformed the nature 
of the story; '... both the British and American press were absolutely captives of television. News editors 
saw pictures on television and they wanted a story that was the same sort of picture.' Hawthorne continues 
to live in South Africa and report for Time magazine.
30. Ray Kennedy. AP (to 1975), The Times, Daily & Sunday Telegraph & Daily M inor. South Africa. 
Kennedy, who was British, had worked for the Daily Mail in London during the early 1960s. He met and 
married a South African woman and emigrated to the Republic in the mid-1960s. Having worked for both 
the Rand Daily Mail and the (Johannesburg) Sunday Express and become disenchanted with the quality of 
South African journalism, Kennedy decided to work with Peter Hawthorne as a stringer. After one year, 
Kennedy left Hawthorne to work on his own. He took the Daily Telegraph and Daily Mirror strings with 
him. Michael Knipe later invited him to string for the Times. During the 1970s, his specialities included 
mining and South-West Africa-Namibia.
31. Robin Wright. Washington Post. 1974-1977, Christian Science Monitor. 1975-1976 (Angola and
Mozambique) & CBS, from 1976. Southern Africa.
In 1974, Wright (an American citizen) went to southern Africa on a grant from the Alicia Patterson 
Foundation. Originally she operated as a stringer for The Argus (Cape Town), before taking over Peter 
Younghusband's Washington Post string. In 1975, Wright gained a degree of recognition for her work in 
Mozambique and Angola, which was published in the Christian Science Monitor. In 1976, she applied for 
the post of correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor but was unsuccessful. During the same year, 
she began stringing for CBS radio and television. In 1977, she was replaced as stringer for the Washington 
Post by Caryle Murphy, whereupon she concentrated her efforts on work for CBS. She regularly worked in 
both South Africa and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. Wright was heavily criticised by an anti-apartheid activist, 
Lynne Watson, in a letter to a member of the Washington Post foreign staff: '... too often she gives readers 
the dubious generality, followed by a quote from a Rhodesian white. She appears never to ask a Rhodesian 
or South African official a tough question. Her coverage is marked by paternalism toward blacks and 
neglect of black opinion (in Rhodesia especially), superficiality of political analysis, and cultural 
chauvinism.' (Lynne Watson, Unpublished letter to Julian Ross, 9 April 1977, Africa News archive).
32. Stewart Dalby. Financial Times, 1975-1976. Southern Africa.
Dalby had previously covered the Vietnam war, remaining in the country after the fall of Saigon. He was 
sent to southern Africa by the Financial Times because the newspaper expected the region to be a suitable 
location for a war correspondent. Dalby was unhappy in South Africa and returned to London within twelve 
months. He recalls that while in the Republic, he had personal problems, which were a form of delayed 
reaction to the amount of time that he had spent in war-zones.
33. Denis Herbstein. Sunday Times, The Guardian & BBC, 1975-1976. Southern Africa.
Herbstein, who had been born in South Africa, worked for the Cape Times during the 1960s, before joining 
the Sunday Times in London in 1968. In 1975, he took leave from the newspaper in order to spend a year 
reporting from southern Africa. Although he was the recipient of a small retainer from the Sunday Times. 
he also arranged to string for the Guardian and the BBC. After twelve months in South Africa, he applied to 
have his South African passport renewed - this request was denied because he had taken up British 
nationality in 1974. Herbstein was instructed that from henceforth he would need to make a standard 
application to visit the country. (Denis Herbstein, 'Why Vorster is kicking me out', Sunday Times. 7 Nov.
1976). In Britain, he continued to write reports which publicised the activities of the Anti-Apartheid 
Movement. Herbstein recalls that 'I never wanted the [white] South African point of view ... I am afraid I 
was a pretty subjective reporter. I just hated apartheid.'
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34. Bruce Loudon. Daily & Sunday Telegraph, from 1975. Southern Africa.
During the early 1970s, Loudon was the Financial Times and Daily & Sunday Telegraph stringer in 
Portugal (and the Portuguese colonies). Having being dismissed from the Financial Times, Loudon reported 
from Angola for the Telegraph (see chapter six). He arrived in South Africa in 1976 and continued to 
supply reports to the Telegraph when Christopher Munnion or A.J. Mcllroy were not available. Loudon 
also worked for the (Johannesburg) Sunday Times, under the editorship of Tertius Myburgh. A number of 
my interviewees have suggested that Loudon was born in South Africa. He is also thought to have been 
closely involved with a number of intelligence agencies.
35. Caryle Murphy. Washington Post, from 1977. Southern Africa.
Caryle Murphy had started her journalism career by settling in Angola in 1974 and learning to speak 
Portuguese. Peter Younghusband provided her with a link to the Washington Post and recommended that 
she remain in Luanda because Angola was going to become a major story. She reported for the Washington 
Post throughout the Angolan war until she was expelled from the country in Aug. 1976. The Washington 
Post brought her back to the United States for one year's training before dispatching her to South Africa to 
take over from Robin Wright. Murphy was upgraded to correspondent status some years later. Her first 
reports from the Republic dealt with the inquest into Steve Biko’s death. Murphy recalls that when she 
arrived in South Africa, '... the black confrontation ... was happening in the streets, in the newspapers, you 
could meet the people - you could talk to them - it had drama! After the inquest into Biko's death and 
because of all the bannings and the fear and the repression, things quietened down.1 By 1980, '... it was 
almost as if black resistance had received a lobotomy.' Murphy continued to focus her attention on the 
iniquities of apartheid and became the subject of some attention from BOSS. Caryle Murphy was born in 
1946.
36. Andrew Silk, The Nation, 1976-1978. South Africa.
Andrew Silk was the son of Leonard Silk, an economics specialist on the editorial board of the New York 
Times. Silk visited South Africa for one year in 1974, where he worked as a visiting reporter on the Pretoria 
News and the Rand Daily Mail. Having completed his degree in the United States, he returned to South 
Africa on a Thomas J. Watson fellowship. In the Republic, Silk researched working and housing conditions 
of African migrant workers in Modderdam, near Cape Town. During his research visit to South Africa, Silk 
contributed a number of exceptional articles to The Nation. He left the country in Sept. 1977 following his 
arrest for being in Guguletu township without a permit. He continued to write on the subject of apartheid 
for The Nation. In 1980, his book, A Shanty Town In South Africa: The Story of Modderdam was 
published by Ravan Press, Johannesburg. Silk died in 1981, aged twenty-eight.
BBC Radio 
Correspondents.
AP
Bureau Chiefs.
UP!
Bureau Chiefs.
Reuters
Correspondents.
Wall Street Journal 
Stringers.
1972 Angus McDermid. Kenneth Whiting. Mike Keats. Bill Humphries. Neil Behrmann.
1973 John Osman.
1974
Larry Heinzerling. John Platter.
1975 Clive Small.
Peter Mosley.
1976
[Graham Leach],
Stephen Mulholland.
1977
John Simpson.
1978
David McNeil. Bill Nicholson. Nat Gibson.
1979
Christian Science Monitor 
Africa Correspondents.
CBS.
Bureau Chiefs.
ABC.
Bureau Chiefs.
NBC.
Bureau Chiefs.
Financial Times. 
Chief Stringers.
1972 Frederic Hunter. Graham Hatton.
1973 Henry Hayward.
1974
1975
1976
June Goodwin.
1977 Rex Ellis. Tom Ackerman. Bernard Simon.
Douglas Sefton.
1978 Howard Tuckner.
Robert Harris. Martin Fletcher.
1979 Gary Thatcher.
* the underlining of a name signifies South African birth.
Appendix A. ii. Syndication networks I: Print media.
.The Times [R/A/U].New York Times [R/A/U].
NYT News Service.
International Herald Tribune.
Sunday Times [R/U].Washington Post [R/A/U].,
Newsweek.
Observer Foreign News Service.
.LAT-WPNews Service.
Los Angeles Times [R/A/U|f The Observer [R/A].
The Guardian Weekly.
Tlifc Guardian [R/A/U].Chicago Tribune [R/A].,
Wall Street Journal [A/U]. .Daily/Sunday Telegraph [R/A/U].
Financial Times [R/A/U].Christian ScienceJVIonitor [R/U].
CSM Weekly.
The Economist.
Key:
R - Reuters. 
A -AP.
U - UPI.
Syndication networks II: Broadcast media.
ABC.- ITN.
fPITN (UPI).
BBC.
Wisnews (Reuters).-
CBSr
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Appendix A. iii. Circulation figures.
Com parative circulations and prices o f  
broadsheet dailies 1967-1981
T h e T im es 6 d D . T elegraph 4 d Guardian 5 d Financial 
T im es 6d
C om m en ts
1967 349 ,168 1,392,328 284,860 149,312 8 d
1968 408,301 1,393,094 S d 274,638 6 d 159,536
1969 431,721 8 d 1,380,435 291,310 171,790 9d
1970 3 8 8 ,406  9d  
Is
1,409,009 6 d 303,717 8d  
9d
169,901 Is
1971 339 ,948 1,445,705 7d  
3p
4p
331,723 4p  
5p
170,466 6p
1972 340 ,288 1,433,558 339,078 188,485
1973 344 ,840  6p 1,419,487 345,766 194,290 D . T elegraph: 
c lo sed  N ov . 
du e  to  s trike
1974 3 4 5 ,400  8p 1,406,134 5p
6p
359,169 6p
8p
194,592 7p
8p
D . T elegraph: 
c lo sed  Jan. 
du e to  strike
1975 318 ,565  W p 1,330,788 7p 319,417 lOp 180,507 W p
1976 30 9 ,560  12p 1,308,020 8p 305,289 12p 175,156
1977 298 ,443  I5p 1,318,124 9p 279,513 ISp 177,546 12p FT: c lo sed  
A u g . du e  to 
s tr ike
D . Telegraph: 
c lo se d  Jan. 
a n d  A p r . due  
to  s tr ike  
Tim es: c lo sed  
Jan. a n d  M ar. 
du e to  strike
1978 295,864 1,358,875 2S3.494 181,67S W p D . Telegraph: 
c lo sed  M ar., 
A p r . a n d  O ct. 
du e to strike  
T im es: c lo sed  
b y
m an agem en t
1979 360,257 1,493,827 I Op 388,304
est
204,609 20p
est
D . Telegraph: 
c lo sed  A p r. 
a n d  June due  
to  s tr ike  
Tim es: c lo sed  
Jan. to  N o v . 6
1980 297 ,392  20p 1,439,455 12p 
15p
377,016 ISp 197,097 2Sp D . Telegraph: 
c lo sed  M ay  
due to  strike
1981 289,987 1,371,471 I8p 395,719 20p 198,488 30p
Extract from John Grigg.The History of The Times. Volume VI: The Thomson Years, 1966-1981 (London, 
1993), pp. 580-581.
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Observer
Sunday Telegraph
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Extract from Jeremy Tunstall, Newspaper Power The New National Press in Britain (Oxford, 1996), p. 49.
New York Times. 854,000 (daily); 1,460,000 (Sunday). [1979].
Washington Post. 601,417 (daily); 827,938 (Sunday). [1980],
Los Angeles Times. 1,020,987 (daily); 1,309,677 (Sunday). [1979].
Wall Street Journal. 1,798,416 (daily). [1980].
Chicago Tribune. 789,767 (daily); 1,146,474 (Sunday). [1980].
Christian Science Monitor. 172,470 (daily). [1980],
The Economist 131344. [average, 1972-1979].
New Statesman. 49,701. [average, 1972-1979],
The Spectator. 14,022. [average, 1977-1979].
Time. 4,341,978 (domestic); 1,427,626 (international). [1973].
Newsweek. 2,716,148 (domestic); 367,057 (international). [1973],
Sunday Times (Johannesburg-). 492.645. [average, 1973-1976].
Rand Daily Mail. 146,596. [average, 1973-1976].
The Star ('Johannesburg). 186,086. [average, 1973-1976].
Sunday Express (Johannesburg1). 169,057. [average, 1973-1976].
The World. * closed 1977. 125,981. [average, 1973-1976],
The Cape Times. 74,420. [average, 1973-1976],
The Daily Dispatch (East London). 27,732. [average, 1973-1976].
The Citizen. * founded 1976. 56,928. [1976].
Financial Mail. 23,262. [1977],
All figures are extracted from John C. Merrill & Harold A. Fisher, The World's Great Dailies: Profiles of 
Fifty Newspapers (New York, 1980); Michael & Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive 
History of the Mass Media (New Jersey, 1988); George Thomas Kurian (ed.), World Press Encyclopedia. 
Volumes I & II (London, 1982); Merle Miller, 'Why the editor of Newsweek is not the editor of Time and 
vice versa', Esquire, June 1973, pp. 169-231; Benn's Press Directory (London. 1972-1980); Advertising & 
Press Annual of Africa (Cape Town. 1974-1977).
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Appendix A. iv. Editors and Publishers, 1972-1979.
Newspaper/News-magazine. Editor(s). Publisher(s).
The Times Sir William Rees-Mogg. Lord Roy Thomson (to 1976). 
Lord Kenneth Thomson.
The Guardian Alastair Hetherington (to 1975). 
Peter Preston.
The Scott Trust.
Dailv Telegraph Maurice Green (to 1974). 
W.F. Deedes.
Lord Hartwell.
Financial Times Sir Gordon Newton (to 1972). 
Fredy Fisher.
Lord Drogheda (Pearson) (to 1975) 
Alan Hare (Pearson).
Sundav Times Harold Evans. Lord Roy Thomson (to 1976). 
Lord Kenneth Thomson.
The Observer David Astor (to 1975). 
Donald Trelford.
David Astor (to 1976).
Robert Anderson (Atlantic Richfield).
Sundav Telegraph Brian Roberts (to 1976). 
John Thompson.
Lord Hartwell.
New York Times Abe Rosenthal. Arthur Ochs (Punch) Sulzberger.
The Washington Post Benjamin Bradlee. Katherine Graham (to 1979). 
Donald Graham.
The Los Angeles Times William Thomas. Otis Chandler.
The Wall Street Journal Robert L. Bartley Dow Jones & Co..
Christian Science Monitor John Hughes (to 1979). 
Earl Foel.
Christian Science Publishing Co..
The Chicago Tribune Clayton Kirkpatrick. Tribune Co-
The Economist Alastair Burnett (to 1974). 
Andrew Knight.
Economist Newspaper Ltd.. (Pearson).
The New Statesman Richard Crossman (to 1972). 
Anthony Howard (to 1978). 
Bruce Page.
The Statesman & Nation Publishing Co.
The Spectator George Gale (to 1973). 
H.D.F Creighton (to 1975). 
Alexander Chancellor.
H.D.F. Creighton.
Time Henry Grunwald (to 1977). Time-Life Inc..
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Newsweek Osborn Elliott (to 1976). 
Edward Kosner (to 1979). 
Lester Bernstein.
Katherine Graham.
The Nation Carey McWilliams (to 1976). 
Blair Clark (to 1978).
Victor Navasky.
James T. Storrow Jr.. (to 1978). 
Hamilton Fish.
New Republic Gilbert A. Harrison (to 1974). 
Martin Peretz (to 1979). 
Michael Kinsley.
Robert J. Myers (to 1979). 
Martin Peretz.
National Review William Buckley Jr.. William A. Rusher.
Tile Rand Dailv Mail Raymond Louw (to 1977). 
Allister Sparks.
SAAN.
The Star (Johannesburg) John .Tordi (to 1974). 
Harvey Tyson.
The Argus Group.
Sundav Times (Johannesburg) Joel Mervis (to 1976). 
Tertius Myburgh.
SAAN.
Sundav Express (Johannesburg) Johnny Johnson (to 1974). 
Allister Sparks (to 1977). 
Rex Gibson.
SAAN.
The World Charles Still (to 1974). 
Percy Qoboza.
The Argus Group.
The Cape Times Anthony Heard. Independent (to 1973). 
SAAN.
The Dailv Dispatch Donald Woods. Independent.
The Citizen Martin Spring (to 1976). 
M.A. Johnson.
Louis Luyt (to 1978). 
H. Jussen syndicate.
Financial Mail George Palmer (to 1976). 
Graham Hatton.
SAAN & Pearson (to 1976). 
SAAN.
Reuters was owned, during the 1970s, by The Press Association, representing the provincial daily press of 
the United Kingdom (41.5 per cent); the Newspaper Publishers Association, representing national 
newspapers based in London (41.5 percent); the Australian Associated Press, representing Australian daily 
newspapers (14 per cent); and the New Zealand Press Association, representing the daily newspapers of 
New Zealand (3 per cent). AP was a newspaper co-operative owned by its hundreds of membership 
newspapers in the United States and Canada. UPI was a subsidiary commercial interest administered by 
E,W. Scripps Co., which held a controlling interest in the agency. E.W. Scripps Co. had extensive 
newspaper interests in the Scripps-Howard Newspapers chain.
For portraits of the British newspaper proprietors, circa 1974, see The Press Proprietors - 1-8', New 
Statesman. 20 Sept.- 8 Nov. 1974, pp. 370-371; 413-414; 462-464; 500-502; 532-533; 566-568; 610-611; 
646-648. For further infonnation on the news agencies, see Oliver Boyd-Barrett, Colin Seymour-Ure & 
Jeremy Tunstall, Studies on the Press. Royal Commission on the Press Working Paper Volume 3 (London,
1977), pp. 35-43.
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J o v a n o v lc h  in 1976)
B r o a d c a s t in g :
W REG -TV , M em p h is , T e n n . 
W Q X R -A M /FM . N ew  Y ork City 
B o o k s :
Q u a d ra n g le /N Y T  B ook  C o .
A rn o  P r e s s ,  Inc.
C a m b rid g e  B o o k  C o .
TIME INC.
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 217  
1976 Total S a le s :
$ 1 ,038  billion
P R IN C IPA L  O P ER A TIO N S:
P u b lis h in g :
Time, Fortune, Sports Illustrated, 
Money, a n d  People m a g a z in e s  
a c c o u n t  fo r  3 5 %  of to ta l  re v e n u e  
T im e-L ife  B o o k s  
L ittle , B row n
N ew  Y ork G ra p h ic  S o c ie ty  
(A lva M u seu m  R e p lic a s )
M inority  I n te r e s ts  in p u b l is h e rs  in 
G e rm a n y , F ra n c e ,  S p a in , M exico , 
a n d  J a p a n  
F ilm s a n d  B ro a d c a s t in g :
T im e-L ife  F ilm s
TV p ro d u c tio n  a n d  d is t r ib u t io n ,  
m u lt im e d ia , TV b o o k s  
H om e Box O ffice  
'M a n h a t ta n  C a b le  TV 
WOTV— G ra n d  R a p id s , M ich. 
N e w s p a p e rs :
P io n e e r  P r e s s ,  In c .— 17 w eek ly  
n e w s p a p e rs  in  s u b u rb a n  C h ic a g o  
S e llin g  A re a s -M a rk e tin g , In c .
(d is tr ib u tin g  m ark e tin g  in fo rm a tio n ) 
P r in tin g  D e v e lo p m e n ts ,  Inc,
(p rin tin g  e q u ip m e n t)
O th e r:
F o re s t  P ro d u c ts :
T e m p le -E a s te x , In c . (p u lp  & p a p e r-  
> b o a rd ,  p a c k a g in g ,  b u ild in g  
m a te r ia ls ,  t im b e rla n d )
AFCO In d u s t r ie s ,  In c . ( in te rio r  w all 
p ro d u c ts )
W o o d w a rd , In c . (b ed ro o m  fu rn itu re )  
L u m b e rm a n 's  In v es tm e n t C o rp o ra tio n  
S a b in e  In v e s tm e n t C o m p an y
R C A
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 31
1976 Total S a les:
$5 .32  billion
PR IN C IPA L  O P ER A TIO N S:
E le c t ro n ic s — C o n s u m e r  p ro d u c ts  
&. s e rv ic e s  (2 5 .6 %  of to ta l  s a le s )  
E le c tro n ic s — C o m m e rc ia l p ro d u c ts  
& s e rv ic e s  (1 2 .8 %  of to ta l  s a le s )  
B ro a d c a s t in g :
NBC: o w n s  o n e  TV s ta t io n  in 
C h ic a g o , L os A n g e le s ,  C le v e la n d , 
N ew  Y ork  C ity , W a sh in g to n , D .C ., 
a n d  o n e  AM a n d  o n e  FM s ta t io n  in 
C h ic a g o , N ew  Y ork, S a n  F ra n c is c o ,  
W a sh in g to n , D .C. (1 7 .8 %  of to ta l)  
P u b lis h in g :
R an d o m  H o u se  (R a n d o m  H o u se ,
- A lfred  A . K nopf, P a n th e o n ,  Bal- 
la n tin o  B o o k s , V in ta g e , M odern  
L ibrary) (1 7 .6 %  of to ta l)'
O th e r;
B a n q u e t  F o o d s ;  C o ro n e t  ( c a rp e ts ) ;  
O rlet F o o d s  (U .K .); V e h ic le  R en tin g  
& R e la te d  S e rv ic e s  (e .g .,  H ertz): 
G o v 't B u s in e s s
GULF & W ESTERN ...
1976 Fortune 500 ,
rank: 57
1976 Total S a les: . . '
$3 .39  billion
•PRIN CIPA L O PE R A T IO N S: . ,
M a n u fa c tu r in g  (25%  of to ta l  s a te s )  
L e isu re  T im e :
P a ra m o u n t P ic tu re s — m o tio n  p ic tu re .  . 
p ro d u c t io n  S. d is tr ib u tio n ;  TV 
ex h ib it io n  &. s e r ie s  p ro d u c tio n .
O w n s: O xford  F ilm s (d is tr ib u tio n  
of n o n - th e a tr ic a l  film s), - 1
M a g lc a m , In c . ( re n ts  c a m e ra  ■ 
s y s te m s) , F u tu re  G e n e ra l C o rp . 
( r e s e a rc h ,  s p e c ia l  e f f e c ts  s e rv ic e s )  . 
C in e m a  In te rn a tio n a l  (4 9 %  In te re s t)
— o w n s  o r  o p e ra te s  fo u r th e a te rs  
in L o n d o n , o n e  in A m s te rd a m , two 
In E gyp t, 17 in B raz il, 10 in o th e r  j 
p a r ts  of S o u th  A m erica , 19 in ■ | 
S o u th  A fric a  !
F a m o u s  P la y e rs  L td. (51%  in te re s t)—  |
o w n s  o r o p e ra te s  so m e  300 . >
th e a t e r s  In C a n a d a , o n e  in  P a r is ,  1
o n d  o w n s  5 0 %  o f a F re n ch  c o m - !
p a n y  o p e ra t in g  35 th e a te r s  in 
F ra n c e
S e g a  E n te rp r is e s ,  In c .— c o in -o p e ra te d  
a m u s e m e n t g a m e s  
P u b l is h in g :  ji
S im o n  a n d  S c h u s te r— in c lu d e s  F ire ­
s id e  a n d  T o u c h s to n e  q u a lity  
p a p e rb a c k s ;  a n d  m a ss -m a rk e t  
p a p e rb a c k s  from  P o c k e t  B oo k s, 
W a sh in g to n  S q u a re  P re s s .  A rchw ay  
(1 4 %  of to ta l s a le s )
O th e r:
N a tu ra l R s s o u r c e s — z in c  a n d  c e m e n t 
(5 %  of to ta l)  • ;
A p p a re l P ro d u c ts — a p p a re l ,  h o s ie ry , .
s h o e s
P a p e r  a n d  b u ild in g  p ro d u c ts  1
(1 1 %  of to ta l)
A uto  re p la c e m e n t p a rts
(8 %  of to ta l)  !
F in a n c ia l  s e rv ic e s — c o n s u m e r  an d  
c o m m e rc ia l f in a n c in g , life in su r­
a n c e ,  c a s u a l ty  in su ra n c e  
(19%  of to ta l)
C o n s u m e r  a n d  a g r ic u ltu ra l  p ro d u c ts  
— s u g a r ;  M inute  M aid (c itru s ) :  
l iv e s to c k ;  C o n s o lid a te d  C ig a r; |
S c h ra lf t  C an d y  C o . (14%  of to ta l)  i
iI
A sample of conglomerates in the communications industry
TIMES MIRROR 
COMPANY
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 232 
1976 Total S a les:
$964.7 million
PRINCIPAL O P ER A TIO N S:.
- Newspapers:
Los Angeles Times, Newsday, Dallas 
Times Herald (Tex .), L.A. 
T im es-W ash ing ton  P o s t N ew s 
i Serv ice  (joint)
M agazine a n d  Book P u b lis h in g :  .
Now A m erican  L ibrary  ■
I S ignet, S ig n e t C la s s ic s ,  M en to r,
I M eridian p a p e rb a c k s  
Abrams art boo k s 
•. Malthow B en d er law  b o o k s  
Year Book m ed ica l b o o k s  
C.V. Mosby m ed ic a l, d e n ta l ,  a n d  
nursing b o o k s an d  jo u rn a ls  
Outdoor Li/e 
Popular Science 
Golf 
Ski
The Sporting News 
Ski Business 
How to
The Sporting Goods Dealer 
Television:
KDFW-TV. D a lla s , Tex .
KTBC-TV, A ustin , T ex .
Owns two n ew sp rin t m ills , 10 w o o d  
p roducts m ills, a n d  320 ,000  a c re s  
of tim berland  
Other:
Information S e rv ic e s  
Cable C o m m u n ica tio n s  
Directory Prin ting
THE WASHINGTON 
POST COMPANY
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 452
1976 Total S a le s :  $375.7
PRINCIPAL O PERA TIO N S: 
N ew spapers:
Washington Post, Trenton 
Times and  Sunday Times- 
Advertiser, International Herald 
Tribune (30% )
W ashington P o s t  W rite rs  G ro u p  
(syndication a n d  b o o k  p u b lish in g ) , 
L.A. T im es-W ash in g to n  P o s t  N ew s 
Service (50% )
M agazines:
Newsweek 
Books: 
j Newsweek B ooks 
B roadcasting:
WTOP-TV, W a sh in g to n . D.C.
YWXT-TV, J a c k s o n v ille ,  F la .
WPLG-TV, M iam i, F la.
WFSB-TV, H artfo rd , C o n n .
WTOP-AM, W a sh in g to n , D.C.
Other:
I Robinson T erm in al .W a re h o u se  C o rp .
| (new sprint s to ra g e )
: Bowater M srsay  P a p e r  C o ., Ltd,
■' (49%, C a n ad a )
GANNETT
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 426  
1976 Total S a les:
$413 .2  m illion
P R IN C IPA L  O P ER A TIO N S; 
N e w s p a p e r s :
Pacific Daily News (A g a n a , G u am ) 
Sunday News, Enquirer and 
News (B a ttle  C re e k , M ich.) 
Bellingham Herald, Sunday Herald 
(B e ll in g h a m , W ash .)
Evening Press, Sun-Bulletin,
S u n d a y  Press (B in g h am to n , N.Y.)
Idaho Statesman (B o ise , Id ah o ) 
Courier-News (B r id g e w a te r,  N .J.) 
Burlington free Press 
(B u rlin g to n , Vt.)
Courier-Post (C a m d e n , N .J.)
Public Opinion (C h a m b e rs b u rg , P a .) 
"Today” (C o c o a , F la .) 
Commercial-News (D an v ille , III.) 
Star-Gazette, Sunday 
Telegram (E lm ira , N.Y.)
El Paso Times (E | P a s o ,  Tex.)
Fort Myers News Press (F ort M yers, 
F la .)
News-Messenger (F re m o n t, O hio) 
Honolulu Star-Bulletln, Star-Bulletin 
& Advertiser (H o n o lu lu . H aw aii) 
Herald Dispatch, Huntington 
Advertiser, Herald Advertiser 
(H u n tin g to n , W . Va.)
Ithaca Journal ( I th a c a ,  N.Y.)
Journal and Courier (L a fa y e tte , Ind.) 
S fa fe  Journal (L a n s in g , M ich.)
Marietta Times (M a rie tta , O hio) 
Ghronlcle Tribune (M ario n , Ind .) 
Nashville Banner (N a sh v ille , T en n .)  
Valley News Dispatch-
(N ew  K e n s in g to n -T a re n tu m , P a .) 
Niagara Gazette (N ia g a ra  F a lls , N.Y.) 
Daily Olympian (O ly m p ia , W ash .)  
Pensacola Journal, Pensacola Nows, 
Pensacola News-Journal 
(P e n s a c o la .  F la .)
News-Herald (P o rt C lin to n , O hio) 
Times Herald (P o rt H u ro n , M ich.) 
Paltadium-ltem (R ich m o n d , Ind .) 
Times-Unlon, Democrat & Chronicle 
( R o c h e s te r ,  N.Y.)
Morning Star, Rogisler-Republic, 
Register-Star (R o c k fo rd , III.)
Capital Journal, Oregon 
Statesman (S a le m , O re.)
Sun-Tetegram (S a n  B e rn a rd in o ,
C alif.)
New Mexican (S a n ta  F e , N.M.) 
Saratogian ( S a ra to g a  S p r in g s , N.Y.) 
Daily Citizen (T u c so n , Ariz.)
Daily Press, Observer Dispatch 
(U tica . N.Y.)
Dally Times (M a m a ro n e c k , N.Y.)
Dally A rg u s  (M ount V o rn o n , N.Y.) 
Standard-Star (N aw  R o c h o llo , N.Y.) 
Citizen-Register (O ss in in g , N.Y.)
Daily Item (P o rt C h e s te r ,  N.Y.) 
Journal-News; N y ack  (R o c k la n d , N.Y.) 
Daily-News (T a rry lo w n , N.Y.) 
Reporler-Dispatch (W hite P la in s , N.Y.) 
Herald-Statesman (Y o n k ers, N.Y.) 
Review Press-Reporler (B ro n x v ille ,, 
N.Y.)
S u b u rb a n  N e w s p a p e r  G ro u p  (10 
w e e k lie s )  (C h erry  H ill, N .J .)  
Falrpress (F a ir f ie ld , C o n n .)
Timas (M e lb o u rn e , F la .)
Butler County News, North Hilts News 
R e c o rd  (sem i-w eek ly ) Herald 
(N ow  K e n s in g to n , P a .)
Commercial News (S a ra to g a  S p r in g s ,  
N.Y.)
Taos News (T a o s, N.M .) ■
Star Advocate (T itu sv ille , F la .) 
B ro a d c a s t in g :
W B R J (R a d io ) (M a rie tta . O hio) 
W HEC-TV (R o c h e s te r ,  N.Y.)
W KFi (R ad io ) (W ilm in g to n , O h io ) 
O th e r:
L ou is  H a rr is  & A s s o c ia te s  a n d  L o u is  
H a rr is  In te rn a tio n a l
KNIGHT-RIDDER
1976 Fortune 500  
rank: 295  
1976 Total S a les:
$677 .5  m illion
P R IN C IP A L  O P E R A T IO N S; 
N e w e p a p e r* :
Aberdeen American News . - V
Akron Beacon-Journal
Boca Raton News *
Boulder Dally Camera
Bradenton Herald '
' Charlotte Observer 
Charlotte News 
Columbus Enquirer 
Columbus Ledger 
Detroit Free Press 
Duluth News-Trlbune 
Duluth Herald 
Gary Post-Tribune 
Grand Forks Herald 
Journal ol Commerce 
■Lexington Herald 
■'Lexington Leader 
Long Beach Independent '
Long B e a c h  Press-Telegram 
Macon Telegraph 
Macon News 
Miami Herald 
Pasadena Star-News 
Philadelphia Inquirer 
Philadelphia Dally News 
St, Paul Pioneer Press 
St. Paul Dispatch 
San Jose Mercury 
San Jose News 
Seattle Times 
Tallahassee Democrat 
Walla Walla Unlon-Bulletln 
Wichita Eagle 
Wichita Be a e o n  
Arcadie Tribune (C alif.)
Temple City Times (C alif.)
Monrovia Journal (C alif.)
Duarteen (C alif.)
Buena Park News (C alif.)
La Mirada Lamplighter (C alif.) 
Huntington Beach Independent 
(C alif.)
Anaheim-Fullerton Independent 
(C alif.)
Orange County Evening News 
(C alif.)
Broward Times (F la .)
Coral Gables Times a n d  Guide 
(F la .)
Florida Keys Keynoter (F la .) .
North Dade Journal (F la .)
Union Recorder (G a.)
O th e r :
C o m m e rc ia l  T e rm in a ls  of D e tro i t ,  In c . 
C o m m o d ity  N ew s S e rv ic e s ,  In c .
(K a n s a s  C ity , M o.)
K n ig h t-R id d e r  N e w s p a p e r  S a le s ,  In c .
(N ew  York)
K n ig h t N ew s S e rv ic e s ,  In c . (D e tro it, - 
M ich .)
T h e  O b s e rv e r  T ra n s p o r ta t io n  C o .
(C h a r lo tte ,  N .C.)
P o r ta g e  N e w s p a p e r  S u p p ly  C o .
(A kron , O hio)
T w in  C i t ie s  N e w s p a p e r  S e rv ic e s ,  In c . 
(S t. P a u l ,  M inn.)
Extract from Kevin Phillips, 'Busting the Media Trusts', Harpers. July 1977, pp. 28-29.
Appendix A. v. Additional details relating to the interviews.
Although the vast majority of people from whom interviews were requested made themselves available, it 
did prove impossible to speak with a small number of potential interviewees.
A.J. Mcllroy & Bruce Loudon chose to decline to be interviewed. Mcllroy stated that he intended to write 
about his career as a foreign correspondent at some future unspecified date. Loudon cited illness for his 
unwillingness to speak.
Max Hastings & John Kane-Berman were too busy to speak with me.
John Simpson replied to my letter with an agreement to be interviewed but failed to respond to any attempts 
to arrange such a meeting.
Tony Trew (who was a media analyst during the late 1970s for the International Defence and Aid Fund) 
claimed that he couldn’t remember anything to do with that period of his life.
Denys Rhoodie refused to speak with me, stating that he had never given an interview on the subject of 
South Africa's Department of Information. He said that when he chose to speak or write on the subject, he 
would do so on his own terms.
Professor Nic Rhoodie suggested that he was under doctor's orders not to do or say anything to anybody.
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APPENDIX B.
i). The secret projects list.
ii). The Rhoodie tapes: a synopsis.
iii). An index of the Club of Ten & Committee for Fairness in Sport (CFS) 
advertisements.
iv). Seven examples of Club of Ten & CFS advertisements.
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Appendix B. i. Secret projects.
In April 1978, Dr. Connie Mulder (the Minister of Information) sent a list of projected secret Department 
of Information projects for the year 1978-1979 to the Minister of Finance, Owen Horwood. Mulder 
requested that Horwood sign every page of this presentation so that the projects may be proceeded with.1 
Horwood duly did this. The approved budget was R14.8 million. One year later, Eschel Rhoodie appeared 
on the BBC where he used this list to prove that Horwood was fully cognisant of the Department's 
activities. During the same month (March 1979), Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Irregularities in the Former Department of Information (Pretoria, 1979), Annexure A, pp. 1-7, reproduced 
the documents, in Afrikaans, with the titles of the secret projects removed. See also ’"Uiters Geheim" ... the 
secret papers', Rand Dailv Mail. 3 April 1979.
In 1981, the documentation was leaked to the South African press with the names of the majority of the 
projects included. (Mike O'Sullivan & Anthony Duigan, 'The full list of "Info" secret projects', The Star 
[Johannesburg], 11 April 1981). In 1983, Eschel Rhoodie published the same list that had appeared in The 
Star in Rhoodie, Real Information, pp. 761-769. The descriptions of twenty-six of the projects, however, 
remained unknown '... because they are either ongoing or it is not in the national interest that they should be 
revealed.' (p. 761). The translation reproduced here, which includes the missing projects, was found in the 
archives of Africa News (North Carolina). An equivalent British translation was also provided by David 
Pallister (The Guardian). The cost of the secret projects is listed in South African rand.
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• ' P r o j e c t  2 2 2 - ^ 2 2
G.2 A f r i c a n  comics p ro jec t in SA and SWA. 4 0 0  0 0 0
G . 2 A  ' P u b l i c a t i o n  of mon th ly  journal "Hit" and s up p l e m e n t  1 000
G . 2E  P urc h as e and e xp ans io n of "Drum W e e k e n d "  (Nominal) 1 000
q %2G P urc h as e costs for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of a bl ac k n e w s p a p e r  1 000
G.5 and C o u n t  D o n h o f f ,
G . 1 6 D  G e r m a n y  and f e l l o w
w o rk e r s .  13 000
G. 6 C lu b of Ten, L o nd on  300 000
G.7 ' C o m m i t t e  for F a i r n e s s  in S p o r t  150 000-
G . 8 A  Don d e K i e f e r  and A s s o c i a t e s ,  W a s h i n g t o n  250 000
H ei nz  B eh rens 
G . 8 B  ‘ / L i a s o n  p r o g r a m  in L a t i n  A m e r i c a
/
2 0  0 0 0
 .. .....—  ...liennenhof f er . .
G.-8C . / L i a s o n  p r o g r a m  in G e r m a n y  470 0 00
G.8D L i a s o n  prrfgram in G e r m a n y  215 000
J ew i s h
G . 8E S p e c i a l  Aiaso'n p r o g r a m  in USA, e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h  r e ga r d  to
S e n a t o r s  and a c ad em ic s.  20 000
G.9 E x t e r n a l  news b u r e a u  (C. Breyer) 30 000
G.10 S p e c i a l  c ov er t  ' a d v e r t i s e m e n t s  eg vi a To the P o i n t
and B u s i n e s s  W e ek  100 000
G . 1 1 A  2 ^ 3 hoc c hu r c h  a c ti o ns ^
and 11B N G K  s p e c i a l  o v e r s e a s  a g t i o n
p r o g r a m 60 0 00
G .1 ‘1C C h r i s t i a n  League, of SA and a c t i o n s  in B r i t a i n  and US 32 0 0 00
G . 1 1 D  C h u r c h  a c t i on s  in G e r m a n y  ‘ • --
G.12 A f r i c a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  m a g a z i n e  in L o n d o n  for
S o u t h e r n  and E a s t  Af ri ca . r . - -
G . 14  ... , C o v e r t  o p i n i o n  su rv ey s and m a r k e t  a n a l y s e s .
G. 15  . A f r i c a n  ' ^ A m e r i c a n  A f fa ir s  A s s o c i a t i o n  in N e w  Y ork  1 0 00 0
-247-
s e c r e t  
Ad h o c / c o - w o r k e r s 25 00 0
To m S ta ce y  Publishers, London 6 0 0 0
S p e c i a l  news b u r e a u  in N a i r o bi  for A f r i c a  news 
(van Zyl Albe rt s) 2 0 0 0  0
J ea n  A b a d i e  in France
Dr. W. Breyte nb ac h. 6 0 00
AAT K a p t e i n  in the N e th e r l a n d s
A. de St. Agnes in Fra nc e
G. L o r r a i n e  in London
W. de Boer in the N e th er l an d s 500
G a r y  P I a y e r  (n o m i n a l ) 1 0 0 0
B a n t u  F i lm s  P r o d u c t i o n 500 000
D i s t r i b u t i o n  of films to b l a c k  p o p u l a t i o n 500 000
C a se  S t u d ie s  in Human R ig h t s  - c e n t r a l  m a n u s c r i p t  -50 000
I n s t i t u t e  for the St ud y of P l u r a l  S o ^i t i e s .
s '
S p ec i al  c o n f e r e n c e s  in U.S.
1 Op 0 0  0
150 000
" G e r m a n y 60 0 0 0
" S ou t h A f r i c a 1 0 0 0
1 Lond on 1 0 00
" F r a n k f u r t 1 0 0 0
Ad hoc c o n t r i b u t i o n s  for s pe c ia l c o n f e r e n c e s  
w h i c h  m u s t  s ti l l be arranged.
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L a ^M o nd e Mo de rn , France
75 000
30 000
F ra n ce  E u r a f r i q u e  - M o nt hl y jou rn al  —
U n i v e r s i t y  Libre m a ga z i n e  in Paris ■ 1 3  OOQ
G.22-.- A g u a r an t ee  .for boo ks  a b o u t S o u t h  A f r i c a  w o r l d w i d e  200 000
G.23 Del F il m P r o d u c t i o n  companies"” in S w i t z e r l a n d  200 OOQ
G .. 2 5 To the P o i n t  1 300 0 00
G . 2 6 A  Fr on t o r g a n iz at i on s : Ad hoc - aksies.
G.2 6B- N ZAW 19 0 00
G.26C South A f r i c a n  Society, L o n d o n  6 000
G .26D OESAC - A u s t r i a n  A ct io n  -5 500
G . 2 6E  A G N E T A  . (Sweden) v 1 2  0 0 0
G. 26 F * ■ P lu ra l S tu d ie s J o ur n al  in the N e t h e r l a n d s  21 000
G . 2 6 G  F o u n d a t i o n  C o n t r ol  Centre, the N e t h e r l a n d s  1 3 000
G . 2 6 H  ‘ Israel - S o ut h  A f r i c a n  C h amb er  of C o m m e r c e  11 000
G. 26 J Cent re  for I nt e r n a t i o n a l  Politics, P o t c h e f  s tro om  (*BP) 25 0 00
G . 2 6 K  I n s ti t ut e  for S t ra te gi c Studies, U n i v e r s i t y  of P r e t o r i a  iq 000
G. 26 L G er ma n  S o u t h A f r i c a n  A ss oc ia t io n,  G e rm a n y  105 000
%
G . 2 6 M  I n s t i t u t e  for A f r i c a n  Studies 4 000
G . 2 6 N  N e t h e r l a n d s  South A f r i ca n  Assoc, visits to the 7' 000
N e t he r la nd s * . .
G . 2 6 0  J a p a n e s e  - South A f ri c a n  As so c ia ti o n,  T ok yo  5 000
G. 26 P Hu ma n R ig h ts  F o u nd a ti on ,  L on d on
G.26R H uman R i g h t s  R e s e a r c h  Institute, South Africa.
G.27 L e g a l a c t i o n s  in- the U.S. B ri ta in , N e t h e r l a n d s
and G e r m a n y .  ' 7-0 0 00
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G . 28 
G. 29 
G . 30 
G. 31 '
G. 32 
G. 33 ■
G . 34A 
3
G . 34D
G.-34E 
G . '3 5 
G . 3 6 . 
G. 4 2 
G.4 3
G . 44A 
G , 4 4 B
,G. 4 4C 
G . 4 4 E 
G . 4 4 G 
G . 45
Be rn ar d L ejeune: Salary, T r a v e l l i n g  &. S u b s i s t e n c e 45 00 0
C o- w o r k e r  Y a ' o c o v  Y an n ay  in Israel 42 000
A n o n y m o u s  c o w o r k e r s 25 0 0 0
Ad hoc t r a v el  and s u b s i s t e n c e  of o f f i c i a l s  and 
o t h e r  v i s i to r s. 1 0 0  0 0 0
F o r e i g n  g u e s t s  of f ro n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s 2 0 0  0 0 0
P u r c h a s e  of s p e c i a l  e q u i p m e n t  eg tape r e c o r d e r s ,  
t e l e p h o n e  s c r a m bl er s , etc. 5 00 0
V a l i a n t  P u b l i c a t i o n s  - b o ok  p u b l i s h i n g  comp an y. 
"1 i3 a e a e * te s * e . 160 000
P ro d u c t i o n  E d it o r i a l e  Book p ub li sh er , F r an c e
5 0 00
S.A. F r e e d o m  F o u n d a t i o n 130 000
S p e c i a l  SWA a ct i on s  a g a i n s t  Swapo. t 2 0 0 0 0
S p e c i a l  s e c r e t  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  costs (nominal) 2 0 0 0
E m e r g e n c y  F un d
C om m u n a l  a c t i o n s  t o g e t h e r  
w i t h  the I s r a e l i  G o v e r n m e n t  (nominal) 5 0 00
Ad hoc c o n t r i b u t i o n s  for p r o - S o u t h  A f r i c a n  a c t i o n s
F r e n c h  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  J o h a n n e s b u r g  and 
Paris. 1 0 0  0 0  0
S.A, R a i l w a y s  re To the P oi nt 1 2 500
S a t o e r  for p r o v i d i n g  cover for op e ra ti o ns  of 
Y a ' a c ov  Y an n ay  in Israel.
1 2 0 0 0
F r e n c h  S o u t h  A f r i c a  A s s o c i a t i o n ' s  a c t i o n s  in F r a n c e  20 000
F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s  a s s o c i a t i o n .(A c a d e m i c  s t u d y  o r g a n i z a ­
tion, o r g a n i z e d  s e m i n a r s  as w e l l  as p u b l i s h i n g  a c a d em i c, 
p a p e r s ). ; . , ■
: 1 5  3 0 0 0
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G . 4 7 O p e r a t i o n s  in Far East 5 0 0 0
G . 48 
G . 52 
G . 61
G . 62 
G . 6 5 ■
•G. 73
G . 7 5
G . 7 6 .
G. 77 
■ G . 7 a"
G . 79 
• G. 80 
G. 81 
G. 82 
G . 83 
G . 84
G. 85 
G . 86
B r i t i s h  P a r l i a m e n t  m embers' v i s i t  to S.A. 10
Guard: F or e i g n  Policy Institute, Lo n do n -'120
S p e c i a l  r a d i o  c a s s e t t e  p r o g r a m s  in A f r i c a n  
c o u n t r i e s  (nominal)
P o l i t i c a l  s tu d ie s and e v a l u a t i o n  in A f r i c a
T h o r C o m m u n i c a t o r s  - u p k e e p  c osts of c o m p a n y  
and r e p l a c e m e n t  by H om er us  F i n a n c e  Corp. for 
c h a n e l l i n g  of funds to f o r e i g n  c p u n t r i e s  
( s i n g l e ) ,
i .njffj n mp nn i r ~r~m jtm r'itrf ii ngurJilT' Hi 'fi1*
M a n a g e m e n t  b u d g e t  for B rit is h, F r e n c h  and S.A. 
o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  o f f i c e s  in J o h a n n e s b u r g ,
P a r i s  and L on don. ; ■ 200
P re s co n B u sin ess  Ne ws - F i n a n c i a l - n e w s  
s e r v i c e  to the world. •• 37
q SA me r ic an s  C o n c e r n e d  for South..Africa* O p e r a t i o n ^ ---
in the U S A ' -5.0
I n t e r n a l  a c t i o n s  in the b l a c k  r e s i d e n t i a l  areas. ■ ■ . >25
E x t e r n a l n e w s - p i c t u r e s e r v i c e  1 -1
Ad hoc p r i n t i n g  and dis tr ibu tion, e.g. R ot a r i a n s  : ■ : ' . ( 2 5
& L i o n s .
S p e c i a l  b u r s a r y  p r o g r a m e :f o r •f o r e i g n e r s ^ t i e d  in ' •
i.i.Vith... Ian Player. *■ > 30
- C o n f i d e n t i a l  F r e n c h  n e w s l e t t e r  : i . 1
S / p r o j e c t  (Axel Springer) .. B e r l i n  28
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  a r t i c le  se rv ic e - (nominal) 10
■ L e t t e r  w r i t i n g . c a m p a i g n ,  in :different-icountries •
S p e c i a l  r e s e a r c h  p r o g r a m  re The WorIdj : t h e \ R a n d
D a il y  M a i l  and: other, p r o j e c t s  1
0 0  0 '  
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0  
0 0  0 
0 0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0  0 
0 0  0 
5 0 0
0 0 0
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\G.87 . Ac t io n  .program . in . R h o d e s i a  .for the :b e n e f i t  of
, m o d e r a t e  .political p a r t i e s  (a 'one shot program)
G t 8 9  . , . . .Purshase of I nv e st or s Review* L o n d o n  , , ,
a n d . e x t e n s i o n  p r o g r a m
• S
40 0
G,88 N a t i o n a l  F r e e d o m  A s s o c i a t i o n  . . .  .. . .....
.British . (60 j 00 0 . m e mb er s ) .... 200
G.90 -Senate tactions via .Jewish g r o u p s  . ■ '30
(3,91 . P u r c h a s e  of Marie N o ve ll e  j ou rn al s  .. _ , ^
■ , in F r a n c e  (pa ss po rt s from t h e . B u r e a u ) .
G.92 .. P u r c h a s e . o f  F r e n c h  m u n i c i p a l .j o u r n h l s  ( t w o . c a b i n e t
M i n i s t e r s ) .
G.93 E s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f .t h e . A t l a n t i c  C o u n c i l . b r a n c h  for
S ou th  A f r i c a  as w el l  as t h e . e s t a b l i s h m e n t  :of the 
. . h ead o f f i c e  in l o n d o n  and b r a n c h  : o f f i c e  . in U S A ........... 280
G.94 A c t i o n s  in S c a n d a v i a  TO
G.95 . S p e c i a l  a c t i o n  p r o g r a m  for t ra d e un i on s  in
B r i t a i n , Ge rm a ny ,  B e l g iu m  and the US (Nominal)
P u r c h a s e  of s p e c ia l  space in n e w s p a p e r s  and 
m a g a z i n e s  in Europe, A u s t r a l i a  and- US by m e a n s  
of the s o - c a l l e d  "sailor" s y s t e m v w h e r e b y .s y m p a t h e t i c  
j o u r n a l i s t s  are i n v o l v e d  (nominal) - . . 1
S p e c i a l  m o v i e  p r o g r a m s  j eg.th e .movie of-Dr. B e u r t  /
S e r V a a s  o f . t he  S a t u r d a y  E v e n i n g .P o s t  a b o u t  /
S o u t h  A f r i c a  (nominal)
0 0 0 
0 0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
OS'.
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Appendix B. ii. The synopsis.
In 1979, Eschel Rhoodie was interviewed by Mervyn Rees (Rand Daily Mail). The transcripts of the 
interviews stretched to more than five hundred pages in length. During the weeks and months that followed, 
Rhoodie regularly claimed that he had tape-recorded his memories of the Department of Information secret 
projects and that these 'tapes' were his 'insurance'. The tapes were in fact the recordings of Rees's interview. 
During March 1979, Rhoodie attempted to sell the tapes to various newspapers and television companies 
(including the Washington Post, The Guardian. NBC and the BBC). At this time, a synopsis of his story 
was distributed amongst the potential purchasers. David Beresford recalls: The opposition papers were shut 
out - they didn't have access to the transcripts which was crucial.'
The synopsis which is reproduced here was provided by Anthony Sampson.
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SYNOPSIS: MULDKUGATB
Mien Rhoodie was stationed in Washington as a S.A. government 
official, a CIA agent named Browning gave him the idea of using 
"unorthodox" methods to promote S.A.'s image. Hhoodie tried 
unsuccessfully to sell the idea to the uept, of Foreign Affairs, 
but later he found Dr.Connie Mulder a receptive listener. This 
led to the formation of the triumvirate of D r .Mulder as Minister 
of Information, D r .Eschel Rhoodie as Secretary for Information, 
and Gen. Hendrik van den Bergh as director of BOSS. Rhoodie claimi 
he and van den Bergh took Mulder abroad to "meet the world," and 
even took him clandestinely into Egypt, where they almost ran 
into trouble with the authorities. The plan was that Mulder woul< 
become Prime Minister, and that South Africa then would be run by 
a strategic co-ordinating body consisting of Ministers and heads 
of some government departments, the security agencies, and the 
"best brains" of the private sector. The triumvirate were not 
impressed by the calibre of the average Cabinet Minister. Van den 
Bergh would be given a pnrliamentaijry seat and be promoted to the 
Cabinet and he would become chairman of the committee. Originally, 
Hhoodie claims, Vorster had chosen Mulder as his successor, but 
later they fell out. In the premiership elections in 1978, PV 
Botha defeated Mulder by only six votes. Hhoodie claims Vorster 
had people spying on the triumvirate. There is bitter enmity be- 
-tween the triumvirate and Botha, and particularly between Botha 
and VD Bergh.
(1) The triumvirate drew up a five-year master plan covering 180 secret pro- 
-jects, costing R65 million, with expenditure at about R15 m a year. Rhoodie 
has a photostat copy of the first five-year plan, which included the financing 
of an attempt by the American rightwing publisher, John McGoff, to *take over 
the Washington Star. Vorster said the 116** million could not come out of the 
BOSS budget, because it would inflate the budget and he did not want to be 
accused of putting so much money into an organisation that was being described 
as sinister. In fact, Vorster wanted to diminish BOSS'S public budget. The 
fund, therefore^ was tacked on to Botha's large Defence Force budget, where it 
escaped notice, Dr.Nico Diederichs, former Minister of Finance and later State 
President, worked out the internal structure of this financing,
UNITED STA TES t ------------ ---------------
(1) The SA government, through Rhoodie, employed a top US lobbyist, Sidney 
Barron, who registered himself as required with the US Bept. of Justice as a 
SA agent. Barron's company handled the SA Gvt'a overt operations, and Barron 
personally handled the covert operations, paying himself a salary from funds 
sent by the SA Treasury in Pretoria. Barron had close connections with the 
Democratic Party and helped to run Carter's campaign in New York, Rhoodie 
claims that some of the money SA sent to Barron was used in this campaign. 
Hhoodie pioneered this scheme.
(2) Rhoodie felt the power in the US increasingly would lie with the Senate 
and the State Department. His first project was to finance a Senator (Democrat) 
who had been beaten by Senator Tunney. Tunney was succeeded as chairman of
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee by.Senator Dick Clark. In 1978, Rhoodie 
attended a briefing by Barron at which two BOSS men (Kemp and Reynders) were 
present. Barron discussed his budget for 78/79 and said he intended to 
concentrate most of the money on unseating Clark. Barron was given about 
#250,000. Clark was unseated.
(3) Barron had good Catholic contacts and he arranged an audience for 
Rhoodie with the Rope. The Pope was ill when Hhoodie arrived there, so he saw 
the Vatican Secretary of State Bennelli, He told Bennelli the Catholic Church 
in SA was involving itself in politics and this was against Church policy.
This was an example of Hhoodie's unorthodox methods.
(4) Over three years, Barron received more than #1 million from SA, but he 
declared only some of it with the Dept of Justice.
(5) McGoff sold Vorster and Mulder the idea that he should try to take over 
the Washington Star and use it to promote SA's interests in the US. He was 
given K6 million as part of a #25 million bid for the Star. This was seen as a 
great investment for SA, Diederich* called in Gerald Browne, Secretary for 
the Treasury, to handle the arrangements. The money was sent to McGoff through 
the Union Bank of Switzerland.
((>) McGoff failed in the takeover bid, and he used the money to buy the 
Sacramento Union, one of California's largest newspapers. Later, he repaid 
the interest on the loan, which SA accepted as full repayment of the 
capital sum.
(7) Pro-South African newspapax was disseminated through McGoff'a 
syndication service, Panax.
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(6) McGoff bought a 50 per cent interest in UPI TV with an open-ended loan 
from the SA Gvt of Hit million. On many occasions, Rhoodie claims, UPI TV 
was used to put out SA footage - eg on defence matters. It was the first 
TV company to be granted a major interview with Vorster. The interviewer 
was Clarence Rhodes. Rhoodie claims Rhodes was a member of the Club of 
10 in Britain (a Rhoodie-front-organisation) in 1074). Rhodes is su-ing the 
Observer for saying ho was a member of the Club (Hhoodie says Rhodes was 
not a member at the time the Observer said he was).
(9) Another Barron project was to contact Labour leaders in the US. In 
1977, the 1CFTU called a worldwide shipping and aircraft strike against 
SA. Barron, Hhoodie and VD Bergh worked out a plan to influence labour 
leaders. Barron was paid #120,000. The US labour movement did not take part 
in the strike.
JAPAN
. (l) Vorster, who was anxious to promote SA trade with Japan, instructed 
VD Bergh to spend 11200,000 purchasing the "goodwill" of labour leaders in 
Japan. VDBergh gave the money to two Japanese MPs who wielded considerable 
influence with the Japanese trade union movement,
UNITED KINGDOM
(1) It was felt Britain was not making much use of the exchange scheme 
whereby MPs visited each other's countries, A sepret project, "Bowler Hat," 
was set up to be used as a conduct for British M s to visit South Africa, 
Ostensibly as guests of private enterprise^11 SA; The. scheme was run in 
the UK wx by Sir Frederick Bennett, Tory front bencher. He was paid
RIO,000 to provide airline tickets for MPs visiting SA (this was not a 
bribe - Bennett acted as SA1s agent in the payments). One of the Mpa who 
visited SA under this project was Patrick Vail.
(2) Rhoodie claims two Labour MPs were bribed to provide information on 
the plans of the AntiOApartheid movement. They were paid about £2,000 each 
a year. On the basis of this information, SA'b "dirty tricks" squad would 
then anticipate the plans. The project was particularly effective in the 
U11 and Holland, For example, if Anti-Apartheid meetings were called, the 
squad would be sent the leaflets by the Labour MPs, and then just before 
the meetings they would send out fake leaflets cancelling the meetings. 
These tactics were particularly effective in HOLLAND, where they were 
used against the Ax±±x Boycott Outspan (oranges) movement,
(3) Hhoodie and co. felt it was futile trying to persuade UK newspapers 
to change their attitudes towards SA. Also, they were concerned that at 
universities only books critical of SA's race policies generally were 
available. They knew it would be futile for SA to provide books itself, 
so they came to the conclusion SA would have to buy a publishing house and 
a newspaper. The starting point was the takeover by Hhoodie's group 
(through frontmen) of Hortors printers in SA, and Hortors1 bid for Morgan 
Grampian in the UK. The first target was to take over the publishing house 
of Hutchinsons and the Daily Express. The eventual aim was to try to take 
over either the Observer or the Guardian. Rhoodie and Co. chose David 
Abramson to direct the project. Abramson had a reputation in South Africa 
as a Progressive and in fact was connected with the Progressive Party's 
fund-raising in the Transvaal. (Abramson has now fled SA and is living in 
London).
F R A N C E
(1) Parallel with the Morgan Grampian project was an attempt to buy into 
publishing in France. One project was to buy into Paris Match through a 
.yman (whom Rhoodie will name). The aim was to sdcure sufficient shares to 
f  exert editorial influence and block anti-SA interest articles, and influent 
editorial appointments. SA set up an Institute for the Study of the Modern 
World in Paris under a wellknown French journalist, Vigreau. Ostensibly, 
it was a research institute, but it would be able tp disseminate papers 
on SA'sstrategic importance to the Vest, It was given a K150,000 budget, 
but it lasted only 15 months, because Vigreau "took SA for a ride," Nothin; 
was achieved.
(2) Vigreau was also used as front to try to buy an influential weekly 
newspaper in Brance. The newspaper was bought but it was closed down when 
it lost circulation,
NORWAY
(1) The re-election of a former Conservative MP was financed. He was 
given a "lot of money," and five or six MPs on his ticket were elected.
Their re-election was due mainly to SA financing. Rhoodie says this was 
one of the few occasions on which he saw Vorster chuckle,
KENYA
*«»*
(1) For a long time.SA ran a news agency in Kenya with a French journalisl 
as a front man. SA also owned a farm newr Nairobi where Black Kenyans 
were trained In agricultural technical services.
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HOLLAND
(1) riA founded the Stigting Deheer Centrum —  an institute which was used
as a conduit to send funds throughout Europe.
RHODESIA
(1) Rhoodie consistently tried to detect potential leaders and cultivate 
them. In this way James Chlkerema was chosen and his campaign to become 
president of the ANC financed. But SA was worried that, once elected, he 
might not deliver the goods. He was given 1 million Rhodesian dollars 
and Keynders, the BOSS accountant, was sent to audit his hooks.
David Abramson was also sent to Rhodesia, where he had business Interests 
(this was used as the cover). He had instructions to engage Chlkerema in 
conversation over the aid he was receiving from SA, and what attitude he 
would adopt towards SA if he became president. The meeting took place in
Chlkerema's office which had been bugged by two BOSS agents sent to
Rhodesia for that purpose’, Abramson further invited Chlkerema to SA, 
where Shikerema was phptographed against the background of Jan Smuts 
Airport. He was also photographed clandestinely on his way to Johannesburg. 
The meeting with Abramson took place at the house of Stuart Pegg (Abramson 
’s partner in the attempted Morgan Grampian takeover —  also in exile now 
in London). The house was bugged and Abramson now has the tape. VD Bergh 
told Rhoodie later that in fact Vorster had chosen Muzorewa as leader of 
the Uanc (meaning Vorster predicted he would win the election). Money 
was also channeled to Muzorewa's campaign. An argument took place .between 
VD Bergh and Senator1Owen Horwood, Minister of Finance, over the amount of 
money Muzorewa should receive. VD Bergh said it should be R800,000, but 
Horwood only paid out R400,000.
SOUTHWEST AFRICA
(1) Mr.Retief van Rooyen, an advocate (who appeared for the State in 
the Biko inquest hearing), was retained as a legal adviser to the Ovambo 
homeland government. He was a close friend of Vorster's. He told Rhoodie 
he was paid R400 a day by Vorster to influence the Ovambos favourably 
towards SA.
(2) Vorster decided to support Dirk Mudge's Democratic Rurnhalle Alliance 
financially, and VD Bergh channelled R1 million to him. Rhoodie assumes 
much of the money was used to buy control of newspapers in SWA, which now 
support Mudge.
o r  iv Botha launched "Operation Cherry," which is still in progress,
J SA ship sailing along the strip of coast between northern SWA and 
/Southern Angola broadcasts anti-Swapo bulletins. This is a joint Defence- 
Force-1nformation Dept project. When Rhoodie was Secretary for Informatioi 
his department helped to compile these bulletins. The project also include] 
the issue of leaflets among the Ovambo to turn them against Swapo, The 
leaflets are issued by the Craft Bress, which is owned jointly by McGoff 
and Van Zyl Alberts (To The Point).
Hhoodie will explain how SA moved money around the world, implicating 
Diederichs (former Minister of Finance, then State President/, now' deceased 
and Owen Horwood, present Minister of Finance, as well as Civil Servants, 
Hhoodie claims Gerald Ford, after leaving the Presidency, was paid 
#10,000 to address a SA business men's seminar in the southern US,
ANGOLA (Information given to Rhoodie by VD Bergh),
(l) khen the MPLA made a half-hearted attack on the Ruacana Hydro- 
Electric project (across the SWA-Angola border, on Angolan side —  built 
jointly by SA and Portuguese), an SA army brigadier (whom Rhoodie will 
name) telephoned Botha (then Minister of Uefencejx, claims he was told 
"Follow the buggers and catch them even if you have to go to Luanda."
Vhen VD Bergh saw Vorster, the PM knew nothing about it. Vorster called in 
Botha who confirmed that an SA Army column was already 100 km into 
Angola (without Vorster's approval or even knowledge). Thereafter, the SA 
invasion of Angola continued.
$2? H1AFRA
(1) SA was heavily involved in the attempted secession ofi Biafra. It 
supplied arms, general supplies and advice to tix±±axajidxl?Hk the secessionii 
-ats. The aim was to Instal a moderate government and split the OAU. 
Rhoodie says SA must take some of the moral blame for the killing that 
took place in Biafra,
RHODESIA (Information from VD Bergh).
(1) Soon after SA had pulled its remaining armed forces personnel out of 
Rhodesia, vd Bergh discovered Botha had set up a commando force to go into 
Rhodesia. VD Bergh told Vorster it was madness. Vorster claimed no 
knowledge of it, and the unit was pulled back.
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M O Z A M BIQ U E :
(1) Soon after the Frelirao victory in Mozambique, VD Bergh received a 
call from a highly placed Defence officer to say a large convoy of SA 
troops were moving towards Komatipoort' (border town) to link up with a 
Portuguese civilian force to stage a counter-revolution. VD Berg sent two 
BOSS men to Nelspruit, where the convoy had halted, to disable the 
trucks until he had time to see Vorster and have the operation called off. 
VD Bergh claims Vorster was appalled and called in Botha.
Rhoodie (quoting VDB) claims Botha went to Vorster to ask for 1150,000 
to pay somebody oho claimed to have organised the escape of SA prisoners 
of war in Angola. Botha told Vorster the prisoners of war were hiding in 
the bush in Angola and he needed helicopters to go in and fetch them. VDB 
was sceptical, because he had heard that a week earlier the men were still 
in prison. VDB claims- he then had pictures taken of the men in prison and 
showed these to Vorster, Vorster refused Botha's request, but by then the 
Defence Force had already paid out the H50,000 —  for what turned out to be 
a hoax.
i )  Rhoodie says he and VDB divided Africa between them. Jtiat He took 
:st Africa and VDB took East Africa. Rhoodie felt French-speaking Vest 
Africa particularly was open to influence. He claims he simply flew into 
the Jvory Coast one day and told the aghast officials that if the US could 
talk to China, he could talk to them. The visit was extremely fruitful, 
but Rhoodie claims Vorster had to be pushed into making the visit to the 
ivory Coast.
AFRICA
IS R A E L
(1) Rhoodie claims Vorster had also to be pushed into making a visit to 
Israel. He backed out of arrangements three times, and Rhoodie refused to 
make further arrangements until he had Vorster's acceptance in writing..
Appendix B. iii. The Club of Ten & CFS advertisements:
This is a complete list of the advertisements placed in the international media under the guise of the Club
or Ten and the Committee for Fairness in Sport (CFS). Advertisements are dated and credited to the
newspaper where they first appeared. If the advertisement were also placed in the United States, that 
information is also listed.
1. Who is discriminating now?, New York Times & Fleet Street Blinkers, The Times, 15 & 16 April 1973. 
CFS.
2. Does Britain have a conscience?, The Times, 28 July 1973.
3. 'No dealing with diabolos', The Guardian, 28 Aug. 1973.
4. The double standard game, The Times, 18 Sept. 1973.
5. Cowardice or Indifference?, The Times, 31 Oct. 1973. [& U.S.].
6. Double standards world silence on this massacre, The Times, 1 Feb. 1974. [& U.S.].
7. An analysis of indignation, The Observer. 9 June 1974.
8. Now the dust has settled..., The Guardian, 31 Aug. 1974.
9. In God's name do something: An appeal to the World Council of Churches, The Times. 14 Oct. 1974.
10. South African Sports News, New York Times. 22 Dec. 1974. [& Britain], CFS.
11. a) In South Africa more Black golfers play on the PGA circuit than anywhere else in the world; b) In
South Africa a Coloured tennis player was chosen to represent his country at the Wimbledon Junior 
Championships 1975. The Guardian. 20 Oct. 1975. CFS.
12. The Free World stands today in greater danger than at any time since the darkest days of World War
II..., Daily Telegraph. 6 Feb. 1976.
13. Can Britain afford double think ... should a British government apply double standards?, The Times, 5 
May 1976.
14. Double talk aL World HQ, The Times. 16 Dec. 1976. [& U.S.].
15. From the Guardian of December 6 1976, The Guardian, 17 Dec. 1976.
16. 1976 A year of double talk, The Times. 24 Dec. 1976.
17. This is how we discriminate in South Africa, Washington Post. 27 Jan. 1977. CFS.
18. A Challenge to Tom Jackson, The Guardian. 8 Feb. 1977.
19. At lOptn on February 6, 1977, these seven Jesuit priests and nuns were murdered..., The Times, 23 Feb. 
1977.
20. Moscow's next target in Africa (Moss), The Guardian. 11 March 1977. [& U.S.].
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21. Energy: the peril Carter did not reveal..., The Times, 6 May 1977. [& U.S.].
22. Bias. The Times. 20 May 1977. CFS.
23. The double standards game ... and the rumour that mushroomed, The Times. 23 Sept. 1977. [& U.S.].
24. The double standards game: Why is the West looking the other way?, Washington Post, 30 Sept. 1977. 
[& Britain].
25. The double-standards of Mr Carter & the EEC, The Times, 7 Oct. 1977. [& U.S.].
26. Double standards on Capitol Hill?, Washington Post, 18 Nov. 1977.
27. The double-standards game (continued): The strange silence of Dr. Owen, The Times, 1 Dec. 1977.
28. The great credibility gap, New York Times. 23 Dec. 1977.
29. The Cuban threat to peace, The Times, 7 March 1978. [& U.S.].
30. The Great Majority Rule Hoax, Washington Post. 28 March 1978.
31. Kolwezi... the Double Standards of the British Press, The Times, 9 June 1978.
32. 'The stabilizing influence of the Cubans in Africa!', New York Times, 14 June 1978.
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Appendix B. iv. Examples of advertisements.
a). Fleet Street Blinkers, The Times, 16 April 1973, CFS.
This advertisement complained that the international media had not covered the 'multi-racial' South African 
Games (March-April 1973).
b). Does Britain have a conscience?, The Times. 28 July 1973.
This advertisement was a direct response to the Raphael/GHarrf/Vf« starvation wages expose. See chapter 
five.
c). An analysis of indignation, The Observer, 9 June 1974.
As for advertisement b..
d). Now the dust has settled ..., The Guardian, 31 Aug. 1974.
This advertisement followed a series of articles by Adam Raphael and others examining the Club of Ten 
and its sponsors. See chapter three.
e). The Free World stands today in greater danger than at any time since the darkest days of World War II 
..., The Times, 6 Feb. 1976.
This advertisement addressed the Angolan War, Soviet 'expansionism' and the Organisation of African 
Unity. The bottom picture shows '... automatic weapons from behind the Iron Curtain earned by MPLA 
soldiers.' In fact the weapons shown were Israeli Uzi sub-machine guns. See chapter six,
0- Moscow's next target in Africa, The Times. 11 March 1977.
This advertisement reproduces the final page of Robert Moss's four-part series on the Angolan War 
(originally published in the Sunday Telegraph, two-and-a-half weeks earlier). See chapters three and six.
g). The double standards game ... and the rumour that mushroomed, The Times. 23 Sept. 1977.
This advertisement was a belated response to the first burst of coverage in the international media regarding 
South Africa's programme to construct a nuclear weapon. The media coverage had been inspired by a report 
which appeared in Tass. (Tass statement on South Africa and the nuclear bomb1, Tass - Soviet News. 9 
Aug. 1977). Ironically, the high-point of the coverage had passed when the advertisement was published. 
Two years later, South Africa tested a nuclear weapon.
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A D V E R T IS E M E N T
Does Britain
have a conscience?
Britain is concerned about its business 
reputation abroad. Prompted by the press, 
Members of Parliament are investigating 
black wages paid by British Industry in South 
Africa. It is encouraging to hear that the South 
African government also sees a need to improve 
black wages; and reassuring to know that our 
companies operating out there have never been 
inhibited by law in this respect.
But does Britain really have a conscience 
or is it simply reacting to anti-South African 
pressures? After all, that country represents 
only 15% of our total investment abroad.
Let us insist that Members of Parliament 
also probe British wages in India, Black Africa, 
Ceylon and Hong Kong and all the other 
areas that make up 85% of our commitment
abroad.
And while we arc in the midst of this 
conscience crisis, how about wages at home 
where charity is supposed to begin? On May 9, 
The Times reported : “ Most Asian seamen 
in the British Merchant Fleet are Indians,' 
who now earn a basic £24.48 a month.
There tire also 1,600 Pakistanis, who earn a 
basic £14.69 a month and 1,000 Bangladeshi 
earning £16.73 a month. Minimum rates 
for British seamen are now £94.00 a month.”
4
Does Britain really have a conscience?
Let us write to our MPs and insist that 
all wages be investigated at home and abroad 
before we answer that question.
SPONSORED BY:
THE CLUB OF TEN. 2 GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET. LONDON W.l
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B. iv. c.
A D V E R T I S E M E N T
■ i k .
AN ANALYSIS 
OF INDIGNATION
It Is a lm ost a year ag o  that a ser ie s  of artic les  by Mr Adam Raphael on black w a g e s  In 
South Africa appeared  in The Guardian. This ser ie s  earned Mr Raphael a p r e ss  award 
a s  n ew s reporter o f the year.
Our Parliam entarians took  over w here Mr Raphael s ig n ed  off. A G overnm ent com m ittee  
probed British op era tion s in South Africa and p iovided  th ese  co m p a n ies  with 
" g u id e lin es"  on w age  in crea ses.
In the end It w as c la im ed  that Mr R aphael’s ser ie s  on South Africa led to a  dram atic string  
of w age  r ises. Mr Harry O ppenheim er, Chairman of A nglo Am erican, how ever, co n ten d ed  
In London recently  that c h a n g e s  w ere taking p lace in any even t—w ithout in terference  
from Britain.
In his s p e e c h  at Chatham  H ouse, Mr O ppenheim er hinted that the con cern  sh ow n  by 
Raphael for black e m p lo y ees  of British firm s in South Africa " is  not felt in anything like 
the sam e d eg ree  in regard to British firm s operating, say. in Hong Kong or India, or 
e lsew h ere  in the African continent."
Mindful of the fact that Mr Raphael may want to earn another p r ess  award In th is  field, w e  
have taken great care not to s c o o p  him on the real in-depth story of labour co n d it io n s  at 
British e s ta b lish m en ts  in Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, S in gapore and a h o st of black African  
cou n tries, but th e s e  fa c ts  are beyond d isp u te :
y W e found that on su gar  p lan tation s in South Africa, w orkers earned som eth in g  like five 
tim es the w a g e s  of th e tea -lea f p ickers in Sri Lanka—the island w e u sed  to know a s  Ceylon. 
In a Daily Mirror report on N ovem ber 2, 1973, Dr S Vijeratnar d escr ib ed  working c o n d itio n s  
on tea p lan tation s in Sri Lanka a s  fo llo w s: “ It is w orse  than a prison cam p. Their quarters  
aren't fit for an im als, let a lon e  hum an beings."
C onsider our Crown C olony, Hong Kong, w here a C h in ese  worker doing the sam e |ob  as  
a European is  norm ally paid only o n e-se v en tie th  to one-h undredth  of the European’s 
w a g e s. There are an estim ated  thirty th ou san d  child labourers in Hong Kong w here su ch  
exploitation  is  illegal. ^
A T elegraph report p u b lish ed  In May 1973 sh o w ed  that an unskilled  black worker earn s  
. betw een  £25.40 and £44 per m onth in South Africa, w hile in Kenya w a g e s  fo r th e  unskilled  
varied betw een  £ 4  and £14.50 a m onth. A sem i-sk illed  black worker in South Africa earn s  
betw een  £30.80 and £55.40 w hile in Uganda he is  paid b etw een  £12 and £24.50; and a 
sk illed  black w orker in South Africa earn s b etw een  £37.50 and £92.40, w hile in Liberia he 
earn s b etw een  £21 and £63 a m onth. Add to th is brief com p arison  b etw een  the b lack  
worker’s  p o sitio n  in South  Africa and the rest of the contin en t, free food, clo th in g  and  
h ou sin g  and m edical ad v a n ta g es  w hich  he enjoys in South Africa.
Now let's carry on, Mr Raphael. Let's have a c lo s e  look at Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, India and  
a h o st of oth er African cou n tries. It m u st not be thought that you and The Guardian are 
being se lec tiv e ly  Indignant— of being m ore intent on South Africa - baiting than on 
• 'jim proving th e lot of th e  w orkers em ployed by British firm s abroad.
• h i  *
x  . x :’.v *. the club of ten ,
P O  B o x  4AA
-V-T. •' ‘ n  * - * < • •  LO N D O N  W 1.
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NOW THAT 
THE DUST 
HAS
SETTLED. . .
T h e  m ain  a im  o f  T h e  C l u b  o f  T en .  a p r i .  a t e  c r o u p  of c it izen; ,  
h a s  a l w a j s  been  |n  expose  t h e  h o a x i n g  o f  t h e  pu b l ic  by d oub le  
s t a n d a r d s  in i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a (fair* w h e r e b y  e v e r y t h in g  th a t  
C o m m u n i s t  urn envftryil s  do  is a p p l a u d e d  a s  p r o g re s s iv e  a n d  nobly 
in sp i r ed  in t h e  in te re s t  o f  t h e  peop le ,  w h e r e a s  Ihe  m o ti v a ti o n  of 
c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  re j e c t  soc ia l ism  or  c o m m u n i s m  is d e n o u n c ed  as  
s in i s te r  a n d  opp ressive .
• P u r s u i n g  th is  l ine of  a r g u m e n t ,  t h e  C lu b  o f  Ten .  some m o n th s  
a g o .  i n se r te d  an  a d v e r t i s e m e n t  in t h re e  n a t i o n a l  n e w s p a p e r s  u n d e r  
th e  t i t le  AN A N A L Y S IS  O F  I N D I G N A T I O N .  T h i s  c ri t ic ised a se rie s  
of a r t i c l e s  by Mr A d am  R a p h a e l  o f  T H K  G U A R D I A N  a t t a c k i n g  the  
w ages  p a id  by l ir i t is h  firm* o p e r a t i n g  in S o u t h  A f r ic a .  W e e x te n d e d  
a n  i n v i t a t i o n  to T h e  G u a r d ih n  to  i n v e s t ig a t e  s im i l a r  w a g e s  p a id  in 
l l o n g  K ong .  Sri  l . a n k a  a n d  S i n g a p o r e  a n d  in the  i n d ep e n d e n t  A f r ic a n  
c o u n t r i e s  u n d e r  b lack ru le .  H e p o i n t e d  n u t  t h a t ,  u n l ik e  the  
C o m m u n i s t  c o u n t r i e s  whose  p ro b le m  is to p r e v e n t  t h e i r  own c it i zens  
e s c a p in g  to th e  W est ,  in S o u t h jA f r i c a  t h e  co n c e rn  is to co n t ro l  a f lood 
o f  b lack  l ab o u r  f ro m  o u t s id e  Lhe c o u n t r y  who wish to work  in S o u th  
A f r ic a  because  of  the  h i g h e r  w a g e s  p a id  t h e re ,  the  b e t t e r  l iv ing 
c ond it ions ,  a n d  tin* r u le  o f  luw whi ch p reva i ls .
T h e  G u a r d i a n  did  not  ac ce p t  t h e  in v i t a t i o n .  In s t e a d  it s t a r t e d  a 
c a m p a i g n  of  d e n ig r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  C l u b  o f  T en .  in s i s t i n g  t h a t  the  
C lu b  o f  Ten was a “ f ro n t  ”  fo r  t h e  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  G o v e rn m e n t .
Th e  C lu b  o f  T e n  p r o m p t ly  su p p l i e d  t h e  F o r e ig n  Ofiice wi th  the  
n a m e s  of f o u r  of Ihe c h ie f  c o n ^ b u t o r *  to t iic f u n d s  of  t h e  C l u b  o f  
Ten. a l l  p r iv a t e  i n d iv id u a ls  f ro m  t h r e e  f r i e n d ly  c o u n t r i e s .  A f t e r  
i n v e s t ig a t i n g  the  activit ies ,  o f  th e  C lu b  o f  T en .  t h e  a u th o r i t i e s  s t a t e d  
t h a t  t h e r e  was  “ no ev id en ce  o f  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  o r  i l l e g a l i t i e s  in the  
H u l l ' s  a c ti v it ie s . ”  T h i s  w a s  In a c c o r d a n c e  wi th  a p r in c ip le  lo n g  
e s ta b l i sh e d  in B r i ta in  t h a t  b o th  s id e s  s h o u ld  ha v e  th e  r i g h t  to be 
h e a rd ,  a p a r t  of t h e  b as ic  d e m o c r a t i c  r i g h t  o f  f re e  speech .
N ow  the  C lu b  o f  T e n  h a s  Inv it ed  t h e  P r e s s  to  m ee t  a l e a d in g  
c o n t r i b u to r  to the  Club'  f tf T e ^  j . h o  is in Ix in don  on b u s in ess  a n d  h a s  
h a n d e d  ove r  a c h eque  to  t h e  s p o k e s m a n  o f  t h e  C lu b  o f  T en  a s  a 
c o n t r ib u t io n  to t h e i r  f o r t h c o m i n g  a d v e r t i s i n g  c a m p a i g n  and  th e  cos t  
o f  p u b l i s h in g  a q u a r t e r l y  m a g a z i n e .  T h e  P h o e n ix ,  d evo te d  to  t h e  
e x p o s u re  o f  the  ^ l i t l c a l l y  m o t iv a te d  d o u b le  s t a n d a r d s  ploy.
W ; "
N ow  t h a t  the  d u s t  h a s  s e t t l e d ,  we a g a i n  in v it e  T h e  G u a r d i a n  a n d  
i ts  r e p o r t e r  to c a r r y  on th e  In v e s t ig a t io n  in to  w a g e s  p a id  in the  
c o u n t r i e s  we have  n am ed .  O t h e rw i s e  we will  ha v e  to co n c lu d e  t h a t  
T h e  G u a r d i a n  is m o re  in te rea t e d  In S o u t h  A f r ic a  b a i t i n g  t h a n  in an  
i m p a r t i a l  i n v es t ig a t io n  of  b l a c k  w a g e s  a n d  l iv ing  s t a n d a r d s .
T h e J f l u ! t . o f  T e n , ^  
PO 4  0x1:4 A A ^
L ondon W 1.
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at sea
,1 m lurk •  *« f «nvhtv sv |
(  U t l l l K l ig U
I IM A M IINI. psllrr mtr la 
rsMp«i|n Ur lU aarut «•*»- 
itwl s i  Ihe iW ur |C h k r  I t  
he If W i'letirit il»m  letsl 
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A D V E R T IS E M E N T
]' i ;!fi .Hr 1^
The Free World 
stands today in greater danger 
than at any time since the 
darkest days of World War II...
I H
The Agony of Angola
T n  A ngola, while ihe W est is looking  
-*• on , Russian imperialism is gojng 
unchecked. Tire m odern Russian war- 
m achine, manned by Cuban intruders, 
is intent on preventing a united m ajor­
ity governm ent m this form er Portu­
guese colony. D irecting the destiny o f  
the minority M PI.A . Russia w ants an 
A ngola which will be at its mercy.
W hen the Soviet co lonisers lirst ap ­
peared on the A ngolan  scene in lull 
strength to till the vacuum  left by Por­
tugal. the FNI A -U N IT A  liberation  
m ovem ents appealed for assistance in 
the West. While som e in the W est re­
sponded half-heartedly, and others 
stayed unconfm ittcd. South Africa  
assisted. Said F N L A  leader H olden  
R oberto in New York: "I am strongly  
against apartheid but I will say this for 
South Africa, when they ^cc a neigh­
bour's house burning they com e to put 
o u t the fire.”
South Africa’s 
Role of Honour
In  som e quarters in the W est it w as  
argued that, having R ussia take over  
A n gola  w ould be preferable to  being  
caught o n  the sam e side as racist Sou th  
A frica. In the First and Second W orld  
W ars the free w orld heard n o  such  
arguments w hen Sou th  A fricans (then  
infinitely m ote racist than today) fou ght 
and died on  our side. A lso  in  K orea , in  
the fight agaijnst a com m u qist in v a sio n , 
w e accepted  Sou th  A frica (under th e  
. sam e governm ent as to d a y -O n ly  then  
ijiucfi less enlightened) as a sturdy ally  
w ith out reservations. T he U S A  alone
honoured South African airm en with 
alm ost a hundred m edals and had its 
18th Bom ber W ing pluv  ^ the lirst two  
bars o f  the South \fr ican  national 
anthem  every m orning in hon our o f  
the South Africans* r.do;
Ironically enough , when these argu- 
m e n lsagainst South \ fr ic a a s a  lighting  
partner w e e  s t r o n g e s t  in the journals 
o f  the v*-!. South Kt»re^ unveiled a 
m onum ent to the South A fricans killed 
there in their light against com m unism .
Verdict of 22 
Nations
In Addi*. A b a b a  22 black African 
nations did not seem to mind the South  
African M i n ; '  b y  v o t i n g  against recog­
nition o f  the MPI \  as the single in­
heritor o f  A ngola. I ; c \ voted against 
this Russian-directed m ovem ent. Is it 
perhaps reluctance on  the side o f  the 
W est to light com m unism  that m ade it 
look  for specious reasons to stay out, 
or did they really believe that a South  
A frican-assisted black majority force is 
less desirable in Angola than a Russian 
take-over?
I f  that is so , i;’s time to draw the 
curtain on  the W o t.
The long-term 
problem
T he W estern W orld is now  stuck 
w ith  the long-term  p rob lem -th e  cease­
less expansion o f  the biggest imperialist 
pow er the w orld has ever seen. T he 
advance o f  the Soviets threatens our 
w hole w av o f  life.
,  Inserted by the C LUB  O F T EN  .
S uite 06. K en t H ouse. 87 R egent Street, L ondon W IR  7H F
i
l*V*tv>*rmpJ>cd in Angola: hrcpowtr IM Rtt
lorvrv Top. Soviet muU'pfe rofkvt-UuiKfwr *nJ i  
itool beikati \tc  1am Cana in earned b> MPLA wUbcn.
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n e x t  t a r g e t  in A frica
P A N  th e  W est laarn  from Angola’* 
v  tragedy , or are  w# condemned to 
rellv* the  experience? W hit th* 
Ruaalan*, leam ad from Angola I* th a t 
w * r by proxy pay* off. Th*y will ba
Where th e  pressure points are
carta  u j y  in I ha 
and  South-W ant Africa.
Tho Cabana am  Moacow’a a ll, 
purpose m ercraa irra , h u t they a /a  bo* 
lh a  only proxy eoldiers who a r t  being 
tho widening 
apulhcrn A frka .
Tho Nigerian* arc  m «| to  bo W v ity  
involved ia  Aagol*. W aaUrn in to llc
A lG iK A
im /
report ifcai Ni*ori*n 
R m r t  at battaLon
th* M PLA and tho
^ M W S aS sdW uth laat|
JSESb.
deployed in  Angola. They a r t  opera 
aa lo r h tfr th  oa Mogoaoodaa. and 
alao boa ad ia  L oh ito .U taada  and
A n  -intriguing sidelight 
U N fT \a i* *  oUUpa th a t a b r i l
t o A a ia l a .  N i« « u ,  rich in oiT and 
bdo t in g  on a nayjof
Tha
Into IM  ration .
ErawXraal
Paying the p r ice  for
th rg v e m tia  A l l '  -^  — A n g o l a - b y  R O B E R T  M O S S
N yorw ohaa O  /
ito northorn
tho n u f c J M o  
C a a p m io n t  to  oippraoa tho  major 
revolt mt tho  M ahon da triboa lad by 
Laadro K pvandoW . . M oaa*bN u«''.
arm y ia largely recruited from Iho 
w aruko M* ho was,
Yo» onothor African o ra y  ia re- »«ag»i-----
M f M t e  have o ral unit* rau th  .Sumali ih n  same *u> ra ting  
or* oaid to  ba quM-tJy muvmir
•e rrice , tbo POI. in  orchestrating  tho tho Viotoong.
•n-L virtu* of L atin  American exile 
croup* and trananationa^
Wu*U-ni Europe. In j t
Now th a t the  MPI.A regime h«« 
boon adm itted u» tha  United Nation*, 
hacking UNITA ha* bcvt
troora  a e a U
iSSsrassrin—
bo uoad m fu ture  opwr a lion* again*! Ian 
(todth'a fort**. T ha atory may not la- a* 
btoorro *• U aoooda.X raral.*. like t uba 
to 0 Soviet xaU-lliu whumi armsNl lurit-# 
and intriligonce srrvM-e# u p rra tr  under 
i ha d irec t lu u c m
• are. A K tw ughth*_______________
taome li.QQU a n ) ,  i t  ia widl-cndowed 
w ith  Aovmk arm our arwl haa prrfnrmril 
well in  border akinmahca with the 
Ethiopian*- Tha Somali* have 
So not-mode T-J4 U nha and about U>
T 4 U .
Tbo black expeditionary forrra* u « k  
may bo to  froa the  Cubana lor a  future 
off*o*iv41xgainat t^hodoaia. South W on 
A frica—or Zaire, which ia alao a pi imc 
ta rge t for tho Kuaaiana. Hut the  Cubana 
in  A ngola aull have the ir hand* full 
roping w ith tho continuing sue r 
...................  ftber there
• a h  Cnnuhunisl country of cally  tr icky—although tom e Wiwtern 
G overnment* an-•aun-*ir.ttt-la«'vdili«M 
i»thorn. The Krrw h wi-n- *h--.»l ui i I*- 
•U n p c d r  to  m  tigntM- ihe M I *1 .A U  t  
in  February. ImTi. im urh in  the  nam e 
o f  the ir  KKC partner*. wh»» ha»l
*lHie alraU-gMr i-ffeet iff the  lo*« «»f 
Angola ia summed up  by tw o slate- 
nieii|« th a t imUIv v-inneirte ene Ire *’
v u t paper //ivalio . in o major a rtic le  expooted lo  hi* , n-.uH.ili hut thi* .1*1 ♦ M*®
UN IT A -bald te r r i to r y  in 
»nutherm  A ngola , th e  Aral o n - tlir  - 
sp o t ev idence  o f  tho  c o n tin u in g  wai 
a g a ln a t th e  M1’L \  G o v ern m e n t in 
L uanda . T h a t  s tru g g le  Still gooa on  
wvor fkrga  a re n a  o f th o  c o u n try .
regard the ir  new m.i<ler«. Some 10.000 
Iwve been aboorbrd in to  South- W e t
Africa.
A conarrvative inlvUigenc* rati- 
HM»h* haa ATW Cuban iruop* curK-ntly 
••• lha  central-wivrfern rvgimi, mi- 
le a r in g  lad* In. Iluam lai (ftgym-rly 
Nuva l.i-tuM*) and IW  If-una ri> Silva 
I’mcim); 2.UUU in iw h  o f  the northern.
i of Kuaaian uAi- animal
tug u a t; the  id her Irum Suulh 
'rune Alimsl.-r. Mr. Vnratev. 
•w Y.-ar’a rm-s-mcv. /li r« fwl.i .  N
probably booo 
o f tbo South  A frican cam paign; mmc 
oetimatoa range aa high oa 22.000.
There a re  more than  1.000 Cuban 
advioaro and "uch n ic ia n s’’ in  Mozam­
bique. nom inally aoaignod to  the  Senna
A frica--the  luat at rung 
In-m/and racism -  
ami the  ►s«**il nt ih r  o f the Haim*
ui teal a tMlhchutfi-«M|iplM*«nf'cx|»li*uvc
m alaria l’ n--euniul.it>ng tlm rr."  Mr.
\  ••rater, in <uni|iln l*ut chilling word*, 
ahnwid th a t ihe  in- had not been
l>ui on h im - "T lU  ilu rm  ha* not utruvb 
i r t  We am  im ly e«|a-rn*m*ing the  
w hirl« iml th a t g-wa Uiiurc it."
W etr tin- t l l ia U  of tho Cuban 
v irh a v  tw iw r a  by tin- men who aal 
down m th e  A m T ir i*  Senate on 
Ihvt-aih rt IT. U W i.todi-hatgw hether ur »g«
jT jr mH lhi-y almuld \.He to  cu t off all Kn
T*, United Statco aupimit to  ihe  anti-
|t>^  Sovmt muvvmcnt* in A ngola? W ith a
lew honourable r»»e|Miona. i t  term ed 
th a t tho N unatnla w^re talk ing  about 
another war. Senator after Senator 
rrcalhal the  ongui»h o f V ietnam, the  
l*?ril o f ge tting xu- ked in to  another
S o u ll i  . tj'riruus  
/ ikii'h to ill con torts
in Itn* ( ’n U n d . rncl.*-.. ►Herr 
o f tin- lieri'ivt fighting •« taking 
. Tlp-rw a re  at Ivuat I.VJU Cutmn
tii4 Mnwa a  Intal --I u l..in  11 J u l  -I 
n P.IPA a re  n it.u .tr, The Cul*.i 
« m« Iml*- an  itrim nind n - jin -n t 
I.m I VI and  1 VI iaiib« am i I HU 
an . i-m ound ,x i  rratimritf w t'h  Tu
TamtiMi
■■|runtline"culi* nw 
with U N ir  \ .  ai.-t
lorvign opuk-wfiii,!i 
mary haunt, llu-In
TH« South Air- ■••• 
tac t w ith th e  ai-li n i , 
and the re  i* a In- « 
A ngolan rvfuiym . tug • 
l«d by the ir  uvm/ v m<
Mil
I th -  MIT \  * Naiv
■ '.Va. M i l  idi-M. i
p retext fur i
quagmirt-, tin* ho|iclei
C o n tin u in g  J ig h t  
^ tp o in s l M a rx is ts
lo a tn ic tarx  for tho  ZIFA cuem ila*  
fVom Kbodcma and  tho KKk.Ll.MU 
forcaa.
In Som alia, a t lcaat GO Cuban 
inatructora  are  a ttached lo  tho Snmalt 
army and the  preS om ali guerrilla* 
from D jibouti—the French-controlled
Coo tho  Had Sea th a t ia expected tu  m e  independent la ter  thia year.
Tho Cuban* are alao active in  hqua- 
to n a l Cutram. w here President Macias 
haa ootabliahod on* o f th* bloodieat 
ibctatorahipo lo  black Afric*. Some AX)
Cuban iaaoructora tra in  hi* p* rami In
ta ry  forcaa and h is poreonal b ody  Senator M cGovrrn jumped up 
guard. T hera  ara  ano ther W0 Cuban *n:u* th a t it mado no diifcrano* whi
a won of South-W est , \ i . .
Ironically , if anv 
ready to  adopt .i 
Angola. itc»uh ! sdil- 
T ha Chine*.- h«,v- 
KNLA and UNI I A 
UNITA lead* i • . 
num ber tsru. Mic h  I
.•*•:*•, ^ light l
• |-.--«i w «w  ,g‘ th-- «*«wva -*f light 
I 'm I wviv I* pi-r.th .-l In th-
•j -ii|--r\ i«-.iig lhi- oM ii.r-rthH- .il ,-w-w 
K.--4 a t l lu  in b o . w-s sn.i
. - Umbi ami I hr .*<:. -  e«M  -
.« N -lil l  alti-Wipl t o n - -  \|||^ -I I *4 the
odnoors in Sekou Tourd’a C uinra .
Cuban ’Technician*" hav* a lso been 
■eat to  the  etralogically-placed fonuor 
I'ortuguaoo poaaeaaiooa in Woat Africa: 
Cuino-Bissau, tha Cap* Yards U landi. 
and Sao Toow 0 Friactp*. I
The Cubans a ra  p a rtk a le fly  a ril -  
•ntrenched in Congo-Braxxavdle. th* 
maio stafing-point in  the ir invasion  of 
Angola. They m aintain a t ImiVtOO men 
a t  tb* Point* Noire docks add th e  M aya 
.M aya a ir  ha so, and there  pro report* 
th a t reinforcement* have recently been 
moved la  from Angola ia  prepara tion 
t renewed praesuro
I tu tv r t Humphrey < aught the  pre­
vailing mood: The "U nited Stale* 
Iw-ttrr a tari tak ing  care  o f things it 
knows how to take  care  of. We know so 
little  of Africa, thu nOO and so « «  tnbcw 
th a t ipnko up Africa . .  . I s a y  i l l s  like a 
dilfurent. world.”
Senator c overn ju ped up lo 
tu* th a t it ado no d ifference hich 
o f th a  black movvou-ole won anyway. 
Senator Tunney though t th *  rival 
A ngolan movement* were only nomin­
a lly  pro-Soviet o r  pro-Amorvcajx. At 
Jn.-ari. a lI o f them  were "basically  pro- 
A ngolan. Sscia lia t and highly national- 
iatic." Moot o f the  Senator* who auok* 
th a t day found it  difficult t«f bcliev* 
th a t th* Kuaaiana w ould ba  able to 
i-stabliah a  occur* foothold iff Angola.
ggeat^d th a t Angola Could
 tuaaia 'a  Vietnam.
ra* not a wholly absurd idea. To
amc£* to  l»u- w h.ii I i tr t now h ;r:
M u tj the  ng-H.;« :n -  I 'h im v
am iiic arhnlut-* ta i  • :i .tiu--I
monev will b* printed. On tho cvffeo 
plantations, C uban supervisor* are 
•aid W operate a  system o f fortoil 
labour: w orkers a re  shifted from on* 
pl*c* to  another, o r from oo* iob  to 
another, w ithout noGce o r app**l.
The** are  examples o f  w hat "sa lrlli 
aation" mopna. Hut foreign troop* and 
advisors c an  be shown the  door.
Th# Kuaaiana rem*mb*r w hat hap- 
f o x d  in  kgypt in  lffU. when Sadat 
tiirntal agaiiMt lh*m. juet oa tha  Cuban* 
n me-wilier the  rv tctiun  wf th e ir  miaakm 
frum H/naaavilht in 1MW. before M arten 
Nguuabi *tfiu-d puwqr. So an  effort is 
b im g  Buulr in A ngola, as in Moaam- 
iHSUv.l--lraaaform the  ruling movement 
in to  an orthodox C osununid  party .
Soviet w nter* have d-wcribed in 
11--tail h**w th is  effuct should 
T lir  elsoairal tex t is a honk en titled 
"I'ldiliCMl iW tie sn f  A im  a."  poldi*h«-«t 
in  Mimhuw m IWiU l u  * u .n  .-ditor .s 
Ya««ity Solial-iviiikov, now Sovii-t 
An>lvH.n.lof in Lusaka.
Snlialavntkov a«o-|>i- t!iat it h  un-
m*t ooeiety in  A frtra overnight. It will 
la- nntSKtf)* ti* b ign i liv working 
torough  ‘ revnlutionarv demia'ratie 
parti--*. * like th e  nui,wnH-nt« the t tmiw 
In  lam.-r liu inea  Congii ami Tan- 
•a n mi. and like  the  M P Ie\ m  Angide. 
Theag aMivi-nMSila mav s ta r t -mt « , a 
nn d i n u ,h  ul iuitiunal*»ni. MaruMu 
sod ti ibali«m, but I h r \- ir.iiiele at llV|-t« 
• w h« a rc  inspired by the  m i u  of 
fc- :i-ntilM' Sis .slisq t"—•in  pla in  wonts, 
f'l-mmunist*
Si-ludmnikuv’* th e m  i* w m king 
<• n  in .Angola. During In* v»«*H to 
M-w ow Uat tA t-n . r A gtwlinho N-1 . 
ngn.-d .1 tSFycar friemlahiii t reg ty  w.iti 
liuaaia tha t pruvidid lor r--gul-n ex 
rhang,-* u - t w n  the  MIT.A and th- 
S o n e t t'-anm unist part,-. S a m  a ltn  
his n tu r n .  Ih r  MIT.A anmaimv-d v-.s 
kng-ila « « • tiih-ilt-w -rilxil ofhgiall, a 
a* ) U r \n i  la n in u l  rrpuh lu  "
It .« |a-i hap* a tun* U|. win-ther th.
c o u n tn m —could bo 3
•  world oould b« met fo ha lf  rartjoaUy 
tb* ciomag of tb* tu r n  Coool as 
HI. There >• no ait era  Ml** to  tb*
CUiml can b* cfoaod mrarmlfbt-mnd 
Wvwtere Kurop* I* ao depanOeel *n 
MMdl* Laataro oil. b u t braaum  focb- 
nolugy baa kypn md lb* C anal: tb*
suprrtankers cannot gat th rough  i t  I 
Th* CommuiiUt invasion o f Angdl*
was a iu-p tow ard tb* fulfllsaoot o f, 
Kumia’s grand design ; th* domination 
o f tho whole of sou thara  Afric*.
t. tb* W*et*rn 
inique oppor- 
igslost Soviet
___________ i a
H) givifcg op IB Angola,  este  
Ifowvrs threw  away a  u * t 
tun ity  to  bold th* lin* a i a I 
expansion in  sou thern  Afrf 
unique? liccauae la  A ngola, t  
id  the  Soviut th roat was not 
by racial K -n u m sM -a t aoy  rate , no t 
un til M oran* propagandisU  sot about 
trying u» tu rn  th* Spulh African* m tu
I he villain* id  the  pioc*.
The w ar in Angola was not a w ar of 
black men versus w hite st*o. It was a 
war between rival black guecnlla 
..«**cmont* and th e ir  foreign helper*.
II pn-acnted a c le* r< u t chotc* b*tw**ri 
pm S oviai pro up th a t |
u tl*- m glit
I L
s i.in .o t to  UNITA a* i»u - id  ;•*. 
when hard  % videiu .- iM >-n:?h A f... • 
nivol vemcut iw |* , l  t-ul
Hut thcC h tn e m 'h iea P g ’x tn d  f  
h a re  l<>st nearly  nvi-ry jo-mt »• »• 
Kuaaiana in the  iv a lt-4  lor |u a v r  
black Africa d eapiti- tlu-1*« t tha t tlw . 
hav* spool ronaidi-rul-lv ni-ai- m ih, h -- 
mic aid. So rvnuwi-d i-onU -t with 
UNITA ia a pMaibil.i >. d a  tvww.tr o n . .
W ith o r  witlunit -»ui-»»-lc tim 'king. 
UNITA’•  proven survival i s p a r n ,  
w orries th* Kuwuauv The SovkI ail. 
baaaudor in  Luanda. IUmis Vombyi-v. •« 
said lu  have b m i i in i rw io l  to  f n -1 
the  MPLA tu ito a deal will. U N lT \. 
President N etu ami th* Cubans an- 
reluc tan t, bu t thu biggest stumbling- 
block is th a t ne ither Sav.mla nor auv 
o the r of the  tu p ran a in g  UNI f«\ 
has beam ready lo  accept the  idea of -• 
.trVof iHe country. U\« W L A  In U ,. '*“ ■ * > *  ^  M P U > - “ l“ , | H.M, .cy ^ r ! '1
th '.H d  the  M « - io » U t .  of n-EC to « « - » >  •*
C b u W . - n c l . . .  U jiliH. U ft-w io , 
dbonarics from o the r countries h * ra tn Oraforabeen  try ing  to  suunu w t
IW aff la  un iM rtiiv  d i u a i m  or UNITA T*pre*entSllV,-a shroud to  dl>- 
■er w hether it  is posaiUs tu vraat
inrdli
..ml I ah
on Zaire •  rrs*i(i*oi ivioituiu, ------  — — -------- .
supply routs* to  tb* A tlan tic  ara  dow. P defeat on th e ir  horn* ground Jonas ^  between Savimtu and Iwwer-L v. I 
endangered. In  T ansania there  are  e l i t  carrying  on the  battle  deep c«d*ua, ao far w ithout n o tsb l-  sucra%*
laaei ISO advisers t a d  " t*chnkisn* . ina-ds Angola. A ngola today cannot be objmtivcLi ios  «md *T 
»f them a U ache tiS  tb s  Taaaaniao 
s 's Defeoce Force.
All in  a ll. H b  not •  bad effort for
H e 'h a s  claim ed lh * t UNITA has i M M  m  «n ledepewAmt u w n 'i
Cartb 
nullion j
is picking Tip tb*  '------
h a re  no t only bpon aubaidning 
Cuban ocooomy U  tb* tun*  of more 
than  11 m illion I d s ; ;  they in raeu d  
r 1600 million In tha  Angolan
supporters, a lthough 
W astefn intelligence svurce* bcliev* 
th a t th* figure is probably no more than  
d.000. I t it  v irtua lly  unpuesibl* to  get 
reliable inform ation un  tha  tv « m l!* s‘
Control o f its  armed funv i. 
police, i u  economy, it* civil adorn 
tra tion  and ita educational ax «u-m ii 
th* bands ^of Kuosiaits. Cuban*
L ii iU f i  c . ’l^ a .fT k  U i  o ^ r i l d . .  o f •«>"« in '»
UN ITA '- ab ility  lo  h a r w  c h . r ig im i -------* --------
the fact tha t
Last E uropeans, and Ihe M FI A  ita rliis  
being remoulded in to  an  orthodox tV u. 
m um st party . Th* Cuban ga rn  v -n , *r.-
cover th e  whole leng th  of the Benguel.
b *  l m  *psign, a o d ra ra  Uii«v*tf ko b a re  eup>; raUwgy—from tb*
plied weaponry sod aqulpment to  th* coast—since  th
A ngols worth more than  U60 milftoo war. UNITA’* poll
in  th* year line* tb* South A fricans largely in tac t, and 1
pulled out. i
Hoi Cuba's rfil* aa a Soviet proxy is 
•even more striking if you lake account 
o f the  Cubaq prc**oc* la  tbo Caribbean 
fwb*re CagtrO'i
lanrely ii 
little  #ip
among th e  Ovimbuodu proj 
Uoosl ON ITA sympnthisur*.
lining of the 
Ms* is still 
th e  MPLA has bad
The Cubans have divided Angola 
in to  six m ilitary region*, with garrison* 
in th*  m ajor towns. F ire  major m o^ 
ping up oparsQoa* hax •  bdvi Inunclinl
'l liL  means th a t  it  m ight woU bo C u U o s a a d tb * M lT ^ h a v * d e a H w i
anti- tb*  civil population larv* s«atbe*  ul
D W u i k .  M mHU- * ^ X » W . U i M k 1 1 M n o M l M i ,
Cuban instructore e r f  Jiaboct on  the  Cubans and tb* MFLA— t _
in  i f  tboycou ld  count cm effectiveoutsid* over the  1,200-mile border of South-
cootinue^ flight o f  refugcrs
nol u> M aU oo t h .  . “ “ I W « m rn  K oW f i-< U - W « t A f t i c  i .  - n
I .  U l .  ■— - H  o t Lb. p c iv i  la  f l u  U u A*** “  V foeu fo t u d  u .  w . /  U k  p r a f l .  of -ou tberu  A o,oU
( ti ho i is I m in in g  
u n io n  Inu lcrs
.'.m.Uily. Cukw ...lvi».« !.«»« 
n-'uH inl k»-v ]■•*>(tun- Ihm ugliuut tin*
- n 'i lw rv iii-,«n(lnn t* lil\ inUu* Intriuu- 
-Miiiu-try. Ihe M uv*i»-u M inu tn r, and 
ui the kU|M-rvi*ion ul »b-* MIT.A’* j«m- 
graoifna u f "political mobilisation,’’ 
which is *upt«ui*cd to.druin up support 
lu r a "maos M arxiat-l^ninist party .’’ 
The Cuban* are  training AngoUa trod-i 
union leaders, sod  the  sy llabus on offer 
a t the  1-nAsro Pena trade  union collage 
ui M nrianao inpludim-M arxist philo­
sophy and C uban history. Th* Cuban* 
are aironxlv ra  proven I od on I’resident 
Netu * aUff, pnd b* IS aaid to  bav* 
••nuU 'IH  his persooal secunly to  tbnpt. 
They aha re control o f th*  Kloaisb* 
M uuatiy and  the  Hank o f Angola or^h 
the llu isians. The recent mens urea to  
i-atsblish a new A ngolan currency, th* 
kwanca, *ut an  exampU to  any  oilier 
ti-nvrnm i-nt’th a t might Wish to  wijw 
out its  middle class at a stroke. Angolan 
fi q iliw  are  allqweil (un a nne for-on* 
»vi*i«) tu  cschangn the  old ro rtogum * 
A ngolan racudos for hwnoraa. but only 
op to  t ho lim it of'JU.UUU kwanraa. Any- 
• •im; w ‘hj hue mpro than  t l u t  stasbi-d 
nwav ha« to  accept th a t his aavinge 
liave bren luroed  in to  w ort hi*** papor 
l a s t  Ju ly , Angola became th* fltxt 
Afnemn country to  join the  S o n e t- 
omii relied Council of M utual Economic 
A s»:«tmc* (C tM A ) SiOC# Ncto’a visit 
to  M uwow in O ctober. th«  trickle o f 
1-jiat h.urupnnn technician*, agrtcal- 
turtil s>i'-Mi*»U and managcni ha* 
become a  tlood.
Ik-tweco them , th*  Cubans nod th* 
Russians, now docid* who can  eokcr 
and  le a re  A ngola, w hat civ iriibcrtica  
( J  any) individuals and organisation* 
will bu allowed, w hat tbo cuuntyy will 
ox port and  im port, and bow much
li-thVrtwtifom iSal'*!!.
rairartr ara s tp e tid  i  ______
i* x.-ar. Tln-ir m ain |a»rt* uf call will 
M-tputo and t|*ubaM v) U nn
Snlnniu. The S x w a ii-  ruu ld  hx- th a t the  
W.-at ix un  th e  re tre a t and th a t Kumia 
is l<x<ruming i Im  dom inant |M>wnr in 
Africa. Tliair *trenglh ia th a t llu-y are 
.u lm « according to  a global auatvgy  - • 
while W retera h  oders an t not.
111* ring o f  naval and a ir  r*ci|itir«
I ha t the Kuaaiana Itavu acquired around 
llu- African cua*t. and th* deep-wati-r 
harbour* w here they  now hav* th* 
•W ortun ity  to  cre*t* nvw aava l base-*, 
locludo Luanda and four excellent 
port* in Moxambique: M aputo. H*ira, 
Nocala and  P o rto  Amelia. Som alia. 
Congo anff a ll o f w hat uaod to  b* 
Hnrtugu*** Africa bow hav* G orern- 
iM nts th a t oaa  b* callad M arxist, and 
So<0*4-bloc m ilita ry  a d v ia m , troop* 
and lotallifooc* oAcora a ra  prarant 
tkroughowi most *f tha  cootinonL 
i But th*  BMet im portan t th ing  to  
f t**P about tb*  S oviet• draign  for, 
**utb*rn Africa ia th a t i t  ia  araaotially  
nggolfor; U haa b ran  accura tely  do- 
■cnbod. la  a a  adm irable papar fro a  th* 
la stitu t*  for th* 8 tudy  o f Conflict" as 
’’a stra tegy  o f donial’’—donial. th a t  is, 
of raw material* and  communications.
T h r e a t to  
Cape ro u te  
1 ' 
I A  loading Soviet A fricanist, E. 
T arabria , predicts th a t  th*  We*t'a d*- 
Vendonco on African raw  m aU riels anil 
incrcas* rapidly over th*  reel o f th* 
dqcatl*. sod  th a t imports o f ehrom iu* 
(from Rbodosia and Sm ith  Africa) will 
double. Soviet experts a lso straw  th a t 
m uch of A frica's m ineral w ealth  lias in  
th* southern h a l l  Tb* gold, diamond*.
•  Koviti Strategic rvastretM aofA frica.br 
p a n d  la m . ISC. 17 NortbomUtlaoJ 
A rraus, London,W.CL1 £2.
who prutniffd democratic election* and 
guarantoc* for p rivate Inreetors.
L -araing  irom A ngola, the  Kuaaian* 
an- determined to  ensure th a t tf  they 
I *n riiginsvr the  removal o f the  whit* 
t-uvvrnmeni in Sahabury. the re  will 
n->t be a suhsvquunt battle  for th* apoil* 
nutwiun pnvhoviet and anti-8ori*t 
Murk*, which might again divide black 
Africa. How can they enaurs th a t?  Th* 
%|xuti‘-work has already b*en don*. T^*
i-ulh Ul tl»e black gtMJTilla forcaa hav* 
U-im umti-d by th* Nkomo-Mugab* 
■lliaitav, under th* um brella o f th* 
I 'a triutic  Frunt
‘Die h ie  n>-tglibouriag African 
t - rn im -nu -w h ich  ware *1 loager-
ii-wda during tli* Angolan war—hav# 
i> give the ir  support tu  
ugah# Britain and
j  will rafueo to  accept 
ny *<ttlvn.vtit th a t M rejected by tbra* 
two. r v w  though they patently cannot 
• laim tu apeak for th* m aionty o f black 
Khixlreians and the only hop* of a 
i-iviltard solution in Khodraia lira  ia  a a  
agreement betwuon Ian SaxUh aad 
i i r v t  n ^ rro rn ta liv a  black trad e rs  such 
as llixhup Musorvwa.
TI** Soviet calculaL oo—w hich 
N \-w  to lie paying off ao far—i* tha t 
tha  assault on south«ra Africa will be 
to lerated, if  not aided and abetted, by. 
th a  W rat. so long as it ia e arn ed  out in
T h e  W es t's  . }'  v  
lo s t chance
But wh*t t, k ill Im  u c v u l b  k  ll«  
n n lM  b r  W a u n  poLucuua at oc. 
o t l t e  ,1 * 1  j ,  I m ,  tk a t
i t  ‘m u triir ralm" ■—ni mmtmmmmi 
► id  l b .  o o b m i  o T th . ;» i , l i»  U m  U 
rw  m It M m *. U  Afr*o. U i t  la 
(w U d  m iM i rnwpiinis »MTM>l»n.
No» Brtuia 
t la r  wtu Mt, M ew  ,  m t f f t  ' . 
r * a * tg * .u i « siPMX« h I t U h
IrMid. Rho^M ,—or for t i n  —[-*T  
Soolh WM AftiM. Tk. H U ni. n *  • -.
r d l e U U M M W t . l a d u l i d i X w M  t! ‘
t lu t  ii  1m  >ot u t u r  o t i n x l  i»
•I i liw  W M n  O m n s  If Um
• ! u M .U y .a e r M r <  I i
uoa for sutothac Maadst eoUfogihieL
.» r? • -i Vi
c i b u i s i . i m m i  i ;  ►
 •  i  1 - j i j iy t l -  •!-! ' » '
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The Double Standards Game;... and
RUMOUR 
THAT 
MUSHROO
TJie Soviet news agency Tass last month reported that “work is nearing completion in the Republic of South Africa for the 
creation of a nuclear weapon and preparations are1 being made 
for carrying out tests of this weapon”. Warned Tass: “If the 
racialist Pretoria regime were to obtain the nuclear weapon this 
would create a direct threat to the security of the African states.” 
It was not coincidence that this so-called “report” was. 
launched by the Soviets on the eve of the Lago$ conference 
organized to pillory South Africa.
The rumour, detonated in Moscow, rapidly mushroomed 
and created concern in the United States, Britain and France -  
all seeking reassurances from a somewhat perplexed South Africa 
-while Moscow and its allies continued to pontificate on the 
da ngers of nuclear proliferation.
Backward or 
Forward?
K ohiIi A Inc. i. ii is generally understood, 
Ii.in developed its own uitinium enrichment 
process in order lo utilize its supplies o f  
iliis mineral more fully lor peaceful power 
generation.
A few years a^n, when il first announced 
d iscovery  of lliis new process and entered 
llic hi" lcn£i<v through its own ingenuity. 
S o u th  Africa nlfcred the process lo any 
peaceful nation for peaceful purposes. She 
was ignored.
South Africa, a founder member o f  the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, was 
jettisoned front the world txxly in Juno 
this year in favour of Egypt as Africa’s 
"m ost developed nuclear stale” . South 
Africa was apparently too backward to  
qualify any longer. Barely two months 
later the Russians, with the West as an 
attentive audience, charged that the same 
"backward" South Africa was ready to 
explode a nuclear device.
South Africa, the United States insisted, 
should sign the Non-l’rohferation Treaty. 
Yet America itself, as a signutory, failed to 
live up to commitments under this Treaty 
in as far as it had not yet delivered nuclear 
tueP■•Icmcnls for peaceful use to South 
Africa promised and paicf for 2 years ago. 
Aiid. of the .'-I members or the Board o f 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
no fewer than la have either not ratified 
or acceded to the Nou-l'roliferation Treaty. 
They include India, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, France and South Africa's 
replacement, Egypt. .
France Defied 
the World
South Africa, warned France, should 
realize that a nuclear test could have
"grave consequences" for the relations 
. betw een. them -  FRANCE, the same 
country which defied Newj Zealand, Aus­
tralia, the United Nationsland eventually 
the World Court when it  went about 
testing nticlcar explosives in -th e  Pacific, 
not so long ago. At the time it waved asido 
British criticism a s '  ‘‘irritating and 
moralising".
South Africa, claimed the Kremlin, 
created a direct threat lo the security o f tho 
African states. Coming from a  nuclear 
superpower, whose imperialist machina­
tions have contributed largely to the sabre- 
rattling uncertainty engulfing much o f 
Africa, this charge is irony indeed.
The Gullible
West
In reviewing this recent masterly display 
of double standards, with Russia in tho 
lead and a gullible West following, tho 
South African Prime Minister exclaimed: 
"I  feel like laughing out aloud”  -  an 
understandable reaction considering the 
exasperation he must huvo felt a t witnes­
sing this performance.
One of South Africa’s leading opposi­
tion newspapers echoed, the same 
sentiments:
“The spectacle o f mighty nuclear powers 
crying wolf because of a Russian claim' 
that South Africa intend^ exploding a 
nuclear device would be amusing tf it 
was not so infuriatingly hypocritical" 
-  the Johannesburg Star:
To date the nuclear explosion fore-’ 
shadowed by Tass in Moscow has not 
happened.
The South African authorities have' 
taken great pains in denying the flood o f 
accusations and have explicitly reassured 
the world that they intended utilizing their 
advance nuclear technology only for peace­
ful purposes. Magnanimous indeed, con-1 
sidcring the shifty double dealing to  which 
their country has been subjected by so- 
called friend and foe.
CLUB OF TEN —
Kent House, 87 Regent Street, London W1R 7H F
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APPENDIX C.
i). Photographs of the Soweto uprising.
ii). Cartoons relating to the Soweto uprising.
-268-
Appendix C. i. Photographs of the Soweto uprising.
C. i. a. Sam Nzima's photograph of the dying Hector Pietcrson appeared lirst in The World, late edition, 16 
June 1976, p. 1. It was then syndicated by AP. The Los Angeles Times, late edition, 16 June carried the 
picture on p. 2. On 17 June, the photograph appeared on the front page of The Times. The Guardian. Daily 
Mail. The Sun, San Francisco Chronicle and the Chicago Sun-Times. The Chicago Tribune, New York 
Times, Daily Mirror and Daily Express carried the picture on their inside pages. The Sunday Telegraph 
rcpnxiuccd the picture to accompany Peregrine Worsthomc's article on 20 June and the Financial Times 
published the photograph on 21 June to accompany an article by Bridget Bloom.
C. i. b.Thc photograph of African policemen shooting their hand-guns did not appear in any South African 
newspaper, although it appears to be very similar to a picture in The World, morning edition, 17 June, p. 1. 
It is thought that this photograph was also taken by Sam Nzima, sec chapter seven. It was syndicated by 
AP. On 17 June, the 'hand-gun' picture was published on the front page of the Washington Post. New York 
Times. The Guardian. San Francisco Chronicle and the Chicago Sun-Times. The Daily Express. Daily Mail 
and The Times carried the picture on their inside pages.
C. i. c. Peter Magubanc's photograph of the students running at the camera appeared in the Rand Daily 
Mail. 17 June. It was syndicated by UPI. The Magubane picture was reproduced on the front pages of the 
Daily Telegraph, New York Times and the Washington Post. The Daily Express carried the picture on an 
inside page.
In 1976, neither the Financial Times nor the Wall Street Journal carried pictures on their front-page. 
The Christian Science Monitor was the only major British or American newspaper not to carry one of the 
three photographs. Newsweek and Time, 28 June 1976, reproduced all three images. The international 
edition of Time devoted a cover-story to the unrest. The covcr-picturc featured John Vorster's head and 
shoulders superimposed upon the Magubane photograph. Newsweek displayed a tableau of all three 
images, the 'hand-gun' picture on the left, the Magubane picture in the centre and the N/ima photograph on 
the right.
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C. i. a.
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C . i. b.
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Appendix C. ii. Cartoons.
C. i i .  a .  Garland, 'Now al ter me, Balthazar', New Statesman, 25 June 1976, p. 833.
C. ii. b. New Republic. 'Ignore them!', 3 & 10 July 1976, p. 10, originally published in the Washington 
Star.
C. i i .  c. 'Relieving the pressure', The Guardian, 5 Aug. 1976.
C. i i .  d .  Scarfe, 'Maintaining Civilisation', Sunday Times, 15 Aug. 1976.
C. ii. e. There! That ought to teach 'em!'. Los Angeles Times, 24 Aug. 1976, originally published in the 
Philadelphia Star.
C. i i .  f .  'White elephant', Christian Science Monitor. 2 Sept. 1976.
C. i i .  g. Graysmith, 'Smith, Vorster & Apartheid'. Time, 20 Sept. 1976, p. 25, originally published in San 
Francisco Chronicle.
C. ii. h. Wright, 'South Africa', Time. 27 Sept. 1976, p. 12, originally published in the Miami New s.
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C . ii. a.
Cv«y|nw\
'Now after me, Balthazar . .
C. ii. b.
RioTcowm
STATION
PKSSES WILL £  
K. SHOWN _0
"Ig n o re  th e m !  / /  th ey  w on I */»rnk lo u s  in  A fr ik a a n s , w r m s l w o n 't sprnk lo  t h e m 1'
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C. ii. c.
Relieving the pressure
C .ii. d.
1
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C. ii. f.
'White elephant'
C. ii. g-
C. ii. h.
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Neil Bchrmann, 15 March 1996, London.
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Hilda Bernstein, 15 July 1996, Oxford. *
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Paula Giddings, 19 April 1996, New York.
June Goodw in, 5 April 1996, Ohio. *
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Jimmy Greenfield, 29 March 1996, telephone to New York, |untaped|.
Peter Gregson, 26 May 1995, Johannesburg.
Lee Griggs, 16 Sept. 1995, Connecticut.
John Grimond, 29 Jan. 1996, London.
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Cresley Gumcdc, 20 Sept. 1996, Johannesburg.
Christabcl Gurney, 6 Aug. 1996, London, (interview conducted with Sean Milton]. 
Brian Hackland, 13 Nov. 1995, London.
Peter Hain M.P., 4 March 1996, London.
David Harrison, 8 Dec. 1995, London. *
Graham Hatton, 2 Oct. 1995, London.
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Barn, Hillenbrand, 12 March 1996, London.
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Graham Hovey, 17 April 1996, telephone to Michigan.
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Graham Leach, 24 Oct. 1995, London.
Colin Lcgum, 15 June 1995, London.
Joseph Lelyvcld, 22 Sept. 1995, New York.
Joan Lestor M.P., 14 Aug. 1996, telephone to London.
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David Ottaway, 15 Sept. 1995, Washington D.C..
Bruce Page, 17 May 1996, London.
Les Payne, 8 Nov. 1996, telephone to New York.
Quentin Peel, 7 July 1995, London, |untaped|.
John Platter, 15 May 1995, Western Cape.
Benjamin Pogrund, 12 Sept. 1995, 27 Sept. 1995, 1 April 1996, 23 July 1996, in Boston, London, Maine 
and London. *
Dr John Poorter, 22 May 1995, 26 May 1995, telephone to Durban.
Mike Popham, 2 March 1995, London. *
Adam Raphael, 30 Sept. 1994, 13 Oct. 1995, London.
William Raynor, 5 Dec. 1995, London. *
Mervyn Rees, 25 April 1994, |untapcd|, 9 May 1995, Johannesburg. *
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Joe Rogaly, 22 Nov. 1995, London.
Barbara Rogers, 5 Dec. 1995, 15 Dec. 1995, London. *
Stephen Rosenfeld, 1 Nov. 1996, Washington D.C..
Karen Rothmyer, 16 April 1996, New York. *
Anthony Sampson, 24 Oct. 1995, London. *
Danny Schcchter, 19 April 1996, New York. *
Reg September, 17 May 1995, Cape Tow n.
Nat Serache, 4 Oct. 1996, telephone to the Eastern Cape.
Hcnnic Scrfonlein, 3 Oct. 1996, Johannesburg.
Gerald Shaw, 15 May 1995, 23 Sept. 1996, Cape Town. *
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Bernard Simon, 4 April 1996, Toronto.
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James Srodes (a.k.a. Lew is James), 11 April 1996, Washington D.C.. *
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Dan Swanson (a.k.a. James North), 28 March 1996, New York, |untapcd|. 
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Robin White, 19 Feb. 1997, London.
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Ian Wright, 26 Oct. 1994, London.
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